| R v Brown | |
|---|---|
| Court | House of Lords |
| Date decided | 11 March 1993 |
| Citation(s) | [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556; [1993] 2 All ER 75; (1993) 97 Cr App R 44; (1993) 157 JP 337; (1993) 157 JPN 233; (1993) 143 NLJ 399 |
| Judge(s) sitting | Lord Templeman, Lord Jauncey, Lord Lowry, Lord Mustill and Lord Slynn |
| Case history | |
| Prior action(s) | None |
| Subsequent action(s) | Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. the United Kingdom |
R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 is a House of Lords judgment in which a group of men were convicted for their involvement in consensual sadomasochistic sexual acts over a 10 year period. They were convicted of "unlawful and malicious wounding" and "assault occasioning actual bodily harm" contrary to sections 20 and 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The key issue facing the Court was whether consent was a valid defence to assault in these circumstances, to which the Court answered in the negative.
The case is colloquially known as the Spanner case after Operation Spanner, the investigation which led to it.
Contents |
A group of individuals — five of them appellants of the case — had engaged in sadomasochistic sexual acts, consenting in each case to the harm they received. While none of these individuals complained against any of the acts in which they were involved, they were uncovered by an unrelated police investigation.[1] Upon conviction, the individuals argued that they could not be convicted under the Offences against the Person Act 1861, as they had in all instances consented to the acts they engaged in.
The certified question of appeal which the House of Lords was asked to consider was:
"Where A wounds or assaults B occasioning him actual bodily harm in the course of a sado-masochistic encounter, does the prosecution have to prove lack of consent on the part of B before they can establish A's guilt under section 20 or section 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861?"[2]
The Lords — by a bare majority, Lords Mustill and Slynn dissenting — answered this in the negative, holding that consent could not be a defence to offences under sections 20 and 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.
There has been much academic criticism of the judgment's overtones. Marianne Giles calls the judgment: "Paternalism of an unelected, unrepresentative group who use but fail to acknowledge that power".[3]