| United States v. Kagama | ||||||
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Supreme Court of the United States |
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| Submitted May 10, 1886 Argued March 2, 1886 |
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| Full case name | United States v. Kagama, alias Pactah Billy, an Indian, and another. | |||||
| Citations | 118 U.S. 375 (more) 6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228 |
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| Holding | ||||||
| The Major Crimes Act was constitutional, and, therefore, the case was within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This ruling meant that the San Francisco Court's indictment would stand. | ||||||
| Court membership | ||||||
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| Case opinions | ||||||
| Majority | Miller | |||||
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), is a United States Supreme Court case that upheld the Constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act of 1885. Kagama was selected as a test case by the Department of Justice to test the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act of 1885, which was passed as a rider to an appropriations bill . This Congressional Act gave the federal courts jurisdiction in certain cases of Indian on Indian crimes, even if the crimes were committed on an Indian Reservation. The importance of the ruling in this case was that it upheld the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act of 1885 and confirmed Congress’ plenary power over Indian affairs. Plenary power over Indian tribes, supposedly granted to the U.S. Congress by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (Article I §8.3) was affirmed and broadened by the Supreme Court in this decision; thus, allowing Congress to pass the Dawes Act the following year.[1]
Contents |
In 1883, a Brule Sioux named Crow Dog, killed his government-installed chief. Crow Dog was detained and tried for the murder. However, Crow Dog contended that the United States held no jurisdiction on the reservation. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case confirming Crow Dog’s assertion that they lacked jurisdiction because the crime occurred in Indian Country between two Indians. In the opinion issued by Justice Thomas Stanley Matthews for the Supreme Court on Ex parte Crow dog 109 U.S. 556, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883), the court implied that if Congress intended to exert legislative authority over these tribes they must pass an explicit law-granting jurisdiction to the federal courts over Indian on Indian crime in Indian Country, and then the court would confirm its constitutionality.[2]
In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling of no jurisdiction in Ex Parte Crow Dog, Congress debated the need and importance of teaching Indians regard for the rule of law. Further, it was argued, that if an Indian committed a crime he should be treated like a criminal and tried under the laws of the land. Congress ultimately passed an addendum to the Indian Appropriations Act of March 3, 1885 claiming exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government to prosecute Indians for seven major crimes any where in the land, including Indian reservations. The seven original crimes included in the 1885 act (the list is now 15 crimes) were murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny.[3]
The Hoopa Valley Reservation was originally called the Klamath River Reservation and was created by executive order in 1855. At the time when the reservation was formed, three unique bands of Indian tribes lived on different parts of the Klamath River, each with its own language. The Yurok lived on the Lower Klamath, the Karak occupied the upper Klamath and the Hupa lived at the confluence of the Trinity and Klamath Rivers. When the reservation was formed it was planned as a repository for other tribes within the region.
The tribes living along the river had long established rules for property rights and ownership, including how property was to be passed down from one generation to the next. In some cases, families owned lands that were located at a substantial distance from their “home” village.
In charge of the Reservation was the Indian Agent, Major Charles Porter, who by commanding the local military garrison on the reservation was charged with the de facto responsibility for the people on the reservation. Without legal authority and against government policy, Indian Agent Porter took it upon himself to allot small parcels of land to the local people, thus upsetting an age-old property rights system among families in the Klamath River Valley. On several occasions, Agent Porter had been called out to Kagama and Iyouse’s homes to mediate their property dispute. Shortly before the murder, Kagama requested a title to the land upon which he built his home.[4]
On the day of June 24, 1885, only weeks after the Major Crimes Act was passed, Kagama and Mahawaha went to Iyouse’s house; where an argument ensued which resulted in the stabbing and death of Iyouse. Agent Porter moved quickly to detain both Kagama and Mahawaha on the charge of murder. He informed both federal and state authorities. The state of California declined to prosecute stating that they lacked jurisdiction to try the case. The U.S. Attorney for Northern California forcefully prosecuted the case.[5]
Because the crime supposedly occurred on the Hoopa Valley Reservation, the U.S. Attorney and the BIA fully supported the jurisdictional shift to the federal government and were immediately prepared to prosecute the case in federal courts. Challenges to the jurisdiction were heard before the circuit court in early October 1885, the case received a division of opinion resulting in the case being appealed to the Supreme Court later in October.
