Opium Wars

Opium Wars
Second Opium War-guangzhou.jpg
Combat at Guangzhou (Canton) during the Second Opium War
Date 1839–1842, 1856–1860
Location China
Result Decisive victory of the Western powers over China, resulting in the Treaty of Nanjing and the Treaty of Tianjin
Territorial
changes
Hong Kong Island and southern Kowloon ceded to the United Kingdom
Belligerents
United Kingdom United Kingdom
France France

United States United States (1856 and 1859 only)

Qing Dynasty
Commanders and leaders
United Kingdom Michael Seymour
United Kingdom James Bruce
France Jean-Baptiste Louis Gros
France Auguste Léopold Protet

United States James Armstrong

Lin Zexu
Qishan
Sengge Rinchen
Strength
~40,000 troops,
American: 287 troops,
3 warships
~110,000 troops
Casualties and losses
over 2,800 killed or wounded 47,790 killed or wounded

The Opium Wars (simplified Chinese: 鸦片战争; traditional Chinese: 鴉片戰爭; pinyin: Yāpiàn Zhànzhēng), also known as the Anglo-Chinese Wars, were the climax of trade disputes and diplomatic difficulties between China under the Qing Dynasty and the British Empire after China sought to restrict illegal British opium trafficking. It consisted of the First Opium War from 1839 to 1842[1] and the Second Opium War from 1856 to 1860.[2]

Opium was smuggled by merchants from British India into China in defiance of Chinese prohibition laws. Open warfare between Britain and China broke out in 1839. Further disputes over the treatment of British merchants in Chinese ports resulted in the Second Opium War.

China was defeated in both wars leaving its government having to tolerate the opium trade. Britain forced the Chinese government into signing the Treaty of Nanking and the Treaty of Tianjin, also known as the Unequal Treaties, which included provisions for the opening of additional ports to unrestricted foreign trade, for fixed tariffs; for the recognition of both countries as equal in correspondence; and for the cession of Hong Kong to Britain. The British also gained extraterritorial rights. Several countries followed Britain and sought similar agreements with China. Many Chinese found these agreements humiliating and these sentiments contributed to the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901), and the downfall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912, putting an end to dynastic China.

Contents

Background

European trade with Asia

Direct maritime trade between Europe and China began with the Portuguese in the 16th century, who leased an outpost at Macau starting from 1557; other European nations soon followed. European traders, such as the Portuguese, inserted themselves into the existing Asian maritime trade network, competing with Arab, Chinese, and Japanese traders in intra-regional trade.[3] Mercantilist governments in Europe objected to the perpetual drain of silver to pay for Asian commodities, and so European traders often sought to generate profits from intra-regional Asian trade to pay for their purchases to be sent back home.[3] After the Spanish acquisition of the Philippines, the exchange of goods between China and the West accelerated dramatically. From 1565, the annual Manila Galleon brought in enormous amounts of silver to the Asian trade network, and in particular China, from Spanish silver mines in South America. As demand increased in Europe, the profits European traders generated within the Asian trade network, that were used to purchase Asian goods, were gradually replaced by the direct export of bullion from Europe in exchange for the produce of Asia.[3] The Spanish Empire began to sell opium, along with New World products such as tobacco and maize, to the Chinese in order to prevent the trade deficit which was costing it so much silver.

Qing attitudes toward trade

The Qing, and its predecessor the Ming, shared an ambivalent attitude towards overseas trade, and maritime activity in general. From 1661 to 1669, in an effort to cut off Ming loyalists, the Qing issued an edict to evacuate all populations living near the coast of Southern China. Though it was later repealed, the edict seriously disrupted coastal areas and drove many Chinese overseas.[4] Qing attitudes were also further aggravated by traditional Confucian disdain (even hostility) towards merchants and traders. Qing officials believed that trade incited unrest and disorder, promoted piracy, and also was a threat to compromise information on China's defences.[5] The Qing instituted a set of rigid and incomplete regulations regarding trade at Chinese ports; setting up four maritime customs offices (in Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu) and a sweeping 20 percent tariff on all foreign goods. These policies only succeeded in establishing a system of kickbacks and purchased monopolies that enriched the officials who administered coastal regions.[5]

