Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) 大日本帝國陸軍 Dai-Nippon Teikoku Rikugun |
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![]() The ensign of the Imperial Japanese Army |
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Active | 1867–1945 |
Country | Empire of Japan |
Allegiance | Empire of Japan |
Type | Army |
Engagements | Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, World War I, World War II |
Commanders | |
Notable commanders |
Kotohito Kan'in, Hajime Sugiyama, Hideki Tojo, Yasuji Okamura, Shunroku Hata, Tadamichi Kuribayashi, Tomoyuki Yamashita, Masaharu Homma |
The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) (Kyūjitai: 大日本帝國陸軍, Shinjitai: 大日本帝国陸軍, Romaji: Dai-Nippon Teikoku Rikugun), or more officially Army of the Greater Japanese Empire was the official ground based armed force of Imperial Japan from 1867 to 1945. It was controlled by the Imperial Army General Staff Office and the Ministry of War, both of which were nominally subordinate to the emperor as supreme commander of the army and the navy. Later an Inspectorate General of Military (Army) Aviation, became the third agency with oversight over the army. During wartime or national emergencies, the nominal command functions of the emperor would be centralized in an Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ), an ad-hoc body consisting of the chief and vice chief of the Army General Staff, the minister of war, the chief and vice chief of the Naval General Staff, the inspector general of military aviation, and the inspector general of military training.
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During the Meiji Restoration, the military forces loyal to the Emperor were samurai drawn primarily from the loyalist feudal domains of Satsuma and Chōshū. After the successful overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate (bakufu) and establishment of the new Meiji government modeled on European lines, a more formal military, loyal to the central government rather than individual domains, was recognized as a necessity to preserve Japan’s independence from western imperialism.
This central army, the "Imperial Japanese Army" (IJA), became even more essential after the abolition of the feudal domains in 1871. To reform the military, the government instituted nationwide conscription in 1873, mandating that every male serve in the armed forces for 3 years upon turning twenty-one. One of the primary differences between the samurai and peasant class was the right to bear arms; this ancient privilege was suddenly extended to every male in the nation.
The early Imperial Japanese Army was essentially developed with the assistance of French advisors, through the second French Military Mission to Japan (1872-1880), and the third French Military Mission to Japan (1884-1889). However, due to the German victory in the Franco-Prussian War, the Japanese government also relied on Prussia as a model for their army, and hired two German military advisors (Major Jakob Meckel, replaced in 1888 by von Wildenbrück and Captain von Blankenbourg) for the training of the Japanese General Staff from 1886 to April 1890: the Imperial Army General Staff Office, created after the Prussian Generalstab, was established directly under the Emperor in 1878 and was given broad powers for military planning and strategy.
In 1874, the Taiwan expedition was the first foray abroad of the new Imperial Japanese Navy and the Imperial Japanese Army.
Other known foreign military consultants were the Italian Major Pompeo Grillo, who worked at the Osaka foundry from 1884 to 1888, followed by Major Quaratezi from 1889 to 1890, and the Dutch Captain Schermbeck, who worked on improving coastal defenses from 1883 to 1886.
Japan did not use foreign military advisors between 1890 and 1918, until again a French Military Mission to Japan (1918-1919), headed by Commandant Jacques Faure, was requested to assist in the development of the Japanese air services.
The Taiwan Expedition of 1874 was a punitive expedition by Japanese military forces in response to the murder of 54 crewmembers of a wrecked Ryukyuan merchant vessel by Paiwan aborigines on the southwestern tip of Taiwan in December 1871. It marked the first overseas deployment of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy.
Not surprisingly, the new order led to a series of riots from disgruntled samurai. One of the major riots was the one led by Saigō Takamori, the Satsuma rebellion, which eventually turned into a civil war. This rebellion was put down swiftly by conscripts in the newly- formed imperial army, trained in Western tactics and weapons, even though the core of the new army was actually the Tokyo Police force, consisting mostly of former samurai.
An imperial rescript of 1882 called for unquestioning loyalty to the Emperor by the new armed forces and asserted that commands from superior officers were equivalent to commands from the Emperor himself. Thenceforth, the military existed in an intimate and privileged relationship with the imperial institution.
Top-ranking military leaders were given direct access to the Emperor and the authority to transmit his pronouncements directly to the troops. The sympathetic relationship between conscripts and officers, particularly junior officers who were drawn mostly from the peasantry, tended to draw the military closer to the people. In time, most people came to look more for guidance in national matters to military commanders than to political leaders.
By the 1890’s, the Imperial Japanese Army had grown to become the most modern army in Asia, well-trained, well equipped and high in morale. However, it was basically an infantry force which at times was deficient in cavalry and artillery when compared with its European contemporaries. Artillery pieces, which were purchased from America and a variety of European nations, presented two problems: they were scarce, and the relatively small number that were available were in several different calibers, causing problems with their ammunition supply.
