Russophobia (Russian: Русофобия) refers to a diverse spectrum of prejudices, dislikes or fears of Russia, Russians, or Russian culture. Its opposite is Russophilia.
In modern international politics the term "Russophobia" is also used more specifically to describe clichés preserved from the times of the Cold War.[1][2] Many prejudices, often introduced as elements of political war against the Soviet Union, are still observed in the discussions of the relations with Russia—whose leadership are seen as manipulating perceptions of Russia and its history by means of deliberate distortions and omissions in representing its Soviet past.[3] The extent of Russophobia varies country by country and depends not only on the geography but also the fraction of the society.
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On 19 October 1797 the French Directory received a document from a Polish general, Michał Sokolnicki, entitled "Aperçu sur la Russie". This became known as the so-called "Testament of Peter the Great" and was first published in October 1812, during the Napoleonic wars, in Charles Louis-Lesur's much-read Des progrès de la puissance russe: this was at the behest of Napoleon I, who ordered a series of articles to be published showing that "Europe is inevitably in the process of becoming booty for Russia".[4][5] Subsequent to the Napoleonic wars, propaganda against Russia was continued by Napoleon's former confessor, Dominique Georges-Frédéric de Pradt, who in a series of books portrayed Russia as "despotic" and "Asiatic" power hungry to conquer Europe.[6]
In 1843 the Marquis de Custine published his hugely successful 1800-page, four volume travelogue La Russie en 1839. Custine's scathing narrative reran what were by now clichés which presented Russia as a place where "the veneer of European civilization was too thin to be credible". Such was its huge success that several official and pirated editions quickly followed, as well as condensed versions and translations in German, Dutch and English. By 1846 approximately 200 thousand copies had been sold.[7]
The Prometheism political strategy conceived by Polish chief of state Józef Piłsudski sought to weaken the threat of Tsarist Russia and later the Soviet Union by facilitating its breakup into its constituent parts.
The influential British economist John Maynard Keynes wrote controversially on Russia, that the oppression in Russia, rooted in the Red Revolution, perhaps was "the fruit of some beastliness in the Russian nature”, also attributing "cruelty and stupidity" to tyranny in both the "Old Russia" (tsarist) and "New Russia" (Soviet).[8]
In the 1930s, Adolf Hitler enhanced the Russophobe stereotypes with his racial theory of subhumans, in part to rationalize and justify the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the atrocities committed against its populace. The notion of Russian — and Slavs in general — as an "inferior race" was actively used in Nazi propaganda.
"Need, hunger, lack of comfort have been the Russians' lot for centuries. No false compassion, as their stomachs are perfectly extendible. Don't try to impose the German standards and to change their style of life. Their only wish is to be ruled by the Germans. <...> Help yourselves, and may God help you!" ("12 precepts for the German officer in the East", 1941) [9]
Modern Russophobia peaked during the Cold War, driven by Western fears of the Soviet role in communism's mission to take over the "Free World". The Sino-Soviet split saw more of a stand against Soviet communism rather than communism in general.
Post-Soviet distrust of Russia and Russians is attributable to backlash against the historical memory of Russification pursued by Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, and backlash against modern policies of the Russian government.[10]
Vlad Sobell[11] believes current "Russophobic sentiment" in the West reflects the West's failure to adapt and change its historical attitude towards Russia, even as Russia has (in his view) abandoned past ideology for pragmatism, successfully driving its economic revival. With the West victorious over totalitarianism, Russia serves to perpetuate the role of a needed adversary owing to its "unashamed continuity with the communist Soviet Union."[12]
In the October of 2004, the International Gallup Organization announced that according to its poll,[13] anti-Russia sentiment remained fairly strong throughout Europe and the West in general. It found that Russia was the least popular G-8 country globally. The percentage of population with a negative perception of Russia was 62% in Finland, 57% in Norway, 42% in the Czech Republic and Switzerland, 37% in Germany, 32% in Denmark and Poland, and 23% in Estonia. However, according to the poll, the people of Kosovo had the lowest opinion of Russia: 73% of Kosovar respondents said their opinion was "very negative" or "fairly negative". Overall, the percentage of respondents with a positive view of Russia was only 31%.
