Barro Blanco Dam

Barro Blanco Dam
Computer rendition of the dam
Location of Barro Blanco Dam
Location	Chiriqui Province, Panama
Coordinates	8°12.861′N 81°35.653′W / 8.214350°N 81.594217°W / 8.214350; -81.594217Coordinates: 8°12.861′N 81°35.653′W / 8.214350°N 81.594217°W / 8.214350; -81.594217
Owner(s)	GENISA S.A.
Dam and spillways
Type of dam	Gravity, roller compacted concrete
Height	44.91 m (147.3 ft)
Height (foundation)	61.09 m (200.4 ft)
Reservoir
Surface area	2.58 km2 (1.00 sq mi)
Normal elevation	103 m (338 ft)
Power station
Hydraulic head	42.94 m (140.9 ft)
Turbines	1 x 1.98 MW Francis-type, 2 x 13.14 MW Kaplan-type
Installed capacity	28.56 MW
Annual generation	124.83 GWh Est. [1]
Website http://www.genisa.com.pa/en/barro-blanco/

Barro Blanco is a gravity dam currently under construction on the Tabasara River in the Chiriqui Province of Panama. As of 2012, the project is under construction and is 30 percent completed. It is the subject of local and international protests.

Technical features

The roller-compacted concrete gravity dam is to have a maximum height of 44.91 m (147.3 ft) and a maximum reservoir surface of 2.58 km² (1.00 sq mi), including .69 km² (0.27 sq mi) currently occupied by the Tabasara River and 1.89 km² (0.73 sq mi) that would be inundated, according to the project design document submitted to the UN Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board.^[2] The reservoir of the dam would reach into the indigenous territory (Comarca) of the Ngöbe–Buglé people, where 0.07 km² (0.027 sq mi) of the inundated land would be located. The installed capacity of the planned hydropower plant is 28.84 Megawatt.

Ownership and financing

The project developer is Generadora del Istmo S. A. (GENISA), a Panamanian special purpose company created specifically for this project. It is unclear who owns GEMISA, except that it is owned by Panamanian businessmen. Allegedly, some of the owners are politicians or are closely connected to politicians. The project is financed through equity capital from the developer and through loans. Loans have been provided by two European state-owned banks that promote private sector investments in developing countries, the German Investment Corporation (DEG) and the Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO),^[3] as well as by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CBIE). CBIE approved a USD 25 million loan to the project developer in 2011. Total funding from the three banks amounts to USD 78.3 million.^[4]

Context of the conflict

There is a long-standing conflict between the Ngöbe people and the government concerning mining and the construction of dams for hydropower generation in or near their territory.^[5] There are 30 planned hydropower plants in Panama with a total installed capacity of 1,804 MW, more than 30 times the capacity of Barro Blanco.^[3] The Changuinola Dam in the neighboring province of Bocas del Toro was completed in 2011 and resulted in numerous Ngöbe villages being flooded, with no compensation provided, according to affected people interviewed for a documentary by Aljazeera.^[6] The Changuinola Dam with an installed capacity of 223 Megawatt, developed by the US energy giant AES, is much larger than the Barro Blanco Dam.^[7] Another large dam, Tabarasá I, is planned further downstream on the Tabarasá River.^[6]

Environmental and social impact

The information on the environmental and social impact of the dam is conflicting. According to critics, more than half a dozen townships will be flooded, the livelihoods of some 5000 Ngöbe farmers who rely on the river for potable water, agriculture and fishing will be negatively impacted,^[8] primary forest would be cut down and the habitat of the endangered Tabasará rain frog would be destroyed.^[9] According to GENISA, no resettlement will take place. It says that the land to be inundated consists of ravines close to the river that are not suitable for agriculture or livestock grazing. It also says that the Tabasará rain frog lives in several habitats in Panama, including in the Anton Valley hundreds of kilometers away from the site.^[10]

Chronology

Concession award and environmental impact study (2006-2008)

In 2006 the government bid out concessions for several hydropower projects in the country. GENISA won the concession to develop the project, meaning that it could commission preparatory studies, obtain financing, build and operate the dam.