The First Sino-Japanese War was a war fought between Qing Dynasty of China and Japanese Meiji government over the control of Korea. The Sino-Japanese War would come to symbolize the weakness of the Qing military, with Japanese securing victory after victory over the Chinese forces. This was the result by Japan's new western-style conscript army which was well equipped and well trained when compared with their Chinese counterpart. The principal results were a shift in regional dominance in Asia from China to Japan and a fatal blow to the Qing Dynasty. Japan fielded a force of 120,000 in two armies and five divisions.
In 1899-1900, Boxer attacks against foreigners in China intensified and later accumulated in the siege of the diplomatic legations in Beijing. An international force consisting of British, French, Russian, German, Italian, Austro-Hungarian, American and Japanese troops was assembled to relieve the legations. The Japanese provided the largest contingent of troops; 20,840, as well as 18 warships. Of the total number, 20,300 were Imperial Japanese Army troops of the 5th Infantry Division under Lt. General Yamaguchi Motoomi, the remander were 540 naval rikusentai from the Imperial Japanese Navy.
The Russo–Japanese War was the result of tensions between Russia and Japan, largely out of the rival imperialist ambitions over Manchuria and Korea. The Japanese inflicted severe losses on the Russians; however, they were not able to inflict a decisive blow to the Russian armies. The intensive training and discipline of the Imperial Japanese Army together with the astute decisions of commanders as battle approached were the keys to Japanese victories. But over reliance on infantry led to large casualties among Japanese forces especially during the siege of Port Arthur.
The Empire of Japan entered the war on the Entente side. The only action in which the Army was involved in was the careful and well executed Japanese attack on the German concession of Tsingtao in 1914.
In 1918, Japan continued to extend its influence and privileges in China via the Nishihara Loans. Following the collapse of the Russian Empire in Bolshevik Revolution, Japan and the United States sent forces to Siberia in 1918 to bolster the armies of the White Movement leader Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak against the Bolshevik Red Army. In this Siberian Intervention, the Imperial Japanese Army initially planned to send more than 70,000 troops to occupy Siberia as far west as Lake Baykal. The plan was scaled back considerably due to opposition from the United States.
In July 1918, President Wilson asked the Japanese government to supply 7000 troops as part of an international coalition of 25,000 troops planned to support the American Expeditionary Force Siberia. After heated debate in the Diet, the administration of Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake agreed to send 12,000 troops, but under the command of Japan, rather than as part of an international coalition.
Once the political decision had been reached, the Imperial Japanese Army took over full control under Chief of Staff General Yui Mitsue, and by November 1918, more than 70,000 Japanese troops had occupied all ports and major towns in the Russian Maritime Provinces and eastern Siberia.
In June 1920, America and its allied coalition partners withdrew from Vladivostok after the capture and execution of White Army leader Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak by the Red Army. However, the Japanese decided to stay, primarily due to fears of the spread of communism so close to Japan, and Japanese controlled Korea and Manchuria. The Japanese army provided military support to the Japanese-backed Provisional Priamur Government based in Vladivostok against the Moscow-backed Far Eastern Republic.
The continued Japanese presence concerned the United States, which suspected that Japan had territorial designs on Siberia and the Russian Far East. Subjected to intense diplomatic pressure by the United States and Great Britain, and facing increasing domestic opposition due to the economic and human cost, the administration of Prime Minister Kato Tomosaburo withdrew the Japanese forces in October 1922.
In the 1920s the Imperial Japanese Army expanded rapidly and by 1937 had a force of 300,000 men. Unlike western countries it enjoyed a great deal of independence from government. Under the provisions of the Meiji Constitution, the War Minister was held accountable only to the Emperor Hirohito himself, and not to the elected civilian government. In fact, Japanese civilian administrations needed the support of the Army in order to survive. The Army controlled the appointment of the War Minister and in 1936 a law was passed that stipulated that only an active duty general or lieutenant-general could hold the post. As a result, the military spending as a proportion of the national budget rose disproportionately in the 1920s and 1930s, and various factions within the military exerted disproportionate influence on Japanese foreign policy.
The Imperial Japanese Army was originally known simply as the Army (rikugun) but after 1928, as part of the Army's turn toward romantic nationalism and also in the service of its political ambitions, it retitled itself the Imperial Army (kōgun).
Action by the military, largely independent of the civilian leadership, led to the invasion of Manchuria in 1931; and the subsequent Second Sino-Japanese War and Pacific War. As war approached, the Imperial Army's influence with the Emperor waned and the influence of the Imperial Japanese Navy increased.
In 1941, the Imperial Japanese Army had 51 divisions and various special-purpose artillery, cavalry, anti-aircraft and armored units with a total of 1,700,000 men. At the beginning of the Second World War most of the Japanese Army was stationed in China. However, from 1942 soldiers were sent to Hong Kong (23rd Army), the Philippines (14th Army), Thailand (15th Army), Burma (15th Army), Dutch East Indies (16th Army) and Malaya (25th Army). By 1945, there were 5.5 million men in the Imperial Japanese Army.