A Russian commentator Vyacheslav Nikonov claimed Russia’s image is so negative in the West by quoting his Canadian friend: "The main problem is that these Russians have white skin. If they had been green, or pink, or came from Mars...or had flowers sticking out of their ears, then everybody would have said – well, these people are different, like Turks, or Chinese, or Japanese. We have no questions about the Japanese. They are different, their civilisation is different. But these Russians ... they are white but they have totally different brains ... which is thoroughly suspicious."[1]
In a report by the Jamestown Federation, dealing with the topic of the (extremely positive according to the report) reception of John McCain's statements about Russia's "double standards in the Caucasus" (referring to how Russia recognized South Ossetia but would not let Chechnya go), one Chechen was quoted to have gone so far as to tell the website that Chechnya "cannot exist within the borders of Russia because every 50 years... Russia kills us Chechens".,[14] demonstrating local fear of the Russian government.
Journalist Fatima Tlisova released an article in 2009 discussing the frequent occurrences of Russian Orthodox crosses being sawed off buildings and thrown off mountains in Circassia, due to the cross being associated with the people who initiated the mass expulsions of Circassians.[15]
The Chinese Qing dynasty General Zuo Zongtang called for war against Russia during the Ili crisis, saying: "We shall first confront them [the Russians] with arguments...and then settle it on the battlefields."[16][17][18][19]
When Russians consorted with Uyghur prostitutes, in Kashgar, China, it set off rage against them.[20]
In 1930s, a White Russian driver accompanying the Nazi agent Georg Vasel in Xinjiang was afraid to meet the Hui General Ma Zhongying, saying "You know how the Tungans hate the Russians." Tungan is another name for Hui. Georg passed the Russian driver off as German to get through.[21] Ma Zhongying, a general in the Chinese army, then did battle against the Russians during the Soviet Invasion of Xinjiang. He was chief of the Tungan 36th Division (National Revolutionary Army). His brother Ma Hushan fought the Russians again, and killed many Russians in combat, leaving many graves at a memorial to war dead with Russian Orthodox crosses.[22]
Uyghur riots against white Russians in Xinjiang during the Ili Rebellion occurred, with Uyghurs calling for White Russians to be expelled along with Han Chinese. White Russians fled out of fear.[23]
In 1951, Chinese Muslim General Bai Chongxi made a speech to the entire Muslim world calling for a war against Russia, and Bai also called upon Muslims to avoid the Indian leader Nehru, accusing him of being blind to Soviet imperialism.[24][25]
According to veteran German author, journalist and Russia-correspondent Gabriele Krone-Schmalz, there is deep disapproval of everything Russian in Estonia,[26] this however has been challenged in a poll conducted by Gallup International[13] which suggests that 23% of Estonians see Russia in negative light while 34% have positive attitude towards Russia.[13]
According to Estonian philosopher Jaan Kaplinski, the birth of anti-Russian sentiment in Estonia dates back to 1940, as there was little or none during the czarist and first independence period, when anti-German sentiment predominated. Kaplinski states the imposition of Soviet rule in 1940 and subsequent actions by Soviet authorities led to the replacement of anti-German sentiment with anti-Russian sentiment within just one year, and characterized it as "one of the greatest achievements of the Soviet authorities".[27] Kaplinski supposes that anti-Russian sentiment could disappear as quickly as anti-German sentiment did in 1940, however he believes the prevailing sentiment in Estonia is sustained by Estonia's politicians who employ "the use of anti-Russian sentiments in political combat," together with the "tendentious attitude of the [Estonian] media."[28] Kaplinski says that a "rigid East-West attitude is to be found to some degree in Estonia when it comes to Russia, in the form that everything good comes from the West and everything bad from the East";[28] this attitude, in Kaplinski's view, "probably does not date back further than 1940 and presumably originates from Nazi propaganda."[28]
The Estonian businessman and politician Tiit Vähi, who briefly served as Estonia's prime minister in 1992 and once more in 1995-1997, described "overall anti-Russian sentiment" as a feature of the populist current in the country's politics, raising it as one among a number of issues with the ruling coalition of Prime Minister Andrus Ansip.[29]
European discrimination watchgroups express worries about the usage of a highly derogatory Estonian term for Russians, tibla, in mainstream media.[30][31]
During the World War II, Mannerheim, Commander-in-Chief of Finland, issued a so-called second Sword Scabbard Declaration, ordering an invasion, alongside with the Nazi army, of the Karelia region of the USSR.
