| Jacob & Youngs v. Kent | |||||||||||
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| New York Court of Appeals | |||||||||||
| Argued December 1, 1920 Decided January 25, 1921 |
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| Holding | |||||||||||
| Owner of a home could not recover from the construction company as a result of a breach of contract due to the constructor having completed substantial performance. New York Supreme Court Appellate Division affirmed as modified. | |||||||||||
| Chief Judge Frank H. Hiscock | |||||||||||
| Associate Judges Benjamin Cardozo, Chester B. McLaughlin, John W. Hogan, Frederick E. Crane, Cuthbert W. Pound, William S. Andrews | |||||||||||
| Case opinions | |||||||||||
| Majority by: Cardozo Joined by: Hiscock, Hogan, Crane Dissent by: McLaughlin Joined by: Pound, Andrews |
Jacob & Young, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239 (1921) is a famous contract law case with the majority opinion by Judge Cardozo. It dealt with the matters of material breach and substantial performance.[1]
Contents |
The defendant learned that some of the pipe, instead of being made in Reading, was Cohoes piping. The Defendant asked the plaintiff via the architect to do the work all over again supported by the perfect tender rule. Because the pipes had already been encased within the walls except in a few places where it had to be exposed, to replace the Cohoes Pipe with the contracted for Reading Pipe would have meant more than the substitution of other pipe. Plaintiff would have had to demolish at great expense of substantial parts of the completed structure. The plaintiff left the work untouched, and asked for a certificate that the final payment was due (arguing substantial performance).
The plaintiff builder wins and gets his money; he does not have to rip out the Cohoes pipe and replace it with Reading.
When the defect is insignificant, the court will find that there was substantial performance and excuses the breach of using the same type and quality of pipe which parties had agreed were the same except for brand name. Measure of damages is not the cost to rip out the old pipe and install the new, but the difference in value which in this case is zero dollars.
The rule, however, is argued to contain a tautology. If there is material breach, then by logic there was not substantial performance. If the court or jury holds that there was substantial performance, then by logic there is no material breach.