Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
Організація Українських Націоналістів
Flag of UPA.svg
Leader first
Bohdan Kravciv
last
Volodymyr Timtchyj
Headquarters
Official colors Red, Black

Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists or OUN (Ukrainian: Організація Українських Націоналістів, Orhanizatsiya Ukrayins’kykh Natsionalistiv or ОУН) was a Ukrainian political movement originally created in 1929 in the interwar Poland (modern western Ukraine). The OUN at one time accepted violence as an acceptable tool in the fight against foreign and domestic enemies of their cause as the revenge upon the occupation of Ukraine by Poland, Russia, and Germany. The OUN's stated immediate goal was to protect the Ukrainian population from repression and exploitation by Polish governing authorities in particular; its ultimate goal was an independent and unified Ukrainian state. In 1940, the OUN split into two parts, with the older more moderate members supporting Andriy Melnyk (OUN-M) while the younger and more radical members supporting Stepan Bandera (OUN-B). The latter group came to control the nationalist movement in western Ukraine including the OUN's military wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which was a major Ukrainian armed resistance movement.

Contents

History

Background and Creation

Yevhen Konovalets

In 1919, the West Ukrainian National Republic was conquered by Poland. One year later, a small group of exiled Ukrainian officers created the Ukrainian Military Organization, an underground military organization composed of Ukrainian veterans whose goal was to continue the armed struggle against Poland, to destabilize the political situation, and to prepare disarmed veterans for an anti-Polish uprising. The UVO was strictly a military organization with a military command structure. Its leader was Yevhen Konovalets, the former commander of the elite Sich Riflemen unit of the Ukrainian military, and was secretly funded by West Ukrainian political parties. Although it engaged in acts of sabotage, including the attempted assassination in 1921 of Polish leader Józef Piłsudski, it was more of a military protective group than a terrorist underground. [1] When in 1923 the Allies recognized Polish rule over western Ukraine, many members left the organization, and the Ukrainian legal parties turned against its militant actions preferring to work within the Polish political system. As a result, the UVO turned to Germany and Lithuania for political and financial support, and established contact with militant anti-Polish student organizations, such as the Group of Ukrainian National Youth, the League of Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth. After preliminary meetings in Berlin in 1927 and Prague in 1928, at the founding congress in Vienna in 1929 the veterans of the UVO and the student militants met in Vienna and united to form the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Although most of its members were Galician youths, its first leader was Yevhen Konovalets and its leadership council, the Provid, was composed mostly of veterans and was based abroad. [2] [3]

Pre-war Activities

At the time of its founding, the OUN was originally a fringe movement in western Ukraine, where the political scene was dominated by the mainstream and moderate Ukrainian National Democratic Party (UNDO). This party promoted constitutional democracy and sought to achieve independence through peaceful means. UNDO was supported by the Ukrainian clergy, intelligentsia, and the traditional establishment and publisehd the main western Ukrainian newspaper, Dilo.

In contrast, the OUN accepted violence as a political tool against foreign and domestic enemies of their cause. Most of its activity was directed against Polish politicians and government representatives. Under the command of the Western Ukrainian Territorial Executive (established February 1929), the OUN carried out hundreds of acts of sabotage in Galicia and Volhynia, including a campaign of arson against Polish landowners (which helped provoke the 1930 Pacification), boycotts of state schools and Polish tobacco and liquor monopolies, dozens of expropriation attacks on government institutions to obtain funds for its activities, and some sixty assassinations. Some of the OUN's victims included Tadeusz Hołówko, a Polish promoter of Ukrainian/Polish compromise, Emilian Czechowski, Lviv's Polish police commissioner, Alexei Mailov, a Soviet consular official killed in retaliation for the Holodomor, and most notably Bronisław Pieracki, the Polish interior minister. The OUN also killed moderate Ukrainian figures such as the respected teacher (and former officer of the military of the West Ukrainian People's Republic) Ivan Babii. Such acts were condemned by the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky, who was particularly critical of the OUN's leadership in exile who inspired acts of youthful violence, writing that they were "using our children to kill their parents" and that "whoever demoralizes our youth is a criminal and an enemy of the people." [4]

As Polish persecution of Ukrainians during the interwar period increased, many Ukrainians (particularly the youth, many of whom felt they had no future) lost faith in traditional legal approaches, in their elders, and in the western democracies who were seen as turning their backs on Ukraine. This period of disillusionment coincided with the increase in support for the OUN. By the beginning of the Second World War, the OUN was estimated to have 20,000 active members and several times that number in sympathizers. Many bright students, such as the talented young poets Bohdan Kravtsiv and Olena Teliha (executed by the Nazis at Babi Yar) were attracted to the OUN's revolutionary message. In 1936 and 1937, the Poles used claims of OUN involvement to justify mass arrests of Ukrainians, particularly youths.

