Paris Peace Conference, 1919

Map of the World with the Participants in World War I. The Allies are depicted in green, the Central Powers in orange, and neutral countries in grey.
Paris Peace Conference, Greek and French proposals
"The Big Four" during the Paris Peace Conference (from left to right, Lloyd George, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, Georges Clemenceau, Woodrow Wilson)
Paris Peace Conference, Armenian proposal

The Paris Peace Conferencetook place in 1919 and involved diplomats from more than 30 countries. They met in an attempt to form a lasting peace throughout the world. The conference took place in Paris and Versailles, soon after the end of World War I.

Contents

Overview

The conference opened on January 18, 1919.[1] It came to a close on January 21, 1920 with the inaugural General Assembly of the League of Nations.

The following treaties were prepared at the Paris Peace Conference (in absence of the affected countries):

Also considered was the "holy grail" of Palestine, the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement (3 January 1919). The Paris peace treaties, together with the accords of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922, laid the foundations for the so-called Versailles-Washington system of international relations. The remaking of the world map at these conferences gave birth to a number of critical conflict-prone international contradictions, which would become one of the causes of World War II.[2]

The decision to create the League of Nations and the approval of its Charter both took place during the conference.

The 'Big Four' — Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France; David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States; and Vittorio Orlando, Prime Minister of Italy — were the dominant diplomatic figures at the conference. The conclusions of their talks were imposed on the defeated countries.

Australian approach

The Australian delegates were Billy Hughes (Prime Minister), and Joseph Cook (Minister of the Navy), accompanied by Robert Garran (Solicitor-General). John Greig Latham later Sir, was also part of the delegation. Frederic Eggleston had been invited, but left in disgust at Hughes' behaviour. Indeed, Latham was to run successfully for the Federal seat of Kooyong on a policy of 'Get Rid of Hughes', so appalled was he at Hughes' behaviour. Their principal aims were war reparations, annexation of German New Guinea and rejection of the Japanese racial equality proposal (see below). Hughes had a profound interest in what he saw as an extension of the White Australia Policy. Despite causing a big scene, Hughes had to acquiesce to a class C mandate for New Guinea.

President Wilson asked Hughes if Australia really wanted to flout world opinion by profiting from Germany's defeat and extending its sovereignty as far north as the equator; Hughes famously replied: "That's about the size of it, Mr. President".[3]

French approach

The chief goal of the French leader, Georges Clemenceau, was to weaken Germany militarily, strategically, and economically. Having personally witnessed two German attacks on French soil in the last forty years, the French Premier was adamant that Germany should not be permitted to attack France again. In particular, Clemenceau sought an American and British guarantee of French security in the event of another German attack. Clemenceau also expressed skepticism and frustration with Wilson's Fourteen Points: "Mr. Wilson bores me with his fourteen points," complained Clemenceau. "Why, God Almighty has only ten!" (referring to the Ten Commandments)

Another alternative French policy was to seek a rapprochement with Germany. In May 1919, the diplomat René Massigli was sent on several secret missions to Berlin. During his visits, Massigli offered his behalf of his government to revise the territorial and economic clauses of the upcoming peace treaty.[4] Massigli of the desirability of “practical, verbal discussions” between French and German officials that would lead to a “collaboration franco-allemand”.[5] Furthermore, Massagli told the Germans that the French thought of the “Anglo-Saxon powers”, namely the United States and British Empire to be the major threat to France in the post-war world, argued that both France and Germany had a joint interest in opposing “Anglo-Saxon domination” of the world and warned that the “deepening of opposition” between the French and the Germans “would lead to the ruin of both countries, to the advantage of the Anglo-Saxon powers”.[6] The French offers to the Germans was rejected by the latter because the Germans considered the French overtures to be a trap to trick them into accepting the Versailles treaty “as is” and because the German foreign minister, Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau thought that the United States was more likely to soften the peace terms than France.[7]

Italy's approach

Italy had been persuaded first to join the Triple Alliance and then to join the Allies in order to gain land. In the Treaty of London, 1915, they had been offered the Trentino and the Tyrol as far as Brenner, Trieste and Istria, all the Dalmatian coast except Fiume, full ownership of Albanian Valona and a protectorate over Albania, Antalya in Turkey and a share of Turkish and German Empires in Africa.

