The Rizeigat, or Rizigat, or Rezeigat (Standard Arabic Rizayqat) are a Muslim and Arabic tribe of the nomadic Bedouin Baggara (Standard Arabic Baqqara) people in Sudan's Darfur region. The Rizeigat belong to the greater Baggara Arabs fraternity of Darfur and Kordofan and speak Sudanese Arabic. Numbering over one million, the Baggara are the second largest people group in Western Sudan, extending into Eastern Chad. They are primarily nomadic cattle herders and their journeys are dependent upon the seasons of the year. They are a branch of the Juhayna group. They are divided into the Abbala (camel-herding) Rizeigat, who live in northern Darfur and Chad, and the Baggara (cattle-herders) who inhabit south-east Darfur. In turn they are divided into several large clans, notably the Mahamid, Mahariya and Nawaiba. The Mahamid, led by Sheikh Musa Hilal, have been deeply implicated in the Darfur conflict.
The Rizeigat are the largest and most powerful of the Arab people in Darfur. Most live in southeast Darfur. The Rizeigat are composed of three main divisions which are each further subdivided. The Northern Rizeigat herd camels and the Southern Rizeigat herd cattle. Page text.[1]
The ecological differences between the north and south of Sudan allowed for two different types of nomadism to evolve: camel herders in the north and cattle herders in the south7. The people who made up the precursors to the Janjaweed mainly come from the Baggara (cattle herders) who speak Arabic and are Muslim. They live in the west of Sudan, mainly south of Jebel Marra and both north and south of Kordofan. A subsection of the Baggara, the Northern Rizaygat, are one of the largest groups who make up the Janjaweed. [2]
The Rizeigat backed the Sudanese government during the conflict with the SPLA. They formed frontline units as well as Murahleen, mounted raiders that attacked southern villages to loot valuables and slaves. [3] During the Second Sudanese Civil War thousands of Dinka women and children were abducted and subsequently enslaved by members of the Messiria and Rizeigat tribes. An unknown number of children from the Nuba tribe were similarly abducted and enslaved. [4]
In the recent Darfur conflict the Baggara Rizeigat have refused to join the government troops under Janjaweed militias to exterminate rebels. Their leader, Saeed Madibo cites the governnment's lack of development in Rizeigat areas, despite the tribe's history of support in recent southern conflicts. He also states that his tribe was not allowed to be part of the southern peace process.
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The Northern Rizaygat are Arab nomads who herd camels. They are the largest and most powerful of the Arab people in Darfur. Most live in southeast Darfur. Like most nomads, their identity and livelihoods are linked through their animals. They are Bedouin pastoralists who became a part of the Janjaweed. The term janjaweed the term tends to be synonymous with the term ‘nomad’.[2]
Camels are at the center of status and identity. Ownership of camels is directly related to the power of the tribe and defines the nomads relationships to land, resources, and farmers. Owning camels has produced systems that allowed for a symbiotic relationship between the nomads and settled farmers. However, certain pressures have negatively affected this livelihood. These range from population growth and increases in farming (including associated economic and commercial agriculture) to climate change and restrictive legislations. This challenged their lifestyle and led to feeding competition between the nomads and farmers, which shepherds in inevitable conflict. [5]
Power is closely linked to education and it fuels how they understand themselves, their status, and attaining power. The nomads are aware of their lack of education and therefore influence. This leads to a desire for education which pressures them to convert to a sedentary lifestyle with the idea of making education more accessible. [5]
Provided a quick solution to immediate problems. Regardless of it’s instant gratifications, it causes the nomads to struggle with finding a balance between traditional and modern livelihoods. This process has led to lifestyles being eroded, giving way to the process of “sedentarization, conflict, and militarization.” [5]
Livelihood erosion is occurring by many means. These range from sedentarization and (further) militarization to social polarization and governance. Sedentarization is occurring as a result of choices being driven by the promise of development and pressures on livelihoods. Militarization is targeting the youth of the Northern Rizaygat, acting as a culture - therefore creating unity and organization; suggesting the youth think their “voice” is being heard. Social polarization was increased by the willingness of the Northern Rizaygat to support the government’s counterinsurgency. This support hurt intertribal relationships. Peace was hindered by the nomads being denied access to their migration pastures. Loss of markets hurt the Northern Rizaygat’s livelihoods and was locally fueled by the displacement of communities. Climate change is affecting the livelihoods, peace, and stability of Sudan, making the area more vulnerable. The conflict has heightened the environmental instability due to shifts in populations - putting a strain on natural resources. Governance has deprived the nomads of favourable pastoral policies. Within the leadership of the country, there are limited representatives of the Northern Rizaygat.