As a means to gain independence from Polish and Soviet oppression, before World War II the OUN accepted material and moral support from Nazi Germany. The Germans, needed Ukrainian assistance against the Soviet Union, were expected by the OUN to further the goal of Ukrainian independence. Although some elements of the German military were inclined to do so, they were ultimately overruled by Hitler and his political organization, whose racial prejudice against the Ukrainians precluded cooperation [fact].

Split within the OUN

Stepan Bandera

There had always been some tension within the OUN between the young radical Galician students and the older military veteran leadership based abroad. The older generation has the experience of growing up in a stable society and of having fought for Ukraine in regular armies; the younger generation had only known Polish repression and an underground struggle. The leadership abroad thought of itself as an unapproachble elite, referring to themselves using their military titles acquired during the war (which the youthful members could never attain). They were also more politically moderate, and adhered to an officer's code of honor and standads of military discipline that prevented them from fully following the belief that any means could be used to achieve the goal. In contrast, the youths were more impulsive, violent, and ruthless. [5] The older leaders living in exile admired aspects of Benito Mussolini's fascism but condemned Nazism while the younger more radical members based within Ukraine admired fascist ideas and methods as practiced by the Nazis. [6]Despite such differences, the OUN's leader Yevhen Konovalets through his considerable political skill and reputation was able to command enough respect to maintain unity within the organization. This unity was, however, shattered when Konovalets was assassinated by Soviet agent Pavel Sudoplatov in Rotterdam in May, 1938. Andriy Melnyk, a 48 year old former colonel in the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic and one of the founders of the Ukrainian Military Organization was chosen to lead the OUN despite not having been involved in political or terrorist activities throughout the 1930's. Calm and dignified, Melnyk was more friendly to the Church than any of his associates (the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was generally anti-clerical), and had even became the chairman of a Ukrainian Catholic youth organization that was regarded as anti-Nationalist by many OUN members. His choice was seen as an attempt by the leadership to repair ties with the Church and to become more pragmatic and moderate. However, this direction was counter to the trend within western Ukraine itself. [1]

The Galician youths formed the majority of the membership. Due to their presence in western Ukraine rather than in exile abroad, they faced the danger of arrest and imprisonment. Yet, they were shut out of the leadership. After failing to come to an agreement with their elder leaders in the Provid, in August 1940 they held their own leadership conference, choosing Stepan Bandera, who as an iron-willed, extremist conspirator was in many ways the opposite of the cautious, moderate and dignified Melnyk. [1] On the eve of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the OUN was thus divided into two competing and hostile factions: the "legitimate" OUN-M headed by Andrii Melnyk and OUN-B (or OUN-R for "revolutionary") headed by Stepan Bandera. Each group had its strengths. THe OUN-M retained aloyalty of some youths and Galicia as well as a majority of the youths in the regions of Bukovyna and Trancarpathia, whose political leader monsignor Avgustyn Voloshyn praised Melnyk as a Christian of European culture, in contrast to many nationalists who placed the nation above God. [7]. The OUN-M's leadership was more experienced and had some limited contacts in Eastern Ukraine; it also maintained contact with German intelligence and the Germany army. [8] The OUN-B, on the other hand, enjoyed the support of the majority of the nationalistic Galician youth, who formed the backbone of the underground nationalist movement. It had a strong network of devoted followers and was powerfully aided by Mykola Lebed, who began to organize the feared Sluzhba Bezpeky or SB, a secret police force modelled on the Cheka with a reputation for ruthlessness.

During the German-Soviet War

Further information: Ukrainian Insurgent Army

After the invasion of Poland in September 1939, both factions of the OUN collaborated with the Germans and used the opportunity of the invasion to send their activists into Soviet-controlled territory. Both OUN factions, OUN-M and OUN-B, created their own special forces units, named "Roland" and "Nachtigall", respectively within the Wehrmacht. Eight days after Germany's invasion of the USSR, on June 30 1941, the OUN-B proclaimed the establishment of Ukrainian State in Lviv, with Yaroslav Stetsko as premier.

One of the versions of the “Act of Proclamation of Ukrainian State” signed by Stepan Bandera.

