Caliphate

The last Caliph, Abdülmecid II.

The term caliphate (from the Arabic خلافة or khilāfa) refers to the first system of governance established in Islam. The most common translation for the word which appears in the Quran is vicegerency (or caretaker). It is a constitutional republic, which means that the rulers are bound by a set of laws which they cannot break at a whim, and the people have the right to appoint their leader through their local leaders and should the leaders divert from their obligations as vicegerents, the people have the right to remove them.

It was initially led by Prophet Muhammad's companions as a continuation of the political authority the Prophet established, known in Arabic as Khulufaa'u Rashidin or English 'Rashidun Caliphate (Rightly Guided Caliphate)'. It represented the political and theological unity of the Muslim Ummah, and was the world's first major welfare state.[1][2] A "caliphate" is also a state which implements such a government.

Sunni Islam dictates that the head of state, the caliph, should be selected by Shura - elected by Muslims or their representatives.[3] Followers of Shia Islam believe the caliph should be an imam descended in a line from the Ahl al-Bayt. After the Rashidun period until 1924, caliphates, sometimes two at a single time, real and illusory, were ruled by dynasties. The first dynasty was the Umayyad. This was followed by the Abbasid, the Fatimid, and finally the Ottoman Dynasty.

The caliphate was "the core political concept of Sunni Islam, by the consensus of the Muslim majority in the early centuries."[4]

Contents

History

The caliph, or head of state, was often known as Amir al-Mu'minin (أمير المؤمنين) "Commander of the Believers". Muhammad established his capital in Medina, and after he died Medina remained the capital for the rashidun period. At times in Muslim history there have been rival claimant caliphs in different parts of the Islamic world, and divisions between the Shi'a and Sunni communities.

According to Sunni Muslims, the first Caliph to be called Amir al-Mu'minin was Abu Bakr Siddique and then Umar ibn al-Khattāb, the second of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs. Uthman ibn Affan and Ali ibn Abi Talib also were called by the same title, while the Shi'a consider Ali to have been the first truly legitimate Caliph, although they concede that Ali accepted his predecessors, because he eventually sanctioned Abu-Bakr.[5]

After the first four caliphs, the Caliphate was claimed by dynasties such as the Umayyads, the Abbasids, and the Ottomans, and for relatively short periods by other, competing dynasties in al-Andalus, North Africa, and Egypt. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk officially abolished the last Caliphate, the Ottoman Empire, and founded the Republic of Turkey, in 1924. The Kings of Morocco still label themselves with the title Amir al-Mu'minin for the Moroccans, but lay no claim to the Caliphate.

Some Muslim countries, like Indonesia and Malaysia were never subject to the authority of a Caliphate, with the exception of Aceh, which briefly acknowledged Ottoman suzerainty.[6] Consequently these countries had their own, local, sultans or rulers who did not fully accept the authority of the Caliph.

Rashidun, 632–661

Islamic caliphate

Abu Bakr, the first successor of Muhammad, according to Sunni beliefs, nominated Umar as his successor on his deathbed, and there was consensus in the Muslim community to his choice. Umar Ibn Khattab, the second caliph, was killed by a servant. His successor, Uthman Ibn Affan, was elected by a council of electors (Majlis), but was soon perceived by some to be ruling as a "king" rather than an elected leader. Uthman was killed by members of a disaffected group. Ali then took control but was not universally accepted as caliph by the governors of Egypt, and later by some of his own guard. He faced two major rebellions and was assassinated after a tumultuous rule of only five years. This period is known as the Fitna, or the first Islamic civil war. Under the Rashidun each region (Sultanate, Wilayah, or Emirate) of the Caliphate had its own governor (Sultan, Wāli or Emir).[7]

Muawiyah, a relative of Uthman and governor (Wali) of Syria, became one of Ali's challengers and after Ali's death managed to overcome the other claimants to the Caliphate. Muawiyah transformed the caliphate into a hereditary office, thus founding the Umayyad dynasty.

In areas which were previously under Sassanid Persian or Byzantine rule, the Caliphs lowered taxes, provided greater local autonomy, greater religious freedom for Jews, indigenous Christians, and brought peace to peoples demoralized and disaffected by the casualties and heavy taxation that resulted from the decades of Byzantine-Persian warfare.[8]

Umayyads, 7th–8th centuries

The Caliphate, 622–750      Expansion under the Prophet Muhammad, 622–632      Expansion during the Rashidun Caliphs, 632–661      Expansion during the Umayyad Caliphate, 661–750

Under the Umayyads the Caliphate grew rapidly in territory. Islamic rule expanded westward across North Africa and into Hispania and eastward through Persia and ultimately to the ancient lands of Indus Valley, in modern day Pakistan, and Abhisara, present-day Kashmir. This made it one of the largest unitary states in history and one of the few states to ever extend direct rule over three continents (Africa, Europe, and Asia). Although not ruling all of the Sahara, homage was paid to the Caliph by Saharan Africa, usually via various nomad Berber tribes. However, it should be noted that, although these vast areas may have recognised the supremacy of the Caliph, de facto power was in the hands of locals sultans and emirs.

For a variety of reasons, including that they were not elected via Shura and suggestions of impious behaviour, the Umayyad dynasty was not universally supported within the Muslim community. Some supported prominent early Muslims like Al-Zubayr; others felt that only members of Muhammad's clan, the Banu Hashim, or his own lineage, the descendants of Ali, should rule.

There were numerous rebellions against the Umayyads, as well as splits within the Umayyad ranks (notably, the rivalry between Yaman and Qays). Eventually, supporters of the Banu Hashim and the supporters of the lineage of Ali united to bring down the Umayyads in 750. However, the Shiˤat ˤAlī, "the Party of Ali", were again disappointed when the Abbasid dynasty took power, as the Abbasids were descended from Muhammad's uncle, `Abbas ibn `Abd al-Muttalib and not from Ali. Following this disappointment, the Shiˤat ˤAlī finally split from the majority Sunni Muslims and formed what are today the several Shiˤa denominations.

The Caliphate in Hispania

During the Ummayad dynasty, Hispania was an integral province of the Ummayad Caliphate ruled from Damascus, Syria. When the Caliphate was seized by the Abbasids, Al-Andalus (the Arab name for Hispania) split from the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad to form their own caliphate. The Caliphate of Córdoba (خليفة قرطبة) ruled the Iberian Peninsula from the city of Córdoba from 929 to 1031. This period was characterized by remarkable flourishing in technology, trade and culture; many of the masterpieces of Spain were constructed in this period, including the famous Great Mosque of Córdoba. The title Caliph (خليفة) was claimed by Abd-ar-Rahman III on 16 January 929; he was previously known as the Emir of Córdoba (أمير قرطبة).

