Rwandan Revolution

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The Rwandan Revolution, also known as the Wind of Destruction,[1] (Kinyarwanda: muyaga)[2] was a period of ethnic violence which occurred in Rwanda from 1959-1961, preceding Rwanda's independence from the Belgian colonial empire on 1 July 1962. It was the culmination of years of tension between the Hutu and Tutsi groups. The violence began in November 1959, following the beating up of a Hutu politician, Dominique Mbonyumutwa by Tutsi forces. Believing Mbonyumutwa to have been killed, groups of Hutus began systematic assaults on the Tutsi. It upended the power structure of Rwanda by dissolving the monarchy, which was headed by a Tutsi mwami, in favor of a Hutu-led republic. Tutsi chiefs and vice-chiefs were replaced by Hutus. Many Tutsi civilians were killed in the revolution, which was the nation's first ethnically-based conflict, while others fled to semi-permanent refugee settlements in neighboring countries. In 1965, 130,000 (one third of all Tutsis) lived in exile in Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi.[3] These exile communities later gave rise to Tutsi rebel movements, one of which was the RPF.

An estimated 20,000 to 100,000 Tutsis were killed and many thousands more, including the Mwami, fled to neighboring Uganda before Belgian commandos arrived to quell the violence. Several Belgians were subsequently accused by Tutsi leaders of abetting the Hutus in the violence. The report of a United Nations special commission reported racism reminiscent of "Nazism against the Tutsi minorities" that had been engineered by the government and Belgian authorities.

Background

Precolonial Rwanda and origins of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa

The earliest inhabitants of what is now Rwanda were the Twa, a group of aboriginal pygmy hunter-gatherers who settled in the area between 8000 BC and 3000 BC and remain in Rwanda today.[4][5] Between 700 BC and 1500 AD, a number of Bantu groups migrated into Rwanda, and began to clear forest land for agriculture.[6][5] The forest-dwelling Twa lost much of their habitat and moved to the slopes of mountains.[7] Historians have several theories regarding the nature of the Bantu migrations; one theory is that the first settlers were Hutu, while the Tutsi migrated later and formed a distinct racial group, possibly of Cushitic origin.[8] An alternative theory is that the migration was slow and steady, with incoming groups integrating into rather than conquering the existing society.[9][5] Under this theory, the Hutu and Tutsi distinction arose later and was a class distinction rather than a racial one.[10][11]

Photograph of King's palace in Nyanza, Rwanda depicting main entrance, front and conical roof
A reconstruction of the King of Rwanda's palace at Nyanza

The population coalesced, first into clans (ubwoko),[12] and then, by 1700, into around eight kingdoms.[13] The country was fertile and densely populated, and the kingdoms were governed with strict social control.[14] One of the kingdoms, the Kingdom of Rwanda, ruled by the Tutsi Nyiginya clan, became increasingly dominant from the mid-eighteenth century.[15] From its origins as a small toparchy near Lake Muhazi,[16] the kingdom expanded through a process of conquest and assimilation,[17] achieving its greatest extent under the reign of King Kigeli Rwabugiri from 1853–95. Rwabugiri expanded the kingdom west and north,[18][15] and initiated administrative reforms; these included ubuhake, in which Tutsi patrons ceded cattle, and therefore privileged status, to Hutu or Tutsi clients in exchange for economic and personal service,[19] and uburetwa, a corvée system in which Hutu were forced to work for Tutsi chiefs.[18] Rwabugiri's changes caused a rift to grow between the Hutu and Tutsi populations.[18]

Colonization

The Berlin Conference of 1884 assigned the territory to Germany, but with the boundaries not precisely defined.[20] When explorer Gustav Adolf von Götzen explored the country in 1894,[21] he discovered that the Kingdom of Rwanda included a fertile region to the east of Lake Kivu. Germany wanted this region, but it was also claimed by Leopold II as part of the Belgian Congo. To justify its claim, Germany began a policy of ruling through the Rwandan monarchy, and supporting Tutsi chiefs around the country; this system had the added benefit of enabling colonisation with small European troop numbers.[22] Yuhi V Musinga, who emerged as king following a succession crisis caused by death of his father Rwabugiri,[23] and had also endured fighting with Belgian troops, welcomed the Germans and used them to strengthen his rule.[21] German rule thus allowed Rwabugiri's centralistion policy to continue, while the rift between Tutsi and Hutu grew wider.[22]

Belgian forces took control of Rwanda and Burundi during World War I, and the country was formally passed to Belgian control by a League of Nations mandate in 1919.[24] Belgium initially continued the German style of governing through the monarchy, but from 1926 began a policy of more direct colonial rule.[25][26] The reforms included simplifying the complex chieftaincy system so that one chief, usually a Tutsi, controlled all aspects of rule for a local area rather than the previous three, who were typically split between Tutsi and Hutu. Belgian reforms also extended uburetwa to apply to individuals rather than whole communities, and spread it to regions not previously covered by the system.[27] Simultaneously, the Tutsi chiefs began a process of land reform, with Belgian support. Grazing areas traditionally under the control of Hutu collectives were seized by Tutsi and privatised, with minimal compensation.[28]

From the late 1920s, the Catholic Church became increasingly important in Rwanda. The Belgian government encouraged this, as the priests knew the country well and made administration easier. A large number of Rwandans, including elite Tutsi, became Catholics, as this was increasingly a prerequisite for social advancement.[29] King Musinga refused to convert, and in 1931 was deposed by the Belgian administration; his eldest son, Mutara III Rudahigwa, succeeded him and eventually became the country's first Christian king.[30] In the 1930s, the Belgians introduced large-scale projects in education, health, public works, and agricultural supervision, including new crops and improved agricultural techniques to try to reduce the incidence of famine.[31] The country had been modernised but Tutsi supremacy remained, leaving the Hutu disenfranchised and subject to large scale forced labour.[32] In 1935, Belgium introduced identity cards labelling each individual as either Tutsi, Hutu, Twa or Naturalised. While it had previously been possible for particularly wealthy Hutu to become honorary Tutsi, the identity cards prevented any further movement between the classes.[33]

