| Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. | ||||||
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Supreme Court of the United States |
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| Argued October 8, 1991 Decided June 24, 1992 |
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| Full case name | Thomas Cipollone, Individually and As Executor of the Estate of Rose D. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., et al. | |||||
| Citations | 505 U.S. 504 (more) 112 S. Ct. 2608; 120 L. Ed. 2d 407; 60 U.S.L.W. 4703; CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. P13,199; 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1087; 92 Cal. Daily Op. Service 5517; 92 Daily Journal DAR 8688; 6 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 589 |
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| Prior history | 893 F. 2d 541 (rev'd in part, aff'd in part, and remanded) | |||||
| Court membership | ||||||
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| Case opinions | ||||||
| Majority | Stevens, joined by Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter (Parts I, II, III, and IV) | |||||
| Concurrence | Stevens, joined by Rehnquist, White and O'Connor (Parts V and VI) | |||||
| Concur/dissent | Blackmun, joined by Kennedy and Souter | |||||
| Concur/dissent | Scalia, joined by Thomas | |||||
| Laws applied | ||||||
| Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1331-1340 | ||||||
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), was a United States Supreme Court case. In a split opinion, the court held that the Surgeon General's warning did not preclude suit by smokers against tobacco companies on several claims. The warning at issue said:
WARNING: THE SURGEON GENERAL HAS DETERMINED THAT CIGARETTE SMOKING IS DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEALTH.
The court's holding and some of Justice Stevens's reasoning enjoyed majority support, but the opinion eventually gained full majority support 16 years later in Altria Group v. Good.
Contents |
Rose Cipollone began smoking at the age of sixteen. She continually smoked a pack and a half a day of Chesterfield cigarettes until she first attempted to quit when she became pregnant, as requested by her husband Antonio Cipollone. Though she cut down on her regular smoking, she still secretly smoked during her pregnancy. In 1955, Mrs. Cipollone switched to Liggett and Myers brand of cigarettes on the basis that their “pure white Miracle Tip” filter appeared to be a healthier alternative to her habit[1]. In 1968, she switched once again, this time to Philip Morris’ Virginia Slim brand because the women advertised smoking seemed “glamorous"[1]. A few years later, in 1972, Ms. Cipollone switched to smoking Parliament brand cigarettes for reasons she attributed to health; Parliaments were advertised to have a recessed filter and lower tar content. Finally, Cipollone switched to Lorillard’s True cigarettes under the recommendation of her physician to either quit smoking or switch to this brand of cigarette with its advertised plastic filter inserts. Rose Cipollone was under the misguided impression that “tobacco companies wouldn’t do anything to kill you,” and therefore, continued to smoke cigarettes[1].
In the mid-1960s, Rose Cipollone began to develop a smokers’ cough, as well as problems such as chest pain and hypertension. In 1981, doctors found a carcinogenic spot on her right lung and performed a partial lung resection. Mrs. Cipollone still continued to smoke, “though often now in secret"[1]. In 1982, the cancer had spread to her lower and middle right lung, and Cipollone had surgery to remove the entire lung as well as a large adrenal mass in 1983. Rose Cipollone died on October 24, 1984, after her lung cancer had spread and become inoperable.
Rose Cipollone became the litigant in the case after she was recommended by her chest surgeon to attorney Marc Edell. Edell had previously represented the asbestos companies in their defense in regard to the health-related claims brought against them. Due to his involvement in asbestos litigation, Edell became familiar with “pulmonary pathology and risks of smoking” and became interested in litigation against the tobacco industry[1]. In need of a client, Edell took on Cipollone’s case in 1983 and filed suit against Liggett and Myers, Philip Morris, and Lorillard in five separate tort cases on August 1.
Edell’s initial case focused on the factor of the cause of Cipollone’s addiction: the nicotine found in her cigarettes. In the initial presentation of the facts, Edell brought forth a series of claims. He planned to prove that:
The tobacco companies motioned to dismiss the case, citing the 1966 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertisement Act, which the companies argued preempted independent state regulation of tobacco and therefore prevented state litigation, making the tobacco industry immune to suits. Though the trial judge, Sarokin, ruled in favor of Cipollone, the ruling was overturned by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The appellate court allowed the case to be retried in district court on the condition that no claims regarding advertisement and promotion could be made.