GENISA commissioned an Environmental Impact Study. As part of this study, in August 2007 58 local residents in 23 villages were asked about their view of the dam. At the time, half the respondents rejected the dam, because they would lose their land, would not be able to use the river any more and because the environment would be harmed. The other half supported the project, because it would provide jobs, better road access and improved living standards. Some of those who were opposed to the project subsequently sold their land to the project developer.^[2] In May 2008 the Panamanian Environmental Authority ANAM approved the project based on the study, and in December 2008 the concession contract between the government and GENISA was signed.^[11] Also in December 2008, GENISA and representatives of the Ngobe Bugle people signed a cooperation agreement that included safeguards for the fundamental rights of the indigenous people. In January 2009 a validation team consisting of the consulting firm AENOR working for the UN CDM Executive Board visited the area and confirmed "that the most relevant communities involved in the area of the project were consulted, all of them supported the project activity, and project participant (i.e. GENISA) has forecasted several social compensation measurements for the communities involved."^[12] The International Rivers Network says that the validation report by AENOR was flawed, since only the non-indigenous population was consulted and they failed to take into account all comments received.^[13]

Increase of capacity and controversy about impact study (2009-2010)

After presidential elections in early 2009, in June 2009 Ricardo Martinelli, a businessman who promised to quickly upgrade Panama's infrastructure, took office as President of Panama. In May 2009 GENISA requested a modification of the permit to increase the capacity to 28.8 Megawatt by moving the turbines to a lower elevation without increasing the water level in the reservoir. The original environmental study and the permit referred to an installed capacity of only 19 Megawatt. In January 2010 ANAM approved the modification, and in January 2011 the concession contract was modified accordingly.^[11] As of 2010, according to the UN CDM project document, 98% of the land to be inundated was owned by GENISA.^[2]

According to critics, the environmental impact study was flawed, because impacts on biodiversity were assessed superficially and because the capacity of the plant was increased.^[3] In late 2010 the European Investment Bank withdrew funding for the dam after an investigation into human rights abuses prompted by NGO protests.^[13]

Mining project and escalation of conflict (2011)

In February 2011, the Panamanian government proposed a new mining law that would facilitate the development of mining projects in indigenous areas, while the indigenous people had asked for a law banning mining in their territories. The proposal and the simultaneous launching of bids for a large copper mining project called Cerro Colorado triggered protests of indigenous people, including local communities from the Barro Blanco area, who blocked the Interamerican Highway for four days. The protests were violently suppressed. The conflict was temporarily ended through the San Felix agreement, signed in the village of San Felix.^[5] Construction of the dam began in February 2011. In June 2011, the regional congress of the Kädriri, the local group of Ngäbe people, approved by public majority voting that the construction of the dam should continue, after having been authorized to take a decision by the General Congress of the Ngäbe-Buglé.^[14] Also in June 2011 the UN CDM Board approved the carbon finance proposal that is to generate part of the revenue stream for the project.^[3]

International campaign and UN inspection (2012-13)

However, the conflict remained unresolved. The government called for a referendum on the dam, but the indigenous leader Silvia Carrera initially rejected it.^[5] An international campaign was started to stop construction of the dam and international funding for it. In March 2012 Parliament passed a modified version of the mining law that prohibited mining in the indigenous territory and requires the approval of the Ngöbe Buglé General Congress for any future hydroelectric projects.^[15] However, the traditional authorities of the Ngöbe criticized Silvia Carrera for having given in. They had asked for a complete ban on hydropower projects to be included in the law.^[16]

Construction had to be halted in May 2012, because the local population occupied the site. The protests were suspended while "UN inspectors" were expected to visit the area.^[17] In September 2012 an inspection team led by UNDP and consisting of representatives of the Catholic Church, the environmental agency ANAM, the electricity regulatory agency ASEP and the project developer GENISA, visited the area.^[18] The purpose of the inspection was to verify on the ground issues that had not been answered satisfactorily in the environmental impact assessment. The inspection team presented its report in December 2012, recommending a water flow simulation to understand the impact of sudden floods as well as a participatory rural appraisal.^[19] In March 2013 an indigenous protester against the dam was killed by masked assailants.^[20]

On September 9, 2013, the United Nations released three reports on the water flow simulation, a participatory rural appraisal as well as an ecological and economic analysis conducted by two independent international experts, Gonzalo Castro de la Mata and Luis Lopez, showing that the impacts of the dam had no impact on global biodiversity, but had "real and important impacts" on the indigenous populations living in the area.^[21]

See also

• List of power stations in Panama

References