Bandwagoning

Bandwagoning in international relations occurs when a state aligns with a stronger, adversarial power and concedes that the stronger adversary-turned-partner disproportionately gains in the spoils they conquer together.[1] Bandwagoning, therefore, is a strategy employed by weak states. The logic stipulates that an outgunned, weaker state should align itself with a stronger adversary because the latter can take what it wants by force anyway.[2] Thucydides' famous dictum that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" captures the essence of bandwagoning.[2][3]

Bandwagoning was coined by Quincy Wright in A Study of War (1942) and popularized by Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics (1979) (in his work, Waltz incorrectly attributes Stephen Van Evera with coining the term). Bandwagoning occurs when weaker states decide that the cost of opposing a stronger power exceeds the benefits. The stronger power may offer incentives, such as the possibility of territorial gain, trade agreements, or protection, to induce weaker states to join with it.

Realism predicts that states will bandwagon only when there is no possibility of building a balancing coalition or their geography makes balancing difficult (i.e. surrounded by enemies). Bandwagoning is considered to be dangerous because it allows a rival state to gain power.

Bandwagoning is opposed to balancing, which calls for a state to prevent an aggressor from upsetting the balance of power.

Foreign policy commitments

The belief that states will ally with a dominant power, as opposed to balance against it, has been a common feature among foreign policy practitioners. German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz's "risk theory", for example, posited that if Germany built a formidable naval fleet, it could force England into neutrality or alliance with it by threatening to England's maritime supremacy.[4][5][6] According to Stephen Walt, "American officials have repeatedly embraced the bandwagoning hypothesis in justifying American foreign policy commitments". John F. Kennedy, for example, stated that "if the United States were to falter, the whole world...would inevitably begin to move toward the Communist bloc".[4][7] Henry Kissinger suggested that states tend to bandwagon, stating that "if leaders around the world...assume that the U.S. lacked either the forces or the will...they will accommodate themselves to the dominant trend."[4][8] Ronald Reagan endorsed the same sentiment when he said, "if we cannot defend ourselves [in Central America]...then we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere...our credibility will collapse and our alliances will crumble".[4][9]

See also

References

  1. ↑ Mearsheimer, John (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. pp. 162–163. ISBN 9780393076240.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Mearsheimer, John (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. p. 163. ISBN 9780393076240.
  3. ↑ Strassler, Robert (1998). The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. New York: Simon and Schuster. p. 352. ISBN 9781439106594.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Walt, Stephen M. (Spring 1985). "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power". International Security 9 (4): 7. doi:10.2307/2538540. Retrieved 8 May 2013.
  5. ↑ Langer, William L. (1953). The Diplomacy of Imperialism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 434–435.
  6. ↑ Craig, Gordon L. (1978). Germany: 1866-1945. London: Oxford University Press. pp. 303–314. ISBN 9780198221135.
  7. ↑ Brown, Seyom (1968). The Faces of Power. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 217. ISBN 9780231096690.
  8. ↑ Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st session (1977). The Soviet Union and the Third World: Watershed in Great Power Policy. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. pp. 157–158.
  9. ↑ Reagan, Ronald (28 April 1983). "President Reagan's Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Central America". New York Times. Retrieved 8 May 2013.
  10. ↑ Waltz, Kenneth (2010). Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill. p. 126. ISBN 1577666704.

Further reading