The Finnish administration divided local population by ethnicity into "relative" [to Finns] and "non-relative" peoples. Ethnic Russians (46.7% of the population of the territories occupied by Finns) and Ukrainians (1.3%) were the majority of the "non-relative" population. Karels (39.6%) and Finns (8.5%) were the two main ethnic groups of "relatives". "Non-relatives" were initially discriminated in wages, provision of food, and their freedom of movement was more severely restricted. On 8 July 1941 Mannerheim ordered to send masses of "non-relative" population to concentration camps, with goals of hindering partisan activities and moving civilians away from the war zone. Possible later aim was to relocate "non-relative" population after the war to the areas outside of the Greater Finland and repopulate the area with displaced Finnic people.[32][33][34][35]
Of the 64 thousands of Soviet prisoners of war, 18 thousands died during their captivity majority of them due to malnutrition. Roughly 24 thousands of the local population were sent to concentration camps, and about 4 thousands of them perished primarily due to malnutrition and related conditions.[36][37][38]
According to polls in 2004 62% of Finnish citizens had a negative view of Russia.[13] The main reasons where general distrust of major owers in world politics (in the same poll conducted during the Iraq War, 56% of Finns had a negative view of United States)[13] and historically rooted antipathy. Deportation of Ingrian Finns, autochthones of St. Petersburg, Ingria and other Soviet repressions against its Finnish minorities have contributed negative view of Russia and Russians..
Many Georgians dislike Russia because the two countries had a war in 2008.[39]
Most Japanese interaction with Russian individuals – besides in major cities such as Tokyo – happens with seamen and fishermen of the Russian fishing fleet, therefore Japanese people tend to carry the stereotypes associated with sailors over to Russians.[40][41] According to a report by the Cabinet in Japan, the percentage of Japanese who dislike Russia is 15%. (Japanese dislike towards China is 35%, South Korea 20%, and North Korea 80%.)
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union ethnic clashes have been infrequent but, sometimes serious.[42] The Kyrgyzstan's 2005 Tulip Revolution turned into an anti-Russian pogrom in Bishkek.[43][44]
According to Andrei Tsygankov, ethnic Russians in Latvia are subjected to ethnic discrimination.[45]
Latvian American doctor and former member of the Civic Union, Aivars Slucis wrote op-eds in the New York Times and Washington Post in which he explains to the Americans that Russians have invading other nations in their genes, and they can only understand the language of force. Slucis wrote that he would personally never treat a Russian patient who came into his office.[46] In November 2010, Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis, the Latvian Foreign Affairs Minister, became embroiled in a scandal with Slucis after email correspondence between the two from 2009 was released by journalist Lato Lapsa. In one of the letters, Slucis stated that he would not be able to treat Russians with the same level of care that we would Latvians, and also stated that in the event of a shortage of medical supplies he would deny Russians the right to access to those supplies. In reply, Kristovskis stated that he approved of "both his assessment and vision of the situation".[47][48] According to Lapsa, Kristovskis was also in agreeance with Slucis advocating for freezing and reviewing all citizenships granted after 1991 with the thought of rescinding a majority.[49]
The 1926 published books "The Nineteenth century and after, Volume 99" and "The Twentieth century, Volume 99" stated that the Mongolians sought "the extermination of Russian colonists".[50][51]
Russian officials claim that negative feelings towards Russia are widespread in Poland. The New York Times reported after the Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza that Gleb Pavlovsky, an advisor to President of Russia Vladimir Putin, complained during his 2005 visit to Warsaw that "Poles talk about Russians the way anti-Semites talk about Jews." [52] On the other hand, Poland's foreign minister Adam Rotfeld thinks that Russian politicians are "looking for an enemy and...find it in Poland.".
