| Hundred Days' Reform | |||||||
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| Traditional Chinese | 戊戌變法 | ||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 戊戌变法 | ||||||
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| Alternative Chinese name | |||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 百日維新 | ||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 百日维新 | ||||||
| Literal meaning | Hundred Days' Reform | ||||||
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The Hundred Days' Reform was a failed 104-day national cultural, political and educational reform movement from 11 June to 21 September 1898 in late Qing Dynasty China. It was undertaken by the young Guangxu Emperor and his reform-minded supporters. The movement proved to be short-lived, ending in a coup d'état ("The Coup of 1898") by powerful conservative opponents led by Empress Dowager Cixi.
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Guangxu (1875–1908), ordered a series of reforms aimed at making sweeping social and institutional changes. This was in response to weaknesses exposed by China's defeat by Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5, not long after the First and Second Opium Wars; this blow came as a major shock to the Chinese, because Japan had been regarded as a tributary state, was much smaller than China, and was regarded as inferior. Moreover, the defeat of China by Japan led to a scramble for 'privileges' in China by other foreign powers, notably the German Empire and Russia, further awakening the stubborn conservatives.
With the help of certain senior officials of the Qing court, who were supporters of reform, Kang Youwei was permitted to speak with the Emperor, and his suggestions were enacted. Some of Kang's students were also given minor but strategic posts in the capital to assist with the reforms. Some essential preconditions of reform were:
The reformers declared that China needed more than "self-strengthening" and that innovation must be accompanied by institutional and ideological change.
The reason that conservatives like Prince Duan opposed the reformers, was that they suspected foreigners were behind the plot. He wanted to expel foreigners completely from China.[1]
The conservatives were far from being opposed to modern technology. The conservatives brought in the Chinese Muslim Kansu Braves army to Beijing on their side, and it was armed with modern repeater rifles and artillery.[2] Prince Tuan, who helped crush the hundred days reform, himself commanded modernized Manchu Bannermen Divisions.[3]
The court put into effect some reform measures a decade later. These included the abolition of the Imperial Examination in 1905, educational and military modernization patterned after the model of Japan, and an experiment in constitutional and parliamentary government. The suddenness and ambitiousness of the reform effort actually hindered its success. One effect, to be felt for decades to come, was the establishment of the New Army, which, in turn, gave rise to warlordism.
On the other hand, the failure of the reform movement gave great impetus to revolutionary forces within China. Changes within the establishment were seen to be largely hopeless, and the overthrow of the whole Qing government increasingly appeared to be the only viable way to save China. Such sentiments directly contributed to the success of the Chinese Revolution in 1911, barely a decade later.
Views of the Hundred Days' Reform have grown increasingly more complex and nuanced. The traditional view [4] portrayed the reformers as heroes and the conservative elites, particularly the Empress Dowager Cixi, as villains unwilling to reform because of their selfish interests.
However, some historians in the late 20th century have taken views that are more favorable to the conservatives and less favorable to the reformers. In this view, Kang Youwei and his allies were hopeless dreamers unaware of the political realities in which they operated. This view argues that the conservative elites were not opposed to change and that practically all of the reforms that were proposed were eventually implemented.
For example, Sterling Seagrave, in his book "The Dragon Lady", argues that there were several reasons why the reforms failed. Chinese political power at the time was firmly in the hands of the ruling Manchu nobility. The highly xenophobic Iron hats faction dominated the Grand Council and were seeking ways to expel all Western influence from China. When implementing reform, the Guangxu Emperor by-passed the Grand Council and appointed four reformers to advise him. These reformers were chosen after a series of interviews, including the interview of Kang Youwei, who was rejected by the Emperor and had far less influence than Kang's later boasting would indicate. At the suggestion of the reform advisors, the Guangxu Emperor also held secret talks with former Japanese Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi with the aim of using his experience in the Meiji Restoration to lead China through similar reforms.
It has also been suggested, controversially, that Kang Youwei actually did a great deal of harm to the cause by his perceived arrogance in the eyes of the conservatives. Rumours about potential repercussions, many of them false, made their way to the Grand Council, and were one of the factors in their decision to stage a coup against the Emperor. Kang, like many of the reformers, grossly under-estimated the reactionary nature of the vested interests involved.
The Emperor set about to enact his reforms largely bypassing the powerful Grand Council. The councillors, angry at the Emperor's actions and fearful of losing the political power they had, then turned to the Empress Dowager Cixi to remove the emperor from power. Many, though not all, of the reforms were cancelled. The Council, now confident in their power, pushed for the execution of the reformers, an action that was carried out ruthlessly.
According to Professor Lei Chia-sheng,[5] Japanese former prime minister Itō Hirobumi (伊藤博文) arrived in China on September 11, 1898, approximately the same time that Kang Youwei invited British missionary Timothy Richard to Beijing. Richard suggested that China should hand over some political power to Itō in order to further push China's reform efforts.[6] On September 18, Richard successfully convinced Kang to adopt his plan in which China would join a federation (合邦) with China, Japan, the United States, and The United Kingdom. It was Richard's (and perhaps also Itō's) ulterior motive to convince China to increasingly relinquish sovereign authority. Kang nonetheless asked fellow reformers Yang Shenxiu (楊深秀) and Song Bolu (宋伯魯) to report this plan to the Guangxu Emperor.[7] On September 20, Yang sent a memorandum conveying this effect.[8] In another memorandum to the Emperor written the next day, Song advocated the formation of a federation and the sharing of the diplomatic, fiscal, and military powers of the four countries under a hundred-man committee.[9] Prof. Lei argues that this plot was the reason why Cixi, who had just returned from the Summer Palace on September 19, decided to put an end to the reforms with the September 21 Coup.
On October 13, following the coup, British ambassador Sir Claude MacDonald reported to his government about the Chinese situation, saying that Chinese reforms had been devastated by Kang and his friends' actions.[10] British diplomat Baurne, who thought Richard to be a plotter, separately claimed in his own report that Kang was a dreamer who had fallen for Richard's convincing arguments.[11] The British and American governments had been largely unaware of the "federation" plot, which appears to have been Richard's own personal idea. The Japanese government might have been aware of Richard's plan, since his accomplice was the former Japanese prime minister, but there is no evidence to this effect yet.