All Caliphs of Córdoba were members of the Umayyad dynasty; the same dynasty had held the title Emir of Córdoba and ruled over roughly the same territory since 756. The rule of the Caliphate is considered as the heyday of Muslim presence in the Iberian peninsula, before it fragmented into various taifas in the 11th century.

Abbasids, 8th–13th centuries

Mustansiriya University in Baghdad.

The Umayyad dynasty was overthrown by another family of Meccan origin, the Abbasids, in 750. The Abbasids had an unbroken line of Caliphs for over three centuries, consolidating Islamic rule and cultivating great intellectual and cultural developments in the Middle East. By 940, however, the power of the Caliphate under the Abbasids was waning as non-Arabs, particularly the Berbers of the Maghrib, the Turks, and later, in the latter half of the 13th century, the Mamluks in Egypt, gained influence, and the various subordinate sultans and emirs became increasingly independent.

However, the Caliphate endured as a symbolic position. During the period of the Abbasid dynasty, Abbasid claims to the caliphate did not go unchallenged. The Shiˤa Ubayd Allah al-Mahdi Billah of the Fatimid dynasty, which claimed descent from Muhammad through his daughter, claimed the title of Caliph in 909, creating a separate line of caliphs in North Africa.

Initially controlling Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, the Fatimid caliphs extended their rule for the next 150 years, taking Egypt and Palestine, before the Abbasid dynasty was able to turn the tide, limiting Fatimid rule to Egypt. The Fatimid dynasty finally ended in 1171. The Umayyad dynasty, which had survived and come to rule over the Muslim provinces of Spain, reclaimed the title of Caliph in 929, lasting until it was overthrown in 1031.

Fatimids, 10th-12th centuries

Map of the Fatimid Caliphate also showing cities.

The Fatimid Caliphate or al-Fātimiyyūn (Arabic الفاطميون) was an Arab Shi'a dynasty that ruled over varying areas of the Maghreb, Egypt, Sicily, Malta and the Levant from 5 January 909 to 1171. The caliphate was ruled by the Fatimids, who established the Egyptian city of Cairo as their capital. The term Fatimite is sometimes used to refer to the citizens of this caliphate. The ruling elite of the state belonged to the Ismaili branch of Shi'ism. The leaders of the dynasty were also Shia Ismaili Imams, hence, they had a religious significance to Ismaili Muslims.

Shadow Caliphate, 13th–16th centuries

1258 saw the conquest of Baghdad and the execution of Abbasid caliph al-Musta'sim by Mongol forces under Hulagu Khan. A surviving member of the Abbasid house was installed as caliph at Cairo under the patronage of the newly formed Mamluk Sultanate (literally: The Sultanate of the Slaves) three years later; however, this line of caliphs had generally little authority although some Abbasid rulers had the actual rule over the Mamluk Sultans. Later Muslim historians referred to it as a "shadow" caliphate. Thus, the title continued into the early 20th century.

Ottomans, 16th-20th century

The Ottoman Caliphate.

Ottoman rulers (generally known as Sultans in the West) were known primarily by the title of Padishah and used the title of Caliph only sporadically. Mehmed II and his grandson Selim I used it to justify their conquest of Islamic countries. As the Ottoman Empire grew in size and strength, Ottoman rulers beginning with Selim I began to claim Caliphal authority.

Ottoman rulers used the title "Caliph" symbolically on many occasions but it was strengthened when the Ottoman Empire defeated the Mamluk Sultanate in 1517 and took control of most Arab lands. The last Abbasid Caliph at Cairo, al-Mutawakkil III, was taken into custody and was transported to Constantinople, where he reportedly surrendered the Caliphate to Selim I. According to Barthold, the first time the title of "Caliph" was used as a political instead of symbolic religious title by the Ottomans was the peace treaty with Russia in 1774.

The outcome of this war was disastrous for the Ottomans. Large territories, including those with large Muslim populations, such as Crimea, were lost to the Russian Empire. However, the Ottomans under Abdul Hamid I claimed a diplomatic victory by assigning themselves as protectors of Muslims in Russia as part of the peace treaty. This was the first time the Ottoman caliph was acknowledged as having political significance outside of Ottoman borders by a European power. As a consequence of this diplomatic victory, as the Ottoman borders were shrinking, the powers of the Ottoman caliph increased.

Around 1880 Sultan Abdul Hamid II reasserted the title as a way of countering Russian expansion into Muslim lands. His claim was most fervently accepted by the Muslims of British India. By the eve of the First World War, the Ottoman state, despite its weakness relative to Europe, represented the largest and most powerful independent Islamic political entity. The sultan also enjoyed some authority beyond the borders of his shrinking empire as caliph of Muslims in Egypt, India and Central Asia.

Sokoto, 19th century

The Sokoto Caliphate was an Islamic spiritual community in Nigeria, led by the Sultan of Sokoto, Sa’adu Abubakar. Founded during the Fulani Jihad in the early 1800s, it was one of the most powerful empires in sub-Saharan Africa prior to European conquest and colonization. The caliphate remained extant through the colonial period and afterwards, though with reduced power.

Khilafat Movement, 1920

In the 1920s the Khilafat Movement, a movement to defend the Ottoman Caliphate, spread throughout the British colonial territories in what is now Pakistan. It was particularly strong in British India, where it formed a rallying point for some Indian Muslims as one of many anti-British Indian political movements. Its leaders included Maulana Mohammad Ali, his brother Shawkat Ali, and Abul Kalam Azad, Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari, and Barrister Muhammad Jan Abbasi. For a time it worked in alliance with Hindu communities and was supported by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who was a member of the Central Khilafat Committee.[9][10] However, the movement lost its momentum after the arrest or flight of its leaders, and a series of offshoots splintered off from the main organization.

End of the Caliphate, 1924

On March 3, 1924, the first President of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as part of his reforms, constitutionally abolished the institution of the Caliphate. Its powers within Turkey were transferred to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the parliament of the newly formed Turkish Republic. The title was then claimed by King Hussein bin Ali of Hejaz, leader of the Arab Revolt, but his kingdom was defeated and annexed by Ibn Saud in 1925. The title has since been inactive.

A summit was convened at Cairo in 1926 to discuss the revival of the Caliphate, but most Muslim countries did not participate and no action was taken to implement the summit's resolutions.

