In ethical philosophy, rational egoism (also called rational selfishness or egotism) is the principle that an action is rational if and only if it maximizes one's self-interest.[1] The view is a normative form of egoism. However, it is different from other forms of egoism, such as ethical egoism and psychological egoism.[2] While psychological egoism is about motivation and ethical egoism is about morality, rational egoism is a view about rationality (where rationality may or may not be tied to morality). Ethical egoism is also different from amoralism.
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Rational egoism is discussed by the nineteenth-century English philosopher Henry Sidgwick in The Methods of Ethics.[3] A method of ethics is "any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings 'ought' – or what it is 'right' for them – to do, or seek to realize by voluntary action".[4] Sidgwick considers three such procedures, namely, rational egoism, dogmatic intuitionism and utilitarianism. Rational egoism is the view that, if rational, "an agent regards quantity of consequent pleasure and pain to himself alone important in choosing between alternatives of action; and seeks always the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over pain".[5]
Sidgwick found it difficult to find any persuasive reason for preferring rational egoism over utilitarianism. Although utilitarianism can be provided with a rational basis and reconciled with the morality of common sense, rational egoism appears to be an equally plausible doctrine regarding what we have most reason to do. Thus we must "admit an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct; and from this admission it would seem to follow that the apparently intuitive operation of Practical Reason, manifested in these contradictory judgments, is after all illusory".[6]
Two objections to rational egoism are given by the English philosopher Derek Parfit, who discusses the theory at length in Reasons and Persons.[7] First, from the rational egoist point of view, it is rational to contribute to a pension scheme now, even though this is detrimental to one's present interests (which are to spend the money now). But it seems equally reasonable to maximize one's interests now, given that one's reasons are not only relative to he, but to he as he is now (and not his future self, who is argued to be a "different" person). Parfit also argues that since the connections between the present mental state and the mental state of one's future self may decrease, it is not plausible to claim that one should be indifferent between one's present and future self.
Rational egoism is the standard behavioral postulate of neoclassical economics and of rational actor theory in political science. The economic assumption of rational egoism is often referred to in terms of the implied model of the individual, homo economicus, a term that has been used at least since Pareto (1906).
In both fields, the postulate has been criticized and defended on a range of empirical and philosophical grounds. For example, in political science, the assumption of rational egoism gives rise to the paradox of voting - given the low probability of being decisive, relative to the personal benefit from a change in the outcome, voting in elections is not rational unless the number of electors is very small.[8] Supporters of rational egoism, however, might point out that this argument is not sound because cultural influences might incentivize voting. Additionally, Scott Aaronson notes that the likelihood of one vote being decisive is on the order of the square root of the number of voters, due to the central limit theorem. However, the utility of a vote could be expected to scale linearly with the number of voters, implying that one should vote because its importance outweighs the chance that it will make a difference.[9]
The philosopher Ayn Rand also discusses a theory that she called 'Rational egoism' (or more specifically: 'Rational self-interest'). She holds that it is both irrational and immoral to act against one's self-interest.[10] Thus, her view is a conjunction of both rational egoism (in the standard sense) and ethical egoism, because according to objectivist philosophy, egoism cannot be properly justified without an epistemology based on reason:
Her book The Virtue of Selfishness (1964) explains in depth the concept of rational egoism. According to Rand's ethical egoism, every rational individual's own life should be his or her own highest value; rationality is every human being's highest virtue, and one's own happiness is the highest purpose of one's life.
Consequently, Rand was sharply critical of the ethical doctrine of altruism:
Do not confuse altruism with kindness, good will or respect for the rights of others. These are not primaries, but consequences, which, in fact, altruism makes impossible. The irreducible primary of altruism, the basic absolute is self-sacrifice–which means self-immolation, self-abnegation, self-denial self-destruction–which means the self as a standard of evil, the selfless as a standard of the good. Do not hide behind such superficialities as whether you should or should not give a dime to a beggar. This is not the issue. The issue is whether you do or do not have the right to exist without giving him that dime. The issue is whether you must keep buying your life, dime by dime, from any beggar who might choose to approach you. The issue is whether the need of others is the first mortgage on your life and the moral purpose of your existence. The issue is whether man is to be regarded as a sacrificial animal. Any man of self-esteem will answer: No. Altruism says: Yes."[11]