Kurdistan Workers Party

Kurdistan Workers' Party
Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, (PKK)
The current PKK flag used since 2005
The current PKK flag used since 2005
Operational 1978-present
Led by The current official leader is Murat Karayilan. Abdullah Öcalan (also known as "Apo") was one of the founders and still directs the party from his prison cell, through his lawyer.[1][2][3]
Objectives The creation of an independent socialist state of Kurdistan in parts of present Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Cultural and political rights for the Kurdish population in Turkey.[4]
Active region(s) Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria
Ideology Kurdish nationalism, Marxism-Leninism
Major actions Assassination, Bombing Attacks, Chemical Warfare, Drug Trafficking, Extortion, Human Trafficking, Kidnapping, Sabotage, []s[5][6][7][8]
Status Designated as Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US State Department[9][10]
Designated as Proscribed Group by the UK Home Office
Designated as terrorist group by EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.[11]
Size As high as 90,000 in the early 1990s. Currently estimated at 3,000[12][13]-6000[14]
Annual revenue 500 million Euros[15]
Means of revenue Drugs (200-250m), smuggling (100-150m), donations (15-20m)[15]

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or پارت ی کار که‌رێن ی کوردستان) best known as PKK (Kurdish language:په‌ که ‌که‌) also called KADEK, Kongra-Gel, and KGK[10]) is a militant organization founded in the 1970s and led by Abdullah Öcalan. The PKK's ideology is founded on revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and Kurdish nationalism. The PKK's goal has been to create an independent, socialist Kurdish state in Kurdistan; a geographical region that comprises parts of southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, northeastern Syria and northwestern Iran, where the Kurdish population is the majority. This goal has now been moderated to claiming cultural and political rights for the ethnic Kurdish population in Turkey.[1]

The PKK has fairly wide support among the Kurdish population in Turkey, and limited support in other parts of Kurdistan.[16][17] It is listed as a terrorist organization internationally by a number of states and organizations, including the United States,[10] NATO and the European Union.[18] The organisation is listed as one of the 12 active terrorist organisations in Turkey as of 2007 according to the Counter-Terrorism and Operations Department of Directorate General for Security (Turkish police).[19] Turkey labeled the organization as an ethnic secessionist organization that uses terrorism and the threat of force against both civilian[18][20] and military targets for the purpose of achieving its political goal.

Contents

Name

Despite the organization's self-declared name changes, names used by its branches, names of it's front groups, and names used by vassal structures, the group is commonly referred as the PKK. For convenience, we refer to the group as "the organization" hereafter.

The organization first deciphered by the intelligence community as "Apocus." Since then, the organization declared name changes without changing organizational structure, such as Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK); Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan (Kurdish: Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasiya Kurdistanê, KADEK); Halu Meşru Savunma Kuvveti (HSK). Organization established front groups including the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (Turkish: Kürdistan Özgürlük Şahinleri), (Kurdish: Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan, TAK). The organization used the front groups to claim responsibility for attacks against civilians. The organization adapted a decentralized structure to improve effectiveness and these branches adapted different names. [21] The armed wing active in south-east Turkey; the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (Kurdish: Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan, ARGK), the People's Defence Forces (Kurdish: Hêzên Parastina Gel, HPG). The organization held a vassal or tenant to the major control over structures such as the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress, the Kurdistan People's Congress (KHK), and the People's Congress of Kurdistan. As of 30 April 2007, all the social arrangements, all the activities declared, using the listed names are classified as originating from the same organization (commonly known as the PKK) by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of USA as published in Country Reports on Terrorism.[10]

On 25 October 1987, the organization created Youth Council of Kurdistan (YCK) to organize and recruit the youth more systematically. This structure extended to branches; Free Youth Movement of Kurdistan (Kurdish: Tevgera Cîwanên Azad a Kurdistan, TECAK), The Independent Youth Movement in Turkey (Turkish: Bağımsız Gençlik Hareketi, BAGEH), Democratic Youth Movement in Iran, Independent Youth Movement in Iraq (TCM), Free Youth Movement in Syria (TCA), The Free Youth Movement (ÖGH) in Europe and in the Commonwealth of Independent State.[22]

History

October 22 2007, demonstration against the PKK in Kadıköy, Istanbul.
February 15, 2003, PKK supporters at the anti-war protest for the imminent invasion of Iraq in London.
Main article: History of the Kurdistan Workers Party

