| Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays | |
|---|---|
| Born | June 1, 1977 Sada, Yemen |
| Detained at | Guantanamo |
| Alternate name | Ali Hussain al Tais |
| ISN | 162 |
| Charge(s) | No charge (extrajudicial detention) |
| Status | Repatriated |
Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays (also transliterated as Ali Hussain al-Tais) is a citizen of Yemen who was held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] Al Tay's Guantanamo Internment Serial Number was 162. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts reports that Al Tays was born on June 1, 1977, in Sada, Yemen.
Al Hays was repatriated on December 15, 2006.[2][3][4] On August 21, 2010 Agence France Presse reported that a Yemeni, named "Ali Hussein al-Taiss" who had formerly been held in Guantanamo, and who had joined Al Qaida following his repatriation, surrendered to Yemeni authorities.[5]
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Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.
Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.
A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 15 September 2004.[9] The memo listed the following allegations against him:
- a The detainee is a member of al Qaida:
- The detainee voluntarily traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan to receive weapons training for a tribal war in Yemen in 2001.
- While awaiting transportation from Kandahar to Al Farouq, the detainee stayed at Al Nabrass, an al Qaida safehouse.
- The Al Nabrass safehouse was frequented by Usama Bin Laden.
- The detainee attended the Al Farouq training camp in 2001.
- At the Al Farouq training camp, the detainee received training on the AK-47 rifle.
- The detainee fled the Al Farouq training camp to the Tora Bora Mountains in September 2001.
- Pakistan Authorities held the detainee at the Pakistani/Afghan border, when attempting to flee the Tora Bora region in October 2001.
Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[10]
A writ of habeas corpus was submitted on Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays's behalf.[11] The Department of Defense released 26 pages arising from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal on October 1, 2004. Tribunal panel 5 confirmed his enemy combatant status on 24 September 2004.
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 mandated that Guantanamo captives were no longer entitled to access the US civil justice system, so all outstanding habeas corpus petitions were stayed.
On June 12, 2008 the United States Supreme Court ruled, in Boumediene v. Bush, that the Military Commissions Act could not remove the right for Guantanamo captives to access the US Federal Court system. And all previous Guantanamo captives' habeas petitions were eligible to be re-instated.
On July 18, 2008 Sarah Havens re-initiated Anam v. Bush to which Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays was a party.[12] The other twelve captives who were part of this petition remained in detention in Guantanamo.
Detainees whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal labeled them "enemy combatants" were scheduled for annual Administrative Review Board hearings. These hearings were designed to assess the threat a detainee may pose if released or transferred, and whether there are other factors that warrant his continued detention.[13]
A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays's Administrative Review Board.[14] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.
The following primary factors favor continued detention
- a. Commitment
- The detainee admitted he voluntarily traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan to receive weapons training for use in a tribal war in Yemen in 2001.
- The detainee stated during previous interviews that he had gone to Afghanistan to fight jihad.
- b. Connections and Associations
- The detainee stayed at Al Nabrass, and al Qaida safehouse known to be frequented by Usama Bin Laden, while awaiting transportation from Kandahar, Afghanistan to al Farouq training camp.
- The detainee admitted he relinquished his passport when he arrived at the house (Al Nabrass) in Kandahar, Afghanisan. He stated "when you arrive you are suppose [sic] to hand it over to someone."
- The detainee trained at al Farouq, a known al Qaida training facility near Kandahar, AF.
- c. Intent
- The detainee stated he received training on the AK-47 at al Farouq.
- Al Farouq offered basic training; anti-aircraft and mountain combat tactics courses.
- The detainee stated he went to the Tora Bora region with others and witnessed the bombing in that area.
- d. Other Relevant Data
- The detainnee was combative, angry and defiant during the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT). The Tribunal panel found him to be evasive in his statements.
The following primary factors favor release or transfer
- The detainee stated in the Combatant Status Review Tribunal "My leaving Yemen and going to Afghanistan has nothing to do with Al Qaida or fighting" [sic]
- The detainee stated at the end of an interview "If I were al Qaida would I have helped protect British and American people. [sic] Would I have helped escort Canadian and foreign delegations when they came to visit my tribe?"
In early September 2007 the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official.[15][16] The Board's recommendation was unanimous The Board's recommendation was redacted. England authorized his transfer on May 25, 2005.
The document that explained the basis for the Board's decision noted[16]:
The ARB was convened and began its proceeding without the Enemy Combatant (EC) present. The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the unclassified summary, both in written form and with an oral summary of the unclassified primary factors. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Enemy Combatant Notification as exhibit EC-A and the Enemy Combatant Election Form, indicating the EC was unresponsive to AMO inquiries, as exhibit EC-B. The EC did point to his throat, presumably conveying by gesture that he had a sore throat. This is consistent with prior assertions by the EC although these have been unsubstantiated by multiple medical evaluations and contradicted by a long discussion the EC had with his lawyer the day prior, according to verbal report from the guards.
Yemen's President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, demanded the release of the remaining Yemenis held in Guantanamo on December 23, 2006.[3][4] The Yemen Observer identified Mohammed Ahmed al-Asadi, Esam Hamid al-Jaefi and Ali Hussain al-Tais as three of the six Yemeni who had been repatriated the previous week. Al Asadi, the first of the six men to be released, on December 29, 2006, was asked to sign an undertaking promising to refrain from armed activity.[17] On January 7, 2007 the Yemen Times identified two of the three remaining men as Tawfiq Al-Murwai and Muhassen Al-Asskari.[18] Yemen's President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, said the men would be released as soon as Yemeni authorities had cleared them. On August 21, 2010 Agence France Presse reported that a Yemeni, named "Ali Hussein al-Taiss" who had formerly been held in Guantanamo, and who had joined Al Qaida following his repatriation, surrendered to Yemeni authorities.[5] A statement from Yemen's Saba News Agency said Ali Husayn expressed remorse, and said he: "expressed remorse for having served in Al-Qaeda" and was "ready to collaborate".
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