Adams v. Tanner | ||||||
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Supreme Court of the United States |
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Argued May 7, 1917 Decided June 11, 1917 |
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Full case name | Joe Adams, et al., Appts., v. W. V. Tanner, Attorney General of the State of Washington, and George H. Crandall, Prosecuting Attorney of Spokane County, State of Washington. |
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Holding | ||||||
The Washington state law that prohibited employment agencies was unconstitutional, because a ban would breach the principle of due process of law in the deprivation of liberty and property. | ||||||
Court membership | ||||||
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Case opinions | ||||||
Majority | McReynolds, joined by White, Day, Van Devanter, Pitney | |||||
Dissent | Brandeis, joined by McKenna, Holmes, Clarke |
Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917), is a US Supreme Court case, which held that a Washington state law that prohibited employment agencies was unconstitutional.
Contents |
Washington state attempted to pass a law, supported by the then Federal Department of Labor, to prohibit private employment agencies charging fees to people seeking work. It read as follows,
“ | "Section 1. The welfare of the State of Washington depends on the welfare of its workers, and demands that they be protected from conditions that result in their being liable to imposition and extortion."
"The State of Washington therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that the system of collecting fees from the workers for furnishing them with employment, or with information leading thereto, results frequently in their becoming the victims of imposition and extortion, and is therefore detrimental to the welfare of the state." "Section 2. It shall be unlawful for any employment agent, his representative, or any other person to demand or receive either directly or indirectly from any person seeking employment, or from any person on his or her behalf, any remuneration or fee whatsoever for furnishing him or her with employment or with information leading thereto." "Section 3. For each and every violation of any of the provisions of this act, the penalty shall be a fine or [of] not more than $100 and imprisonment for not more than thirty days." |
” |
The constitutionality of the law was challenged.
Chief Justice White, Justices Day, Van Devanter, Pitney and McReynold held that a ban would breach the principle of due process of law in the deprivation of liberty and property. The ban was arbitrary and oppressive. Mr Justice Reynold said,
"there is nothing inherently immoral or dangerous to public welfare in acting as paid representative of another to find a position in which he can earn an honest living. On the contrary, such service is useful, commendable, and in great demand." (at 593)
Justice Brandeis (with whom Justice Holmes, Clarke and McKenna dissented) laid out in his dissenting judgment why employment agency activities were a legitimate concern. He highlighted sources from US Labor Department giving examples of abuse, attempts in over thirty states to regulate and have free public agencies compete. He stated how all methods short of abolition had ultimately failed (601-9).
In this period the practice of charging destitute workers upfront fees for finding work was widespread. People might give up their last pennies for the chance of work. Sometimes, agencies made no effort to place the worker, or the work would last a few days and the employer would then split the next fee with the agent to bring in fresh replacements. Justice Brandeis cited from a report to a 1912 Congress Committee.
“ |
To declare the statute of a state, enacted in the exercise of the police power, invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment is a matter of such seriousness that I state the reasons for my dissent from the opinion of the court. The statute of the State of Washington commonly known as the "Abolishing Employment Offices Measure" was proposed by Initiative Petition No. 8, filed July 3, 1914, and was adopted November 3, 1914, at the general election, 162,054 votes being cast for the measure and 144,544 against it. In terms, the act merely prohibits the taking of fees from those seeking employment.[1] Plaintiffs, who are proprietors of private employment agencies in the City of Spokane, assert that this statute, if enforced, would compel them to discontinue business, and would thus, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, deprive them of their liberty and property without due process of law. The act leaves the plaintiffs free to collect fees from employers, and it appears that private employment offices thus restricted are still carrying on business.[2] But even if it should prove, as plaintiffs allege, that their business could not live without collecting fees from employees, that fact would not necessarily render the act invalid. Private employment agencies are a business properly subject to police regulation and control. Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U. S. 340. And this Court has made it clear that a statute enacted to promote health, safety, morals, or the public welfare may be valid, although it will compel discontinuance of existing businesses in whole or in part. Statutes prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor present the most familiar example of such a prohibition. But where, as here, no question of interstate commerce is involved, this Court has sustained also statutes or municipal ordinances which compelled discontinuance of such business as (a) of manufacturing and selling oleomargarine, Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678; (b) of selling cigarettes, Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343; (c) of selling futures in grain or other commodities, Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425; (d) of selling stocks on margin, Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606; (e) of keeping billiard halls, Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623; (f) of selling trading stamps, Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 240 U. S. 368. These cases show that the scope of the police power is not limited to regulation, as distinguished from prohibition. They show also that the power of the state exists equally whether the end sought to be attained is the promotion of health, safety, or morals or is the prevention of fraud or the prevention of general demoralization.
Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606, 187 U. S. 609; Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 184 U. S. 429. Or, as it is so frequently expressed, the action of the legislature is final unless the measure adopted appears clearly to be arbitrary or unreasonable, or to have no real or substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. Whether a measure relating to the public welfare is arbitrary or unreasonable, whether it has no substantial relation to the end proposed, is obviously not to be determined by assumptions or by a priori reasoning. The judgment should be based upon a consideration of relevant facts, actual or possible -- ex facto jus oritur. That ancient rule must prevail in order that we may have a system of living law. It is necessary to inquire, therefore: what was the evil which the people of Washington sought to correct? Why was the particular remedy embodied in the statute adopted? And, incidentally, what has been the experience, if any, of other states or countries in this connection? But these inquiries are entered upon not for the purpose of determining whether the remedy adopted was wise, or even for the purpose of determining what the facts actually were. The decision of such questions lies with the legislative branch of the government. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 127 U. S. 685. The sole purpose of the inquiries is to enable this Court to decide whether, in view of the facts, actual or possible, the action of the State of Washington was so clearly arbitrary or so unreasonable that it could not be taken "by a free government without a violation of fundamental rights." See McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 195 U. S. 64. 1. The Evils[3] The evils with which the people of Washington were confronted arose partly from the abuses incident to the system of private employment agencies and partly from its inadequacy. (a) The Abuses. These are summarized in a report published by the United States Bureau of Labor in October, 1912,[4] thus:
In the report to Congress of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations, created by Act of August 23, 1912, c. 351, 37 Stat. 415, which gave public hearings on the subject of employment offices in May, 1914, the abuses are found to be as follows:[5]
(b) The Inadequacy. But the evils were not limited to what are commonly called abuses, like the fraud and extortion described above. Even the exemplary private offices charging fees to workers might prove harmful for the reason thus stated in the report to Congress of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations, cited supra.
2. The Remedies During the fifteen years preceding 1914, there had been extensive experimentation in the regulation of private employment agencies. Twenty-four states had attempted direct regulation under statutes, often supplemented by municipal ordinances.[6] Nineteen states had attempted indirect regulation through the competition of state offices, and seven others through competition of municipal offices.[7] Other experiments in indirect regulation through competition petition were made by voluntary organizations, philanthropic, social, and industrial.[8] The results of those experiments were unsatisfactory. The abuses continued in large measure, and the private offices survived to a great extent the competition of the free agencies, public and private. There gradually developed a conviction that the evils of private agencies were inherent and ineradicable so long as they were permitted to charge fees to the workers seeking employment. And many believed that such charges were the root of the evil. On September 25, 1914, the American Association of Public Employment Offices adopted at its annual meeting the following resolutions:
The United States Commission on Industrial Relations declared in its report to Congress:[9]
But the remedies proposed were not limited to the suppression of private offices charging fees to workers and the extension of the system of state and municipal offices. The conviction became widespread that, for the solution of the larger problem of unemployment, the aid of the federal government and the utilization and development of its extensive machinery was indispensable. During the seven years preceding 1914, a beginning had been made in this respect. The Immigration Act of February 20, 1907, c. 1134, 34 Stat. 898, 909, created within the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization a Division of Information, charged with the duty of promoting "a beneficial distribution of aliens." The services rendered by this division included, among others, some commonly performed by employment agencies. While it undertook to place in positions of employment only aliens, its operations were national in scope. The Act of March 4, 1913, creating the Department of Labor, resulted in a transfer of the Bureau of Immigration, including the Division of Information, to that department (37 Stat. 736). By this transfer, the scope of the division's work was enlarged to correspond with the broad powers of the Labor Department. These were declared by Congress to be:
Then its efforts "to distribute" (that is, both to supply and to find places for) labor were extended to include citizens as well as aliens, and much was done to develop the machinery necessary for such distribution. In the summer of 1914, and in part before the filing in the State of Washington of the proposal for legislation here in question, action had been taken by the Department of Labor which attracted public attention. It undertook to supply harvest hands needed in the Middle West, and also to find work for the factory hands thrown out of employment by the great fire at Salem, Massachusetts, June 25, 1914.[10] The division was strengthened by cooperation with other departments of the federal government (Agriculture, Interior, Commerce, and the Post office, with its 60,000 local offices) and with state and municipal employment offices. As early as June 13, 1914, the United States Department of Labor had also sought the cooperation in this work of all the leading newspapers in America, including those printed in foreign languages.[11] 3. Conditions in the State of Washington The peculiar needs of Washington emphasized the defects of the system of private employment offices. (a) The Evils. The conditions generally prevailing are described in a report recently published by the United States Department of Labor, thus:[12]