According to Boris Makarenko, deputy director of a Moscow-based think tank Center for Political Technologies, anti-Russian sentiments have existed in Poland for more than 200 years. He said that much of the anti-Russian feelings in Poland is caused by grievances of the past. [53] The most contentious issue is the massacre of 22,000 Polish officers, priests and intellectuals in Katyn Forest in 1940. [54] "It is easy to understand why, and I am not going to defend Russia either for three divisions of Poland [at the end of the 18 century] or many other [unjust things done to Poland]. These anti-Russian sentiments resurfaced in the recent decade and there are many examples of that." Makarenko said. He also noted that Poland had criticized Russia’s stance on human rights or press freedom, and had clashed with Russia over the Orange Revolution events in Ukraine.[53]
Jakub Boratyński, the director of international programs at the independent Polish think tank Stefan Batory Foundation, said that anti-Russian feelings have substantially decreased since Poland joined the EU and NATO, and that Poles feel more secure than before, but he also admitted that many people in Poland still look suspiciously at Russian foreign-policy moves and are afraid Russia is seeking to "recreate an empire in a different form." [53]
There is a wide anti-Russian sentiment in Romania.[55] It dates back to the conflict between Russian and the Ottoman empires in the early 19th century and the ceding of part of the Moldavian principality to Russia by the Ottoman Empire in 1812 after its de facto annexation, and to the annexations during World War II and after by the Soviet Union of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia and the policies of ethnic cleansing, russification and deportations that have taken place in those territories against ethnic Romanians. Following WWII, Romania, an ally of the Nazi Germany, was occupied by Soviet forces. Soviet dominance over the Romanian economy was manifested through the so-called Sovroms, exacting a tremendous economic toll ostensibly as war-time reparations. Overall, there is a negative perception of everything Russian, including language, culture and people, and of those who take interest in Russia, such individuals seen as pro-Communists or Russophiles.[56][57][58][59]
Universities in Turkmenistan have been encouraged to reject applicants with non-Turkmen surnames, especially ethnic Russians.[60]
In a poll held by Kyiv International Sociology Institute in May 2009 in Ukraine 96% of respondents were positive about Russians as ethnic group, 93% respected Russian Federation and 76% respected Russian establishment. In a poll held by Levada Center in Russia in June 2009 75% of respondents respected Ukrainians as ethnic group but 55% were negative about Ukraine as the state.[63]
In contrast to these polls, statistics released October 21, 2010, according to the Institute of Sociology of National Academy of Science of Ukraine, attitudes towards Russians have continued to decrease since 1994. In response to a question gauging tolerance of Russians, 15% of Western Ukrainians responded positively. In Central Ukraine, 30% responded positively (from 60% in 1994); 60% responded positively in Southern Ukraine (from 70% in 1994); and 64% responded positively in Eastern Ukraine (from 75% in 1994). Furthermore, 6-7% of Western Ukrainians would banish Russians entirely from Ukraine, and 7-8% in Central Ukraine responded similarly. This level of sentiment was not found in Southern or Eastern Ukraine.[64]
The right-wing political party "Svoboda",[61][62][65] small on the national scale (2011 polls in Ukraine put there support on between 4% and 5% of the total electorate),[66][67] has invoked radical Russophobic rhetoric[68] (see poster) and has electoral support enough to garner majority support in local councils,[69] as seen in the Ternopil regional council in Western Ukraine.[70] Analysts explained Svoboda’s victory in Eastern Galicia during the 2010 Ukrainian local elections as a result of the policies of the Azarov Government who were seen as too pro-Russian by the voters of "Svoboda".[71][72]
In Great Britain Russophobia arose during conflicts including the Crimean War[73] and the Anglo-Afghan wars, which were seen as representing Russia's territorial ambitions regarding the British empire in India. This competition for spheres of influence and colonies (see e.g. The Great Game and Berlin Congress) fueled Russophobia in Great Britain. British propaganda of the time took up the theme of Russians as uncultured Asiatic barbarians.[74] The American professor Jimmie E. Cain Jr has claimed that these views were then exported to other parts of the world and were reflected in the literature of late the 19th and early 20th centuries,[73] though this is to miss the fact that these views had been formulated much earlier and already widely published by various French sources since 1812.
