Racial Equality Proposal

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The Racial Equality Proposal was a proposal put forward at the Paris Peace Conference by the Empire of Japan. The intention of the Japanese was to secure equality of their nationals and the equality for members of the league of nations.[1] The proposal was not intended to be a universal principle[2][3] and would not have led to racial equality as interpreted by modern connotations.

The proposal

Baron Makino Nobuaki
Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes
French Senator Léon Bourgeois
Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando
President of the United States Woodrow Wilson

After the end of seclusion, Japan suffered unequal treaties and demanded equal status with the Powers. In this context, the Japanese delegation to the Paris peace conference proposed the "racial equality clause" in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The first draft was presented to the League of Nations Commission on 13 February as an amendment to Article 21:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible to all alien nationals of states, members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.

The Japanese delegation did not realize the full ramifications of their proposal, since its adoption would have challenged the established norms of the (Western dominated) international system of the day, which involved the colonial subjugation of non-white peoples. The Japanese delegation believed it was asking only that the League of Nations should accept the equality of Japanese nationals; however, a universalist meaning and implication of the proposal became attached to it within the delegation, which drove its contentiousness at the conference.[4]

Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes clarified his opposition and announced at a meeting that

ninety-five out of one hundred Australians rejected the very idea of equality.[5]
Then, Makino Nobuaki announced at a press conference.
We are not too proud to fight but we are too proud to accept a place of admitted inferiority in dealing with one or more of the associated nations. We want nothing but simple justice.[6]

The proposal was also problematic for U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who knew he was dependent on pro-segregation Southern Democrats if he was to have any hope of getting the two-thirds majority needed to ratify the final treaty in the United States Senate. The presence of such strong opposition from the British Empire delegations was undoubtedly a relief to Wilson as it gave him a pretext to scupper the proposal.

April 11

On April 11, 1919, the commission held a final session.[7] Makino stated the Japanese plea for human rights and racial equality.[8] British representative Robert Cecil spoke for the British Empire and addressed opposition to the proposal.[9] Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando spoke in favor of the statement on Human rights.[10] French Senator Léon Bourgeois urged adoption and stated that it would be impossible to reject this proposal that embodied "an indisputable principle of justice".[11]

The proposal received a majority vote on the day.[7] 11 of the 17 delegates present voted in favor of its amendment to the charter, and no negative vote was taken. The votes for the amendment tallied thus:

Total: 11 Yes

The chairman, President Wilson, overturned it, saying that although the proposal had been approved by a clear majority, that in this particular matter, strong opposition had manifested itself, and that on this issue a unanimous vote would be required. This strong opposition came from the British delegation.[13] French Delegate Ferdinand Larnaude immediately stated "A majority had voted for the amendment".[14] The Japanese delegation wanted the transcript to show that a clear majority had been voted for the amendment to the Charter.[14]

Though the proposal itself was compatible with British stance of equality for all subjects as a principle for maintaining imperial unity, there were significant deviations in the stated interests of its Dominions, notably Australia. As it risked undermining the White Australia Policy, then Prime Minister of Australia Billy Hughes and Joseph Cook vigorously opposed the proposal behind the scenes, and so advocated against it through the British delegation. Without the support of its Dominions, the British delegation could not take such a stand on principle. According to Cecil, the delegate representing the British Empire at the Conference, in his diary
...it is curious how all the foreigners perpetually harp on principle and right and other abstractions, whereas the Americans and still more the British are only considering what will give the best chance to the League of working properly.[15]

Reaction

In the end, Cecil felt that British support for the League of Nations was a more crucial goal. The Japanese media fully covered the progress of the conference, leading to an alienation of Japanese public opinion towards the United States of America, leading to broader conflicts later on. In the United States, racial riots occurred by the American deliberate inaction.[16] Although the exclusion of the racial equality proposal allowed Wilson to keep Southern Democratic allies on his side, this proved insufficient to get the treaty ratified by the United States Senate, the United States never joined the League of Nations. The mood of the international system changed dramatically by 1945, so that this contentious point of racial equality would be incorporated into the United Nations Charter in 1945 as the fundamental principle of international justice. The Civil Rights Act was enforced in 1964, while Apartheid was abolished in 1994.

As such, some historians consider that this point could be listed among the many causes of conflict and which led to Japan(ese) actions later on. They argue that the rejection of the racial equality clause proved to be an important factor in turning Japan away from cooperation with the West and toward nationalistic policies.[17] In 1923, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance expired, which gradually resulted in a closer relationship of Japan to Germany and Italy. However Prussian militarism was already entrenched in the Imperial Japanese Army, many members of the Army had expected Germany to win the war and Germany had approached Japan for a separate peace in 1916. The rapprochement towards Germany did not occur until the mid-1930s, a time when Germany had greater ties with Nationalist China.

