The Battle of the Ebro (Spanish: Batalla del Ebro, Catalan: Batalla de l'Ebre) was the longest and bloodiest battle of the Spanish Civil War. It took place between July and November 1938, with fighting mainly concentrated in two areas on the lower course of the Ebro River, the Terra Alta comarca of Catalonia, and the Auts area close to Fayón (Faió) in the lower Matarranya, Eastern Lower Aragon. These sparsely-populated areas saw the largest array of armies in the Civil War. The results of the battle were disastrous for the Second Spanish Republic with tens of thousands of dead and wounded, with little effect on the relentless advance of the Nationalists.
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By 1938, the Spanish Republic was in dire straits. The Basque Country had fallen, the Workers' Party of Marxist Unification (POUM) had been crushed by the Stalinist Communist Party of Spain, and many foreign governments felt it was only a matter of time before the question of who would rule Spain would be settled in favour of the Nationalists.
In the winter of 1937/38 the Republican Popular Army had spent its forces in the Battle of Teruel, in a series of bloody combats in subzero temperatures around the city of Teruel, which ended up being taken by the Francoist army in February.
General Franco then launched his Aragon Offensive in March without giving his enemies a chance to recover. This would be one of the most decisive operations in the Spanish Civil War. Fighting in the middle of bitter winter temperatures, the exhausted Republican army could offer only feeble resistance. Rushing victoriously across the rugged mountainous terrain of Southern Aragon, Franco's troops reached the Mediterranean sea at Vinaròs on April 15. As a result, the Nationalist Nacionalista army conquered Zaragoza, Lleida and the hydroelectric dams that provided much of the Catalan industrial areas with electricity. This situation demoralized Republican leaders and proved the strength and decisiveness of the Nationalist armies in an area between Barcelona and Valencia, that leaving Republican territory split in two.
The Francoist armies attacked the Levante Offensive north of Valencia with the intention of capturing the Republican capital, instead of advancing towards Barcelona, fearing that France would enter the war in support of the ailing Republic.[9] In response to the situation, Spanish premier Juan Negrín approved a plan by Vicente Rojo Lluch to launch attacks against the main Nationalist Francoist forces advancing towards Valencia. The purpose of the attacks were to relieve the pressure on Valencia and Catalonia, as well as to show European governments that the Republican government was still viable.
Some scholars have argued that Negrín's "active war policy"—attacking rather than adopting strong defences and hoping for a wider European conflict or harrying the nationalist forces—was primarily driven by the PCE's desire for propaganda victories, and, as at the Ebro, destroyed the Republican army for no great purpose.[10]
In order to distract the Nationalist armies that were advancing towards Valencia, the Popular Republican Army decided upon an offensive in the lower Ebro basin. The size of the army was important but it lacked enough air and artillery support. The Army of the Ebro was formed on May 15 under Lieutenant Colonel Juan Modesto, merging the 15th and the 5th Army Corps. It would receive reinforcement from the 12th and 18th Army Corps as soon as the battle began. Its command centre was located in Espluga de Francolí.
The 15th Army Corps XV Cuerpo del Ejército was led by Manuel Tagüeña from Escaladei and was formed by the following Divisions:
The 5th Army Corps V Cuerpo del Ejército Popular, led by Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Líster, with base in Salou:
The 12th Army Corps led by Lieutenant Colonel Etelvino Vega, was based at Bisbal de Falset :
The 18th Army Corps, led by Lieutenant Colonel José del Barrio acted as tactical reserve of the two first ones:
The Morocco Army Corps was positioned on the right bank of the Ebro. Later, the Maestrazgo Army Corps was sent as reinforcements, led by General Rafael García Valiño.
The Morocco Army Corps Cuerpo del Ejército de Marruecos included about 98000 men led by General Juan Yagüe:
Except for the 50a División, made up of relatively inexperienced soldiers, all other divisions were battle-hardened Legionarios, Regulares, African mercenaries from Ifni and Western Sahara, as well as Carlist and Falangist militias.
The Maestrazgo Army Corps Cuerpo del Ejército del Maestrazgo was led by General Rafael García Valiño.[11]
The Battle of the Ebro opened on July 25, 1938. Republican forces under Colonel Juan Modesto launched attacks across the Ebro river. The surprise was total and Republican forces were initially successful. Nevertheless, the Republican forces were only lightly armed and had no means to transport their artillery and armor across the river. The key to the battle was Nationalist air superiority, provided by Italian and German squadrons that flew under the Aviación Nacional markings. Some 550 first class planes were available on the Nationalist side against only some 35 modern fighters and some 40 second class aircraft of the Spanish Republican Air Force. The Nationalist air force was thus able to quickly identify the areas of Republican penetration and attack the Republican troops that were crossing the river.
The key target for the Republicans was the town of Gandesa, some 25 km west of the Ebro, a cross-roads to Catalonia and the north/south roads running parallel to the Ebro. The terrain around the town was extremely hilly with the Serra de Cavalls, Serra de Pàndols and Serra de la Fatarella mountain ranges whose hard and bold limestone rocks and scant forest cover provided little shelter against Francoist fire. Eventually the Republican attacks bogged down and became stalled, and within a week Franco sent heavy artillery and some 500,000 troops into the battle that annihilated most of the Republican strong points. Within a month Negrín understood that the effort had failed, but in his desperation was unable to consider any withdrawal. The difficulty of the terrain, however, delayed Franco considerably and the battle lasted for another 2 months, until November 16, 1938.
The Republicans were unable to accomplish any of their strategic objectives and, according to Beevor, were unwilling to apply the theory of the deep operation to their attacks — meaning their forces spent a long time clearing Nationalist secondary defensive positions, allowing the highly mechanised Nationalist forces to quickly deploy in strong defensive positions.
The battle was fought by both sides as a World War I Western Front battle, with each side launching bloody frontal assaults on enemy positions in what became a war of attrition. The Nationalist superiority in numbers and armaments meant they were better able to withstand the losses and exhaust the Republicans. The Ebro saw the Republican army destroyed as an effective force while the Republican air force was no longer capable of offering further resistance.
The battle was also the last action of the International Brigades, who were ordered to withdraw by the Non-Intervention Committee midway through it.
This defeat destroyed the Republican Army as a fighting force. After this battle, the Republicans would continue to lose ground until April 1, 1939 when Franco declared the war over.
A well-known Republican song, El Paso de Ebro, commemorates the battle.