War Plan Red

Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Red, also known as the Atlantic Strategic War Plan, was a war plan by the United States in the event of war with British Empire (the "Red" forces). The war was seen as "unlikely" and "highly improbable"[1], but was used as a planning exercise to understand the United States ability to defend the Atlantic coast, as well as fight a two-front war with Japan and the British Empire simultaneously (as envisioned in War Plan Red-Orange).

It was developed by the United States Army following the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference; and approved in May 1930 by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy and updated in 1934–35. In 1939 it was decided that further planning was no longer applicable but that the plan be retained. [2] War Plan Red was declassified in 1974.

The war was envisioned as a conflict that arose between the British Empire and the United States due to commercial conflicts. Planning predicted that the British Empire would initially have the upper-hand due to the strength of their navy, and would use their former colony in Canada as an ally to stage an invasion of the United States. As such, the plan focused on the United States waging a war that would first be defensive against British forces invading through Canada, and eventually defeat the British empire through blockade and economic isolation of the United Kingdom.[3]

Contents

History

War Plan Red was one of a number of U.S. color-coded war plans developed after the First World War. War Plan Red was created because some American planners thought that Britain’s imperial reach would bring it into conflict with the U.S.

War Plan Red was declassified in 1974, and caused a stir in American-Canadian relations as Canada, named "Crimson" in the plans, was to have been the principal target of American forces.

Outline

War Plan Red primarily set out a description of Canada's geography, military resources, and transportation, and then proceeded to discuss a series of possible campaigns aimed at occupying key ports and railroad lines before British troops could reinforce Canada. This would prevent Britain from using Canadian resources, ports, or airbases against the United States. the assumption was made that Britain would use Canada as a staging point; therefore, the U.S. planned to invade Canada in several areas.

First, a joint army-navy force was to capture the port city of Halifax, thereby cutting the Canadians off from their British allies. The next objective was to "[s]eize Canadian Power Plants near Niagara Falls" (Carlson, 2005). Then, the plan was to invade along three fronts: From Vermont to take Montreal and Quebec, from North Dakota to grab the railroad center at Winnipeg, and from the Midwest to capture the strategic nickel mines of Ontario. Meanwhile, the Navy would seize the Great Lakes and blockade Canada’s Atlantic and Pacific ports.

Zones of operation

The main zones of operation discussed in the plan are:

No attacks outside Western Hemisphere

Unlike the Rainbow Five plan, War Plan Red did not envision striking outside the Western Hemisphere. The plan assumed that the British Empire would have a much larger army and slightly larger navy. Because of the Empire's historical strength the United States had traditionally planned for a defensive war with it, and War Plan Red continued doing so even as American power grew to match Britain's. Its authors saw conquering Canada as the best way to attack the British Empire, and believed that doing so would cause Britain to negotiate for peace. A problem with the plan was that it did not discuss how to attack the Empire if Canada declared its neutrality, which the authors believed was likely. (They nonetheless refused to accept such a declaration without permission to occupy Canadian ports and some land until the war ended.)[4]

Based on extensive war games conducted at the Naval War College, the plan rejected attacking British shipping or attempting to destroy the British fleet. The main American fleet would instead stay in the western North Atlantic to block British-Canadian traffic. The navy would wait for a good opportunity to engage the British fleet, and if successful would then attack British trade and colonies in the Western Hemisphere.[4]

In 1935 War Plan Red was updated and specified which roads to use in the invasion. "The best practicable route to Vancouver is via Route 99" (Carlson, 2005). Further, in 1935 Americans planned to build three military airfields near the Canadian border and disguise them as civilian airports. "In February 1935, the War Department arranged a Congressional appropriation of $57 million to build three border air bases for the purposes of pre-emptive surprise attacks on Canadian air fields" (Berlin Glasnost, 1992–2007). The airfields were to be kept secret, but their existence was accidentally published by the Government Printing Office and reported on the front page of the New York Times on May 1, 1935.

British strategy for war with America

The Royal Navy never prepared a formal plan for war with America during the first half of the 20th century. The government of David Lloyd George in 1919 restricted the navy from doing so to prevent it from using American naval growth to justify building more ships. Like their American counterparts most Royal Navy officers viewed cooperation with the other nation as the best way to maintain world peace due to the shared culture, language, and goals, although Britons feared that British attempts to regulate trade during a war with another nation might force a war with the United States.[4]

If war did occur, Royal Navy officers generally believed that they could transport an army to Canada if asked, but nonetheless saw it as impossible to defend against the much larger United States, so did not plan to do so; Canada's loss would not be fatal to Britain, however. An invasion of the United States was unrealistic and a naval blockade was too slow. The navy could not use a defensive strategy of waiting for the American fleet to cross the Atlantic because Empire trade was too vulnerable. They believed that the United Kingdom was so vulnerable to a blockade that, if a superior American fleet appeared near the British Isles, it would quickly surrender.[4]

The officers planned to, instead, attack the American fleet from a Western Hemisphere base, likely Bermuda, while other ships based in Canada and the West Indies would attack American shipping and protect Empire trade. The navy would also bombard coastal bases and make small amphibious assaults. India and Australia would help capture Manila to prevent American attacks on British trade in Asia and perhaps a conquest of Hong Kong. The officers hoped that such acts would result in a stalemate that would make continued war unpopular in the United States, then a negotiated peace.[4]

Canadian counterpart

Canadian military officer Lieutenant Colonel James "Buster" Sutherland Brown developed an earlier counterpart to War Plan Red called Defense Scheme No. 1 on April 12, 1921. Maintaining that the best defense was a good offense, "Buster" Brown planned for rapid deployment of flying columns to occupy Seattle, Great Falls, Minneapolis, and Albany. With no hope of holding these objectives, the idea was to divert American troops to the flanks and away from Canada, hopefully long enough for Imperial allies to arrive with reinforcements. Defence Scheme No. 1 was terminated by Chief of the General Staff Andrew McNaughton in 1928, two years prior to the approval of War Plan Red.

See also

Further reading

External links

References

  1. ^ Roberts, Ken. Command Decisions. CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY. http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_0.htm. Retrieved 2011-07-19. 
  2. ^ 15 June 1939: Declassified Letter "Joint board to Secretary of Navy"
  3. ^ "Joint Estimate of the Situation - Red and Tentative Plan - Red". Security Classified Correspondence of the Joint Army-Navy Board, compiled 1918 - 03/1942, documenting the period 1910 - 03/1942. Joint Board, 325. Serial 274.. http://strategytheory.org/military/us/joint_board/Estimate%20of%20the%20Situation%20-%20Red%20and%20Tentative%20Joint%20Basic%20Plan%20-%20Red.pdf. Retrieved 2011-12-03. 
  4. ^ a b c d e Bell, Christopher M. (November 1997). "Thinking the Unthinkable: British and American Naval Strategies for an Anglo-American War, 1918-1931". The International History Review 19 (4): 789-808. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40108144.