Vittorio Orlando was sent as the Italian representative with the aim of gaining these and as much other territory as possible. The loss of 700,000 Italians and a budget deficit of 12,000,000,000 Lire during the war made the Italian government and people feel entitled to these territories. There was an especially strong opinion for control of Fiume, which they believed was rightly Italian due to the Italian population.

Nevertheless, by the end of the war the allies had made contradictory agreements with other nations, especially in Central Europe and the Middle-East. In the meetings of the "Big Four," in which Orlando's powers of diplomacy were inhibited by his lack of English, the Great powers were only willing to offer Trentino to the Brenner, the Dalmatian port of Zara, the Island of Lagosta and a couple of small German colonies. All other territories were promised to other nations and the great powers were worried about Italy's imperial ambitions. As a result of this, Orlando left the conference in a rage (Jackson, 1938).

Japanese approach

The Japanese delegation was headed by Saionji Kimmochi, with Baron Makino Nobuaki, Viscount Chinda Sutemi (ambassador in London), Matsui Keishiro (ambassador in Paris) and Ijuin Hikokichi (ambassador in Rome) and others making a total of 64. Neither Hara Takashi (Prime Minister) nor Yasuya Uchida (Foreign Minister) felt able to leave Japan so shortly after their election. The delegation focused on two demands: (a) the inclusion of their racial equality proposal and (b) territorial claims for the former German colonies; Shandong (including Jiaozhou Bay)and the Pacific islands north of the Equator i.e., the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, the Mariana Islands, and the Carolines. Makino was de facto chief as Saionji's role was symbolic, limited by ill-health. The Japanese were unhappy with the conference because they got only one half of the rights of Germany, and walked out of the conference.

The racial equality proposal

After the end of seclusion, Japan suffered unequal treaties and dreamed of obtaining equal status with the Powers. In this context, the Japanese delegation to the Paris peace conference proposed the racial equality proposal. The first draft was presented to the League of Nations Commission on 13 February as an amendment to Article 21:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible to all alien nationals of states, members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.

It should be noted that the Japanese delegation did not realize the full ramifications of their proposal, and the challenge its adoption would have put to the established norms of the (Western dominated) international system of the day, involving as it did the colonial subjugation of non-white peoples. In the impression of the Japanese delegation, they were only asking for League of Nations to accept the equality of Japanese nationals; however, a universalist meaning and implication of the proposal became attached to it within the delegation, which drove its contentiousness at the conference.[8]

The proposal received a majority vote on 28 April 1919. 11 out of the 17 delegates present voted in favor to its amendment to the charter, and no negative vote was taken. The votes for the amendment tallied thus:

Total: 11 Yes

The chairman, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, overturned it saying that although the proposal had been approved by a clear majority, that in this particular matter, strong opposition had manifested itself, and that on this issue a unanimous vote would be required. This strong opposition came from the British delegation. Though in a diary entry by House it says that President Wilson was at least tacitly in favor of accepting the proposal, but in the end he felt that British support for the League of Nations was a more crucial goal. There is not much evidence to show that Wilson agreed strongly enough with the proposal to risk alienating the British delegation over it. It is said that behind the scenes Billy Hughes and Joseph Cook vigorously opposed it as it undermined the White Australia Policy. Later, as conflicts between Japan and the U.S. widened, the Japanese media reported the case widely — leading to a grudge toward the U.S. in Japanese public opinion and becoming one of the main pretexts of Pearl Harbor and World War II.

As such, this point could be listed among the many causes of conflict which lead to World War II, which were left unaddressed at the close of World War I. It is both ironic and indicative, of the scale of the changes in the mood of the international system, that this contentious point of racial equality would later be incorporated into the United Nations Charter in 1945 as the fundamental principle of international justice.

Territorial claims

The Japanese claim to Shandong was disputed by the Chinese. In 1914 at the outset of First World War Japan had seized the territory granted to Germany in 1897. They also seized the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. In 1917, Japan had made secret agreements with Britain, France and Italy as regards their annexation of these territories. With Britain, there was a mutual agreement, Japan also agreeing to support British annexation of the Pacific islands south of the equator. Despite a generally pro-Chinese view on behalf of the American delegation, Article 156 of the Treaty of Versailles transferred German concessions in Shandong, China to Japan rather than returning sovereign authority to China. The leader of the Chinese delegation, Lu Zhengxiang, demanded that a reservation be inserted before he would sign the treaty. The reservation was denied, and the treaty was signed by all the delegations except that of China. Chinese outrage over this provision led to demonstrations known as the May Fourth Movement. The Pacific islands north of the equator became a class C mandate administered by Japan.