Prelude

Growth of a Hutu counter-elite

Belgium continued to rule Rwanda as a UN Trust Territory after World War II, with a mandate to oversee independence.[34][35] The economic landscape had changed considerably during the war, including growth of the cash economy[36] and economic opportunities in neighbouring countries, for example demand for labourers in the Congolese mines of Katanga, and in the coffee and sugar plantations of Uganda.[37] Simultaneously, there was a shift in the sympathies of the Catholic Church.[38] Prominent figures in the early Rwandan church such as Léon-Paul Classe, who were from a wealthy and conservative background,[39] were replaced by younger clergy of working-class origin, with a greater proportion of Flemish rather than French speaking Belgians, who sympathised with the plight of the Hutu.[40] The economic conditions, and seminarial education provided by the church allowed the Hutu a social mobility not previously possible, which in turn led to the development of an elite group of Hutu leaders and intellectuals.[41] This elite, consisting of Hutu derived from the precolonial Kingdom of Rwanda, was joined by prominent citizens of kingdoms acquired during colonialism, including the Kiga people.[42]

The most prominent figure in the movement was Grégoire Kayibanda.[43] Like most of the Hutu counter-elite, Kayibanda had trained for the priesthood at Nyakibanda seminary, although he was never ordained.[43] On completion of his education in 1948 he became a primary school teacher, and from 1952 edited Catholic magazine L'Ami, taking over from Alexis Kagame.[44] In the late 1950s, Kayibanda sat on the board of the Travail, Fidélité, Progrès (TRAFIPRO) food cooperative,[45] edited the pro-Hutu Catholic magazine Kinyamateka,[43] and founded the Mouvement Social Muhutu (MSM), which later became the Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU).[45] The second major figure in the Hutu elite was Joseph Gitera, whose base was in the south of the country.[45] He was also an ex-seminarian, and founder of the Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse (APROSOMA) party.[46] Religious historians Ian and Jane Linden described Gitera as "more passionate and perhaps compassionate" than Kayibanda and other Hutu ex-seminarians, but also described him as "often erratic and sometimes fanatical".[46]

The monarchy and prominent Tutsi, which had always assumed that power would be transferred to them on independence, sensed the growing influence of the Hutu and began to agitate for immediate independence.[47] They formed their own party, the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), which was pro-monarchy and also anti-Belgian, a stance which earned them backing from the Communist bloc.[48] In 1957, a group of Hutu scholars wrote the "Bahutu Manifesto". This was the first document to label the Tutsi and Hutu as separate races, and called for the transfer of power from Tutsi to Hutu based on what it termed "statistical law".[49]

Notes

  1. Gourevitch 2000, p. 59.
  2. Prunier 1999, p. 41.
  3. Crowder, edited by Michall (1984). The Cambridge history of Africa : volume 8, from c. 1940 to c. 1975 (Repr. ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521224098. 
  4. Chrétien 2003, p. 44.
  5. 5.0 5.1 5.2 Mamdani 2002, p. 61.
  6. Chrétien 2003, p. 58.
  7. King 2007, p. 75.
  8. Prunier 1999, p. 16.
  9. Mamdani 2002, p. 58.
  10. Chrétien 2003, p. 69.
  11. Shyaka, pp. 10–11.
  12. Chrétien 2003, pp. 88–89.
  13. Chrétien 2003, p. 482.
  14. Prunier 1999, p. 3.
  15. 15.0 15.1 Chrétien 2003, p. 160.
  16. Prunier 1999, p. 18.
  17. Dorsey 1994, p. 38.
  18. 18.0 18.1 18.2 Mamdani 2002, p. 69.
  19. Prunier 1999, pp. 13–14.
  20. Appiah & Gates 2010, p. 218.
  21. 21.0 21.1 Chrétien 2003, p. 217–218.
  22. 22.0 22.1 Prunier 1999, p. 25.
  23. Prunier 1999, pp. 23–24.
  24. Prunier 1999, pp. 25–26.
  25. Prunier 1999, p. 26.
  26. Chrétien 2003, p. 260.
  27. Prunier 1999, p. 27.
  28. Prunier 1999, pp. 28–29.
  29. Prunier 1999, pp. 31–32.
  30. Prunier 1999, pp. 30–31.
  31. Chrétien 2003, pp. 276–277.
  32. Prunier 1999, p. 35.
  33. Gourevitch 2000, pp. 56–57.
  34. United Nations (II).
  35. United Nations (III).
  36. Prunier 1999, p. 42–43.
  37. Mamdani 2002, p. 106.
  38. Prunier 1999, pp. 43–44.
  39. Prunier 1999, p. 44.
  40. Mamdani 2002, p. 113.
  41. Mamdani 2002, p. 114.
  42. Mamdani 2002, p. 108.
  43. 43.0 43.1 43.2 Prunier 1999, p. 45.
  44. Linden & Linden 1977, p. 245.
  45. 45.0 45.1 45.2 Chrétien 2003, p. 302.
  46. 46.0 46.1 Linden & Linden 1977, p. 251–252.
  47. Prunier 1999, p. 43.
  48. Prunier 1999, p. 47.
  49. Prunier 1999, pp. 45–46.

References

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