Though the title Ameer al-Mumineen was adopted by the King of Morocco and by Mullah Mohammed Omar, former head of the now-defunct Taliban regime of Afghanistan, neither claimed any legal standing or authority over Muslims outside the borders of their respective countries. The closest thing to a Caliphate in existence today is the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an international organization with limited influence founded in 1969 consisting of the governments of most Muslim-majority countries.

Religious basis

Quran

The following excerpt from the Qur'an, known as the 'Istikhlaf Verse', is used by some to argue for a Quranic basis for Caliphate:

" God has promised those of you who have attained to faith and do righteous deeds that, of a certainty, He will make them Khulifa on earth, even as He caused [some of] those who lived before them to become Khulifa; and that, of a certainty, He will firmly establish for them the religion which He has been pleased to bestow on them; and that, of a certainty, He will cause their erstwhile state of fear to be replaced by a sense of security [seeing that] they worship Me [alone], not ascribing divine powers to aught beside Me. But all who, after [having understood] this, choose to deny the truth - it is they, they who are truly iniquitous!"[24:55] (Surah Al-Nur, Verse 55)

In the above verse the word Khulifa (the plural of Khalifa) has been variously translated as "successors" and "ones who accede to power".

Small subsections of Sunni Islamism argue that to govern a state by Islamic law (Shariah) is, by definition, to rule via the Caliphate, and use the following verses to sustain their claim.

So govern between the people by that which God has revealed (Islam), and follow not their vain desires, beware of them in case they seduce you from just some part of that which God has revealed to you
O you who believe! Obey God, and obey the messenger and then those among you who are in authority; and if you have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to God and the messenger's rulings, if you are (in truth) believers in God and the Last Day. That is better and more seemly in the end.

Hadith

The following Hadith from Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal can be understood to prophesy two eras of Caliphate (both on the lines/precepts of prophethood).

"Hadhrat Huzaifa narrated that the Messenger of Allah said: Prophethood will remain among you as long as Allah wills. Then Caliphate (Khilafah) on the lines of Prophethood shall commence, and remain as long as Allah wills. Then corrupt/erosive monarchy would take place, and it will remain as long as Allah wills. After that, despotic kingship would emerge, and it will remain as long as Allah wills. Then, the Caliphate (Khilafah) shall come once again based on the precept of Prophethood."[11]

In the above Hadith the first era of Caliphate is commonly accepted by the Muslims as that of the Rashidun Caliphate.

Nafi'a reported saying:

It has been reported on the authority of Nafi, that 'Abdullah b. Umar paid a visit to Abdullah b. Muti' in the days (when atrocities were perpetrated on the People Of Medina) at Harra in the time of Yazid b. Mu'awiya. Ibn Muti' said: Place a pillow for Abu 'Abd al-Rahman (family name of 'Abdullah b. 'Umar). But the latter said: I have not come to sit with you. I have come to you to tell you a tradition I heard from the Messenger of Allah. I heard him say: One who withdraws his band from obedience (to the Amir) will find no argument (in his defence) when he stands before Allah on the Day of Judgment, and one who dies without having bound himself by an oath of allegiance (to an Amir) will die the death of one belonging to the days of Jahillyya. - Sahih Muslim, Book 020, Hadith 4562.

Hisham ibn Urwah reported on the authority of Abu Saleh on the authority of Abu Hurairah that Muhammad said:

Leaders will take charge of you after me, where the pious (one) will lead you with his piety and the impious (one) with his impiety, so only listen to them and obey them in everything which conforms with the truth (Islam). If they act rightly it is for your credit, and if they acted wrongly it is counted for you and against them.

Muslim narrated on the authority of al-A'araj, on the authority of Abu Hurairah, that Muhammad said:

Behold, the Imam (Caliph) is but a shield from behind whom the people fight and by whom they defend themselves.

Muslim reported on the authority of Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin, who said,

I accompanied Abu Hurairah for five years and heard him talking of Muhammd's saying: The Prophets ruled over the children of Israel, whenever a Prophet died another Prophet succeeded him, but there will be no Prophet after me. There will be Khalifahs and they will number many. They asked: What then do you order us? He said: Fulfil the baya'a to them one after the other and give them their due. Surely God will ask them about what He entrusted them with.

The Sahaba of Muhammad

Al-Habbab Ibn ul-Munthir said, when the Sahaba met in the wake of the death of Muhammad, (at the thaqifa hall) of Bani Sa’ida:

Let there be one Amir from us and one Amir from you (meaning one from the Ansar and one from the Mohajireen).

Upon this Abu Bakr replied:

It is forbidden for Muslims to have two Amirs (rulers)...

Then he got up and addressed the Muslims.[12][13][14][15][16][17]

It has additionally been reported[18] that Abu Bakr went on to say on the day of Al-Saqifa:

It is forbidden for Muslims to have two Amirs for this would cause differences in their affairs and concepts, their unity would be divided and disputes would break out amongst them. The Sunnah would then be abandoned, the bida’a (innovations) would spread and Fitna would grow, and that is in no one’s interests.

The Sahaba agreed to this and selected Abu Bakr as their first Khaleef. Habbab ibn Mundhir who suggested the idea of two Ameers corrected himself and was the first to give Abu Bakr the Bay'ah. This indicates an Ijma as-Sahaba of all of the Sahaba. Ali ibni abi Talib, who was attending the body of Muhammad at the time, also consented to this.

Imam Ali whom the Shia revere said[19]:

People must have an Amir...where the believer works under his Imara (rule) and under which the unbeliever would also benefit, until his rule ended by the end of his life (ajal), the booty (fay’i) would be gathered, the enemy would be fought, the routes would be made safe, the strong one will return what he took from the weak till the tyrant would be contained, and not bother anyone.

The sayings of Islamic scholars

Al-Mawardi says[20]:

It is forbidden for the Ummah (Muslim world) to have two leaders at the same time.

Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (Al-Nawawi) says[21]:

It is forbidden to give an oath to two leaders or more, even in different parts of the world and even if they are far apart.

Ahmad al-Qalqashandi says[22]:

It is forbidden to appoint two leaders at the same time.

Ibnu Hazm says[23]:

It is permitted to have only one leader (of the Muslims) in the whole of the world.

Al-sha’rani says[24]:

It is forbidden for Muslims to have in the whole world and at the same time two leaders whether in agreement or discord.

Al-Qadhi Abdul-Jabbar (he is a Mu’tazela scholar), says[25]:

It is forbidden to give the oath to more than one.

Al-Joziri says[26]:

The Imams (scholars of the four schools of thought)- may Allah have mercy on them- agree that the Caliphate is an obligation, and that the Muslims must appoint a leader who would implement the injunctions of the religion, and give the oppressed justice against the oppressors. It is forbidden for Muslims to have two leaders in the world whether in agreement or discord.