Although foreign merchants and traders dealt with low level Qing bureaucrats and agents at specified ports and entry points, official contact between China and foreign governments was organised around the tributary system. The tributary system affirmed the Emperor as the son of Heaven with a mandate to rule on Earth; as such, foreign rulers were required to present tribute and acknowledge the superiority of the imperial court.[6] In return, the Emperor bestowed gifts and titles upon foreign emissaries and allowed them to trade for short periods of time during their stay within China. Foreign rulers agreed to these terms for several reasons, namely that the gifts given by the Emperor were of greater value than the tribute received (as a demonstration of imperial munificence) and that the trade to be conducted while in China was extremely lucrative and exempt from customs duties.[7] The political realities of the system varied from century to century, but by the Qing period, with European traders pushing to gain more access to China, Qing authorities denied requests for trade privileges from European embassies and assigned them "tributary" status with missions limited at the will of the imperial court. This arrangement became increasingly unacceptable to European nations, in particular the British.[8]

British trade and the Canton System

British ships began to appear infrequently around the coasts of China from 1635; without establishing formal relations through the tributary system, British merchants were allowed to trade at the ports of Zhoushan and Xiamen in addition to Guangzhou (Canton).[8] Trade further benefited after the Qing relaxed maritime trade restrictions in the 1680s, after Taiwan came under Qing control in 1683, and even rhetoric regarding the "tributary status" of Europeans was muted.[8] Guangzhou (Canton) was the port of preference for most foreign trade, ships did try to call at other ports but they did not match the benefits of Guangzhou's geographic position at the mouth of the Pearl river trade network and Guangzhou's long experience in balancing the demands of Beijing with those of Chinese and foreign merchants.[9] From 1700-1842, Guangzhou came to dominate maritime trade with China, this period became known as the "Canton System".[9]

Official British trade was conducted through the auspices of the British East India Company, which held a royal charter for trade with the Far East. The EIC gradually came to dominate Sino-European trade from its position in India.[10]

Low Chinese demand for European goods, and high European demand for Chinese goods, including tea, silk, and porcelain, forced European merchants to purchase these goods with silver, the only commodity the Chinese would accept. In modern economic terms the Chinese were demanding hard currency or specie (gold or silver coinage) as the medium of exchange for the international trade in their goods. From the mid-17th century around 28 million kilograms of silver was received by China, principally from European powers, in exchange for Chinese goods.[11] Britain's problem was further complicated by the fact that it had been using the gold standard from the mid 18th Century and therefore had to purchase silver from other European countries, incurring an additional transaction cost.[12]

In the 18th century, despite ardent protest from the Qing government, British traders began importing opium from India. Because of its strong mass appeal and addictive nature, opium was an effective solution to the trade problem. An instant consumer market for the drug was secured by the addiction of thousands of Chinese, and the flow of silver was reversed. Recognizing the growing number of addicts, the Yongzheng Emperor prohibited the sale and smoking of opium in 1729, and only allowed a small amount of opium imports for medicinal purposes.[13]

Growth of opium trade

Opium destruction

Following the Battle of Plassey in 1757, in which Britain annexed Bengal to its empire, the British East India Company pursued a monopoly on production and export of Indian opium. Monopoly began in earnest in 1773, as the British Governor-General of Bengal abolished the opium syndicate at Patna. For the next fifty years opium trade would be the key to the East India Company's hold on the subcontinent.

Considering that importation of opium into China had been virtually banned by Chinese law, the East India Company established an elaborate trading scheme partially relying on legal markets, and partially leveraging illicit ones. British merchants carrying no opium would buy tea in Canton on credit, and would balance their debts by selling opium at auction in Calcutta. From there, the opium would reach the Chinese coast hidden aboard British ships then smuggled into China by native merchants. In 1797 the company further tightened its grip on the opium trade by enforcing direct trade between opium farmers and the British, and ending the role of Bengali purchasing agents.

