| Toyama-ryū 戸山流 とやまりゅう |
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Flag of the Imperial Japanese Army and of Japan, from 1867 to 1945. |
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| Date founded | 1925 |
| Country of origin | Japan |
| Founder | Created by the Imperial Japanese Army |
| Current head | Currently three separate organizations, and many schools |
| Arts taught | Battōjutsu • Jūkenjutsu (銃剣術) |
| Descendant schools | Morinaga-ha, Nakamura-ha, Yamaguchi-ha |
Toyama-ryū (戸山流) is Battōjutsu which refer to a combination of Iaijutsu, kata, and tameshigiri created by the Imperial Japanese Army. It is based on Gunto Soho forms developed in 1925 at the Rikugun Toyama Gakko, or "Toyama Army Academy" in Toyama, Tokyo, Japan. The original training and forms were established by a committee. Swordsmen involved in developing this military system included Morinaga Kiyoshi Nakayama Hakudo and Sasaburo Takano.
Today, separate lines of Toyama-ryū are primarily located in the Kantō,Tokai & Kansai region.
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After the Meiji Restoration, officers in the Japanese army were required to carry Western-style sabres. However, this caused problems during battles against rebels in Satsuma (now Kagoshima Prefecture), since soldiers equipped with single-shot rifles and sabres were frequently overwhelmed by samurai who knew Jigen-ryū (示現流）and could charge much faster than the non-Samurai soldiers could cope with.
During the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05), the Cossack cavalries frequently charged against the Japanese infantrymen and again it was extremely difficult for the Japanese to defend themselves using sabres once their enemy reached them.
The Japanese studied the First World War with great enthusiasm, hoping to learn more about fighting modern warfare. They discovered that much fighting was still occurring at close quarters in trench warfare, often with heavy swung weapons like entrenching tools. This likely prompted the Japanese to tighten up their close quarter combat training. The katana was therefore readopted as the Japanese could access domestic sword masters more easily than European ones. Jūkenjutsu (銃剣術) was also developed at this time, being based on the use of sōjutsu (spear) techniques. This later became the rarely practiced sport of jūkendō, after the war ended.
Thus, Japanese army officers were later issued new swords shaped more like katana. However, not all officers had sufficient background in kenjutsu to deploy these weapons in combat. Consequently, in 1925, a simplified form of sword technique was devised that emphasized the most essential points of drawing and cutting. For instance, the army iai-battō kata differ from those of many koryū sword schools in that all techniques are practised from a standing position. (Koryū schools included a number of techniques executed from seiza.) Also, this modern ryū has a strong emphasis on tameshigiri, or "test-cutting."
At the end of World War II, the Toyama Military Academy became the U.S. Army's Camp Zama. Nonetheless, the military iai system was revived after 1952. By the 1970s, three separate organizations represented Toyama-ryū Iaido: in Hokkaidō, the Greater Japan Toyama Ryu Iaido Federation (established by Yamaguchi Yuuki); in Kansai (Kyoto-Osaka area), the Toyama Ryu Iaido Association (established by Morinaga Kiyoshi); and the All Japan Toyama Ryu Iaido Federation (established by Nakamura Taizaburo). Each of these organizations was autonomous and retained its own set of forms; the Hokkaido branch even included sword versus bayonet exercises. Today, there are also at least half a dozen active instructors of Toyama-ryū outside Japan, many of whom are in California, though there are also schools in Poland and Australia.
The adoption of the katana by the Westernised Japanese army was also part of a Nationalist trend in Japan. During the 1920s Japan went through a phase of Militant Nationalism that lasted until defeat in the Second World War. By adopting the katana, the traditional sword of the Samurai[1] the Japanese were allying themselves with the Samurai military tradition. Adopting the Katana also served to calm discontent among the more politicized sections of the army who had been outraged at mechanization (another lesson learned from World War I) which had de-emphasized the role of infantry and cavalry.