MiG-15 MiG-15UTI |
|
---|---|
![]() |
|
Single-seat MiG-15 of the Polish Air Force | |
Role | Fighter |
Manufacturer | Mikoyan-Gurevich |
First flight | 30 December 1947 |
Introduced | 1947 |
Status | Trainers in service |
Primary users | Soviet Air Force PLA Air Force North Korean Air Force 41 others |
Number built | ~12,000 + ~6,000 in license |
Variants | MiG-17 |
The Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 (Russian: Микоян и Гуревич МиГ-15) was a jet fighter developed for the USSR by Artem Mikoyan and Mikhail Gurevich. The MiG-15 was one of the first successful swept-wing jet fighters, and it achieved fame in the skies over Korea, where early in the war, it outclassed all enemy fighters. The MiG-15 also served as the starting point for development of the more advanced MiG-17 which would oppose American fighters over Vietnam in the 1960s. The MiG-15 is believed to have been one of the most numerous jet aircraft ever made, with over 12,000 built. Licensed foreign production perhaps raised the total to over 18,000.[1].
USAF and NATO reporting names were as follows:-
Contents |
Most early jets were designed like piston-engined fighters with straight wings, limiting their high speed performance. German research during World War II had shown swept wings would perform better at transonic speeds, and Soviet aircraft designers were quick to take advantage of this information. Claims of Artem Mikoyan and Mikhail Gurevich (lead designers of the "MiG" bureau) being heavily influenced by the Focke-Wulf Ta 183, however, have been discredited. Although the abortive late-war German jet had swept wings and bore a superficial resemblance to the later MiG-15, the two aircraft are very different in structure and general design. The Soviets did seize plans and prototypes for the Ta-183, but the majority of Focke-Wulf engineers were captured by Western armies. Currently, most sources acknowledge that the MiG-15 is an original design benefiting from German research, but conceived, designed, engineered, and produced by the Soviets.[11]
The unusual MiG-8 Utka experimental canard aircraft, built right at the conclusion of World War II by the MiG design bureau, is said to have also been a major influence in the use of swept wings on later Mikoyan designs.
By 1946, Soviet designers were finding it impossible to perfect the German-designed HeS-011 axial-flow jet engine, and new airframe designs from Mikoyan were threatening to outstrip development of the engines to power them. Soviet aviation minister Mikhail Khrunichev and aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev suggested to Premier Joseph Stalin the USSR buy advanced jet engines from the British. Stalin is said to have replied, "What fool will sell us his secrets?"[11]
However, he gave his consent to the proposal and Mikoyan, engine designer Vladimir Klimov, and others travelled to the United Kingdom to request the engines. To Stalin's amazement, the British Labour government and its pro-Soviet Minister of Trade, Sir Stafford Cripps, were perfectly willing to provide technical information and a license to manufacture the Rolls-Royce Nene. This engine was reverse-engineered and produced as the Klimov RD-45, subsequently incorporated into the MiG-15.[11] Rolls-Royce later attempted to claim £207 million in license fees, without success.
In the interim, on 15 April 1947, the Council of Ministers issued decree #493-192, which ordered the Mikoyan OKB to build two prototypes for a new jet fighter. As the decree called for a first flight as soon as December, designers at OKB-155 fell back on an earlier troublesome design, the MiG-9. The MiG-9 suffered from an unreliable engine and control problems; the first would be solved by the excellent new Klimov engine, and to solve the second, the designers began experimenting with swept wings and redesigning the tail. The resulting prototypes were designated I-310.
The I-310 was a clean, swept-wing fighter with 35° sweep in wings and tail, and exceptional performance, with a top speed of over 650 mph (1,040 km/h). Its primary competitor was the similar Lavochkin La-168. After evaluation, the MiG design was chosen for production. Designated MiG-15, the first production example flew on 31 December 1948. It entered Soviet Air Force service in 1949, and would subsequently receive the NATO reporting name "Fagot." Early production examples had a tendency to roll to the left or right due to manufacturing variances, and so aerodynamic trimmers called "nozhi (knives)" were fitted to correct the problem, the knives being adjusted by ground crews until the aircraft flew correctly.[11]
An improved variant, the MiG-15bis ("second"), entered service in early 1950 with a Klimov VK-1 engine, an improved version of the RD-45/Nene, plus minor improvements and upgrades[11]. Visible differences are: a headlight in air intake separator and horizontal upper edge of air brakes in MiG-15. 23mm cannons was put tighter together in their undercarriage. Some "bis" aircraft also adopted on-wing hardpoints for unguided rocket launchers or 50-250Kg bombs. Fighter-Bomber modifications was doubled "IB", "SD-21", "SD-5". About 150 planes was upgraded to SD-21 specification during 1953-1954. Unknown number of aircraft was modified to "IB" specification in late 1950s.