The Shia schools of thought and others expressed the same opinion about this[27][28][29][30] However, the Shia school of thought believe that the leader (Imam) must not be appointed by the islamic ummah, but must be appointed by God.

Al-Qurtubi said in his Tafsir[31] of the verse, "Indeed, man is made upon this earth a Caliph"[32] that:

This Ayah is a source in the selection of an Imaam, and a Khaleef, he is listened to and he is obeyed, for the word is united through him, and the Ahkam (laws) of the Caliph are implemented through him, and there is no difference regarding the obligation of that between the Ummah, nor between the Imams except what is narrated about al-Asam, the Mu'tazzili ...

Al-Qurtubi also said:

The Khilafah is the pillar upon which other pillars rest

An-Nawawi said[33]:

(The scholars) consented that it is an obligation upon the Muslims to select a Khalif

Al-Ghazali when writing of the potential consequences of losing the Caliphate said[34]:

The judges will be suspeneded, the Wilayaat (provinces) will be nullified, ... the decrees of those in authority will not be executed and all the people will be on the verge of Haraam

Ibn Taymiyyah said[35]:

It is obligatory to know that the office in charge of commanding over the people (ie: the post of the Khaleefah) is one of the greatest obligations of the Deen. In fact, there is no establishment of the Deen except by it....this is the opinion of the salaf, such as al-Fadl ibn 'Iyaad, Ahmad ibn Hanbal and others

Reestablishment of the Caliphate

Once the subject of intense conflict and rivalry amongst Muslim rulers, the caliphate has lain dormant and largely unclaimed since the 1920s. For the vast majority of Muslims the caliph as leader of the ummah, "is cherished both as memory and ideal"[36] as a time when Muslims "enjoyed scientific and military superiority globally,"[37] though "not an urgent concern" compared to issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[36]

Tight restrictions on political activity in many Muslim countries, coupled with the obstacles to uniting over 50 nation-states under a single institution, have ensured that calls to revive the Caliphate have remained muted. Popular apolitical Islamic movements such as the Tablighi Jamaat identify a lack of spirituality and decline in personal religious observance as the root cause of the Muslim world's problems, and claim that the caliphate cannot be successfully revived until these deficiencies are addressed. No attempts at rebuilding a power structure based on Islam were successful anywhere in the Muslim world until the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which was based on Shia principles and whose leaders did not outwardly call for the restoration of a pan-Islamic Caliphate.

Islamist call

A number of Islamist political parties and Jihadist guerrilla groups have called for the restoration of the caliphate by uniting Muslim nations, either through political action (e.g., Hizb ut-Tahrir) or through force (e.g., al-Qaeda).[38] Various Islamist movements have gained momentum in recent years with the ultimate aim of establishing a Caliphate; however, they differ in their methodology and approach. Some are locally oriented, mainstream political parties that have no apparent transnational objectives.

Abul Ala Maududi believed the caliph was not just an individual ruler who had to be restored, but was man's representation of God's authority on earth:

Khilafa means representative. Man, according to Islam is the representative of "people", His (God's) viceregent; that is to say, by virtue of the powers delegated to him, and within the limits prescribed by the Qu'ran and the teaching of the prophet, the caliph is required to exercise Divine authority.[39]

The Muslim Brotherhood advocates pan-Islamic unity and implementing Islamic law, it is the largest and most influential Islamic group in the world, and its offshoots form the largest opposition parties in most Arab governments.[40] Founder Hassan al-Banna wrote about the restoration of the Caliphate.[41]

One of the clearly stated goals of the radical Islamist group al-Qaeda is the re-establishment of a caliphate.[42] Bin Laden has called for Muslims to "establish the righteous caliphate of our umma."[43] Al Qaeda recently named its Internet newscast from Iraq "The Voice of the Caliphate."[44]

According to author Lawrence Wright, Ayman al-Zawahiri (Bin Laden's mentor and Al-Qaida No.2 in command), once "sought to restore the caliphate...which had formally ended in 1924 following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire but which had not exercised real power since the thirteenth century. Once caliphate was established, Zawahiri believed, Egypt would become a rallying point for the rest of the Islamic world, leading the jihad against the West. "Then history would make a new turn, God willing," Zawahiri later wrote, "in the opposite direction against the empire of the United States and the world’s Jewish government."[45]

One transnational group whose ideology is based specifically on restoring the caliphate as a pan-Islamic state is Hizb ut-Tahrir (literally: "party of liberation"). It is particularly strong in Central Asia and Europe is and growing in strength in the Arab world. It is based on the claim that Muslims can prove that God exists[46] and that the Qur'an is the word of God.[47][48] Hizb-Ut-Tahrir's stated strategy is a non-violent political and intellectual struggle.

Opposition

Scholar Olivier Roy writes that "early on, Islamists replace the concept of the caliphate ... with that of the amir." There were a number of reasons including "that according to the classical authors, a caliph must be a member of the tribe of the Prophet (the Quraysh) ... moreover, caliphs ruled societies that the Islamists do not consider to have been Islamic (the Ottoman Empire)." [49] This is not the view of the majority of Islamist groups, as both the Muslim Brotherhood (the largest) and Hizb ut-Tahrir view the Ottoman state as a caliphate.[50][51])

A prominent private British think-tank named the Quilliam Foundation was set up to oppose Islamism and the call to re-establish a Caliphate.

Political system

Electing or appointing a Caliph

Fred Donner, in his book The Early Islamic Conquests (1981), argues that the standard Arabian practice during the early Caliphates was for the prominent men of a kinship group, or tribe, to gather after a leader's death and elect a leader from amongst themselves, although there was no specified procedure for this shura, or consultative assembly. Candidates were usually from the same lineage as the deceased leader, but they were not necessarily his sons. Capable men who would lead well were preferred over an ineffectual direct heir, as there was no basis in the majority Sunni view that the head of state or governor should be chosen based on lineage alone.

This argument is advanced by Sunni Muslims, who believe that Muhammad's companion Abu Bakr was elected by the community and that this was the proper procedure. They further argue that a caliph is ideally chosen by election or community consensus, even though the caliphate soon became a hereditary office, or the prize of the strongest general.