In the early 1970s, the organization's core group was made up largely of students led by Abdullah Öcalan (nicknamed "Apo") in Ankara. The group soon moved its focus to large Kurdish population in south-east Turkey. On November 27, 1978, the group adapted the name "Kurdistan Workers Party." The organization took part in the conflict with right-wing entities with its communist ideology. In 1979, the organization as a propaganda of the deed attempted to assassinate Kurdish tribal leader Mehmet Celal Bucak who they claimed exploited the peasants, and collaborated with Turkey. This marked a period of intense urban warfare between other radical political elements. The 1980 Turkish coup d'état pushed the organization to another stage with the members doing jail time, being subject to capital punishment, or fleeing to Syria. On November 10, 1980, the Turkish Consulate in Strasbourg, France was bombed in an joint operation by the ASALA and they claimed this was the start of a "fruitful collaboration."[23]

Starting in 1984, the organization transformed itself into a paramilitary organization using the training camps located in Syria and launched paramilitary attacks as well as continuing with the bombings against governmental installations, military and civilian targets, many of whom were connected to the Southeastern Anatolia Project. The organization moved to a less centralized form, taking up operations in a variety of European and Middle Eastern countries and became a trans-nationalized organization. Following the collapse of the USSR, the organization largely abandoned its Communist roots, attempting to better accommodate nationalistic views and Islamic beliefs.

Beginning with the mid 1990s, the organization lost the upper hand in its operations as a consequence of the declined state support in the post-Cold War shifts. In the mid 1990s, it also began to shift from conventional bombing to suicide bombing and launched 15 attacks which 11 were performed by a female. In the late 1990s, Turkey increased the pressure and the undeclared war between Turkey-Syria ended the Syrian open support. In 1999, Öcalan was captured, prosecuted and sentenced to death, but later commuted to life imprisonment as part of European Union membership.[24] With downgraded security concerns, the Turkish parliament began a controlled process of dismantling the legal control, using the term "normalization" or "rapprochement" depending on the sides of the issue. The ban on broadcasting was lifted in 2000s, which the publishing side of this 1983 ban on use of Kurdish language was already lifted in 1991.[25] At the sometime, the organization blacklisted in many countries. On April 2, 2004, the Council of the European Union added the organization to its list of terrorist organisations. Later that year, the US Treasury moved to freeze assets of branches of the organization. The organization went through a series of changes and unilateral truce declared by the organization ended in 2003.[26]

Since Post-invasion Iraq, 2003–present, according to Turkey, Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish region in northern Iraq, and US forces have not done enough to combat with the organization and secure the Iraqi-Turkish border, causing tensions between the Iraqi and Turkish governments.[27][28]

2008 to date

On October 17, 2007, the parliament approved a military incursion into Iraq to pursue the fighters.[29] Action was delayed on request by the US government on the condition that "swift steps" were taken to deal with the militants. After the October 2007 clashes in Hakkari the 2008 Turkish incursion into northern Iraq took place. On August 7 2008, the organization claimed responsibility for the explosion that halted the operation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.[30]

Ideology

The organization originated in the 1970s from the radical left and drew its leaders, members from other existing leftist groups, mainly Dev-Genç.[21]:127 The organization initially presented itself as part of the communist revolution. The organization's aims and objectives have evolved over time.

During 1980s, the organization was a secular insurgent political movement.[21]:127 During 1980s the organization included and cooperated with other ethnic groups, including ethnic Turks, who were following the radical left. Following the collapse of the USSR, the communist roots were largely abandoned in an attempt to better accommodate nationalistic views and Islamic beliefs.

The organization emerged from the Workers Party of "Kurdistan" heritage. Initially the group aimed to establish a Kurdish nation separate from Turkey. Later this goal extended to Syria, Iraq and Iran. In recent years, organization fundamentally transformed from a party of Kurdistan to a party of Turkey.[21]:129 The profound shift implied a recognition of national sovereignty of "Republic of Turkey," within which the claim is made for regional autonomy, rather than a fight for national independence.[21]:129 This positional change was criticized as a method change rather than a real ideological change.

In 1999, following the capture of Ocalan, organization announced a "peace initiative," and spoken more often about cultural or linguistic rights[10]. The group's hard-line militant wing took control and renounced the self-imposed cease-fire with the turn of 2004.[10] Besides the activities towards Turkey, on 17 July 2005, one of the chief executive Hasan Özen was murdered in Austria. Hasan Özen wanted to leave the organization. In Diyarbakir, on 6 July 2005, the organization killed Hikmet Fidan former founder of the legal branch the People’s Democratic Party (HADEP). Hikmet Fidan tried to formed an alternative organization called PWD with Osman Ocalan.