The MiG-15 arguably had sufficient power to dive at supersonic speeds, but could not do so because it did not feature an "all-flying" tail. As a result, the pilot's ability to control the aircraft deteriorated significantly as Mach 1 was approached. Later MiGs would incorporate all-flying tails.
The MiG-15 was originally intended to intercept American bombers like the B-29. It was even evaluated in mock air-to-air combat trials with an interned ex-U.S. B-29, as well as the later Soviet B-29 copy, the Tu-4 "Bull". To ensure the destruction of such large bombers, the MiG-15 carried cannon armament: two 23 mm with 80 rounds per gun and a single 37 mm with 40. These weapons provided tremendous punch in the interceptor role, but their limited rate of fire and relatively low velocity made it more difficult to score hits against small and maneuverable enemy jet fighters in air-to-air combat. The 23 mm and 37 mm also had radically different ballistics, and some United Nations pilots in Korea had the unnerving experience of 23 mm shells passing over them while the 37 mm shells flew under. The cannon were fitted into a neat pack that could be winched down out of the bottom of the nose for servicing and reloading, in principle allowing a preprepared pack to be switched in for rapid turnaround. (Some sources mistakenly claim the pack was added in later models.)[11]
A variety of MiG-15 variants were built, but the most common was the MiG-15UTI (NATO reporting name Midget) two-seat trainer.
Because Mikoyan-Gurevich never mass-produced the transition training versions of the later MiG-17 or MiG-19, the MiG-15UTI remained the sole Warsaw Pact advanced jet trainer well into the 1970s, the primary training role being fulfilled exclusively by Czechoslovak Aero L-29 Delfin and the L-39 Albatros jet trainers (save for Poland, which used their indigenous TS-11 Iskra jets). While China produced two-seat trainer versions of the later MiG-17 and MiG-19, the Soviets felt that the MiG-15UTI was sufficient for their needs and did not produce their own trainer versions of those aircraft.
The MiG-15 was widely exported, with the People's Republic of China receiving MiG-15bis models in 1950. Chinese MiG-15s took part in the first jet-versus-jet dogfights after communist North Korea's invasion of South Korea. The swept-wing MiG-15 quickly proved superior to the first-generation, straight-wing jets of the United Nations air forces, such as the F-80 and Gloster Meteor, as well as piston-engined F-51 Mustangs and F4U Corsairs (although an American F-80 would score the first all-jet, air-to-air kill in history over a MiG-15). Only the F-86 Sabre with its highly trained pilots was a match for the MiG.
Its baptism of fire occurred during the last phases of the Chinese Civil War (1946-49). During the first months of 1950 the aviation of Nationalist China attacked from Taiwan the communist position in continental China, specially Shangai. Mao Zedong requested the military assistance of the USSR, and the 50th IAD (Истребительная Авиа Дивизия, Istrebitelnaya Avia Diviziya = Fighter Aviation Division) equipped with the MiG-15bis was deployed south of the People’s Republic of China. On 28 April 1950 Kapitan (Captain) Kalinikov shot down a P-38 of the Kuomitang, scoring that way the first aerial victory of the MiG-15. Soon afterwards followed another one on 11 Mayo, when Kapitan Ilya Ivanovich Schinkarenko downed the B-24 Liberator of Li Chao Hua, commander of the 8th Air Group of the nationalist Air Force.
The Korean War (1950-1953) was the ordale of the MiG-15. Along this conflict the MiG-15 was far superior to all the enemy fighters, with the exception of the American fighter F-86 Sabre, of similar performance. The MiG-15s in Korea finished the era of the strikes performed by the heavy bombers B-29, shooting down many UN aircraft (the exact figures are still matter of passionate debates and controversy between US, Russian and Chinese historians).