Exclusion is widespread. Being considered an “‘Arab’, ‘nomad’, ‘pastoralist’, or ‘Janjaweed’” has forced all groups, minorities, and victims alike into one category: culprit.[6] Being the ‘bad guy’ has excluded the nomads, both those who are and are not a part of the Janjaweed, from the humanitarian community. This process has been so obvious that the nomads do not just feel “excluded by the international peace process” but are also able to actively perceive the ways they are being discriminated against.[5] This fuels further alienation, given that they understand they have been ignored by the humanitarian community on a calculated level.[5] The nomads, ignored most of the time by the humanitarians, are trying to make the international community understand how they were vulnerable to climate change, economic failings, neglect, and famine before the conflict like their non-Arab counterparts.[5] However, the international community, despite all the evidence presented to the contrary, continues to treat the nomads as if they are not vulnerable.[5] The government of sudan, equally guilty of turning a blind eye, is also failing to represent the nomads concerns.[5]
Misrepresentation has had different effects. Those involved with the Janjaweed have been “demonized, blamed for the war and the human rights abuses”. This misrepresentation has not just occurred through the international communities view of the conflict but also through the government of sudan. The government of sudan was quick to point its finger when it became accused of human rights violations and did not stop short of turning the Janjaweed and it affiliates into scapegoats just in case any war tribunals were to come about.[7] Being misrepresented creates feelings of resentment within the nomad groups and leads to more tension between communities (settled and pastoral), further inciting the conflict.
The most recent development into the feelings of resentment and deception have only just started to surface. The government of Sudan, afraid of being held responsible for any of its actions or inactions has found its perfect villain: the Janjaweed. The deception the Janjaweed are becoming aware of takes the form of almost every category thus discussed. Their loss of identity and livelihoods through militarization has left members of the Janjaweed even further marginalized.[8] Being a part of the Janjaweed and engaging in its egregious human rights violations has left the constituents of the Janjaweed on the wrong side of government policy and international aid.
Despite what the government of Sudan promised the Janjaweed for their participation in the clearing of non-Arab villages, they have yet to truly receive the compensation for what they were promised - especially in the form of land grants. [8] Not receiving land, or land rights, has left the nomads worse off than they were before making a deal with the government of sudan. After the initial counterinsurgency, intergroup relations collapsed and created vast feelings of resentment - therefore further destroying migration routes and civilized negotiations for land use.
Because of the Western hemisphere's perception of the conflict - that is, in black and white - the Janjaweed have found themselves excluded from aid they desperately need. This exclusion does not just stop at aid, it progresses into exclusion from peace agreements - agreements that rest, at least in part, in the hands of the ‘bad guys’.
Now that Western interest has died down and the spotlight is no longer glaringly on the government of Sudan, the Janjaweed are still sitting at the forefront of the conflict as scapegoats. On the condition that they stay there - justified or not - they will be in constant fear of revenge from their victims and this will not allow for any unilateral surrendering of arms.[7] For as long as they continue to need arms to feel safe, the international community will be unwilling to let go of their prejudices and see the Janjaweed in a new light - that of being victims themselves who were deceived by their own government at a time when they were especially vulnerable.
They live in the South of Darfur and herd cattle. This group was known as the murahaliin. [9]
The Southern Rizaygat and Misseriyya were initially armed by Libya and Chad and then later by the government of Sudan. The drought and famine of 1983-5 put the Rizaygat, Misseriyya, and Humr (a subgroup of the Misseriyya) in an ideal position to be recruited by the government for a counterinsurgency against the Sudanese People's Liberation Army.[10] They had lost a large portion of their animals, which constitute their identity and livelihoods, leaving them vulnerable to predation. This group was known as the murahaliin and they were not paid, but rather allowed to keep booty - which ranged from animals and possessions to anything in between.[9]
The arming of the Arab pastoralists started after the fall of Numeiri under the transitional government of Major-General Siwar al-Dhabab.[10] Allegedly, the nomads were given arms to protect themselves from the SPLA and furthermore as a way for the government to indirectly deal with the nomads concerns regarding development and conflict.[10] Considering the climate, both politically and ecologically, the nomads were weakened due to drought and poverty which allowed the government of Sudan to provide a solution in the form of weapons and self-asserting ideology.[6]
After years of perceived discrimination by their African brothers, who dominated all forms of skilled work, many Arab nomads proved to be willing recruits.[6] It is important to remember that all of Darfur suffered from neglect with respects to services, but the nomads were the most deprived because of how isolated they were. [11] All these factors fed their feelings of enmity towards the non-Arab groups within Darfur. [11]
The Sudanese government promoted attacks by promising no interference so they could seize animals and land from their non-Arab fellows within Darfur, allowing for their resettlement. They were “encouraged to kill as many people as they wanted and to make their destruction as permanent as possible”.[10] In the beginning, the people who made up the Janjaweed were just opportunists for the government of Sudan, but as the conflict continued the Janjaweed provided the government of Sudan cover from blame because of how the conflict appeared to be between nomads and farmers - allowing the government of Sudan to wash their hands of the situation they indirectly created by giving them weapons. As the Western hemisphere became more aware of the killings in Darfur, the government of Sudan denied any direct responsibility for what was happening by denying any links to the Janjaweed - deceiving their closest allies.[10]