The reports of the Washington State Bureau of Labor give this description:
The abuses and the inadequacy of the then existing system are also described by state officials in affidavits included in the record. (b) The Remedies. Washington had not tried direct regulation of private employment offices, but that method was being considered as late as 1912.[15] Its people had had, on the other hand, exceptional opportunities of testing public employment offices. The municipal employment office established at Seattle in 1894 under an amendment of the city charter is among the oldest public offices in the United States. Tacoma established a municipal office in 1904, Spokane in 1905, and Everett in 1908.[16] The continuance and increase of these municipal offices indicate that their experience in public employment agencies was at least encouraging. And the low cost of operating them was extraordinary. In Spokane, the fees charged by private agencies ranged from $1 upward, and were usually about $2.[17] In the Seattle free municipal agency, the cost of operation, per position filed, was reduced to a trifle over 4 cents.[18] The preliminary steps for establishing "Distribution Stations" under the federal system, including one at Seattle, had been taken before the passage of the Washington law.[19] Later, branch offices were established in thirteen other cities.[20] 4. The fundamental problem The problem which confronted the people of Washington was far more comprehensive and fundamental than that of protecting workers applying to the private agencies. It was the chronic problem of unemployment -- perhaps the gravest and most difficult problem of modern industry -- the problem which, owing to business depression, was the most acute in America during the years 1913 to 1915.[21] In the State of Washington, the suffering from unemployment was accentuated by the lack of staple industries operating continuously throughout the year and by unusual fluctuations in the demand for labor, with consequent reduction of wages and increase of social unrest.[22] Students of the larger problem of unemployment appear to agree that establishment of an adequate system of employment offices or labor exchanges[23] is an indispensable first step toward its solution. There is reason to believe that the people of Washington not only considered the collection by the private employment offices of fees from employees a social injustice,[24] but that they considered the elimination of the practice a necessary preliminary to the establishment of a constructive policy for dealing with the subject of unemployment.[25] It is facts and considerations like these which may have led the people of Washington to prohibit the collection by employment agencies of fees from applicants for work. And weight should be given to the fact that the statute has been held constitutional by the Supreme Court of Washington and by the federal district court (three judges sitting) -- courts presumably familiar with the local conditions and needs. Insofar as protection of the applicant is a specific purpose of the statute, a precedent was furnished by the Act of Congress, December 21, 1898, 30 Stat. 755, 763 (considered in Patterson v. The Eudora, 190 U. S. 169), which provides, among other things:
Insofar as the statute may be regarded as a step in the effort to overcome industrial maladjustment and unemployment by shifting to the employer the payment of fees, if any, the action taken may be likened to that embodied in the Washington Workmen's Compensation Law (sustained in Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219), whereby the financial burden of industrial accidents is required to be borne by the employers. As was said in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 169 U. S. 387:
In my opinion, the judgment of the district court should be affirmed. |
” |
Mr Justice Holmes and Mr Justice Clarke concurred.
Probably inspired by the dissenting judgments in this case, the International Labour Organization's first ever Recommendation took on the views of Justice Brandeis. The Unemployment Recommendation, 1919 (No.1), Art. 1 called for each member to,
"take measures to prohibit the establishment of employment agencies which charge fees or which carry on their business for profit. Where such agencies already exist, it is further recommended that they be permitted to operate only under government licenses, and that all practicable measures be taken to abolish such agencies as soon as possible."
The Unemployment Convention, 1919, Art. 2 instead required the alternative of,
"a system of free public employment agencies under the control of a central authority. Committees, which shall include representatives of employers and workers, shall be appointed to advise on matters concerning the carrying on of these agencies."
In 1933 the Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention (No.34) formally called for abolition. The exception was if the agencies were licensed and a fee scale was agreed in advance. In 1949 a new revised Convention (No.96) was produced. This kept the same scheme, but secured an ‘opt out’ (Art.2) for members that did not wish to sign up. Agencies were an increasingly entrenched part of the labor market. The United States did not sign up to the Conventions. The latest Convention, the Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 takes a much softer stance and calls merely for regulation.
In Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928), the Court struck down a similar New Jersey law attempting to regulate agencies, Justices Stone, Brandeis and Holmes dissenting. This is probably no longer good law.
Doubt was placed on the leading dicta of Adams v. Tanner in Olsen v. State of Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), and Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). In the latter, Mr Justice Black said that Adams v. Tanner was part of the "constitutional philosophy" that struck down minimum wages and maximum working hours.