Al-Mawardi has written that the caliph should be Qurayshi. Abu Bakr Al-Baqillani has said that the leader of the Muslims simply should be from the majority. The founder of the biggest Sunni Madh'hab, Imam Abu Hanifa also wrote that the Caliph must be chosen by the majority.[3]

Sunni belief

Following the death of Muhammad, a meeting took place at Saqifah. At that meeting, Abu Bakr was elected caliph by the Muslim community. Sunni Muslims developed the belief that the caliph is a temporal political ruler, appointed to rule within the bounds of Islamic law (Sharia). The job of adjudicating orthodoxy and Islamic law was left to Islamic lawyers, judiciary, or specialists individually termed as Mujtahids and collectively named the Ulema. Many Muslims call the first four caliphs the Rashidun meaning the Rightly Guided Caliphs, because they are believed to have followed the Qur'an and the sunnah (example) of Muhammad.

Shi'a belief

Shia Muslims believe in the Imamate, in which the rulers are Imams divinely chosen, infallible, and sinless from Muhammad's family - Ahl al-Bayt literally "People of the House (of Muhammad)" regardless of majority opinion, shura or election. They claim that before his death, Muhammad had given many indications, in Ghadir Khumm particularly, that he considered Ali, his cousin and son-in-law, as his successor. They claim that Abu Bakr had seized power by threatening to use force against Ali, and so Shia Muslims consider the three caliphs elected before Ali as usurpers of power against the divine appointment of Ali. As per Twelver/Ithna Ashery Shia ,Ali and his eleven descendants, the twelve Imams, are believed to have been considered, even before their birth, as the only valid Islamic rulers appointed and decreed by God.

After these twelve Imams, the potential Caliphs, had passed, and in the absence of the possibility of a government headed by their Imams, some Shi'a believe it was necessary that a system of Shia Islamic government based on Vilayat-e Faqih be developed, due to the need for some form of government, where an Islamic jurist or faqih rules Muslims, suffices. However this idea, developed by the Marja (Ayatollah) Ruhollah Khomeini and established in Iran, is not universally accepted among Shi'as.

Shia group of Ismaili/ Fatimid/ Dawoodi Bohra believe in Imamate principle mentioned above, but they need not be ruler. To safe guard divine authority of Allah the "Din", from politics of World "Duniya" the 'external World', they have instituted office of Dai al-Mutlaq even from the era of their 21st Imam Tayyab (1130A.D.), under juridiction of Suleyhid Queen, as Imam was under seclusion. In the twelver shia also many Imams were not ruler ,and they sacrificed much to upheld "Din".

Take the case of Imam Hasan, After Ali ,Imam Hasan was his successor.It is told that there was power struggle between Imam Hasan and Muawwia ,finally agreement reached between them. As Hasan was more interested in safeguarding Islam, he has kept the 'Din' with him and sacrificed Caliphate to Muawwia. One thing is very clear that Imamat need not have power of ruler , but there cannot be two representative of Allah at one moment,hence to have two Imam at a time is ruled out. Even a small organization have clear hierarchy, a clear cut single line of downward delegation, how come the almighty organisation of Allah be governed in anarchy.

The same was philosophy of Fatimid, and same being literally followed by Dawoodi Bohra's Dai in absence and on behalf of their hidden Imam.This is the result that Bohra have unity amongst them all over the world. There is universal brotherhood amongst them, a same culture, same habits of living, togetherness for the cause of Islam and same time dedication to the land they live. This was the Islam and Fatimid's true dream, and the Fatimid/Dawoodi Bohra seems champion to this cause.There is quote from web;

"...All five of us had different nationality passports. 1 Kenyan, 1 British, 1 Yemeni, 1 Indian passport issued in Egypt & another Indian passport issued in Nairobi . The Jordanian Immigration officer did not have to be explained why such a mixed group. He knew & he smilingly made a statement, that was actually a stunner. He jokingly said, “Why don’t you have a Bohra Passport? It will make things so much more easier for you, & us too.”

"....We .. people .. do not have a nation .. treated like a single nationality, do not have a kingdom, but are treated royally. From Japan in the East to he West Coast of USA, .. have a common bond, a unique culture, a common language, a standard calendar, a uniform code of conduct that..defines the rights & the wrongs, one goal, one platform & one base of knowledge..Our geographic existence might be checkered, but the entire mosaic of our community is a beautiful picture of harmony, painted by a divine hand,..Our Tryst with destiny begins & ends in the same spiritual allegiance,..loyal to the country reside in,.. contributing to..socio-economic progress and prosperity of the country, .. peace loving community,..and yet in spite of all diversities, we are one. What really makes us..special? We have a Maula, ..given us an identity, .. no other government in the world can provide."[52]

Majlis al-Shura: Parliament

Traditional Sunni Islamic lawyers agree that shura, loosely translated as 'consultation of the people', is a function of the caliphate. The Majlis al Shura (literally consultative assembly) or parliament was a representation of this idea of consultative governance. The importance of this is premised by the following verses of the Qur'an:

“...those who answer the call of their Lord and establish the prayer, and who conduct their affairs by Shura. [are loved by God]”[42:38]

“...consult them (the people) in their affairs. Then when you have taken a decision (from them), put your trust in Allah”[3:159]

The majlis is also the means to elect a new caliph.[3] Al-Mawardi has written that members of the majlis should satisfy three conditions: they must be just, have enough knowledge to distinguish a good caliph from a bad one, and have sufficient wisdom and judgment to select the best caliph. Al-Mawardi also said that in emergencies when there is no caliphate and no majlis, the people themselves should create a majlis and select a list of candidates for caliph; then the majlis should select a caliph from the list of candidates.[3]

Some modern interpretations of the role of the Majlis al-Shura include those by Islamist author Sayyid Qutb and Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, the founder of a transnational political movement devoted to the revival of the Caliphate. In an analysis of the shura chapter of the Qur'an, Qutb argued that Islam requires only that the ruler consult with at least some of the ruled (usually their representatives) and govern within the general context of God-made laws. Taqiuddin al-Nabhani writes that Shura is an important part of "the ruling structure" of the Islamic caliphate "but not one of its pillars," meaning that its neglect would not make the Caliphate's rule unislamic, hence justifying rebellion. Non-Muslims may serve in the Majlis. Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest Islamist movement and main opposition in Egypt, argue that in the modern age Shura is democracy and that Islam and the caliphate system is inherently democratic without any need to conform to western political notions [2].

Accountability of rulers

Sunni Islamic lawyers have commented on when it is permissible to disobey, impeach or remove rulers in the Caliphate. This is usually when the rulers are not meeting their obligations to the public under Islam.