On 1st November 1950 the MiG-15 shocked the world when eight MiG-15 of the 1st AE (Авиа Эскадрилья, Avia Eskadrilya = Aviation Squadron) of thel 72nd GIAP (Гвардевский Истревительный Авиа Полк, Gvardevskiy Istrevitelniy Avia Polk = Guard Fighter Aviation Regiment) de la 151st GIAD (Гвардевскaя Истревительная Авиа Дивизия, Gvardevskaya Istrevitelnaya Avia Diviziya = Guard Fighter Aviation Division) intercepted about sixteen F-51D Mustangs of the 18th y 35th FBW de la USAF, and Starshiy Leitenant (1st Lt.) Fiodor V. Chizh –in the cockpit of the MiG-15 Nº 11811- shot down the F-51D of Aaron Abercombrie (35ª FBW), killing the American aviator. Few minutes later other three MiG-15s of the same unit intercepted ten F-80 Shooting Stars of the 51st FIW, and Starshiy Leitenant Semyon Fiodorovich Jominich –flying the MiG-15 Nº 0615372- scored the first jet-vs-jet victory in History when bagged the F-80C of Frank Van Sickle (16th FIS, 51st FIW), who would also perish (USAF credits both losses to the action of the North Korean flak)[12]. However on 9 November the Soviet fighter suffered its first loss when Lt.Cdr. William T. Amen (VF-111, carrier USS Philippine Sea), while flying a F9F Panther shot down and killed Kapitan Mijail F. Grachev (139th GIAP, 28th IAD)[13].
During the rest of the month the Soviet air units claimed to shot down 29 American aircraft: 11 F-80s, seven B-29s and nine F-51s[14]. Twenty-three out of these twenty-nine claims match with acknowledged losses, but the American sources assert that most of them were operational or due to AAA, admitting only four B-29 (a downed B-29, plus two B-29 and a RB-29 which crash-landed or where damaged beyond repair)[15]. Both sides agree that the MiG-15 stole the USAF aerial superiority over North Western Korea.
But the situation evened again with the arrival of the F-86 Sabre of the 4th FIW. On 17 December 1950 the first encounter between this two classic opponents ended up with a clear American victory when Lt.Col. Bruce H. Hinton (commanding officer of the 336th FIS) forced Mayor Yakov Nikanorovich Yefromeyenko to eject of his blazing MiG[16]. Along the following days both sides traded punches, with Kapitan Nikolay Yefremovich Vorovyov (177th IAP, 50th IAD) –in the cockpit of the MiG-15bis Nº 0615396- shooting down the F-86A BuNo 49-1176 of Captain Lawrence V. Bach (335th FIS, POW) on 22 December 1950[17]. Both sides exaggerated the their claims for aerial victories along that month: the Sabre fliers claimed eight MiGs, and the Soviets sincerely believed to shot down 12 F-86s. The actual losses were three MiGs and at least one Sabre (the total might be four).
Those first encounters established the main features of the bulk of the aerial battles that would rage during the next two and a half years. The MiG-15 y MiG-15bis had a higher ceiling that all the versions of the Sabre (15.700 meters against 14.200 of the F-86F), accelerated faster than F-86A/E/Fs due to their better thrust-to-weight ratio (1.005 kph against 972 kph of the F-86F). They had also a better climbing rate -2.800 meters per minute against 2.200 of the F-86A and E (the F-86F matched that rate)-, a better turn radius above 10.000 meters, and a much more powerfull weaponry –the terrible cannon NR-37 of 37 mm and two NR-23 of 23 mm, against six 12,7 mm (0,50”) machineguns of the Sabre, with an inferior hitting power. In the negative side, they were slower al low altitude (1.107 kph of the F-86F against 935 kph of the MiG-15bis), the gyroscopic gunsight ASP-1N was less sopphisticated than the very accurate A-1CM and A4 with radar ranging of the F-86E and F, and all the Sabre versions turned tighter below the 8.000 meters of altitude [18].
