In philosophy, four-dimensionalism (also known as the doctrine of temporal parts and the theory that objects "perdure") is an ontological position that an object's persistence through time is like its extension through space and an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies.[1]
Eternalism is a philosophical approach to the ontological nature of time, according to which all points in time are equally "real", as opposed to the presentist idea that only the present is real.[2] Perdurantism or perdurance theory is a philosophical theory of persistence and identity.[3] according to which an individual has distinct temporal parts throughout its existence. Thus eternalism is a theory of time, while perdurantism is a theory about the identity of objects over time. Sider (1997)[1] uses the term four-dimensionalism to refer to perdurantism. Michael Rea (Forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics), however, uses the term ‘four-dimensionalism’ to mean the view that presentism is false as opposed to ‘perdurantism’, the view that objects last over time without being wholly present at every time at which they exist.[4]
Eternalism and perdurantism tend to be discussed together because many philosophers argue for a combination of eternalism and perdurantism, considering both as better theories than their counterparts, presentism and endurantism, respectively. It may be argued that the acceptance of perdurantism and rejection of eternalism would be incoherent.
Contemporary four-dimensionalists include, according to Sider (1997), Armstrong (1980), Hughes (1986) , Heller (1984, 1990,1992,1993) and Lewis (1983, 1986).
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Temporal parts is a concept used in contemporary metaphysics in the debate over the persistence of material objects. Objects typically have parts that exist in space—a human body, for example, has spatial parts like hands, feet, and legs.
Presentism is an ontological viewpoint which attempts to account for how consciousness functions in relation to time. Presentism asserts that only the present exists. The past and the future, therefore, are seen as non-existent. To a presentist, the memory accounts for the collection of events that have already occurred. Similarly, the future is conceptualized as being a mental construct. Therefore, presentism is attempting to demonstrate that the total sum of the actual world occupies the present moment.
Consequently, eternalism is the ontological view which postulates that past, present and future all equally exist. While the presentist asserts that the past and future are only logical constructs, the eternalist believes that time exists as an objective manifestation. Eternalism is the basic construct behind four-dimensionalism, as it accounts for the reality of past and future rather than proposing that all events occupy the present.
J.M.E. McTaggart in The Unreality of Time, identified two descriptions of time, which he called the A-series and the B-series. The A-series identifies positions in time as past, present, or future; the B-series, as earlier than or later than some time position.
The three dimensionalist view imagines time as being a unique dimension, not analogous to the three spatial dimensions: length, width and height. Whereas the four dimensionalist proposes that objects are extended across time, the three dimensionalist adheres to the belief that all objects are wholly present at any moment at which they exist. While the three dimensionalist believes that objects can be differentiated based on their spatial dimensions, the same does not apply to time. Rather, the existence of temporal parts is a linguistic construct. For example, the person described by the phrase “Descartes in 1635” is objectively the same as the person described as “Descartes in 1620.” Temporal parts are not existent for the three dimensionalist. Therefore, change does not need to be accounted for. Accordingly, the only relation between these objects is that of identity. This helps to account for the paradox of change.[5] The four-dimensionalist view, by contrast, asserts that all objects occupying different time frames are inherently different versions of the same object. In order to account for these different versions, the notion of temporal parts is introduced. Differences among temporal parts are how a four-dimensionalist accounts for change. Thus, the temporal part described by the phrase “Descartes in 1635” is different from the temporal part described by the phrase “Descartes in 1620.” When combined, these parts form a spacetime “worm.”[5]
[1].. This view is variously called ‘four-dimensionalism’, ‘perdurantism’, or ‘the doctrine of temporal parts’. Some think that four-dimensionalism understood as the denial of presentism implies four-dimensionalism understood as perdurantism. But whether or not that is true, the important thing to recognize is that these are two very different views. To avoid confusion, I will in this paper reserve the term ‘four-dimensionalism’ exclusively for the view that presentism is false, and I will use the term ‘perdurantism’ to refer to the view that objects last over time without being wholly present at every time at which they exist.
— MICHAEL C. REA, FOUR DIMENSIONALISM, Forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics)
sophical Studies 46: 323-34. Reprinted in Rea 1997: 12.-330.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
T Sider - 2003 - arsdisputandi.org, Four-dimensionalism: An ontology of persistence and time, Cited by 744 [http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000200/article.pdf. In analytical metaphysics, there are three, closely related, debates about time and the nature of change and persistence. The first is about what there is. Presentists believe that only present things exist, whereas eternalists think that also past and future things exist, even though ...
CHAPTER 9 FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM i. INTRODUCTION. Cited by 48 [ https://www.nd.edu/~mrea/papers/Four%20Dimensionalism.pdf]. FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM, as it will be understood in this chapter, is a view about the ontological status of non-present objects. Presentists say that only present objects exist. There are no ...
How do the familiar concrete objects of common-sense – houses, trees, people, cars and the like – persist through time? According to the position known as 'four-dimensionalism' or 'the doctrine of temporal parts', ordinary concrete objects persist through time by perduring, ie, by ...
2 ,Two Arguments from Sider's Four‐Dimensionalism, Cited by 19 [3]. The Argument from Vagueness Sider's argument from vagueness for Four-Dimensionalism is adapted from his reconstruction of David Lewis's argument for the following conclusion about fusions.2 ... The Principle of Universal Fusions (PUF): Every class of objects has a fusion.
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