Currently, it is labeled as an ethnic secessionist organization that uses terrorism and the threat of force against both civilian and military targets for the purpose of achieving its political goal.

Organization

The PKK has multiple heads in various West European countries.[31] However, Abdullah Öcalan (1984-1999) was unchallenged leader of the organization. After the capture of Öcalan, authorities induced him to publicly plead for a ceasefire and for his own life at the court, which diminished his stature and credibility.[32] Though serving life imprisonment, Öcalan is still considered the honorary leader and figure-head of the organization. He directs the PKK from his prison cell, through his lawyer.[33]

Murat Karayilan has the control of the organization in practice, although undergone numerous conflicts between Cemil Bayik. Cemil Bayik beside Abdullah Ocalan, Kesire Yildirim Ocalan, and Hakki Karaer was one of the core leaders. Cemil Bayik’s military skills and leadership were criticized by Abdullah Ocalan during his 1999 trial. The organization appointed "Doctor Bahoz," the nom de guerre of Fehman Huseyin, a Syrian Kurd, in charge of the movement's military operations signifying the long-standing alliance between the organization and Damascus.[34]

Training camps

The first training camp was established than in Syrian controlled Bekaa Valley in 1982, with the support of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Syria.[35][36] This main camp moved to north Iraq in 1998, under intensive pressure, after the Syria expelled Ocalan and shut down all camps established in the region.[36] The organization moved its training camps to North Iraq where there was a vacuum of control after the Operation Provide Comfort. Instead one big training camp which could be easily destroyed, organization established many small camps. During this period organization set up a fully functioning enclave with training camps, storage facilities, and reconnaissance and communications centers.

In 2007 organization believed to have a number of camps strung out through the mountains that straddle the border between Turkey and Iraq, including in Sinaht, Haftanin, Kanimasi and Zap.[37] The organization has two types of camps, the boarder camps that were used as forward bases from which militants infiltrate into Turkey. The units deployed there are highly mobile and the camps have only the minimum infrastructure.[37] The camps in the Qandil Mountains have a more developed infrastructure—including a field hospital, electricity generators and a large proportion of the PKK's lethal and non-lethal supplies.[37]

There are also training camps in other countries, the organization's training camp which was deep in the woods and indiscernible was dismantled near Eindhoven in the Netherlands and following raids resulted arrests and seize of materials in The Hague, Rotterdam, Eindhoven and Capelle aan den IJssel.[38] There was another training camp at Belgium, which the organization uses training camps in Europe for political and ideological training.[39]

Sympathizers

The organization had sympathizer parties in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey beginning in early 1990s. The establishment of direct links to the organization has been a question. In sequence HEP/DEP/HADEP/DEHAP and the latest Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP) sympathizes with the organization and refuses to brand it as a terrorist group. As of June 2007 report by the European Union Institute for Security Studies stated that "It is an obvious secret that DTP is connected to PKK in a way and PKK is a terrorist group."[40]

The political organizations established in Turkey are banned to both propagate and support violence. As of 2008, there is calling for legal action against the DTP by the constitutional court. The constitution court found direct link with the HEP/DEP/HADEP with the organization and closed these parties. There are also sympathizer figures, members of these parties, which their material connection or propagation of violence has been questioned and some served time, such as Leyla Zana.[41]

Activities

Activities of the Kurdistan Workers Party by Region[5][42]
Target Activity Category Turkey Northern
Iraq
Western
Europe
Government Demonstrations/Protests[5] Yes Yes Yes
Riots[5] Yes Yes
Kidnapping[5] Yes Yes
Assassination[5] Yes Yes
Sabotage[5] Yes
Chemical warfare[notes 1] Yes
Bombing
Attacks
[5]
Post/Train/Power Yes
Police Yes
Outposts Yes
Armed
Attacks[5]
Military Yes Yes
Police Yes
Village Guards Yes
Civilian Kidnapping[5] Yes
Assassination[5] Yes Yes
Bombing
Attacks
Villages Yes Yes
Touristic Facilities[5] Yes
Commercial Units[5] Yes
Organized Crime Extortion[6] Yes Yes
Drug Trafficking[7] Transit Transit Destination
Human Trafficking[7] Origin Origin

During its establishment in the mid 1970s, amid violent clashes in the whole of Turkey, organization used classic terrorism methods, such as failed assassination of Mehmet Celal Bucak as a propaganda-of-the-deed.[21] After the 1980 military coup the organization developed into a paramilitary organization using resources it acquired in Bekaa valley in part of ex-Syrian-controlled Lebanon. After 1984, PKK began to use Maoist theory of people's war.[43][44] There are three phases in this theory. The militant base during the initial years was coming from different sources, so the first two phases were diffused to each other.