British exports of opium to China grew from an estimated 15 tons in 1730 to 75 tons in 1773. The product was shipped in over two thousand chests, each containing 140 pounds (64 kg) of opium.[14]

Meanwhile, negotiations with the Qianlong Emperor to ease the trading ban carried on, coming to a head in 1793 under Earl George Macartney. Such discussions were unsuccessful.[15]

In 1799, the Qing Empire reinstated their ban on opium imports. The Empire issued the following decree in 1810:

Opium has a harm. Opium is a poison, undermining our good customs and morality. Its use is prohibited by law. Now the commoner, Yang, dares to bring it into the Forbidden City. Indeed, he flouts the law! However, recently the purchasers, eaters, and consumers of opium have become numerous. Deceitful merchants buy and sell it to gain profit. The customs house at the Ch'ung-wen Gate was originally set up to supervise the collection of imports (it had no responsibility with regard to opium smuggling). If we confine our search for opium to the seaports, we fear the search will not be sufficiently thorough. We should also order the general commandant of the police and police- censors at the five gates to prohibit opium and to search for it at all gates. If they capture any violators, they should immediately punish them and should destroy the opium at once. As to Kwangtung and Fukien, the provinces from which opium comes, we order their viceroys, governors, and superintendents of the maritime customs to conduct a thorough search for opium, and cut off its supply. They should in no ways consider this order a dead letter and allow opium to be smuggled out![16]

The decree had little effect. The Qing government, seated in Beijing in the north of China, was unable to halt opium smuggling in the southern provinces. A porous Chinese border and rampant local demand only encouraged the all-too eager East India Company, which had its monopoly on opium trade recognised by the British government, which itself wanted silver. By the 1820s China was importing 900 tons of Bengali opium annually.[17]

Napier Affair and First Opium War (1839–1842)

Lin Zexu's "memorial" (摺奏) written directly to Queen Victoria

In 1834 to accommodate the revocation of the East India Company's monopoly, the British sent Lord William John Napier to Macau. He tried to circumvent the restrictive Canton Trade laws which forbade direct contact with Chinese officials by attempting to send a letter directly to the Viceroy of Canton. He refused to accept it, and closed trade starting on 2 September of that year. Lord Napier had to return to Macau (where he died a few days later) and, unable to force the matter, the British agreed to resume trade under the old restrictions.

Within the Chinese mandarinate there was an ongoing debate over legalising the opium trade itself. However, this idea was repeatedly rejected and instead, in 1838 the government sentenced native drug traffickers to death. Around this time, the British were selling roughly 1,400 tons per year to China. In March 1839 the Emperor appointed a new strict Confucianist commissioner, Lin Zexu, to control the opium trade at the port of Canton.[18] His first course of action was to enforce the imperial demand that there be a permanent halt to drug shipments into China. When the British refused to end the trade, Lin blockaded the British traders in their factories and cut off supplies of food[19]. On 27 March 1839 Charles Elliot, British Superintendent of Trade- who had been locked in the factories when he arrived at Canton- finally agreed that all British subjects should turn over their opium to him, amounting to nearly a year's supply of the drug, to be confiscated by Commissioner Lin Zexu. In a departure from his brief, he promised that the crown would compensate them for the lost opium. While this amounted to a tacit acknowledgment that the British government did not disapprove of the trade, it also forced a huge liability on the exchequer. Unable to allocate funds for an illegal drug but pressed for compensation by the merchants, this liability is cited as one reason for the decision to force a war.[20] As well as seizing supplies in the factories, Chinese troops boarded British ships in international waters outside Chinese jurisdiction, where their cargo was still legal, and destroyed the opium aboard. After the opium was surrendered, trade was restarted on the strict condition that no more drugs would be smuggled into China. Lin demanded that British merchants had to sign a bond promising not to deal in opium under penalty of death.[21] The British officially opposed signing of the bond, but some British merchants that did not deal in opium were willing to sign. Lin had the opium disposed of by dissolving it in water, salt, and lime, and dumping it into the ocean.

