Bakun Dam

Bakun Dam

The dam under construction in June 2009.
Location of Bakun Dam
Location Sarawak
Malaysia
Coordinates 02°45′23″N 114°03′47″E / 2.75639°N 114.06306°ECoordinates: 02°45′23″N 114°03′47″E / 2.75639°N 114.06306°E
Construction began 1996
Opening date 2011
Dam and spillways
Type of dam Embankment, concrete face rock-fill
Impounds Balui River
Height 205 m (673 ft)
Length 750 m (2,461 ft)
Spillway type Service, controlled stepped chute
Spillway capacity 15,000 m3/s (530,000 cu ft/s)
Reservoir
Creates Bakun Reservoir
Total capacity 43,800,000,000 m3 (35,500,000 acre·ft)
Catchment area 14,750 km2 (5,695 sq mi)
Surface area 695 km2 (268 sq mi)
Power station
Turbines 8 × 300 MW Francis-type
Installed capacity 2,400 MW
Website
www.bakundam.com

The Bakun Dam is an embankment dam located in Sarawak, Malaysia on the Balui River,[1] a tributary or source of the Rajang River and some sixty kilometres west of Belaga.[2] As part of the project, the second tallest concrete-faced rockfill dam in the world would be built. It is planned to generate 2,400 megawatts (MW) of electricity once completed.

The purpose for the dam was to meet growing demand for electricity. However, most of this demand said to lie in Peninsular Malaysia and not East Malaysia, where the dam is located. Even in Peninsular Malaysia, however, there is an over-supply of electricity, with Tenaga Nasional Berhad being locked into unfavourable purchasing agreements with Independent Power Producers. The original idea was to have 30% of the generated capacity consumed in East Malaysia and the rest sent to Peninsular Malaysia. This plan envisioned 730 km of overhead HVDC transmission lines in East Malaysia, 670 km of undersea HVDC cable and 300 km of HVDC transmission line in Peninsular Malaysia.

Future plans for the dam include connecting it to an envisioned Trans-Borneo Power Grid Interconnection, which would be a grid to supply power to Sarawak, Sabah, Brunei, and Kalimantan (Indonesia). There have been mentions of this grid made within ASEAN meetings but no actions have been taken by any party. Bakun Dam came online on 6 August 2011.[3]

Project history

First attempt

Initial survey was conducted in early 1960s and more studies were conducted in early 1980s. The studies cover the masterplan & feasibility report, rock & soil studies, hydro potential, detailed design & costing, environmental & socio-economic studies[4] and HVDC transmission studies. Notable consultants involved were SAMA Consortium German Agency for Technical Cooperation,[5] Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation[6] & Maeda-Okumura Joint Venture, Fitchner and Swedpower Swedish Agency for Technical Cooperation.

The project was first approved by government in 1986, it was shelved in 1990 due to decreased projection of electricity demand due to the recession of 1985 and the decision to use the then low-cost natural gas as fuel for developing the petrochemical industry.[5]

Second attempt

It was revived in September 1993 by the Malaysian Federal Government led by then-Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad. In January 1994, a privatised contract was awarded to Ekran Berhad. In April 1995, Ekran completes the EIA of the project. The project was to cost US$2.4 billion and was originally scheduled for completion in 2003.[5]

The dam was to be built beginning in 1994 by a privatised joint-venture consortium called Bakun Hydroelectric Corporation, comprising Ekran Berhad, Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB), the government of Sarawak, Sarawak Electricity Supply Corporation (Sesco), and Malaysia Mining Corporation Bhd (MMC).[5]

Ekran awarded the electromechanical works and the transmission portion to ABB. ABB's consortium partner for the civil works will be Companhia Brasileira de Projetos e Obras (CBPO) of Brazil, a large civil engineering company belonging to the Odebrecht Group, responsible for the construction of the dam and power house. Engineering consulting firms involved in the project then were TNB Hydro, a subsidiary of Tenaga Nasional Berhad and KLIA Consult.[4]