1978-1984

In the first phase (1978-1984), the PKK tried to gain the support of the population. It attacked the machinery of government and distributed propaganda in the region. PKK tactics were based on ambush, sabotage, riots, protests, and demonstrations against the Turkish government. PKK has also been accused of violent attacks on individual civilians or residential areas (Kurds and non-Kurds alike), who refused to co-operate with the PKK or were suspected of collaborating with the Turkish authorities. During these years, the PKK fought a turf war against other predominantly Kurdish organisations in Turkey. The PKK effectively used the prison force to gain appeal among the population.[45][46] In the whole Turkey, this period was characterized by violent clashes which culminated in the 1980 military coup.

During this time, the organization argued that its violent actions were explained by the need to defend Kurds in the context of what it considered as the massive cultural suppression of Kurdish identity (including the 1983 Turkish Language Act Ban) and cultural rights carried out by other governments of the region.

1984-1999

In the second phase (1984-1999), which followed the return of civilian rule in 1983, escalating attacks were made on the government's military and vital institutions all over the country. The objective was to destabilise Turkish authority through a long, low-intensity confrontation. In addition to skirmishing with Turkish military and police forces and local village guards, the PKK has conducted suicide bombing on government and police installations, as well as at local tourist sites. Kidnapping and assassination against government officials and Kurdish tribal leaders who were named as puppets of the state were performed as well. Widespread sabotages were continued from the first stage. PKK performed kidnapping western tourists, primarily in Istanbul but also at different resorts. Its actions have taken place mainly in Turkey and against Turkish targets in other countries, although it has on occasions co-operated with other Kurdish nationalist paramilitary groups in neighboring states, such as Iraq and Iran.[47] PKK has also attacked Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities across Western Europe. In effect, the Turkish state has led a series of counter-insurgency operations against the PKK, accompanied by political measures, starting with an explicit denunciation of separatism in the 1982 Constitution, and including proclamation of the state of emergency in various PKK-controlled territories starting in 1983 (when the military relinquished political control to the civilians). This series of administrative reforms against terrorism included in 1985 the creation of village guard system by the then prime minister Turgut Özal who is of partial Kurdish descent.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, in an effort to win increased support from the Kurdish peasantry, the PKK altered its leftist secular ideology to better accommodate and accept Islamic beliefs. The group also abandoned its previous strategy of attacking Kurdish civilians, focusing instead on government and tourist targets.[48] In its campaign, the organization has been accused of carrying out atrocities against both Turkish and Kurdish civilians and its actions have been criticised by human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Actions of the Turkish state in the past have also been criticised by these same groups.

All in all, this low intensity conflict which has lasted more than thirty years has had a number of effects in the Turkish territory.

1999-current

In the third phase (1999-current), after capture of Öcalan, according to Maoist theory of people's war claims that the conventional fighting should be established to seize cities, overthrow the government and take control of the country. This stage has never achieved. In effect, after the capture of Öcalan, activities of the organization never reached to previous levels.

Since the 1999, the organization begin to use improvised explosive devices rather than direct confrontation.

Tactics

The areas in which the group operates are generally mountainous rural areas and dense urban areas. The mountainous terrain offers an advantage to members of the PKK by allowing them to hide in a network of caves and making military air operations, especially helicopter use, hazardous for the Turkish Armed Forces. While in urban areas, PKK members are often able to blend in with the local population.