In 1839 Lin took the step of publishing a letter addressed to Queen Victoria questioning the moral reasoning of the British government (it is not known that she ever received it). Citing what he understood to be a strict prohibition of the trade within Great Britain, Lin questioned how it could then profit from the drug in China. He wrote: "Your Majesty has not before been thus officially notified, and you may plead ignorance of the severity of our laws, but I now give my assurance that we mean to cut this harmful drug forever." [22] In fact, opium was not illegal in England at the time, however, and comparably smaller quantities were imported. The British government and merchants offered no response to Lin, accusing him instead of destroying their property. When the British learned of what was taking place in Canton, as communications between these two parts of the world took months at this time, they sent a large British Indian army, which arrived in June 1840.[23]

British military superiority drew on newly applied technology. British warships wreaked havoc on coastal towns; the steam ship Nemesis was able to move against the winds and tides and support a gun platform with very heavy guns. In addition, the British troops were the first to be armed with modern muskets and cannons which fired more rapidly and with greater accuracy than the Qing firearms and artillery, though Chinese cannons had been in use since previous dynasties. After the British took Canton, they sailed up the Yangtze and took the tax barges, a devastating blow to the Empire as it slashed the revenue of the imperial court in Beijing to just a small fraction of what it had been.

In 1842 the Qing authorities sued for peace, which concluded with the Treaty of Nanjing negotiated in August of that year and ratified in 1843. In the treaty, China was forced to pay an indemnity to Britain, open four ports to Britain, and cede Hong Kong to Queen Victoria. In the supplementary Treaty of the Bogue, the Qing empire also recognised Britain as an equal to China and gave British subjects extraterritorial privileges in treaty ports. In 1844, the United States and France concluded similar treaties with China, the Treaty of Wanghia and Treaty of Whampoa respectively.

The First Opium War was attacked in the House of Commons by a newly elected young member of Parliament, William Ewart Gladstone, who wondered if there had ever been "a war more unjust in its origin, a war more calculated to cover this country with permanent disgrace, I do not know."[24] The Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, replied by saying that nobody could "say that he honestly believed the motive of the Chinese Government to have been the promotion of moral habits" and that the war was being fought to stem China's balance of payments deficit. John Quincy Adams commented that opium was "a mere incident to the dispute... the cause of the war is the kowtow- the arrogant and insupportable pretensions of China that she will hold commercial intercourse with the rest of mankind not upon terms of equal reciprocity, but upon the insulting and degrading forms of the relations between lord and vassal."[25]

Second Opium War (1856–1860)

British antagonism towards Chinese officials within treaty ports continued to escalate in the years following the end of the first Opium War throughout the late 1840s. During the Taiping Rebellion, the British incorporated the most-favoured-nation clause into the American treaty of 1844.[26]

Open conflict broke out after the Qing government conducted a search of a suspicious British ship, previously registered in Hong Kong, dubbed the Arrow.[27] The search prompted the British to resume siege upon the treaty port of Canton in late 1856. By December 1857, the Royal Navy had seized Canton and continued to sail north to capture the Dagu forts by May 1858.

The French also played an important role in the war after their envoy, Baron Jean-Baptiste Louis Gros, had his demands seemingly ignored (the French demands were separate from those of the British and involved a murdered missionary and French rights in Canton) at the same time as the British envoy Lord Elgin. The two diplomats therefore decided upon a joint attack on Canton which was successful and was followed by many more, for example against the five Taku forts leading to Beijing.[28]

British successes continued as they approached Beijing. The exposure of Beijing to British forces goaded the Qing Dynasty to sign a newly drafted treaty; this contained the most-favoured-nation clause, which asserted that all British benefits gained through the war would be communal between all major foreign powers.[27] The Treaty of Tianjin, enacted in 1858, placed stern stipulations upon the Chinese state and allowed a British embassy in Beijing.

Fighting erupted both in Hong Kong as well as Beijing, where the British set out to destroy the Summer Palace and the Old Summer Palace. China ratified the Treaty of Tianjin at the Convention of Beijing in 1860, ending the war. The treaty provided for the creation of ten new port cities, permission for foreigners (including Protestant and Catholic missionaries) to travel throughout the country, and indemnities of three million ounces of silver to Great Britain and two million to France.