So, if the the MiG-15 forced the Sabre to fight in the vertical plane, or in the horizontal one above the 10.000 meters, had already won the battle. Furthermore, the MiG-15 could easily escape away of a Sabre climbing to their ceiling, knowing that the F-86 could not follow him. But bellow the 8.000 meters the Sabre dominated the MiG in almost every aspect (excluding the climbing rate), and was the victor most of the times, specially if the Soviet pilot sobre made the mistake of fighting in the horizontal plane.
But the main mission of the MiG-15 was not to dogfight against the F-86s, but to force the USAF to stop the attacks of the B-29 Superfortress strategic bombers. This mission was assigned to the élite of the VVS (BBC, Военно Воздушные Силы, Voyenno Vozdushnye Sily = Soviet Air Force), first to the 324th IAD of Coronel Ivan Kozhedub (Three-Times Heroe of the Soviet Union, top allied ace of the Second World War with 62 victories against the Luftwaffe) in April 1951, and later to the 303rd IAD of General Georgiy A. Lobov (19 victories in WWII), which arrived to Korea in june of that same year [19].
Forty-four MiG-15s belonging to both regiments of the 324th IAD (176th GIAP and 196th IAP) accomplished that mission on 12 April 1951, when they intercepted a huge formation of 48 Superfortresses, 18 Sabres, 54 Thunderjets y 24 Shooting Stars heading towards the vital bridge over the Yalu river in Uiju. When the battle was over, the experienced Soviet fliers had shot down or damaged beyond repair ten B-29As, one F-86A and three F-80Cs, all that against the loss of only one MiG[20].
The American strategic bombers came back during the week from 22 to 27 October to neutralize the North Korean aerodromes of Namsi, Taechon y Saamchan, and the MiGs inflicted them terrible losses. The most important battle occurred on 23 October 1951 when 56 MiG-15bis of all three regiments of the 303rd IAD (17th y 523rd IAP, and 18th GIAP) should face nine Superfortresses escorted by 34 Sabres and 55 Thunderjets. In spite of their numerical inferiority the Soviet airmen shot down or damaged beyond repair eight B-29As and two F-84Es, and lost in return only one MiG. Americans called that day "Black Tuesday". The most successful Soviet pilots that day were el executive commander of the 18th GIAP Podpolkovnik (Lt. Col.) Aleksandr P. Smorchkov and 1st Lt. Dmitriy A. Samoylov (523rd IAP). The first one shot down a Superfortress on each the days 22, 23 and 24 October (the B-29A BuNos 44-61656, 44-70151 and 44-61932)[21]. Samoylov piled two F-86As of the 336th FIS into his scoreboard on 24 October 1951 (the US fliers, Fred T. Wicks and Bradley B. Irish, were both captured)[22], and on 27 October shot down two more aircraft: the B-29A BuNo 44-62971 (30th BS, 19th BW) and the F-84E BuNo 51-570 (136th FBW)[23]. All these four victories Samoylov achieved them flying the MiG-15bis Nº 121067[24]. Those terrible losses among the heavy bombers forced the FEAF’s High Command to cancel definitively the precision daylight attacks of the B-29s, and only perform radar directed night raids [25]
During the period November 1950 - January 1952 (specially while the two elite divisions 303rd and 324th IAD were in Korea) no less than 40 Soviet MiG-15 pilots were credited as aces (with 5 or more victories in their respective tallies). Soviet combat records show that the first pilot to claim his fifth aerial victory was Captain Stepan Ivanovich Naumenko (29th GIAP, 50th IAD) on 24 December 1950[26]. However, crossing references with the USAF loss records, it seems that his actual scoreboard was only three kills (one B-29A, one F-86A and one F-84E). Neither was the first ace of the Korean War James Jabara, proclaimed ace on 20 May 1951 (only 4 out of 6 claims can be confirmed)[27]. Such honor correspond to Captain Sergei Kramarenko (176th GIAP, 324th IAD), when on 29 July 1951 scored his actual fifth victory - the F-86A BuNo 49-1098 (4th FIW)[28]. No less than 16 out of those 40 pilots actually became aces, being the most succesfull Major Nikolay Sutyagin (17th IAP, 303rd IAD) - credited with 22 victories, 13 can be confirmed, Colonel Yevgeny Pepelyaev (commander of the 196th IAP, 324th IAD) - 19 claims, 15 actual victories, and Major Lev Shchukin (18th GIAP, 303rd IAD) - 17 credited, 11 verified[29].
