Alpine Fortress

The Alpine Fortress (German: Alpenfestung) or Alpine Redoubt was the World War II national redoubt planned by Heinrich Himmler in November/December 1943[lower-alpha 1] for Germany's government and armed forces to retreat to an area from "southern Bavaria across western Austria to northern Italy".[lower-alpha 2] The plan was never fully endorsed by Hitler and no serious attempt was made to put the plan into operation.

History

The final operations of the Western Allied armies in Germany between 19 April and 7 May 1945

In the six months following the D-Day landings in Normandy in June 1944, the American and British armies advanced to the Rhine and seemed poised to strike into the heart of Germany, while the Soviet Army, advancing from the east through Poland, reached the Oder. It seemed likely that Berlin would soon fall and Germany be cut in half. In these circumstances, it occurred both to some leading figures in the German regime and to the Allies that the logical thing for the Germans to do would be to move the government to the mountainous areas of southern Germany and Austria, where a relatively small number of determined troops could hold out for some time.

A number of intelligence reports to the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) identified the area held stores of foodstuffs and military supplies built up over the preceding six months, and could even be harbouring armaments production facilities. Within this fortified terrain, they said, Hitler would be able to evade the Allies and cause tremendous difficulties for the occupying Allied forces throughout Germany.

The minister of propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, set up a special unit to invent and spread rumours about an Alpenfestung. Goebbels also sent out rumours to neutral governments, thus keeping the Redoubt myth alive and its state of readiness unclear. He enlisted the assistance of the intelligence service of the SS, the SD, to produce faked blueprints and reports on construction supplies, armament production and troop transfers to the Redoubt. This successful and utter deception of allied military intelligence is considered to be one of the greatest feats of the German Abwehr during the entire war.

Although Adolf Hitler never endorsed the plan, he issued an order on 24 April 1945 for the evacuation of remaining government personnel from Berlin to the Redoubt; he made it clear that he would not leave Berlin himself, even if it fell to the Soviets, as it did on 2 May 1945 (see Battle of Berlin). When the American armies penetrated Bavaria and western Austria at the end of April, they met little serious resistance, and the National Redoubt was shown to have been a myth.[1]

Nevertheless the National Redoubt had serious military and political consequences. Once the Anglo-American armies had crossed the Rhine and advanced into western Germany, they had to decide whether to advance on a narrow front towards Berlin, or on a broad front, with a view to securing both the North Sea coast and southern Germany before advancing further. The American commander of the southern force, General George S. Patton, had consistently advocated a narrow front ever since D-Day,[lower-alpha 3] and did so again at this point. But the Allied commander in chief, U.S. General Dwight Eisenhower, took a more cautious view, and the broad front strategy prevailed.

Goebbels' deception plan over the Redoubt was one of the great successes of German intelligence during World War II, albeit one that came too late to alter the outcome of the war. The Allied intelligence services were completely fooled by Goebbels' false trail of rumours.

The Alpine Fortress was one of three reasons associated with SHAEF's movement of forces towards southern Germany rather than towards Berlin. which was planned to be in the Soviet Zone of Occupation, and the battle for which would entail unacceptably high Western Allied casualties.

Evacuations to the Alpine Fortress

Post-war claims

Post-war claims regarding the Alpine Fortress include:

References

Explanatory notes

  1. "Himmler started laying the plans for underground warfare in the last two months of 1943.... The plans are threefold, embracing (1) Open warfare directed from Hitler's mountain headquarters; (2) Sabotage and guerrilla activity conducted by partisan bands organized by districts, and (3) Propaganda warfare to be carried on by some 200,000 Nazi followers in Europe and elsewhere. Strongholds Established Already picked S.S. (elite) troops have been established in underground strongholds and hospitals in the Austrian, Bavarian and Italian Alpine area and it is the plan of Nazi leaders to flee to that region when the German military collapse comes" Gallagher, Wes (Associated Press Correspondent) (Dec 13, 1944). "Nazis Prepared for Five Years Underground Warfare". The Evening Independent (St. Petersburg, Florida). Retrieved December 2010.).
  2. "But what of the top Nazis who cannot hide? With a compact army of young SS and Hitler Youth fanatics, they will retreat, behind a loyal rearguard cover of Volksgrenadiere and Volksstürmer, to the Alpine massif which reaches from southern Bavaria across western Austria to northern Italy. There immense stores of food and munitions are being laid down in prepared fortifications. If the retreat is a success, such an army might hold out for years" ("World Battlefronts: Battle of Germany: The Man Who Can't Surrender". Time. February 12, 1945.)
  3. As did his British counterpart Field Marshal Montgomery in the northboth to be carried out by their own forces.

Citations

  1. Headquarters, European Theater of Operations (15 April 1945). "World War II Operational Documents". pp. 382–383. Retrieved 12 March 2012.
  2. Nichol, John and Rennell, Tony (2002). "The Last Escape". Penguin UK. Retrieved November 2012.
  3. Shirer, William L. (15 November 1990). The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. Simon and Schuster. pp. 1106–. ISBN 978-0-671-72868-7.
  4. Ambrose, Stephen E (1970). The Supreme Commander: The War Years of Dwight D. Eisenhower (2nd reprint, illustrated ed.). University Press of Mississippi. p. 624. ISBN 9781578062065.