Lin Zexu and the war on opium

Lin Zexu, Governor-General of Hunan and Hubei, recognising the consequences of opium abuse, embarked on an anti-opium campaign in which 1,700 opium dealers were arrested and 2.6 million pounds of opium were confiscated and destroyed.[29]

Lin Zexu's policy against the drug ultimately failed. He was made a scapegoat by the emperor, under heavy pressure from the Western powers, for having provoked British military retaliation in the First Opium War.[30] Lin Zexu is now viewed as a hero of 19th century China who stood against European imperialism and his likeness has been immortalised at various locations around the world.[31][32][33][34]

See also

References

  1. (World Civilizations: The Global Experience FOURTH EDITION AP* EDITION)
  2. Hanes, William Travis; Frank Sanello (2002). Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of Another. pp. 3. ISBN 1402201494. 
  3. 3.0 3.1 3.2 Gray, Jack (2002). Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to 2000. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 22–23. ISBN 978-0-19-870069-2. 
  4. Hayes, James (1974). "The Hong Kong Region: Its Place in Traditional Chinese Historiography and Principal Events Since the Establishment of Hsin-an County in 1573". Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Hong Kong) 14: 108–135. http://sunzi1.lib.hku.hk/hkjo/view/44/4401283.pdf. 
  5. 5.0 5.1 Spence, Jonathan D. (1999). The Search for Modern China (2 ed.). New York: W.W. Norton & Company. pp. 57–58. ISBN 0-393-37651-4. 
  6. Fairbank, John K. (1969). Trade and diplomacy on the China coast: the opening of the treaty ports, 1842-1854. Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp. 27–29. ISBN 978-0804706483. 
  7. Fairbank 1969, p.32
  8. 8.0 8.1 8.2 Spence 1999, p.120
  9. 9.0 9.1 Van Dyke, Paul A. (2005). The Canton trade: life and enterprise on the China coast, 1700-1845. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. pp. 6–9. ISBN 962-2097499. 
  10. Bernstein, William J. (2008). A splendid exchange: how trade shaped the world. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. pp. 286. ISBN 978-0-87113-979-5. 
  11. Early American Trade, BBC
  12. Liu, Henry C. K. (4 September 2008). Developing China with sovereign credit. Asia Times Online.
  13. Chisholm, Hugh (1911). The Encyclopædia Britannica: A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature and General Information. pp. 130. 
  14. Salucci, Lapo (2007). Depths of Debt: Debt, Trade and Choices. University of Colorado.
  15. Hanes, William Travis; Sanello, Frank (2004). The Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of Another. Sourcebooks, Inc. p. 8. ISBN 978-1-4022-0149-3.
  16. Fu, Lo-shu (1966). A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western relations, Volume 1. pp. 380. 
  17. Bertelsen, Cynthia (19 October 2008). "A novel of the British opium trade in China." Roanoke Times & World News.
  18. England and China: The Opium Wars, 1839-60
  19. Palmerston: The People's Darling, by James Chambers, John Murray, London, 2004
  20. Foreign Mud: The opium imbroglio at Canton in the 1830s and the Anglo-Chinese War, by Maurice Collis, W. W. Norton, New York, 1946
  21. Coleman, Anthony (1999). Millennium. Transworld Publishers. pp. 243–244. ISBN 0-593-04478-9. 
  22. Commissioner Lin: Letter to Queen Victoria, 1839. Modern History Sourcebook.
  23. Spence, Jonathan D.. The Search for Modern China 2nd ed.. pp. 153–155. 
  24. Vallely, Paul (25 April 2006). 1841: A window on Victorian Britain. The Independent.
  25. 'China as Victim: The Opium War that wasn't', H.G. Gelber, Centre for European Studies Working Paper 136
  26. Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. 1999 W.W. Norton & Company. p.180
  27. 27.0 27.1 Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. 1999 W.W. Norton & Company. p.181
  28. David, Saul. Victoria's Wars. 2007 Penguin Books. p.360,361
  29. Ebrey, Patricia Buckley; Walthall, Anne; Palais, James (2008). East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political History. Cengage Learning. p. 307.
  30. Choy, Lee Khoon (2007). Pioneers of Modern China. East Asian Studies.
  31. Monument to the People's Heroes, Beijing. Lonely Planet Travel Guide.
  32. Statues of Real People in Manhattan. Forgotten NY.
  33. Lin Zexu Memorial. Chinaculture.org.
  34. Lin Zexu Memorial Museum. Ola Macau Travel Guide.