Ekran launched a rights issue to finance the building of the dam, but it was undersubscribed and Ting Pek Khing (Ekran's chairman) had to put up $500 million to take up the unsubscribed portion as part of his agreement with the underwriters.[7] Ekran was a company of Ting Pek Khing, himself a timber businessman. Neither he nor his company had built a dam before. The entire project was not tendered publicly, and instead was awarded by government contract.[8]

The project was halted in 1997 in the face of the Asian financial crisis. When the project was shelved, the Malaysian government took back the project from this consortium.[5] By this time, RM 1.6 Billion had already been paid out by the government. RM700 million to RM1.1 billion was paid as 'compensation' to Ekran, according to figures disclosed in Parliament.[8][9] The completed works were the river diversion tunnels by Dong Ah of Korea for RM 400 million, and to Global Upline for work completed on the auxiliary coffer dams for RM 60 million. Other works are for selective clearing of biomass, and relocation of the affected native residents. The government had also turned over RM 1 billion for the purchase of 8 turbines.[10]

Third attempt

In May 2000 it was revived through a 100% government owned company, Sarawak Hidro, but the transmission of power to Peninsular Malaysia was not part of the revived project.[11] The construction work was tendered out as a turnkey contract.[12] The completion date has been revised to February 2008.[10]

The new civil builder is the Malaysia-China Hydro JV consortium, led by Sime Engineering Berhad of Malaysia (a subsidiary of Sime Darby and Sinohydro Corporation of China. Other members of the consortium are WCT Berhad, MTD Capital, Ahmad Zaki Resources, Syarikat Ismail and Edward & Sons.[10] It targeted a completion date of September 2007. The total sum to be paid to this consortium was budgeted at RM 1.8 billion. The electromechanical works for the turbines were awarded in two contracts to IMPSA of Argentina and Alstom of France.[10]

In 2004, engineering consulting firm JR Knowles, was hired to study the delays in construction.[10] Other engineering consulting firms involved in the project were Snowy Mountain Engineering Corporation, of Australia and Opus International Malaysia.

Items of temporary interest during third attempt

In May 2004 Ting Pek Khing's name again was raised in connection with the project. A Ting-owned company, Global Upline, was rumoured to be awarded a contract to undertake "biomass removal" in the flood basin. This would allow him to harvest timber in the area without a separate permit.[10] Issuance of timber permits has come under increased scrutiny due to political conditions and environmental concerns. However, as of December 2006 it has not been awarded.

Usage of the generated capacity was to have been by a proposed aluminium smelting plant in Similajau, near Bintulu, approximately 180 km inland from the dam.[13] The project is a joint venture between Dubai Aluminum Co, Ltd (Dubal) and Gulf International Investment Group (GIIG), an investment fund jointly set up by Malaysian tycoon Syed Mokhtar, and Dubai-based international financier Mohamed Ali Alabbar. This plant was expected to consume 50% of the power generated. The government has agreed in principle that 60% of Sarawak Hidro, the entity which owns the dam, will be sold to GIIG. Due to delays in dam construction, the plans for the smelter have since been shelved. The agreement for this smelter was originally signed in 2003 and some conditions have lapsed due to delays in construction. Rio Tinto announced in August 2007 that they had signed a deal with Malaysian conglomerate Cahya Mata Sarawak Berhad (CMSB) to build an aluminium smelter. The production capacity would be 550,000 tonnes initially with expansion to 1.5 million tonnes possible. Production of aluminium would start at the end of 2010.[14]

At the end of 2004, the minor partners in the Malaysia-China Hydro JV consortium (Ahmad Zaki Resources Bhd, WCT Engineering Bhd and MTD Capital) will report quarterly losses due to the Bakun project. Discounting this project, they would all be operating profitably for the quarter.[15]