Al-Mawardi said that if the rulers meet their Islamic responsibilities to the public the people must obey their laws, but a Caliph or ruler who becomes either unjust or severely ineffective must be impeached via the Majlis al-Shura. Similarly, Al-Baghdadi believed that if the rulers do not uphold justice, the ummah via the majlis should warn them, and a Caliph who does not heed the warning can be impeached. Al-Juwayni argued that Islam is the goal of the ummah, so any ruler who deviates from this goal must be impeached. Al-Ghazali believed that oppression by a caliph is sufficient grounds for impeachment. Rather than just relying on impeachment, Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani stated that the people have an obligation to rebel if the caliph begins to act with no regard for Islamic law. Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani said that to ignore such a situation is haraam and those who cannot revolt from inside the caliphate should launch a struggle from outside. Al-Asqalani used two ayahs from the Qur'an to justify this:

“...And they (the sinners on qiyama) will say, 'Our Lord! We obeyed our leaders and our chiefs, and they misled us from the right path. Our Lord! Give them (the leaders) double the punishment you give us and curse them with a very great curse'...”[33:67–68]

Islamic lawyers commented that when the rulers refuse to step down after being impeached through the Majlis, becoming dictators through the support of a corrupt army, if the majority is in agreement they have the option to launch a revolution. Many noted that this option is to be exercised only after factoring in the potential cost of life.[3]

Rule of law

The following hadith establishes the principle of rule of law in relation to nepotism and accountability[53]

Narrated ‘Aisha: The people of Quraish worried about the lady from Bani Makhzum who had committed theft. They asked, "Who will intercede for her with Allah's Apostle?" Some said, "No one dare to do so except Usama bin Zaid the beloved one to Allah's Apostle." When Usama spoke about that to Allah's Apostle Allah's Apostle said: "Do you try to intercede for somebody in a case connected with Allah’s Prescribed Punishments?" Then he got up and delivered a sermon saying, "What destroyed the nations preceding you, was that if a noble amongst them stole, they would forgive him, and if a poor person amongst them stole, they would inflict Allah's Legal punishment on him. By Allah, if Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad (my daughter) stole, I would cut off her hand."

Various Islamic lawyers, however, place multiple conditions and stipulations on the execution of such a law, making it difficult to implement. For example, the poor cannot be penalized for stealing out of poverty, and during a time of drought in the Rashidun caliphate, capital punishment was suspended until the effects of the drought passed.

Islamic jurists later formulated the concept that all classes were subject to the law of the land, and no person is above the law; officials and private citizens alike have a duty to obey the same law. Furthermore, a Qadi (Islamic judge) was not allowed to discriminate on the grounds of religion, race, colour, kinship or prejudice. In a number of cases, Caliphs had to appear before judges as they prepared to render their verdict.[54]

According to Noah Feldman, a law professor at Harvard University, the system of legal scholars and jurists responsible for the rule of law was replaced by the codification of Sharia by the Ottoman Empire in the early 19th century:[55]

Economy

During the Muslim Agricultural Revolution, the Caliphate understood that real incentives were needed to increase productivity and wealth and thus enhance tax revenues. A social transformation took place as a result of changing land ownership [56] giving individuals of any gender,[57] ethnic or religious background the right to buy, sell, mortgage, and inherit land for farming or any other purpose. Based on the Quran, signatures were required on contracts for every major financial transaction concerning agriculture, industry, commerce, and employment. Copies of the contract were usually kept by both parties involved.[56]

There are similarities between Islamic economics and leftist or socialist economic policies. Islamic jurists have argued that privatization of the origin of oil, gas, and other fire-producing fuels, agricultural land, and water is forbidden. The principle of public or joint ownership has been drawn by Muslim jurists from the following hadith of the Prophet of Islam:

Ibn Abbas reported that the Messenger of Allah said: "All Muslims are partners in three things- in water, herbage and fire." (Narrated in Abu Daud, & Ibn Majah) [3] Anas added to the above hadith, "Its price is Haram (forbidden)" [4]

Jurists have argued by qiyas that the above restriction on privatization can be extended to all essential resources that benefit the community as a whole. [5].

Aside from similarities to socialism, early forms of proto-capitalism and free markets were present in the Caliphate,[58] since an early market economy and early form of merchant capitalism developed between the 8th and 12th centuries, which some refer to as "Islamic capitalism".[59] A vigorous monetary economy developed based on the circulation of a stable high-value currency (the dinar) and the integration of previously independent monetary areas. Business techniques and forms of business organization employed during this time included early contracts, bills of exchange, long-distance international trade, early forms of partnership (mufawada) such as limited partnerships (mudaraba), and early forms of credit, debt, profit, loss, capital (al-mal), capital accumulation (nama al-mal),[60] circulating capital, capital expenditure, revenue, cheques, promissory notes,[61] trusts (waqf), startup companies,[62] savings accounts, transactional accounts, pawning, loaning, exchange rates, bankers, money changers, ledgers, deposits, assignments, the double-entry bookkeeping system,[63] and lawsuits.[64] Organizational enterprises similar to corporations independent from the state also existed in the medieval Islamic world.[65][66] Many of these concepts were adopted and further advanced in medieval Europe from the 13th century onwards.[60]

The concepts of welfare and pension were introduced in early Islamic law as forms of Zakat (charity), one of the Five Pillars of Islam, since the time of the Rashidun caliph Umar in the 7th century. The taxes (including Zakat and Jizya) collected in the treasury (Bayt al-mal) of an Islamic government were used to provide income for the needy, including the poor, elderly, orphans, widows, and the disabled. According to the Islamic jurist Al-Ghazali (Algazel, 1058–1111), the government was also expected to stockpile food supplies in every region in case a disaster or famine occurred. The Caliphate was thus one of the earliest welfare states.[1][2]

The demographics of medieval Islamic society varied in some significant aspects from other agricultural societies, including a decline in birth rates as well as a change in life expectancy. Other traditional agrarian societies are estimated to have had an average life expectancy of 20 to 25 years,[67] while ancient Rome and medieval Europe are estimated at 20 to 30 years.[68] The life expectancy of Islamic society diverged from that of other traditional agrarian societies, with several studies on the lifespans of Islamic scholars concluding that members of this occupational group enjoyed a life expectancy between 69 and 75 years.[69] Such studies have given the following estimates for the average lifespans of religious scholars at various times and places: 72.8 years in the Middle East, 69–75 years in 11th century Islamic Spain,[70] 75 years in 12th century Persia,[71] and 59–72 years in 13th century Persia.[72] However, Maya Shatzmiller considers these religious scholars to be a misleading sample who are not representative of the general population.[73] Conrad I. Lawrence estimates the average lifespan in the early Islamic Caliphate to be above 35 years for the general population.[74]