Recruiting

Organization with it's Marxist ideology claim to generate equality of gender. At its establishment, included a small number of female militants, over time, however, this number has increased significantly and the early 1990s, 30 percent of its 17,000 armed militants were women.[49] The Civil Code in Turkey, established as Ataturk's reforms, has accepted men and women as equals since 1926, it was not possible to accomplish this ideal in practice for Kurdish rural areas where tribal structure and a male-dominant oppressive environment that considered women as second-class citizens. The organization increased its number of members through the recruitment of women from different social structures and environments, such as women from families that migrated to several European countries after 1960 as guest workers(German: Gastarbeiter).[49] It was reported that 88% of the subjects claimed that equality was a key objective, there was no equality within the organization.[50] In 2007, approximately 1,100 of total members (4,500-5,000) were comprised of women.[49]

The organization used children within its militant force.[51] 86% percent of who had joined the organization was to bolster their families incomes following offers that it would provide for their families in return.[50] All of the new recruites reported that these offers were not fulfilled.[50] 80% of those surveyed also reported that they had actively stopped other family members—usually younger brothers—from joining the organization too.[50] 60% of those surveyed had an education level below high school level.[50]

When asked why they stayed in the organization, two thirds stated that they were afraid of being caught as reprisals are not just limited to physical harm towards the militant; their families would be at risk as well.[50] Five percent said that it was from fear of punishment by the Republic of Turkey.[50]

Instruments

In July 2007, the weapons captured between 1984-2007 from the PKK operatives and their origins published by the Turkish General Staff indicates that the operatives delete some of the serial numbers from their weapons. The total number of weapons and the origins for traceable ones were:[52]

The choice & origin of the traceable weapons (July 2007)[52]
Type Quantity Sources
AK-47 Kalashnikovs 4,500 71.6% from the USSR, 14.7% from China, 3.6% from Hungary, 3.6% from Bulgaria
Rifles[notes 2] 5,713 of (959 traceable) 45.2% from Russia, 13.2% from United Kingdom, and 9.4% from United States.
rocket launchers 1,610 (313 traceable) 85% from Russia, 5.4% from Iraq, and 2.5% from China in origin.
pistol 2,885 (2,208 traceable) 21.9% from Czechoslovakia, 20.2% from Spain, 19.8% from Italy
grenade 3,490 (136 traceable) 72% from Russia, 19.8% from United States, 8% from Germany,
mines 11,568 (8,015 traceable) 60.8% from Italy, 28.3% from Russia, 6.2% from Germany

Four members of the organization, who handed themselves over to authorities after escaping from camps in northern Iraq, claimed they had seen two U.S. armored vehicles deliver weapons, which was widely reported and further stoked suspicions about U.S. policy in Iraq.[53] US envoy denied these claims.[54] The arms were claimed to be part of Blackwater Worldwide arms smuggling allegations. The probe of organization's weapons and the investigation of Blackwater employees were connected.[55]

The organization has been using mines.[56] Use of these mines has led to civilian deaths, in part due to accidental triggering by civilian trucks and buses rather than the intended military armoured vehicles.[56]

Resources

Funding

The organization's annual budget has been estimated at $500 million Euros.[15]

The PKK receives a proportion of its funding in the form of private donations, from both organisations and individuals from around the world. Some of these supporters are Kurdish businessmen in south-eastern Turkey, sympathisers in Syria and Iran, and Europe. Parties and concerts are organized by branch groups.[57] Additionally, it is believed that the PKK earns money through the sale of various publications, as well as receiving revenues from legitimate businesses owned by the organization.[58] Besides affliate organizations, there are sympathizer organizations such as the Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe (KON-KURD, headquartered in Brussels) and the International Kurdish Businessmen Union (KAR-SAZ, in Rotterdam) which constantly exchanges information and perform legitimate or semi-legitimate commercial activities and donations.

The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) also has been financing its separatist movement by extorting narcotics traffickers and engaging in the trade themselves. The PKK is heavily involved in the European drug trade, especially in Germany and France.[59] French law enforcement estimates that the PKK smuggles 80% of the heroin in Paris.[60] The British Foreign Office has made a similar estimate for Britain.[61]

Another significant source of funding is the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), according to Abdullah Öcalan, who said that the state's spy agency does this to keep the PKK under control. Öcalan himself has been said to be on the agency's payroll. His wife Kesire is the daughter of a MIT agent called Ali Yıldırım.[62]

Human

During it's highest point in the early 1990s the militant membership was around 17000. After the capture of Öcalan this number drastically decreased. The membership increased from 3,000 to more than 7,000 since 2003 invasion of Iraq. In 2008, according to information provided by the Intelligence Resource Program of the Federation of American Scientists the strength of the organization in terms of human resources consists of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 militants of whom 3,000 to 3,500 are located in northern Iraq.[63]

A study carried out by the Counter-Terrorism and Operations Department of Directorate General for Security over a sample of files about people convicted of being a terrorist under Turkish laws including 262 militants from the organization has found that 54% of the members are aged 14 to 25, 34% 26 to 37 and 12% 38 to 58. University graduates make up 11 % of the members, high school graduates 16 %, secondary school graduates 13 %, primary school graduates 39%, literate non-graduates 12% and illiterates 9%.[64]

International

At the height of its campaign, the organization received support from many countries. The level support given have changed through out this period.

