Argument from authority

Argument from authority (also known as appeal to authority or argumentum ad verecundiam) is a special type of inductive argument which often takes the form of a statistical syllogism.[1]

Although certain classes of argument from authority do on occasion constitute strong inductive arguments, arguments from authority are commonly used in a fallacious manner.[1][2][3]

Contents

Forms

The appeal to authority may take several forms. As a statistical syllogism, it will have the following basic structure:[1]

Most of what authority a has to say on subject matter S is correct.
a says p about S.
Therefore, p is correct.

The strength of this argument depends upon two factors:[1][2]

  1. The authority is a legitimate expert on the subject.
  2. A consensus exists among legitimate experts on the matter under discussion.

These conditions may also simply be incorporated into the structure of the argument itself, in which case the form may look like this:[2]

X holds that A is true
X is a legitimate expert on the subject.
The consensus of experts agrees with X.
Therefore, there's a presumption that A is true.

Fallacious appeals to authority

Fallacious arguments from authority often are the result of failing to meet at least one of the two conditions from the previous section.[1][2] Specifically, when the inference fails to meet the first condition, this is sometimes called an "appeal to inappropriate authority".[3] This occurs when an inference relies on individuals or groups without relevant expertise or knowledge[3] (e.g. when a doctor of medicine untrained in economics, opines about the state of the economy, many people still will give his opinions on the subject more credence than the opinions of a person of less, or of less imposing, education).

Secondly, because the argument is inductive (which in this sense implies that the truth of the conclusion cannot be guaranteed by the truth of the premises), it also is fallacious to assert that the conclusion must be true.[2] Such an assertion is a non sequitur; the inductive argument might have probabilistic or statistical merit, but the conclusion does not follow unconditionally in the sense of being logically necessary.[4][5]

See also

References

  1. ^ a b c d e Salmon, M. H. (2006). Introduction to Critical Reasoning. Mason, OH: Thomson Wadsworth. pp. 118–9. 
  2. ^ a b c d e Gensler, Harry J. (2003). Introduction to Logic. New York, NY: Routedge. pp. 333–4. 
  3. ^ a b c Baronett, Stan (2008). Logic. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. p. 304. 
  4. ^ Marguerite H Foster, Michael L Martin (eds) Probability, Confirmation, and Simplicity: Readings in the Philosophy of Inductive Logic. Pub. Odyssey Press 1966
  5. ^ Peirce, C. S. et al; Studies in Logic by members of the Johns Hopkins University 1883

External links