Since this case challenged the authority of the Federal courts to try Indian on Indian crime, this case was an interlocutory appeal, meaning that the Supreme Court would have to decide the Constitutionality of the claimed jurisdiction before Kagama could be tried for the killing of Iyouse in federal court.[6]
Twenty-seven-year-old Joseph D. Redding represented the defendants and the United States Solicitor General was George A. Jenks. Arguments were heard before the Supreme Court on May 2, 1886, only five months after the circuit court delivered a split opinion on the matter of jurisdiction. Both briefs remain in the public record.
Jenks argued the language from Crow Dog, claiming that Congress possessed the authority, because of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, to regulate all intercourse with Indian tribes. In his listing of precedents, he cited numerous laws passed by Congress regulating Indian commerce; he did not cite any other case law that supported Congress’ authority over internal Indian matters, because there was none. Further, Jenks incorporated aspects of the political debate in Congress when the act was passed citing that the U.S. should be able to enforce its laws within its borders, regardless of treaty rights. The prosecution’s “contention is that Congress may regulate intercourse with the Indians in whatever way it may deem wise and prudent.”
Joseph Redding defended his clients vigorously. His argument was three-fold. First he argued that in one hundred years of Indian policy, Congress had never prosecuted Indian-on-Indian crime. Further, the indictment as stated contained no element of commerce and was therefore outside the purview of Congress to legislate such a law. Finally, he argued that such a profound shift in Indian policy should not be enacted in a law whose heading and body were wholly inconsistent with the intent of the Major Crimes Act. In effect, he argued that such a law governing a people should be debated in full sight of the American public and on its own merits. Unfortunately, this argument was lacking in two key areas: Redding did not argue that Congress lacked the absolute authority to exert plenary power over sovereign people that reserved certain rights by ceding large amounts of land to the federal government in treaties. Further, he never argued that the tribes did have a system of law that dealt with crimes against another human.[7]
In a unanimous decision issued at the end of May 1886, authored by Justice Samuel Freeman Miller, the Supreme Court ruled that the Major Crimes Act was Constitutional, and, therefore, the case was within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. All told, from the perpetration of the crime to the Supreme Court decision, eleven months had passed. Justice Miller was well known for writing opinions that supported federal power over state’s rights. This ruling meant that the San Francisco Circuit Court's indictment would stand and the case would proceed to trial back in Northern California.[8]
The opinion drew heavily on the language of the Solicitor General’s brief, which by today’s standards, would be considered by many as racially charged. The language in the opinion authored by Miller is infamous for its description of Indian tribes as weak, degraded and dependant on the Federal government for support. He adopts language from Cherokee Nation v Georgia describing tribes as a “ward” and in a state of “pupilage.”[9]
The opinion did not reference the very clause of the Constitution that was the basis for presumed absolute authority over tribal affairs. In effect, this decision claimed that the U.S. government had supreme authority to enforce laws within its borders; but did not mention where this power was outlined in the Constitution.[10]
U.S. v. Kagama was the case that upheld Congress' plenary power over the Native American tribes in the late 19th century. It reaffirmed Congress' power to pass legislation, including the Dawes Act, that would take away many of the liberties that Native Americans had been able to hold on to up until that point. 19th and early 20th century U.S. lawmakers viewed the American Indians as inferior people who would benefit from being assimilated into the Euro-American culture. The laws that followed the Kagama ruling were attempts to destroy the Native American cultural differences and force these tribes to share the Euro-American culture viewed by these lawmakers to be the superior culture.