In response to the declaration, OUN-B leaders and associates were soon arrested and imprisoned by the Gestapo. Many OUN-B members were killed outright, or perished in jails and concentration camps. Both of Bandera's brothers were murdered at Auschwitz. On September 18, 1941 Bandera and Stetsko were sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp in "Zellenbau Bunker". With Bandera were all the most important prisoners of the third Reich, such as the ex-prime minister of France Leon Blum and ex-chancellor of Austria, Kurt Schuschnigg. Prisoners of Zellenbau received help from the Red Cross unlike common concentration camp prisoners and were able to send and receive parcels from their relatives. Bandera also received help from the OUN-B including financial assistance. The Germans permitted the Ukrainian nationalists to leave the bunker for important meeting with OUN representatives in Fridental Castle which was 200 meters from Sachsenhausen.[9] , where they were kept until September 1944.

As a result of the German crackdown on the OUN-B, the faction controlled by Melnyk was able to occupy many positions in the civil administration of former Soviet Ukraine Ukraine during the first months of German occupation, including control of Kiev's civil administration; that city's mayor from October 1941 until January 1942, Volodymyr Bahaziy, belonged to the OUN-M and used his position to funnel money into it and to help the OUN-M take control over Kiev's police. [10] At this time, the OUN-M also came to control Kiev's largest nespaper and attracted supporters from among the central and eastern UKrainian intelligentsia. Alarmed by the OUN-M's growing strength in central and eastern Ukraine, the German Nazi authorities swiftly and brutally cracked down on it, arresting and executing many of its members in early 1942, including Volodymyr Bahaziy, and the writer Olena Teliha who had organized led the League of Ukrainian Writers. [11] During this time elements within the Wehrmacht tried in vain to protect OUN-M members. The organization was largely wiped out within central and eastern Ukraine.

After the Second World War

After the war, the OUN in eastern and southern Ukraine continued to struggle against the Soviets; 1958 marked the last year when an OUN member was arrested in Donetsk.[12] Both branches of the OUN continued to be quite influential within the Ukrainian diaspora. The OUN-B formed, in 1943, an organization called the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (headed by Yaroslav Stetsko). The Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations it created and headed would include at various times emigre organizations from almost every eastern European country with the exception of Poland: Croatia, the Baltic countries, anti-communist emigre Cossacks, Hungary, Georgia, Czechia, and Slovakia. In the 1970's the ABN was joined by anti-communist Vietnamese and Cuban organizations.[13]

After the fall of Communism the OUN resumed activities within Ukraine, reorganizing itself there as the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN). Until her death in 2003, KUN was headed by Slava Stetsko, widow of Yaroslav Stetsko, who simulataneously headed the OUN and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists is currently a member of Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine Bloc.

Ideology

The OUN grew from the 1917-1921 veterans, whose vision of an independent Ukrainian state had been short lived. According to its initial declaration, the primary goal of OUN was to establish an independent, united national state on ethnic Ukrainian territory. This goal was to be achieved by a national revolution, that would drive out the occupying powers and set up a government representing all regions and Ukrainian social groups. The OUN's leadership felt that past attempts at securing independence failed due to democracy, poor discipline and a conciliatory attitude towards Ukraine's traditional enemies. Accordingly, its ideology rejected the socialist ideas supported by Petliura and the compromises of Galicia's traditional elite. Instead the OUN, particularly its younger members, adopted the ideology of Dmytro Dontsov, an émigré from Eastern Ukraine.

Totalitarianism

Dmytro Dontsov, major source of inspiration for the OUN (particularly its youthful members), wrote that the nation was the Absolute and that all classes, regional groups, and individuals should be subordinated into an all-encompassing national movement. To this end, OUN members were urged to "force their way into all areas of national life" such as institutions, societies, villages and families. [3] Dontsov claimed that the 20th century would witness the "twilight of the gods to whom the nineteenth century prayed" and that a new man must be created, with the "fire of fanatical commitment" and the "iron force of enthusiasm", and that the only way forward was through "the organization of a new violence." This new doctrine was the chynnyi natsionalizm – the "nationalism of the deed."[14] The nation was to be unified under a single party led by a hierarchy of proven fighters. At the top was to be a Supreme Leader, or Vozhd. In some respects the OUN's creed was similar to that of other eastern European, radical right-wing agrarian movements, such as Romania's Legion of the Archangel Michael, Croatia's Ustashe, Hungary's Arrow Cross Party, and similar groups in Slovakia and Poland. [3] There were, however, significant differences within the OUN regarding the extent of its totalitarianism. The more moderate leaders living in exile admired some facets of Benito Mussolini's fascism but condemned Nazism while the younger more radical members based within Ukraine admired the fascist ideas and methods as practiced by the Nazis. [6] The faction based abroad supported rapproachment with the Ukrainian Catholic Church while the younger radicals were anti-clerical and felt that not considering the Nation to be the Absolute was a sign of weakness. [7]

At a party congress in 1943, the OUN-B rejected fascistic ideology in favor of a social democratic model, while maintaining its hierarchical structure. This was done in light of the impending defeat of fascism in Europe and in order to gain support from Soviet deserters and the western Allies. The jettisoning of fascist ideology broadened its membership. In exile, the OUN's ideology was focused on opposition to communism.