After the Nazis gained power, Japan decided to not expel Jewish refugees from China, Manchuria and Japan [18][19] and advocated the political slogan Hakkō ichiu.

Japanese motives

The Japanese wished that they themselves were to be treated equally as a nation and be considered a great power. They were more interested in ensuring that Japan, as a sovereign nation and member of the league, be granted the same privileges as Western nations, including the right to overseas colonies.[citation needed]

Japan's colonial rule was also justified on the basis that the Koreans and Taiwanese were an inferior race needing the guidance of a superior race to bring about civilization and enlightenment of their country.[20][21][22] In 1919, in the year of the Paris Peace Conference the Japanese military brutally suppressed the March 1st Movement which was a Korean nationalist uprising responding to discrimination and oppression by the Japanese. The Japanese never extended equal rights, legal or political, to their colonial subjects.[23]

Propaganda

During the Pacific War, Japanese propaganda included phrases like "Asia for the Asians!" and emphasized the perceived need to liberate Asian countries from imperialist powers.[24] In many cases people welcomed Japanese troops as liberators, driving out British, French and other colonial powers from their former Asian colonies to form a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, the Japanese exploited these colonial sentiments for their own economic and political benefit.[25] They manipulated concepts such as Hakkō ichiu (of supposed racial harmony) and support for the proposal in order to portray Japan as a leader and liberator against western imperialism. However, the subsequent brutality and racism of the Japanese led to people of the occupied areas regarding them as equal to or (more often) much worse than Western imperialists.[24] In 1943 the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare’s Population Problems Research Center created a report titled An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus.

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Shimazu, p. 114.
  2. ↑ Shimazu, p. 4.
  3. ↑ Shimazu, p. 113.
  4. ↑ Shimazu, p. 115.
  5. ↑ Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan p.405 as cited in Lauren, p. 90
  6. ↑ Japan, Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, Documents Distributed to the Public, "Interview du Baron Makino, 2 April 1919", located at the Hoover Institution. "Japan May Bolt World League" San Francisco Chronicle, 3 April 1919. as cited in Lauren, p. 90
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Lauren, p. 90
  8. ↑ Lauren, p. 91
  9. ↑ Lauren, pp. 91-92
  10. ↑ Lauren, p. 92
  11. ↑ Conférence de paix de Paris, 1919-1920, Recueil des actes de la Conférence, "Secret," Partie 4, pp. 175-176. as cited in Lauren, p. 92
  12. ↑ Shimazu, pp. 30-31.
  13. ↑ H.V.W.Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, vol.6, London: Henry Frowde and Hodder Stoughton, 1924, p.352
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 Conférence de paix de Paris, 1919-1920, Recueil des actes de la Conférence, "Secret," Partie 4, p.177. as cited in Lauren, p. 93
  15. ↑ Diary, 4 February 1919, Add.51131, f.33, Cecil Papers, as cited in Shimazu, p. 119.
  16. ↑ Lauren, p. 99.
  17. ↑ MacMillan, p. 321
  18. ↑ "Question 戦前の日本における対ユダヤ人政策の基本をなしたと言われる「ユダヤ人対策要綱」に関する史料はありますか。また、同要綱に関する説明文はありますか。". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved 2010-10-04. 
  19. ↑ "猶太人対策要綱". Five ministers council. Japan Center for Asian Historical Record. 1938-12-06. p. 36/42. Retrieved 2010-10-04. 
  20. ↑ Shin, pp. 42–46
  21. ↑ Dikötter, pp. 112–113
  22. ↑ Dikötter, p. 117
  23. ↑ Shin, p. 45
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Anthony Rhodes, Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II, p248 1976, Chelsea House Publishers, New York
  25. ↑ James L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History p 495 ISBN 0-393-04156-5

References

  • Dikötter, Frank (2006). The construction of racial identities in China and Japan:historical and contemporary perspectives. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-5408-X. 
  • Goodman, David G. (2000). Jews in the Japanese mind: the history and uses of a cultural stereotype. Lexington Books. ISBN 0-7391-0167-6. 
  • MacMillan, Margaret (2003). Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World. Random House. ISBN 0-375-76052-0. 
  • Shimazu, Naoko (1998). Japan, Race and Equality. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-17207-1. 
  • Shin, Gi-Wook (1997). Ethnic nationalism in Korea: genealogy, politics, and legacy. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. ISBN 1-85065-353-4. 
  • Lauren, Paul Gordon (1988). Power And Prejudice: The Politics And Diplomacy Of Racial Discrimination. Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-0678-7. 
  • H.W.V. Temperley (1924), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris vol.6, London: Henry Frowde and Hodder Stoughton
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