Faretta v. California

Anthony Faretta v. State of California

Supreme Court of the United States
Argued November 19, 1974
Decided June 30, 1975
Full case name Anthony Faretta v. State of California
Citations 422 U.S. 806 (more)
422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83 (1975)
Prior history On writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District
Holding
A criminal defendant in a state proceeding has a constitutional right to knowingly refuse the aid of an attorney. Judgment vacated.
Court membership
Case opinions
Majority Stewart, joined by Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Powell
Dissent Burger, joined by Blackmun, Rehnquist
Dissent Blackmun, joined by Burger, Rehnquist

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975),[1] was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to refuse counsel and represent themselves in state criminal proceedings.

Contents

Facts of the case

The defendant Anthony Faretta was accused of grand theft in Los Angeles County, California. Well before the trial began, the defendant requested permission to represent himself. After an admonition, the court granted his request, but later reversed the ruling and required a public defender to conduct the trial on the defendant's behalf. The jury convicted the defendant. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court of California denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari.

Opinion of the court

In the opinion of the court by Justice Stewart, the Court held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has the constitutional right to refuse appointed counsel and conduct the trial when he or she voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. However, such a defendant may not later complain that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court brought analogies to the Star Chamber, saying "the Star Chamber has, for centuries, symbolized disregard of basic individual rights. The Star Chamber not merely allowed, but required, defendants to have counsel. The defendant's answer to an indictment was not accepted unless it was signed by counsel. When counsel refused to sign the answer, for whatever reason, the defendant was considered to have confessed."[2]

Dissents

Justice Blackmun wrote a dissent where he questioned the additional procedural problems that would inevitably arise by the decision, arguing that such procedural problems would far outweigh whatever tactical advantage the defendant may feel he has gained by electing to represent himself. Blackmun concludes with the following: "If there is any truth to the old proverb 'one who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client,' the Court by its opinion today now bestows a constitutional right on one to make a fool of himself."

See also

References

  1. ^ 422 U.S. 806 Full text of the opinion courtesy of Findlaw.com.
  2. ^ 821-22