The early Islamic Empire also had the highest literacy rates among pre-modern societies, alongside the city of classical Athens in the 4th century BC,[75] and later, China after the introduction of printing from the 10th century.[76] One factor for the relatively high literacy rates in the early Islamic Empire was its parent-driven educational marketplace, as the state did not systematically subsidize educational services until the introduction of state funding under Nizam al-Mulk in the 11th century.[77] Another factor was the diffusion of paper from China,[78] which led to an efflorescence of books and written culture in Islamic society, thus papermaking technology transformed Islamic society (and later, the rest of Afro-Eurasia) from an oral to scribal culture, comparable to the later shifts from scribal to typographic culture, and from typographic culture to the Internet.[79] Other factors include the widespread use of paper books in Islamic society (more so than any other previously existing society), the study and memorization of the Qur'an, flourishing commercial activity, and the emergence of the Maktab and Madrasah educational institutions.[80]

Famous caliphs

See also

Further reading

Notes

  1. 1.0 1.1 Crone, Patricia (2005), Medieval Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh University Press, pp. 308–9, ISBN 0748621946 
  2. 2.0 2.1 Shadi Hamid (August 2003), "An Islamic Alternative? Equality, Redistributive Justice, and the Welfare State in the Caliphate of Umar", Renaissance: Monthly Islamic Journal 13 (8)  (see online)
  3. 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Gharm Allah Al-Ghamdy
  4. John O. Voll: Professor of Islamic history at Georgetown University Revivalism, Shi‘a Style
  5. Lexic Orient.com
  6. New world hegemony in the Malay world, By Geoffrey C. Gunn, pg. 96
  7. http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=FaRNoAEoflIC&pg=PA316&lpg=PA316&dq=Wali+or+governor&source=web&ots=6R7pzSBUf-&sig=JB877bB5DoWDdYBs5M6RGqUNZCE&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=5&ct=result
  8. John Esposito (1992) p.36
  9. The Khilafat Movement
  10. The Statesman
  11. Masnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Mishkat, Chapter Al-Anzar Wal Tahzir
  12. "As-Sirah" of Ibn Kathir
  13. "Tarikh ut-Tabari" by at-Tabari
  14. "Siratu Ibn Hisham" by Ibn Hisham
  15. "As-Sunan ul-Kubra" of Bayhaqi
  16. "Al-fasil-fil Milal" by Ibnu Hazim
  17. "Al-A’kd Al-Farid" of Al-Waqidi
  18. "as-Sirah" of Ibnu Ishaq
  19. Nahj-ul-Balagha (part 1 page 91)
  20. Al-ahkam Al-Sultaniyah page 9
  21. Mughni Al-Muhtaj, volume 4, page 132
  22. Subul Al-Asha, volume 9, page 277
  23. Al-Muhalla, volume 9, page 360
  24. Al-Mizan, volume 2, page 157
  25. Al-Mughni fi abwab Al-Tawheed, volume 20, page 243
  26. Al-Fiqh Alal-Mathahib Al- Arba’a (the fiqh of the four schools of thought), volume 5, page 416
  27. Al-Fasl Fil-Milal, volume 4, page 62
  28. Matalib Ulil-Amr
  29. Maqalat Al-Islamyin, volume 2,page 134
  30. Al-Moghni Fi Abuab Al-Tawhid, volume 20, pages 58-145
  31. Tafseer ul-Qurtubi 264/1
  32. [Qur'an 002:030]
  33. Sharhu Sahih Muslim page 205 vol 12
  34. al Iqtisaad fil Itiqaad page 240
  35. Siyaasah Shariyyah - chapter: 'The obligation of adherence to the leadership'
  36. 36.0 36.1 Washington Post, Reunified Islam: Unlikely but Not Entirely Radical, Restoration of Caliphate resonates With Mainstream Muslims.
  37. Andrew Hammond, Middle East Online.
  38. Reunified Islam
  39. Abul A'al Mawdudi, Human Rights in Islam, The Islamic Foundation, 1976, p.9
  40. Robert S. Leiken & Steven Brooke, "[1]", Foreign Affairs Magazine Vol 86 No 2 March/April 2007.
  41. Roy, Olivier, Failure of Islamism, Harvard University Press, (1994) p.42
  42. www.fas.org
  43. Interview Oct 21, 2001, from bin Laden Message to the World, Verso, 2005, p.121
  44. Washington Post
  45. Wright, 46
  46. William Lane Craig, Professor Mackie and the Kalam Cosmological Argument.
  47. Search Results for " harunyaya.com "
  48. http://www.harunyaya.biz/Quran_translation/Quran_translation_index.php
  49. Roy, Olivier, Failure of Islamism, Harvard University Press, (1994) p.42-3
  50. The Muslim Brotherhood And Copts, Historical Perspective
  51. Campus Radicals - Hizb-ut Tahrir
  52. http://hikmah.ekhwan.com/index.php/category/the-world/ The beauty of being a dawoodi bohra
  53. Sahih Bukhari, Volume 4, Book 56, Number 681
  54. (Weeramantry 1997, pp. 132 & 135)
  55. Noah Feldman (March 16, 2008). "Why Shariah?". New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16Shariah-t.html?ei=5070&em=&en=5c1b8de536ce606f&ex=1205812800&pagewanted=all. Retrieved 2008-10-05. 
  56. 56.0 56.1 Zohor Idrisi (2005), The Muslim Agricultural Revolution and its influence on Europe, FSTC.
  57. Maya Shatzmiller, p. 263.
  58. The Cambridge economic history of Europe, p. 437. Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521087090.
  59. Subhi Y. Labib (1969), "Capitalism in Medieval Islam", The Journal of Economic History 29 (1), p. 79-96 [81, 83, 85, 90, 93, 96].
  60. 60.0 60.1 Jairus Banaji (2007), "Islam, the Mediterranean and the rise of capitalism", Historical Materialism 15 (1), p. 47-74, Brill Publishers.
  61. Robert Sabatino Lopez, Irving Woodworth Raymond, Olivia Remie Constable (2001), Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World: Illustrative Documents, Columbia University Press, ISBN 0231123574.
  62. Timur Kuran (2005), "The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and Persistence", American Journal of Comparative Law 53, p. 785-834 [798-799].
  63. Subhi Y. Labib (1969), "Capitalism in Medieval Islam", The Journal of Economic History 29 (1), p. 79-96 [92-93].
  64. Ray Spier (2002), "The history of the peer-review process", Trends in Biotechnology 20 (8), p. 357-358 [357].
  65. Said Amir Arjomand (1999), "The Law, Agency, and Policy in Medieval Islamic Society: Development of the Institutions of Learning from the Tenth to the Fifteenth Century", Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, p. 263-293. Cambridge University Press.
  66. Samir Amin (1978), "The Arab Nation: Some Conclusions and Problems", MERIP Reports 68, p. 3-14 [8, 13].