As of February 2007, there are three developments affecting the Bakun project. The first is the merger of the Sime Darby, Guthrie and Golden Hope into a new entity named Synergy Drive.[16] The second is the proposed takeover of the Bakun project by the contractor, Sime Engineering. The third is the revival of the submarine HVDC cable under the South China Sea to transport electricity from Borneo to Peninsular Malaysia.[10]

In November 2007, Sime Darby, the parent company of the contractor Sime Engineering will be merged with Golden Hope and Guthrie into a new company with a market capitalisation of RM 31 billion (USD 8 billion).[17] Concurrently with the merger, the contractor Sime Engineering will takeover the ownership of the Bakun Dam project.[18]

Sime Engineering Sdn Bhd has filed a suit against AZRB over alleged breaches in the Malaysia-China Hydro joint venture agreement dated 12 June 2002 relating to the Bakun dam. AZRB was served with a writ summons and statement of claim dated 12 Oct by Sime Engineering claiming "RM15.24 million for alleged breaches by AZRB of the Malaysia-China Hydro JVA" relating to Bakun hydroelectric project package CW2 – main civil works.[19]

Sinohydro flawed construction procedures

Chinese constructor Sinohydro has acknowledged that its construction procedures used for Bakun were flawed.[20] The admission came after Sarawak Report reported that Sinohydro had widely used a technique involving adding excessive water to cement, with potentially dangerous consequences. The Sarawak Report said its website was attacked after it published the report.[21][22]

Environmental and social damage

Uma Daro longhouse is one of the longhouses built in Sungai Asap for the relocation of the natives displaced by the Bakun Dam.

The Bakun dam flooding commenced on 13 October 2010[23] with a faulty start[14] and will put 700 km² of land under water – equivalent to the size of Singapore. The rainforest of this part of Southeast Asia has some of the highest rates of plant and animal endemism, species found there and nowhere else on Earth, and this dam has done irreparable ecological damage to that region.[24][25]

Construction of the dam required the relocation of more than 9,000 native residents (mainly Kayan/Kenyah) of the indigenous peoples who lived in the area to be flooded. Many Sarawak natives have been relocated to a longhouse settlement named Sungai Asap in Bakun. Most of them were subsistence farmers. Each family were promised 3 acres of land but many families still have not been compensated.[26][27]

Concerns were raised also about such things as the relocation of people; amount of virgin tropical rainforest which had to be cut down (230 km²); possible dam collapse issues; increase in diseases with water-borne vectors such as schistosomiasis, opisthorchiasis, malaria, and filariasis; and sediment accumulation shortening the useful lifespan of the dam.[28] A 5 part series of Bakun dam documentaries was filmed by Chou Z Lam. The series highlighted the basic community problems faced by displaced indigenous people such as the lack of land areas for farming and hunting, lack of educational, medical, and transport facilities and also the promises not being kept by the government. This documentary series was later banned from Radio Television Malaysia (RTM) on May 2010, forcing the remaining series to YouTube.[29][30][31]

Transparency International includes Bakun Dam in its 'Monuments of corruption' Global Corruption Report 2005.[32] The mandate to develop the project went to a timber contractor and friend of Sarawak's governor. The provincial government of Sarawak is still looking for customers to consume the power to be generated by the project.

Launched in February 2012, an international NGO coalition that includes organisations from the US, Norway and Switzerland are showing its solidarity with Malaysian groups who are protesting against the construction of twelve hydroelectric dams in the Malaysian state of Sarawak on Borneo. The NGO coalition supports the Malaysian groups' demand for an immediate halt to the realisation of these dams, which threaten to displace tens of thousands of Sarawak natives and flood hundreds of square miles of Sarawak's precious tropical rainforests. [33]

Technical specifications

View of turbines inside the powerhouse in 2009

The permanent dam components are as follows:

Transmission lines

There are four major transmission lines sections:[36]

The first consist of an HVAC double circuit overhead lines running over a distance of 160 km from Bakun Dam to Similajau Static Inverter Plant, situated east of Bintulu and is planned beside the HVDC also the Sarawak state electricity grid which is operated by Sarawak Electricity Supply Corporation.[39]