Support of Syria,[57][65] From early 1979 to 1999 Syria had provided valuable safe havens to PKK in the region of Beqaa Valley. After the undeclared war between Turkey and Syria, Syria placed restrictions on PKK activity on its soil. Turkey is expecting positive developments in its cooperation with Syria in the long term, but even during the course of 2005, there were PKK operatives of Syrian nationality operating in Turkey.

Support of Iran;[66] Iran listed PKK as a terrorist organization after Iran's supply of resources to the PKK began to be used on its own soil. Iran provided PKK with supplies in the form of weapons and funds.

Support of Greece; retired Greek L.T. General Dimitris Matafias and retired Greek Navy Admiral Antonis Neksasis had visisted organization's Mahsun Korkmaz base camp in Bakaa valley in October 1988 along with parliamentarians from the panhellenic Socialist movement (PASOK).[67] At the time it was reported that the general has assumed responsibility for training. Greeks also dispatched arms through Greek Cypriot administration.[67] In December 1993, Greek European affairs minister Theodore Pangaios was quoted saying "we must be supportive of the Kurdish people to be free".[68] Greece declined to join Germany and France and the eleven other members at the EU to ban the organization.[68] During the 1990s, Greece supplied the rebels.[69]

Support from the Republic of Cyprus was brought in question when Abdullah Öcalan was caught with a Cypriot passport to the name of Mavros Lazaros, a nationalist reporter.

The support of paramilitary groups; The organization developed links with paramilitary groups among other ethnic groups which has harboured historic grievances against Turkey such as the ethnic Armenian ASALA,[70] as well as groups which shared its left-wing nationalist ideology such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation, ETA, and, to a lesser degree, the Provisional Irish Republican Army.[70] Through the large Kurdish immigration in Germany, it has also formed close contacts with violent left-wing political groups in that country.

Support of the Soviet Union;[71] According to the former KGB-FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko, who was assassinated in 2006, PKK's leader Abdullah Ocalan was among the terrorists trained by KGB-FSB.[72] As of 2008, Russia still is not among the states that list PKK as a terrorist group.

Support of UK; TV broadcast for five years in UK, until its licence was revoked by the regulators Independent Television Commission (ITC) in 1999 due to a breach of ITC guidelines and perceived pro-PKK bias.

Support of various Europe states; Despite Brussels designation of the organization as a terrorist organization, the EU continues to permit the broadcasting of organization's networks on the Hot Bird 3 satellite owned by the French company Eutelsat. MEDYA TV started transmissions from studios in Belgium via a satellite uplink from France. MEDYA TV's licence was revoked by the French authorities. A few weeks later Roj TV began transmissions from Denmark. It has also been argued that the Netherlands and Belgium have supported the PKK by allowing its training camps to function in their respective territories. On November 22 1998, Hanover's criminal police reported that three children had been trained by the PKK for guerrilla warfare in camps in the Netherlands and Belgium.[73] After the death of Theo van Gogh, with increasing attention on domestic security concerns, the Dutch police raided the 'PKK paramilitary camp' in the Dutch town of Liempde and arrested 29 people in November 2004.[74] Denmark allows Kurdish satellite television stations (such as ROJ-TV), which Turkey claims has links with the PKK, to operate in Denmark and broadcast into Turkey.[75]

Various PKK leaders, including Hidir Yalcin, Riza Altun, Zubeyir Aydar, and Ali Haydar Kaytan all lived in Europe and moved freely. The free movement was archived by the strong ties with influential persons. Danielle Mitterrand, the wife of the former President of France, had active connections during the 90s with elements of the organization's leadership that force a down graded relationships between these states.[76] Ali Rıza Altun, a suspected key figure with an Interpol arrest warrant in his name, after harboring him for some time Austria arranged a flight to Iraq.. Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gül summoned the Austrian ambassador and condemned Austria's action.[77] On September 30 1995, While Öcalan was at Syria, Damascus opened contact with high ranking German CDU MP Heinrich Lummer and German intelligence officials.