In May and June 2006, Russian media cited discrimination against Russian companies as one possible reason why the contemplated merger between the Luxembourg-based steelmaker Arcelor and Russia's Severstal did not finalize. According to the Russian daily Izvestiya, those opposing the merger "exploited the 'Russian threat' myth during negotiations with shareholders and, apparently, found common ground with the Europeans",[75] while Boris Gryzlov, speaker of the State Duma observed that "recent events show that someone does not want to allow us to enter their markets."[76] On 27 July 2006, the New York Times quoted the analysts as saying that many Western investors still think that anything to do with Russia is "a little bit doubtful and dubious" while others look at Russia in "comic book terms, as mysterious and mafya-run."[77]
However, the same article also quoted Aleksandr Temerko, a former vice president of YUKOS, the company which was broken up and sold off by the Russian government, saying that Western investors should treat take-overs by Russian companies with suspicion: "What if tomorrow they decide to grab Mordashov [the oligarch in charge of Severstal] and force him to sell his stock to a state company?... Then some K.G.B. agent will show up at Arcelor and say, 'I'm your new partner'.... Political motives are real; they exist.... Investors are right to fear them." Some Russian activists who are against the greater political control associated with the rule of Putin and the United Russia Party are still disappointed by such Western repulsion, however, as a lack of foreign economic presence and investment is, in their view, one of the reasons why the new government and the KGB can so easily interfere in business and economics. Arcelor shareholders themselves portrayed their doubts about Severstal's bid very differently, and completely unrelated to stereotypes of Russian business practice: they were worried about the manner in which the bid was being presented to them by the Arcelor management, who were in favour of the take-over, and the degree of personal control Mr. Mordashov would have over the new company.[78]
Some Russian and Western commentators express concern about a far too negative coverage of Russia in Western media (some Russians even describe this as a "war of information").[79][80][81] In April 2007 David Johnson, founder of the Johnson's Russia List, said in interview to the Moscow News: "I am sympathetic to the view that these days Putin and Russia are perhaps getting too dark a portrayal in most Western media. Or at least that critical views need to be supplemented with other kinds of information and analysis. An openness to different views is still warranted." [82]
In 1995, years before Vladimir Putin was elected to his first term, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press reported: "coverage of Russia and its president, Boris Yeltsin, was decidedly negative, even though national polls continue to find the public feeling positive toward Russia and largely uncritical of Yeltsin." [83]
In February 2007 the Russian creativity agency E-generator put together a "rating of Russophobia" of Western media, using for the research articles concerning a single theme — Russia's chairmanship of G8, translated into Russian by InoSmi.Ru. The score was composed for each edition, negative values granted for negative assessments of Russia, and positive values representing positive ones. The top in the rating were Newsday (-43, U.S.), The Financial Times (-34, Great Britain), The Wall Street Journal (-34, U.S.), Le Monde (-30, France), while editions on the opposite side of the rating were Toronto Star (+27, Canada) and The Conservative Voice (+26, U.S.) [84][85]
Dr. Vlad Sobell claimed that an example of the anti-Russian bias in the West was that in his opinion President Putin was widely assumed to be guilty of the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, without any evidence being considered as necessary. The only proof the Western press needed for Putin's guilt was, that the victim said so himself on his deathbed.[12]
California-based international relations scholar Andrei Tsygankov has remarked that anti-Russian political rhetoric coming from Washington circles has received wide echo in American mainstream media, asserting that "Russophobia's revival is indicative of the fear shared by some U.S. and European politicians that their grand plans to control the world's most precious resources and geostrategic sites may not succeed if Russia's economic and political recovery continues."[86]
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