The three next section consist of a bipolar HVDC 500 kV-line. The first section of this line running from Similajau Static Inverter Plant to Kampung Pueh on Borneo will be implented as overhead line with a length of 670 km.[39]

The next section is the submarine cable between Kampung Pueh to Tanjung Leman, Johor. It will have a length of 670 km. It is planned to be implemented by 3 or 4 paralleised cables each with a transmission capacity of 700 MW.[39]

The last section on Malaysia peninsula will consist of an overhead DC powerline running from Tanjung Leman to the static inverter plant at Bentong.[39]

As part of the transmission works two converter stations will be built at Bakun and Tanjung Tenggara. The HVDC lines will connect to the National Grid, Malaysia operated by Tenaga Nasional Berhad.

Revival of submarine cable component

The revived submarine cable portion is to transport the electricity generated at Bakun Dam in Borneo to Peninsular Malaysia, possibly by year 2012. The consortium partners equity possibly will be Sime Darby (60%), Tenaga Nasional (20%) and the Malaysian Ministry of Finance (20%). The consortium is exploring financing facilities of up to 80% of the planned investment.

The cable is planned to transport 1600 MW of power from the Bakun Dam to Yong Peng, Johor[40] via undersea HVDC power cables and then via land line onto the Malaysian National Grid. The use of HVDC cables would ensure the energy loss is minimal, at about 5% to 6% only. The cost of the undersea cable is estimated at RM 9 billion. The proposed concept is for 2 x 800 MW cables being laid about 660 km under the South China Sea from the Sarawak shore to Yong Peng on Peninsular Malaysia.

Sime Darby would take ownership of the submarine cable project but not undertake its construction. The contractor is rumoured to be Malaysian Resources Corporation Berhad (MRCB), a public listed company on the KLSE.

The buyer of electricity is Tenaga Nasional. The rate proposed is RM 0.17 per kilowatt hour at the intake onto the National Grid. Analysts estimated that generation cost using world market rate natural gas would cost RM 0.22 per kilowatt hour. A 4% increase every 4 years is envisaged over the 35-year concession period.[41]

On 7 January 2008, Sime Darby announce that they have appointed a financial adviser for the under sea power transmission project. However, the company did not name the financial adviser.[42]

After much delays, Sarawak Energy Berhad announced that the contract to build the submarine cable would be awarded in mid-2010 with international tenders to be called in early 2010. It was expected that the construction would be completed by 2015 at an estimated cost of MYR8 billion to MYR10 billion.[43] However, the project has been shelved[44]

Records

Once completed:

See also

References

  1. "Bakun National Hydroelectric Project Milestones". Malaysia-China Hydro Joint Venture. 2004. Retrieved 7 August 2007.
  2. Map of the dam location.
  3. 4.0 4.1 Allison, Tony (28 October 2000). "Special Report – Malaysia's Bakun project: Build and be damned". Asia Times. Retrieved 2 September 2012.
  4. 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Kadikon, Arnold A (2011). THE BAKUN HYDRO ELECTRICAL PROJECT (HEP), SARAWAK, MALAYSIA: THE MANIFESTATION OF ISLAMIC SYSTEM BETWEEN ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)). Universiti Teknologi Malaysia.
  5. "SMEC mulls options to fund future growth.(PROFESSIONAL SERVICES)(subscription required)". Asia Today International. 1 February 2010. Retrieved 2 September 2012.
  6. Shameen, Assif (4 July 1997). "A sinking feeling – Financing Bakun is looking almost as tricky as building the dam". Asiaweek. Retrieved 2 September 2012.
  7. 8.0 8.1 Yang, S.K (28 March 2009). "Damned dams in Sarawak (subscription required)". Malaysiakini. Retrieved 2 September 2012.
  8. Jalleh Martin (2005). "The truth about privatisation – It has led to more bailouts than benefits in Bolehland". Aliran Monthly 25 (6). Retrieved 2 September 2012.
  9. 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 Joe, Hakim (3 October 2009). "We are damned!". Malaysia Today. Retrieved 2 September 2012.
  10. Kuen, Y.L (16 August 2010). "Cheaper source of power". The Star. Retrieved 3 September 2012.
  11. Yang, S.K (26 November 2007). "Cheaper source of power". The Star. Retrieved 3 September 2012.
  12. B. K. Sidhu. "US$1b JV smelter for Sarawak" The Star Online. 10 February 2011
  13. 14.0 14.1 "Rio Tinto in $2bn smelter deal". news.com.au. 7 August 2007. Retrieved 7 August 2007.
  14. 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 "Bakun pushes profitable companies into the red (subscription required)". The Malay Mail. 1 December 2004. Retrieved 3 September 2012.
  15. "Synergy Drive to be world's largest player". The Star. 6 August 2007. Retrieved 3 September 2012.
  16. Sime Shareholders Yes To RM32 Bln Merger
  17. Malaysia's Stock Index Falls, Led by IOI; DRB-Hicom Slides
  18. Chin, Joseph. "Public Bank, PLUS, AZRB, Konsortium". The Edge Malaysia. 19 October 2010.
  19. "Sinohydro admits flaws in Bakun Dam construction procedures". Asian Power. 21 June 2011. Retrieved 22 February 2012.
  20. "In Southeast Asia, Big Dams Raise Big Concerns". The Council on Foreign Relations. 30 June 2011.
  21. "Bakun Dam 'Unsafe'! – Exclusive Evidence on Corner-Cutting and Sloppy Construction Practices". The Sarawak Report. 13 April 2011.
  22. Then, Stephen. "Bakun dam flooding begins". The Star Online. 14 October 2010.
  23. "SAVE_Rivers_Press_release_on_conference_13__February". Save Rivers Network. 13 February 2012.
  24. Yang, S.K (9 December 2011). "Xayaburi Dam Stopped for Now". Asia Sentinel. Retrieved 3 September 2012.
  25. Bakun compensation: Dispute delaying payments
  26. Bakun compensation: Dispute delaying payments
  27. "Bakun Dam, Malaysia". International Rivers
  28. Shadow of Bakun looms over Sibu
  29. TV producer claims political meddling
  30. Banned Bakun Dam series now on YouTube
  31. "A world built on bribes?: Corruption in construction bankrupts countries and costs lives, says TI report" Transparency International. 16 March 2005.
  32. http://www.stop-corruption-dams.org/campaign_update/?show=3
  33. THE BAKUN HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT – MALAYSIA Friends of the Earth. URL assessed on 4 September 2012
  34. Bakun Dam project information Malaysia-China Hydro. URL assessed on 4 September 2012
  35. 36.0 36.1 "Bakun power plant and transmission – Main data". ABB Asea Brown Boveri. 1996. Retrieved 4 September 2012.
  36. The Making of a Dam ... Power Tunnels Malaysia-China Hydro. URL assessed on 4 September 2012
  37. The Making of a Dam ... Powerhouse Malaysia-China Hydro. URL assessed on 4 September 2012
  38. 39.0 39.1 39.2 39.3 Kuen, Y.L (16 November 2009). "Bakun reservoir – 695 sq km – ready to be filled". The Star. Retrieved 4 September 2012.
  39. Raj, Charles (31 March 2008). "Bakun puzzle". Retrieved 4 September 2012.
  40. Rajan Moses: Sime to power up mega Bakun project, New Strais Times, 2 February 2007
  41. Ng, Fintar. "Sime appoints financial adviser for Bakun transmission". The Star Online. 7 January 2008.
  42. Jack Wong (7 July 2009). "Malaysia-Sarawak submarine cable contract to be awarded next year". The Star.
  43. "Federal government to sell Bakun dam to Sarawak; no power transmission to peninsula". The Edge Malaysia. 27 September 2010.

External links