In spite of the succesful performance of those elite divisions, by late January 1952 the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR decided to replace them by two new PVO units (ПВО, Против Воздушная Oборона, Protiv Vozdúshnaya Oborona = Anti-Aircraft Defense), the 97th y 190th IAD. This turned out to be a big mistake, because such units were trained to intercept bombers con nuclear weapons, not to dogfight against the F-86s. Furthermore, unlike the 303rd y 324th IAD (made up almost completely by veterans of WWII, with hundreds of hours flying jets) only the commanders and staff of the 97th and 190th IAD had experience combat experience during WWII, but the bulk of the fliers had only 50-60 hours flying the MiG.
Consequently those units suffered terrible losses by the now better prepared American Sabre pilots. Along only six months since February to July 1952 they lost 81 MiGs and 34 pilots killed by F-86s, and in return they could only shot down 68 US aircraft (between them 36 F-86s). The worst day was 4 July 1952, when 11 MiGs were downed by the Sabres (a pilot was killed in action). To all this contributed the secret and illegal "Maple Special" Operation, planned by the commanding officer of the 51st FIW, the famed WWII ace Colonel Francis Gabreski – this consisted in intentionally to cross the Yalu river, get into Manchuria (something officially forbidden) and caught the unaware MiGs during their scrambles or landings, when they were at disadvantage (they flew slow, at low level, sometimes short of ammunition and fuel). Even then, such pilots could score at least two important victories against American aces:
At least two Soviet fliers could crown themselves aces during that period: Majors Arkadiy S. Boytsov (16th IAP, 97th IAD) and Vladimir N. Zabelin (256th and 821st IAP, 190th IAD) with 6 and 9 victories respectively[34].
New and better trained PVO divisions -32nd, 133rd and 216th IAD- replace the beatten 97th and 190th in July and August 1952, and even when could not take the aerial superiority away from the Americans, they could neutralize it between September 1952 and the end of the war. Once again, the figures of victories and losses in the air still are discussed by historians of USA and Russia, but at least in three occasions Soviet MiG-15 aces gained the upper hand against Sabre aces:
The figures given by the Soviet sources indicate that the MiG-15s of the 64th IAK (the Fighter Corp which included all the divisions that rotated along the conflict) performed 60.450 daylight combat sorties and 2.779 night ones, engaged the enemy in 1.683 daylight aerial battles, and 107 ones at night, cliaming to shot down 1.097 UN aircraft over Korea, among them: 647 F-86s, 185 F-84s, 118 F-80s, 28 F-51s, 11 F-94s, 65 B-29s, 26 Meteors and 17 aircraft of different types. Losses were heavy: 335 airplanes and 120 pilots - 319 MiGs and 110 airmen were lost in combat, the remaining ones in operational accidents[38]. Almost certainly the statistics of victories are very inflated (at least in a 50%), but also it seems clear that the MiG-15s flown by Soviet personnel caused serious problems to the USAF and their allies in Korea, much more serious of what the traditional American bibliography had acknowledged so far.
The Soviet VVS and PVO were the main users of the MiG-15 along the war, but no the only ones: it was also used by the People’s Air Forces of China and North Korea (known as the United Air Army). Excluding a brief apparition in January 1951, the Chinese Air Force did not get into action till 25 September 1951, when sixteen MiG-15s belonging to the 12th Regiment of the 4th Division engaged Sabres of the 4th FIW, claiming the pilot Li Yongtai a victory (USAF admitts that the F-86A of 1st Lt. Charles Loyd, 334th FIS, was severely damaged in the left wing root) but losing also a MiG and its pilot[39]. The North Korean unit equipped with the MiG-15, the 1st Guard Regiment, got into action just an year later, in September 1952. From then on till the end of the war the United Air Army claimed to shot down 211 F-86s, 72 F-84s and F-80s, and 47 other aircraft of various types. Their losses: 231 aircraft - 224 MiG-15s, three La-11s and four Tu-2s, perishing 116 Oriental airmen [40]. Several pilots were credited with the shootdown of 5 or more enemy airplanes, such as Zhao Baotong (7th Regiment, 3rd División) - 7 victories, Wang Hai (9th Regiment, 3rd Division) - 9 kills, and both Kan Yon Duk and Kim Di San (1st Guard Regiment, both credited with 5 victories).
