OpenPuff v3.40 screenshot |
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| Developer(s) | Eng. Cosimo Oliboni |
| Stable release | 3.40 / July 10, 2011 |
| Operating system | Microsoft Windows |
| Type | Steganography tool |
| License | Freeware |
| Website | HomePage |
OpenPuff Steganography and Watermarking, sometimes abbreviated OpenPuff or Puff, is a freeware steganography tool for Microsoft Windows created by Cosimo Oliboni and still maintained as independent software. The program is notable for being the first steganography tool (version 1.01 released on December 2004) that:
Last revision supports a wide range of carrier formats
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OpenPuff is used primarily for anonymous asynchronous data sharing:
The advantage of steganography, over cryptography alone, is that messages do not attract attention to themselves. Plainly visible encrypted messages — no matter how unbreakable — will arouse suspicion, and may in themselves be incriminating in countries where encryption is illegal. Therefore, whereas cryptography protects the contents of a message, steganography can be said to protect both messages and communicating parties.
Watermarking is the action of signing a file with an ID or copyright mark. OpenPuff does it in an invisible steganographic way, applied to any supported carrier. The invisible mark, being not password protected, is accessible by everyone (using the program).[1]
OpenPuff is a semi open source program:
Cryptograhpic algorithms (16 taken from AES, NESSIE and CRYPTREC) are joined into a unique multi-cryptography algorithm:
1. Choosing the cryptography algorithm for data block i f [ i ] = rand ( Oracle )
2. Applying cryptography to data block i Cipher ( D [ i ] ) = f [ i ] ( D [ i ] )
Extensive testing has been performed on the statistical resistance properties of the CSPRNG and multi-cryptography modules, using the ENT,[3] NIST [4] and DIEHARD [5] test suites. Provided results are taken from 64KB, 128KB, ... 256MB samples:
Security, performance and steganalysis resistance are conflicting trade-offs.[6]
[Security vs. Performance]: Whitening
[Security vs. Steganalysis]: Cryptography + Whitening
Data, before carrier injection, is encrypted and whitened: a small amount of hidden data turns into a big chunk of pseudorandom "suspicious data". Carrier injection encodes it using a non linear covering function[7] that takes also original carrier bits as input. Modified carriers will need much less change (Con1) and, lowering their random-like statistical response, deceive many steganalysis tests (Con2).
There will always be a unnegligible probability of being detected even if your hidden stream behaves like a “natural container” (unpredictable side-effects, you're caught Flagrante delicto, ...). Resisting also these unpredictable attacks is possible, even when you will be enforced (by legal or physical coercion) to provide a valid password.[8][9] Deniable steganography (a decoy based technique) allows to convincingly deny the fact that sensible data is being hidden. You only have to provide some expendable decoy data, that you would plausibly want to keep confidential, and reveal it to the attacker, claiming that this is all there is.