MIFARE is the NXP Semiconductors-owned trademark of a series of chips widely used in contactless smart cards and proximity cards. According to the producers, billions of smart card chips and many millions of reader modules have been sold.[1] The technology is owned by NXP Semiconductors (spin off from Philips Electronics in 2006) with its headquarters in Eindhoven, the Netherlands, and main business sites in Nijmegen, the Netherlands, and Hamburg, Germany.
The MIFARE name covers proprietary technologies based upon various level of the ISO/IEC 14443 Type A 13.56 MHz contactless smart card standard.
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The technology is embodied in both cards and readers (also referred to as a Proximity Coupling Device which is suitable to use).
The MIFARE name (derived from the term MIkron Fare Collection System) covers seven different kinds of contactless cards:
The MIFARE Classic card is fundamentally just a memory storage device, where the memory is divided into segments and blocks with simple security mechanisms for access control. They are ASIC-based and have limited computational power. Thanks to their reliability and low cost, those cards are widely used for electronic wallet, access control, corporate ID cards, transportation or stadium ticketing.
The MIFARE Classic 1K offers 1024 bytes of data storage, split into 16 sectors; each sector is protected by two different keys, called A and B. They can be programmed for operations like reading, writing, increasing value blocks, etc.). MIFARE Classic 4K offers 4096 bytes split into forty sectors, of which 32 are same size as in the 1K with eight more that are quadruple size sectors. MIFARE Classic mini offers 320 bytes split into five sectors. For each of these card types, 16 bytes per sector are reserved for the keys and access conditions and can not normally be used for user data. Also, the very first 16 bytes contain the serial number of the card and certain other manufacturer data and are read only. That brings the net storage capacity of these cards down to 752 bytes for Classic 1k, 3440 bytes for Classic 4k, and 224 bytes for Mini. It uses an NXP proprietary security protocol for authentication and ciphering.
MIFARE Classic encryption has been compromised, see below for details.
The MIFARE Ultralight has only 512 bits of memory (i.e. 64 bytes), without cryptographic security. The memory is provided in 16 pages of 4 bytes.
This card is so inexpensive it is often used for disposable tickets for events such as the Football World Cup 2006.
Introduced at the Cartes industry trade show in 2008, MIFARE Ultralight C is part of NXP's low-cost MIFARE offering (disposable ticket). With Triple DES, MIFARE Ultralight C uses a widely adopted standard, enabling easy integration in existing infrastructures. The integrated Triple DES authentication provides an effective countermeasure against cloning.
Key features:
Key applications for MIFARE Ultralight C are Public Transportation, Event Ticketing, Loyalty and NFC Forum Tag Type 2.
The MIFARE DESFire is based on a core similar to SmartMX, with more hardware and software security features than MIFARE Classic. It comes pre-programmed with the general purpose MIFARE DESFire operating system which offers a simple directory structure and files. They are sold in four variants: one with Triple-DES only & 4 Kbytes of storage and three with AES & 2, 4 or 8 KB (see MIFARE DESFire EV1). The AES variants have additional security features, i.e. CMAC. MIFARE DESFire uses a protocol compliant with ISO/IEC 14443-4.[2] The card is based on an 8051 processor with 3DES/AES crypto accelerator, making very fast transactions possible.
The maximal read/write distance between card and reader is 10 cm (4 inches), but actual distance depends on the field power generated by the reader and its antenna size.
In 2011 it was announced that the MIFARE DESFire security had been broken.[3]
(previously called DESFire8)
New evolution of MIFARE DESFire card, broadly backwards compatible. Available with 2 KB, 4 KB and 8 KB NV-Memory. Other features include:
MIFARE DESFire EV1 was publicly announced in November 2006.
MIFARE Plus is a replacement card for the MIFARE Classic. It provides an easy upgrade of existing infrastructures toward high security. Data management is identical to the MIFARE Classic, however the security management requires the modification of the installed reader base. Other features include:
It it less flexible than MIFARE DESFire EV1.
MIFARE Plus was publicly announced in March 2008 with first samples in Q1 2009.[4]
MIFARE Plus, when used in older transportation systems that do not yet support AES on the reader side, still leaves an open door to attacks. Though it helps to mitigate threats from attacks that broke the Crypto-1 cipher through the weak random number generator, it does not help against brute force attacks and cryptoanalytic attacks.[5] During the transition period from MIFARE Classic to MIFARE Plus where only a few readers might support AES in the first place, it offers an optional AES authentication in Security Level 1 (which is in fact MIFARE Classic operation). This does not prevent the attacks mentioned above but enables a secure mutual authentication between the reader and the card to prove that the card belongs to the system and is not fake.
MIFARE SAMs are not contactless smartcards. They are Secure access modules designed to provide the secure storage of cryptographic keys and cryptographic functions for terminals to access the MIFARE products securely and to enable secure communication between terminals and host (backend). MIFARE SAMs are available from NXP in the contact-only module (PCM 1.1) as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-2 and the HVQFN32 format.