United Kingdom's approach

The British Air Section at the Conference

Maintenance of the British Empire's unity, holdings and interests were an overarching concern for the United Kingdom's delegates to the conference, but it entered the conference with the more specific goals of:

with that order of priority.

The Racial Equality Proposal put forth by the Japanese did not directly conflict with any of these core British interests. However, as the conference progressed the full implications of the Racial Equality Proposal, regarding immigration to the British Dominions (specifically Australia), would become a major point of contention within the delegation.

Ultimately, Britain did not see the Racial Equality proposal as being one of the fundamental aims of the conference. The delegation was therefore willing to sacrifice this proposal in order to placate the Australian delegation and thus help satisfy its overarching aim of preserving the unity of the British Empire.[10]

Britain also managed to rebuff attempts by the envoys of the Irish nationalist movement to put its case to the Conference for self-determination, diplomatic recognition and membership of the proposed League of Nations.

United States' approach

Prior to Wilson's arrival in Europe, no American President had ever visited Europe while in office.[11] Since Wilson had established the conditions for the armistices that had brought an end to World War I, Wilson felt it was his duty and obligation to the people of the world to be a prominent figure at the peace negotiations. In doing so, Wilson ultimately began to lead the foreign policy of the United States down the path of interventionism. Wilson's Fourteen Points had helped win the hearts and minds of Germans as the war ended, and high hopes and expectations were placed on him to deliver what he had promised. Once arrived, however, he found himself working diligently to try and sway the direction the French (Georges Clemenceau) and British (Lloyd George) delegations were taking towards Germany and its allies. Unlike France and Britain, who still aspired to be dominant colonial powers, the United States hoped to establish a more liberal and diplomatic world where democracy and sovereignty would be respected. However, Wilson's attempts to ensure that his Fourteen Points would lead to change ultimately failed, after France and Britain refused to adopt its core principles of liberty and self-determination, in part because of the control they wielded over their colonies around the world. France and Britain tried to appease the American President by consenting to the establishment of his League of Nations. However, because some of the articles in the League's charter conflicted with the United States Constitution, the United States never did ratify the Treaty of Versailles nor join the League of Nations,[12] an institution it had helped to create, to further peace through diplomacy rather than war. The United States sued for peace with Germany and its allies in 1920. The United States did not encourage nor believe that the Article 231 placed on Germany was fair or warranted.[13]

The United States had proved itself to be a major world player and a dominant military and economic power, but it had still failed to win the peace at Paris. It would not be until 1921, when the United States finally signed peace treaties with Germany, Austria and Hungary. The treaties reserved for the United States all reservations it might have had if it had joined the League of Nations, but accepted none of the obligations. By this time, Warren G, Harding was President of the United States, and these separate treaties broke the deadlock on the League of Nations. These separate treaties kept the United States out of the League.

World Zionist Organization's statement

The World Zionist Organization issued a statement requesting a fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration, which

"view[ed] with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" with the understanding that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Kaufman, Will; Macpherson, Heidi Slettedahl (2007). Britain and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History. ABC-CLIO. pp. 696. ISBN 1851094318. 
  2. ↑ First World War - Willmott, H. P., Dorling Kindersley, 2003, pp. 292-307.
  3. ↑ Jan Morris Farewell the Trumpets (Penguin, London 1978) p.209.
  4. ↑ Trachtenberg, Marc “Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference” pages 24-55 from The Journal of Modern History, Volume 51, Issue # 1, March 1979 page 42.
  5. ↑ Trachtenberg, Marc “Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference” pages 24-55 from The Journal of Modern History, Volume 51, Issue # 1, March 1979 page 42.
  6. ↑ Trachtenberg, Marc “Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference” pages 24-55 from The Journal of Modern History, Volume 51, Issue # 1, March 1979 page 43.
  7. ↑ Trachtenberg, Marc “Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference” pages 24-55 from The Journal of Modern History, Volume 51, Issue # 1, March 1979 page 43.
  8. ↑ Shimazu (1998), p. 115.
  9. ↑ Shimazu (1998), p. 30-31.
  10. ↑ Shimazu (1998), pp. 14-15, 117.
  11. ↑ MacMillan (2001), p. 3.
  12. ↑ MacMillan (2001), p. 83.
  13. ↑ MacMillan (2001), p. 6.

References

External links