OUN and Antisemitism

Unlike the Croatian Ustashe or Romania's Legion of the Archangel Michael to whom the OUN can be compared, the OUN's ideology did not emphasize antisemitism. Indeed, three of its leaders, General Mykola Kapustiansky, Rico Yary, and Mykola Skyborski, were married to Jewish women. [15] According to the OUN, Ukraine's primary enemies were considered to be Poles and Russians, with Jews playing a secondary role. German documents of the period lead to the impression that extreme Ukrainian nationalists were indifferent to the plight of the Jews; they were willing to either kill them or help them, whichever was more appropriate for their political goals. [16] The OUN was willing to support Nazi antisemitic policies if doing so would help their cause. For example, a resolution of the Second General Congress of OUN-B (April, 1941, Krakow) called the "Jews of the USSR the most faithful supporters of the Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of the Muscovite imperialism in the Ukraine." A slogan put forth by the Bandera group and recorded in the July 16, 1941 Einsatzgruppen report stated: "Long live Ukraine without Jews, Poles and Germans; Poles behind the river San, Germans to Berlin, and Jews to the gallows", and the OUN members who infiltrated the German police were involved in clearing ghettoes and helping the Germans to implement the Final Solution. Once the OUN was at war with Germany, such instances lessened and finally stopped. An underground OUN publication in 1943 condemned "German racism, which carried anthropological nonsense to the absurd." [7] There were many cases of Jews having been sheltered from the Nazis by the OUN-B's military wing UPA [17] and Jews fought in the ranks of UPA .[18]

See also

External links

References

Inline
  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 John Armstrong (1963). Ukrainian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pg. 21
  2. ↑ Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists at Encyclopedia of Ukraine
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Orest Subtelny. (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. pp.441-446.
  4. ↑ Bohdan Budurowycz. (1989). Sheptytski and the Ukrainian National Movement after 1914 (chapter). In Paul Robert Magocsi (ed.). Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptytsky. Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta. pg. 57. A more detailed sample of Sheptytsky's impassioned words condemning the OUN, printed in the newspaper of the maninstream western Ukrainian newspaper Dilo: "If you are planning to kill treacherously those who are opposed to your misdeeds, you will have to kill all the teachers and professors who are working for the Ukrainian youth, all the fathers and mothers of Ukrainian children...all politicians and civic activists. But first of all you will have to remove through assassination the clergy and the bishops who resist your criminal and foolish actions...We will not cease to declare that whoever demoralizes our youth is a criminal and an enemy of our people."
  5. ↑ John Armstrong (1963). Ukrainian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 39-42
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Paul Robert Magocsi. (1996). A History of Ukraine. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pg. 621
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 John Armstrong (1963). Ukrainian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 36-39
  8. ↑ John Armstrong (1963). Ukrainian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pg. 87
  9. ↑ A.B. Shirokorad, Uteryannie zemli Rossii: otkolovshiesya respubliki, Moscow:"Veche", 2007, p. 84.
  10. ↑ John Armstrong (1963). Ukrainian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 114-116.
  11. ↑ John Armstrong (1963). Ukrainian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp.116-117
  12. ↑ Ukrainian News Agency
  13. ↑ Encyclopedia of Ukraine, Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations
  14. ↑ Wilson, A. (2000). The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
  15. ↑ Kost Bondarenko, Director of the Center for Political Research, The History We Don't Know or Don't Care to Know, Mirror Weekly, #12, 2002
  16. ↑ Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews during the Second World War: Sorting Out the Long-Term and Conjunctural Factors by John-Paul Himka, University of Alberta. Taken from The Fate of the European Jews, 1939-1945: Continuity or Contingency, ed. Jonathan Frankel (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Studies in Contemporary Jewry 13 (1997): 170-89.
  17. ↑ Friedman, P.. Ukrainian-Jewish Relations During the Nazi Occupation, YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science v. 12, pp. 259-296, 1958-1959. 
  18. ↑ Heiman, L.. We Fought For Ukraine - the Story of Jews Within the UPA, in Ukrainian Quarterly, Spring 1964, pp. 33-44. 
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