In the retrial of the first case under the new conditions, Edell was not allowed to enter evidence claiming that Liggett & Myers had worked on the creation of a safer cigarette, as well as evidence regarding the tobacco industry’s “duty to warn” of the dangers of cigarette smoking, as the point became moot by the appellate court. Regardless of these setbacks, Edell strengthened his case with his access to 300,000 pages of internal documents of the tobacco companies. These documents included compelling and damaging evidence that the tobacco companies had proof, backed by research dating back to the 1940s, that nicotine was addictive and potentially carcinogenic. The tobacco industry unsuccessfully struggled to suppress the evidence on the grounds that it would divulge trade secrets; the trial court judge, Sarokin, ruled that the people and the court had the Constitutional right to know what the companies know. Though the tobacco industry appealed this ruling to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the ruling, as well as the Supreme Court, which refused to hear the case, it was established that the evidence would be used in trial. Alongside the confidential tobacco industry documents, Edell argued that the powerful advertising for the brands Cipollone smoked was an unscrupulous strategy utilized by the tobacco industry to not only overshadow the warning labels mandated by the federal government, but also to promote cigarette use and nicotine addiction as a marketing strategy for company profit. Edell claimed that Cipollone’s tobacco use stemmed from her nicotine addiction, which was encouraged by the advertising of Liggett and Myers, Philip Morris, and Lorillard by the use of both health claims and deviously appealing advertising. Cipollone was portrayed as a woman who was disparaged by her powerful addiction to the tobacco industry’s product; expert testimony showed that she even displayed withdrawal symptoms, sometimes digging through “the trash for butts when she ran out of cigarettes”[1]. After presenting his case that the tobacco industry’s advertising of cigarettes and knowledge of risk related to Cipolline’s claims, the defense moved for dismissal. The motion was denied.
The tobacco industry argued that Rose Cipollone was fully aware of the risks of smoking both before and during her cigarette use. She was an independent woman, making an independent decision to continue smoking, and she was in control, not the nicotine. Furthermore, even if the cigarettes had caused her death, it was in no way the responsibility of the industry, as research, as well as the confidential documents entered into evidence, did not show any explicit proof that lung cancer is linked directly to smoking. Furthermore, expert testimony revealed that the type of lung cancer affecting Mrs. Cipollone was not associated with smoking, and that Cipollone’s constant switching between “healthier” brands showed her acknowledgment of the dangers of smoking.
The jury deliberated for 6 days, and reached the verdict that:
It was considered a victory for both sides; while Cipollone was awarded damages, signifying the first time a tobacco company had paid damages in a liability case, the tobacco industry was justified in their claim regarding free choice in the decision to smoke cigarettes.
In 1990, the Third Circuit appellate court threw out the verdict and:
Five days after the appellate ruling, Antonio Cipollone died, and the case continued on with his son. Both the plaintiff and the defense in this case were looking for a concrete doctrine regarding the ability to litigate regarding preemption, state regulation of tobacco, and the Act cited in the first trial of the case.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of preemption in regard to state litigation of the tobacco industry and whether common law damages constitute a requirement based on smoking and health based on state law in regard to advertisements and promotion[2]. The Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1969, which excludes all manufacturers who label their packages with proper warnings from requirement or prohibition led the majority of the court to the opinion that:
The majority ruling also limited the potential litigants to smokers who developed disease prior to 1969. The opinion did not exclude fraud and conspiracy or express warranty, as section 5b of the 1969 Act does not explicitly define this; if the plaintiff could prove that the industry conspired to hide evidence concerning the harms of smoking or lied to the public about them, or if express warranties were breached, then a new case can be filed, as there is no discussion of tort litigation or damage claims in the Act. While the concurring opinion found that no damage claims were preempted rather than not discussed, the dissenting justices found that all state laws were preempted by the act.
Written by Justice Stevens.
Excerpt: Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." Art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, since our decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819), it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is "without effect." Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 68 L. Ed. 2d 576, 101 S. Ct. 2114 (1981). Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause "starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 91 L. Ed. 1447, 67 S. Ct. 1146 (1947). Accordingly, "'the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone'" of pre-emption analysis. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 55 L. Ed. 2d 443, 98 S. Ct. 1185 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 11 L. Ed. 2d 179, 84 S. Ct. 219 (1963)).
Congress' intent may be "explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 51 L. Ed. 2d 604, 97 S. Ct. 1305 (1977). In the absence of an express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts with federal law, see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, 75 L. Ed. 2d 752, 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983), or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field "'as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.'" Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153, 73 L. Ed. 2d 664, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230).