Key features:
Integrating a MIFARE SAM AV2 in a contactless smart card reader enables a design which integrates high-end cryptography features and the support of crypto authentication and data encryption/decryption. Like any SAM, it offers functionality to store keys securely, and perform authentication and encryption of data between the contactless card and the SAM and the SAM towards the backend. Next to a classical SAM architecture the MIFARE SAM AV2 supports the X-mode which allows a fast and convenient contactless terminal development by connecting the SAM to the microcontroller and reader IC simultaneously.
MIFARE SAM AV2 offers AV1 mode and AV2 mode where in comparison to the SAM AV1 the AV2 version includes Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Hash functions like SHA-1, SHA-224, and SHA-256. It supports MIFARE Plus and a secure host communication. Both modes provide the same communication interfaces, cryptographic algorithms (Triple-DES 112-bit and 168-bit key, MIFARE Crypto1, AES-128 and AES-192, RSA with up to 2048-bit keys), and X-mode functionalities.
MIFARE was developed by Mikron; the name stands for MIkron FARE-collection System. It was acquired by Philips in 1998. Mikron sourced silicon from Atmel in the US, Philips in the Netherlands, and Siemens in Germany.
After the Philips acquisition, Hitachi licensed MIFARE for the development of the contactless smart card solution for NTT's IC telephone card which started in 1999 and finished in 2006.
Motorola tried to develop MIFARE-like chip for wired-logic version but finally gave up. The project expected one million cards per month for start, but that fell to 100,000 per month just before they gave up the project.
In the NTT contactless IC telephone card project, three parties joined: Tokin-Tamura-Siemens, Hitachi (Philips-contract for technical support), and Denso (Motorola-only production). NTT asked for two versions of chip, i.e. wired-logic chip (like MIFARE Classic) with small memory and big memory capacity. Hitachi developed only big memory version and cut part of the memory to fit for the small memory version.
In 2008 NXP licenced MIFARE Plus and MIFARE DESFire to Renesas Technology. In 2010 NXP licenced MIFARE to Gemalto.[6] In 2011 NXP licenced Oberthur[7] to use MIFARE on SIM cards. These licencees are developing Near Field Communication products.
Infineon Technologies(formerly Siemens) licenced MIFARE from Mikron in 1994 and developed and today produces various dervatives based on MIFARE technology including 1K memory and various microcontrollers with MIFARE emulations, including devices for use in USIM with Near Field Communication.
The encryption used by the MIFARE Classic card uses a 48 bit key.[8]
A presentation by Henryk Plötz and Karsten Nohl[9] at the Chaos Communication Congress in December 2007 described a partial reverse-engineering of the algorithm used in the MIFARE Classic chip. Abstract and slides[10] are available online. A paper that describes the process of reverse engineering this chip was published at the August 2008 USENIX security conference.[11]
In March 2008 the Digital Security[12] research group of the Radboud University Nijmegen made public that they performed a complete reverse-engineering and were able to clone and manipulate the contents of a MIFARE Classic card.[13] For demonstration they used the Proxmark device, a 125 kHz / 13.56 MHz research instrument.[14] The schematics and software are released under the free GNU General Public License by Jonathan Westhues in 2007. They demonstrate it is even possible to perform card-only attacks using just an ordinary stock-commercial NFC reader in combination with the libnfc library.
The Radboud University published three scientific papers concerning the security of the MIFARE Classic:
In response to these attacks, the Dutch Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations stated that they would investigate whether the introduction of the Dutch Rijkspas could be brought forward from Q4 of 2008[15].
NXP tried to stop the publication of the second article by requesting a preliminary injunction. However, the injunction was denied, with the court noting that, "It should be considered that the publication of scientific studies carries a lot of weight in a democratic society, as does informing society about serious issues in the chip, because it allows for mitigating of the risks."[16][17]
Both independent research results are confirmed by the manufacturer NXP.[18]
The MIFARE Classic encryption Crypto-1 can be broken in about 200 seconds on a laptop,[19] if approx. 50 bits of known (or chosen) key stream are available. This attack reveals the key from sniffed transactions under certain (common) circumstances and/or allows an attacker to learn the key by challenging the reader device.
The attack proposed in[20] recovers the secret key in about 40 ms on a laptop. This attack requires just one (partial) authentication attempt with a legitimate reader.
Additionally there are a number of attacks that work directly on a card and without the help of a valid reader device.[21] These attacks have been acknowledged by NXP.[22] In April 2009 new and better card-only attack on MIFARE Classic has been found. It was first announced at the Rump session of Eurocrypt 2009.[23] This attack was presented at SECRYPT 2009.[24] The full description of this latest and fastest attack to date can also be found in the IACR preprint archive.[25] The new attack improves by a factor of more than 10 all previous card-only attacks on MIFARE Classic, has instant running time, and it does not require a costly precomputation. The new attack allows to recover the secret key of any sector of MIFARE Classic card via wireless interaction, within about 300 queries to the card. It can then be combined with the nested authentication attack in the Nijmegen Oakland paper to recover subsequent keys almost instantly. Both attacks combined and with the right hardware equipment such as Proxmark3, one should be able to clone any MIFARE Classic card in not more than 10 seconds. This is much faster than previously thought.