  67. Shatzmiller, Maya (1994), Labour in the Medieval Islamic World, Brill Publishers, pp. 63–4 & 66, ISBN 90-04-09896-8, "At the same time, the “demographic behaviour” of the Islamic society as an agricultural society varied in some significant aspects from other agricultural societies, particularly in ways which could explain a decline in birth rate. It is agreed that all agricultural societies conform to a given demographic pattern of behaviour, which includes a high birth-rate and a slightly lower death-rate, significant enough to allow a slow population increase of 0.5 to 1.0 per cent per year. Other demographic characteristics of this society are high infant mortality, with 200-500 deaths per 1000 within the first year of birth, a lower average life expectancy, of twenty to twenty-five years, and a broadly based population pyramid, where the number of young people at the bottom of the pyramid is very high in relationship to the rest of the population, and that children are set to work at an early stage. Islamic society diverged from this demographic profile in some significant points, although not always consistently. Studies have shown that during certain periods, such factors as attitudes to marriage and sex, birth control, birth and death rates, age of marriage and patterns of marriage, family size and migration pattems, varied from the traditional agricultural model. [...] Life expectancy was another area where Islamic society diverged from the suggested model for agricultural society." 
  68. "Life expectancy (sociology)", Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/eb/topic-340119/life-expectancy, retrieved 2010-04-17, "In ancient Rome and medieval Europe the average life span is estimated to have been between 20 and 30 years." 
  69. Shatzmiller, Maya (1994), Labour in the Medieval Islamic World, Brill Publishers, p. 66, ISBN 90-04-09896-8, "Life expectancy was another area where Islamic society diverged from the suggested model for agricultural society. No less than three separate studies about the life expectancy of religious scholars, two from 11th century Muslim Spain, and one from the Middle East, concluded that members of this occupational group enjoyed a life expectancy of 69, 75, and 72.8 years respectively!" 
  70. Shatzmiller, Maya (1994), Labour in the Medieval Islamic World, Brill Publishers, p. 66, ISBN 90-04-09896-8 
  71. Bulliet, Richard W. (April 1970), "A Quantitative Approach to Medieval Muslim Biographical Dictionaries", Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient (Brill Publishers) 13 (2): 195–211 [200] 
  72. Ahmad, Ahmad Atif (2007), "Authority, Conflict, and the Transmission of Diversity in Medieval Islamic Law by R. Kevin Jaques", Journal of Islamic Studies 18 (2): 246–248 [246], doi:10.1093/jis/etm005 
  73. Shatzmiller, Maya (1994), Labour in the Medieval Islamic World, Brill Publishers, p. 66, ISBN 90-04-09896-8, "This rate is uncommonly high, not only under the conditions in medieval cities, where these ‘ulama’ lived, but also in terms of the average life expectancy for contemporary males. [...] In other words, the social group studied through the biographies is, a priori, a misleading sample, since it was composed exclusively of individuals who enjoyed exceptional longevity." 
  74. Conrad, Lawrence I. (2006), The Western Medical Tradition, Cambridge University Press, p. 137, ISBN 0521475643 
  75. Andrew J. Coulson, Delivering Education, Hoover Institution, p. 117, http://media.hoover.org/documents/0817928928_105.pdf, retrieved 2008-11-22, "Reaching further back through the centuries, the civilizations regarded as having the highest literacy rates of their ages were parent-driven educational marketplaces. The ability to read and write was far more widely enjoyed in the early medieval Islamic empire and in fourth-century-B.C.E. Athens than in any other cultures of their times." 
  76. Edmund Burke (June 2009), "Islam at the Center: Technological Complexes and the Roots of Modernity", Journal of World History (University of Hawaii Press) 20 (2): 165–186 [177–8], doi:10.1353/jwh.0.0045, "The spread of written knowledge was at least the equal of what it was in China after printing became common there in the tenth century. (We should note that Chinese books were printed in small editions of a hundred or so copies.)" 
  77. Andrew J. Coulson, Delivering Education, Hoover Institution, p. 117, http://media.hoover.org/documents/0817928928_105.pdf, retrieved 2008-11-22, "In neither case did the state supply or even systematically subsidize educational services. The Muslim world’s eventual introduction of state funding under Nizam al-Mulk in the eleventh century was quickly followed by partisan religious squabbling over education and the gradual fall of Islam from its place of cultural and scientific preeminence." 
  78. Edmund Burke (June 2009), "Islam at the Center: Technological Complexes and the Roots of Modernity", Journal of World History (University of Hawaii Press) 20 (2): 165–186 [177], doi:10.1353/jwh.0.0045, "According to legend, paper came to the Islamic world as a result of the capture of Chinese paper makers at the 751 C.E. battle of Talas River." 
  79. Edmund Burke (June 2009), "Islam at the Center: Technological Complexes and the Roots of Modernity", Journal of World History (University of Hawaii Press) 20 (2): 165–186 [177], doi:10.1353/jwh.0.0045, "Whatever the source, the diffusion of paper-making technology via the lands of Islam produced a shift from oral to scribal culture across the rest of Afroeurasia that was rivaled only by the move from scribal to typographic culture. (Perhaps it will prove to have been even more important than the recent move from typographic culture to the Internet.) The result was remarkable. As historian Jonathan Bloom informs us, paper encouraged "an efflorescence of books and written culture incomparably more brilliant than was known anywhere in Europe until the invention of printing with movable type in the fifteenth century." 
  80. Edmund Burke (June 2009), "Islam at the Center: Technological Complexes and the Roots of Modernity", Journal of World History (University of Hawaii Press) 20 (2): 165–186 [178], doi:10.1353/jwh.0.0045, "More so than any previously existing society, Islamic society of the period 1000–1500 was profoundly a culture of books. [...] The emergence of a culture of books is closely tied to cultural dispositions toward literacy in Islamic societies. Muslim young men were encouraged to memorize the Qur'an as part of their transition to adulthood, and while most presumably did not (though little is known about literacy levels in pre-Mongol Muslim societies), others did. Types of literacy in any event varied, as Nelly Hanna has recently suggested, and are best studied as part of the complex social dynamics and contexts of individual Muslim societies. The need to conform commercial contracts and business arrangements to Islamic law provided a further impetus for literacy, especially likely in commercial centers. Scholars often engaged in commercial activity and craftsmen or tradesmen often spent time studying in madrasas. The connection between what Brian Street has called "maktab literacy" and commercial literacy was real and exerted a steady pressure on individuals to upgrade their reading skills." 

References

External links