The Chief of the Turkish General Staff during 2007, General Yaşar Büyükanıt, stated that even though the international struggle had been discussed on every platform and even though organizations such as the UN, NATO, EU make statements of serious commitment, to this day the necessary measures had not been taken.[78] According to Büyükanıt; "this conduct on one side has encouraged the terrorists, on the other side it assisted in widening their [the terrorists] activities. The most distressful part of it is that many of the European countries being a member of NATO, an organization that had announced that terrorism was the greatest threat to itself.[78]" Sedat Laciner, of the Turkish think tank ISRO, says that US support of the PKK undermines the US war on terrorism.[79] Seymour Hersh claimed that the U.S. supported PEJAK, the Iranian branch of the PKK.[80] The head of the PKK's militant arm, Murat Karayilan, claimed that Iran attempted to recruit the PKK to attack coalition forces, adding that Kurdish guerrillas have launched a clandestine war in north-western Iran, ambushing Iranian troops.[81]

Effects

Main article: Effects of the Kurdistan Workers Party

As a self-styled revolutionary left-wing organization, the PKK has cited "mass violence by the Turkish state on the Kurd identity" to justify its activities. The main goal of its activities was to alienate the people from the state by pushing security forces into more and more overt and repressive counter-measures. The Political-Justice section extends the results of this ideology and methods of the democratic processes and the justice system in Turkey. In a democratic system, an ideology that questions the state's legitimacy, will of its population and its security apparatus was difficult to be accepted as a political view, which was shaped under HEP/DEP/HADEP story. Turkish government authorities did not negotiate with the organization, so regional NGOs there were no communication channels between the sides. The ill-formed language ban of 1983 and Terrorism Act of 1991 were significant events. Also, amnesties were interesting events during the conflict time, as each amnesty gave more human resources to the organization. The prison as a rehabilitation concept was a failure. The people who were jailed for non-violent activities were becoming militants during their jail time. Government's military operations against the prisons were the highest point in this failure.

As a revolutionary left-wing organization, the PKK perceived Turkish society as one that was deformed by capitalism and imperialism. The PKK unleashed its aggression on enemies spanning all classes (farmers, business, etc.) and those that it considered puppets of the state. The cost of the PKK's actions are significant. PKK had drastic effects on regional economy, as targeted infrastructure of the region. Regions' inability to join the economical activities were associated with the work force, costs (insurance premiums, facility costs, loss of trained personnel etc.), and productivity (loss of work time, travel restrictions, inability to move rapidly etc). The region has had a very high historical tourism potential and it has been dormant because of the terrorism threat for many years.

The integration into social and economical activities are developed within the education system. Educational activities were targeted by the PKK. Because the majority of the people are very resilient to the effects of political violence, young people form a high risk group because of their undeveloped personalities. The effects of political violence on the newer generations is an important issue because, at the moment, the new generation in areas affected by the conflict have no experience living under what would be considered normal conditions.

This conflict became part with the negotiations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) about its eventual integration to the EU.

Toll

Further information: Turkey–Kurdistan Workers Party conflict

More than 37,000 people have died since the beginning of the PKK's armed struggle in 1984.[82] According to Denise Natali, the Turkish Armed Forces have destroyed some 8000 Kurdish communities and created 3 to 4 million refugees in the process.[83]

According to official figures released by the Turkish military for the 1984-2008 period:[14]

According to a July 1998 article in Le Monde diplomatique, the conflict has weighed heavily on the Turkish state's budget.[84] In 1993, a sum of $70m was allocated from the prime minister’s secret funds. According to government inspector Kutlu Savaş, this sum was used mainly for procuring weapons and anti-terrorist equipment from Israel and for external operations. Irregular units in the conflictual zones have had to find ways to finance themselves, including racketeering and secret funding. Sedat Bucak has been alleged by the French newspaper to have under his orders 20,000 men, while the village guards pro-government Kurdish militias created in the mid-1980s would number to a total of 64,000.[84]

Footnotes

  1. Two decoded cases: 1) August 27, 1996 mustard/sarin 2)(50 mg/l) of cyanide to three water tanks used by the Air Force.
  2. Kannas, PKC automatic rifle, Dragunov Sniper Rifle, Arbiki, Heckler & Koch G3, M16 rifle, Heckler & Koch PSG1 (G-1), Mauser

References

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Further reading