For systems based on contactless smartcards (e.g. public transportation), security against fraud relies on many components, of which the card is just one. Typically, to minimize costs, systems integrators will choose a relatively cheap card such as a MIFARE Classic and concentrate security efforts in the back office. Additional encryption on the card, transaction counters, and other methods known in cryptography are then employed to make cloned cards useless, or at least to enable the back office to detect a fraudulent card, and put it on a blacklist. Systems that work with online readers only (i.e., readers with a permanent link to the back office) are easier to protect than systems that have offline readers as well, for which real-time checks are not possible and blacklists cannot be updated as frequently.
Card name | Locality | Details |
---|---|---|
Tarjeta Sin Contacto | Argentina (Rosario) | Transporte Urbano de Pasajeros TUP http://www.etr.gov.ar/ |
EYCON e-Bus | Argentina (Bahía Blanca) | 1K MIFARE, planned to be used on buses and taxis. |
Red Bus | Argentina (Córdoba, Mendoza, Salta) | 1K MIFARE. |
SUBE | Argentina (Buenos Aires) | Metro, trains and buses http://www.sube.gob.ar |
Tarjeta Bip! | Chile (Santiago de Chile) | Metro de Santiago, Transantiago, http://www.tarjetabip.cl |
Istanbulkart | Turkey (Istanbul) | MIFARE DESFire EV1 - Buses, ferry boats, metro, light metro, trams and overground trains |
KentKart | Turkey (Izmir) | Metro, bus, passenger ship |
KGS Card | Turkey | Toll Highways, KGS (acronym for Contactless Card Toll System), MIFARE Classic 1K, MIFARE Plus 2K (in Classic compatibility mode) |
Muzekart | Turkey | MIFARE Classic 1K, MIFARE Plus 2K |
Etalons | Latvia | MIFARE Ultralight 512 bytes |
Moscow Metro | Russia (Moscow) | Ultralight disposable ticket |
Touch 'n Go | Malaysia | |
Mybi, T-money, Upass | South Korea | |
Cívica | Colombia (Medellin) | |
ETS Blue | Canada (Edmonton, Alberta) | |
EMcard | Slovakia | Used by almost every public transport system in Slovakia and some in Czech Republic. In most cases only referred to as BCK - Bezkontaktná cipová karta (contactless smart card) |
RATB Activ | Romania (Bucharest) | |
ORCA Card | USA (Seattle, Washington) | |
In Karta | Czech republic (Prag) | (www.cd.cz) |
opencard | Czech republic (Prag) | |
Go-To Card | USA (Minneapolis, Minnesota) | |
Clipper card | USA (San Francisco Bay Area, California) | MIFARE DESFire; replacing TransLink, which used a Motorola Card. http://clippercard.com |
Breeze card | USA (Atlanta MARTA, Georgia) | MIFARE Ultralight and Classic. http://www.breezecard.com/ |
Oyster card | England (London) | migrating from MIFARE Classic to MIFARE DESFire EV1[26] |
ACTION MyWay | Australia (Canberra) | |
SmartRider | Australia (Perth) | MIFARE Classic 1k |
Myki | Australia (Victoria) | MIFARE DESFire card |
TransLink Go card | Australia (Brisbane) | |
MIFARE4Mobile | ? | MIFARE in the NFC mobile services context |
OV-chipkaart | Netherlands | Currently being introduced as a single payment system for public transportation in the Netherlands, using a MIFARE Classic card. |
Charlie Card | USA (Boston, Massachusetts) | MBTA v. Anderson - Civil case related to the responsible disclosure of flaws in the system |
Yang Cheng Tong | China (Guangzhou) | |
Yikatong | China (Beijing) | |
EasyCard | Taiwan | |
IndianRailways | India | MIFARE DESFire cards, Indian railways (five major cities) |
Cardz Me | India (Karnataka) | Issued to students in the Indian state of Karnataka by Cardz Middle East |
Warszawska Karta Miejska | Poland (Warsaw) | 1K MIFARE Classic cards used on buses, trams, subway and railroad |
Białostocka Karta Miejska | Poland (Białystok) | 1K MIFARE Classic cards used on buses |
EasyRider | England (Nottingham) | Nottingham City Transport |
OPUS card | Canada (Montreal) | Société de transport de Montréal |
Green Card | Australia (Hobart) | |
RioCard | Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) | |
Orovale | Brazil (Teresopolis) | Viação Dedo de Deus (buses) |
Bilhete Único | Brazil (São Paulo) | |
StrongLink | China (Beijing) | |
BuTra | Croatia (Osijek) | |
Resekortet | Sweden | MIFARE Classic 1K[27] |
SL | Sweden | MIFARE Classic 4K. Stockholms lokaltrafik (Stockholm public transit card) |
Rejsekort | Denmark | MIFARE Classic 4k |
Baku metrocard | Azerbaijan (Baku) | 1K MIFARE Classic, 1K MIFARE Plus S[28] |
SmartCard | Ireland (Dublin) | Iarnród Éireann, MIFARE 1K (According to FareBot). |
Institutions