Eager to obtain an intact MiG for testing, the United States offered a reward of US$100,000 and political asylum to any pilot who would defect with his airplane. [41] Eventually, the North Korean traitor Lieutenant No Kum-Sok, who claimed to be unaware of the reward, landed at Kimpo Air Base on 21 September 1953, allowing the first detailed evaluation of the aircraft. [42]
This MiG-15 was minutely inspected and was test flown by several test pilots including Chuck Yeager. Yeager reported in his autobiography the MiG-15 had dangerous handling faults and claimed that during a visit to the USSR, Soviet pilots were incredulous he had dived in it, this supposedly being very hazardous.[43] When this story got back to the Russian pilots Yeager claimed to have talked to, they angrily denounced it. In fact, although the MiG-15 did have some handling quirks and could, in principle, exceed flight limits in a dive, its airbrakes opened automatically at the red line limit, preventing it from going out of control.[11] Lieutenant No's aircraft is now on display at the National Museum of the United States Air Force near Dayton, Ohio.
Along the decade of the 1950s the MiG-15s of the USSR and their allies of the Warsaw Pact intercepted in countless occassions aircraft of the NATO air forces performing recconnoissance near or inside their territory, and many times such incidents ended up with airplanes of one side or the order being shot down . What follows are all the known incidents were the MiG-15s were involved (Sources: "Air Aces - Shootdowns of the Cold War Era, "Goryachoe Nebo Kholodnoy Voyny" ("The Hot Sky of the Cold War" (in Russian)) y Aircraft Downed During the Cold War and Thereafter).
The Egypt of Gamal Abdel Nasser bought a handful of MiG-15bis and MiG-17 fighters in 1955 from Czechoslovakia with the sponsoring and support of the USSR. These were assigned to serve in the No.1 Sqdn, just in time to participate in the Anglo-French-Israeli assault on Egypt, known as the Suez Canal Crisis. During the air combats against the Heyl Ha'Avir (Israeli Air Force), in spite of suffering several losses, the Egyptian MiG-15bis managed to shot down at least three Israeli aircraft: a Piper Cub and a Meteor F.8 of the No.117 Sqdn on 30 October 1956 (the latter because a too tight maneuver), and a Ouragan which should perform a belly landing on 1st November – this latter victory was scored by the Egyptian pilot Faruq el-Gazzavi[44].
Also throughout the 1950s MiG-15s of China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) frequently engaged Republic of China (ROC) and U.S. aircraft in combat, and in 1958, a ROC fighter achieved the first air-to-air kill with an AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile, against a PLAAF MiG-15. [45]
The famous Russian cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin died during a March 1968 training flight in a MiG-15UTI. Due to poor visibility and miscommunication with ground control, Gagarin crashed.[46]
The USSR built around 12,000 MiG-15s in all variants. It was also built under license in Czechoslovakia (as the S-102 and S-103) and Poland (as the Lim-1 and Lim-2 and biplace SB Lim-1 and SB Lim-2).
In the early 1950s, the Soviet Union delivered hundreds of MiG-15s to China, where they received the designation J-2. The Soviets also sent almost a thousand MiG-15 engineers and specialists to China, where they assisted China's Shenyang Aircraft Factory in building the MiG-15UTI trainer (designated JJ-2). China never produced a single-seat fighter version, only the two-seat JJ-2.[1]
The designation "J-4" is unclear; some sources claim Western observers mistakenly labelled China's MiG-15bis a "J-4", while the PLAAF never used the "J-4" designation. Others claim "J-4" is used for MiG-17F, while "J-5" is used for MiG-17PF. [2] Another source claims the PLAAF used "J-4" for Soviet-built MiG-17A, which were quickly replaced by license-built MiG-17Fs (J-5s).[3] What is certain is, the service lives of the J-2 and J-4 in the PLAAF were short, as they were quickly replaced by the more capable J-5 and J-6.
|
|
Many MiG-15 are on display through the world. In addition, they are becoming increasingly common as private sport planes and warbirds.
General characteristics
Performance
Armament
Note: All bullets were armor piercing and highly explosive
Related development
Comparable aircraft
Related lists
|
|