The Japanese Army performed well in the early stages of the war. After 1943 they suffered from a shortage of supplies, especially food, heavy weapons, guns, tanks and aircraft, which was worsened by a long-standing and severe rivalry with the Imperial Japanese Navy. It was affected even more by submarine interdiction of supplies and losses to IJA shipping. The supply situation was so bad, large numbers of fighter aircraft became unserviceable for lack of spare parts[1] and medicines were in such short supply, "as many as two-thirds of Japan's total military deaths resulted from illness or starvation."[2]
Throughout the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army had gained a reputation both for its fanaticism and for its brutality against prisoners of war and civilians alike. After Japan surrendered in the summer of 1945, many Imperial Japanese Army officers and enlisted men were tried and punished for committing numerous atrocities and war crimes.
Several reasons are theorized for the especially brutal and merciless behavior exhibited by many members of the IJA towards their adversaries or non-Japanese civilians. One is probably the brutal behavior that they themselves experienced. The IJA was known for the extremely harsh treatment of its enlisted soldiers from the start of training,[3] including beatings, unnecessarily strenuous duty tasks, lack of adequate food, and other violent or harsh disciplinary tactics. This was contrary to the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors of 1882, which instructed officers to treat subordinates respectfully.[4] Not until 1943 did the senior command realize this brutality had effects on morale and order an end to it, an order which was routinely circumvented or ignored.[5]
In addition, IJA officers took more than their share of food when their men were starving,[6] arranged transfers to safer areas,[7] or simply deserted their men in action,[8] while the spirit of gyokusai ("glorious death") saw them order suicidal attacks with knives, when supplies of hand grenades and ammunition were still available.[9]
The reputation of Imperial Army troops during the Pacific War, and since, of never surrendering is false. While the numbers are small by comparison to the European Threatre, in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) just over 1,000 surrendered in each of 1942 and 1943, around 5,100 in 1944, and over 12,000 in 1945,[10] and might have been greater except for American shooting of prisoners.[11] The effect of psychological warfare was noticeable (about 20% of surrenders were directly due to it, and many more were influenced),[12] amounting to about one POW for every 6,000 leaflets dropped,[13] while the Japanese objected to the "unscrupulous" leaflets,[14] which expressly contained nothing but the truth.[15] This was in stark contrast to IJA's practice of circulating false stories,[16] which leaflets revealled to be false[17] when Army efforts to black out news left the leaflets as the only source of any news.[18]
During the first part of the Showa era, according to the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor had the "supreme command of the Army and the Navy" (Article 11). Hirohito was thus legally supreme commander of the Imperial General Headquarters, founded in 1937 and by which the military decisions were made.
The primary sources such as the "Sugiyama memo", and the diaries of Fumimaro Konoe and Koichi Kido, describe in detail the many informal meetings the Emperor had with his chiefs of staff and ministers. These documents show he was kept informed of all military operations and frequently questioned his senior staff and asked for changes.
According to historians Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, Hirohito authorized by specific orders, transmitted by the Chief of staff of the Army such as prince Kan'in or Hajime Sugiyama, the use of chemical weapons against Chinese civilians and soldiers. For example, he authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate occasions during the invasion of Wuhan in 1938.[19] Such weapons were also authorized during the invasion of Changde.
According to historians Akira Fujiwara and Akira Yamada, Hirohito even made major interventions in some military operations. For example, he pressed Field Marshal Hajime Sugiyama four times during January and February 1942 to increase troop strength and launch attack on Bataan.[20] In August 1943, he scolded Sugiyama for being unable to stop the American advance on the Solomon Islands and asked the general to consider other places to attack.[21]
Only in rare moments of special importance, decisions were made in Imperial council. The Imperial government used this special institution to sanction the invasion of China, the Greater East Asia War and to end the war. In 1945, executing the decision approved in Imperial conference, Emperor Shōwa for the first and last time directly ordered via recorded radio broadcast to all of Japan, as his last role as commander-in-chief, the surrender to United States forces.
Article 9 of the Japanese constitution renounced the right to use force as a means of resolving disputes, this was enacted by the Japanese in order to prevent militarism to which had led to conflict. However, in 1947 the Public Security Force formed; later in 1954, with the early statges of the Cold War, the Public Security Force formed the basis of the newly created Ground Self Defense Force. Although significantly smaller than the former Imperial Japanese Army and nominally for defensive purposes only, this force constitutes the modern army of Japan.
Japanese nationalism meant that the military was built around a concept of the time period: a Rich Country has a Strong Military. Nationalists asserted that Japan as a land was sacred, and its people were special due to a combination of Zen-Chan and various forms of Japanese Buddhism with Shinto. Service in the Japanese military was seen as service to the Emperor. Each soldier in theory believed it was a great honor to die for the Emperor as the samurai concept "to serve" was deeply ingrained in all the soldiers' culture.
The concept of Yamato-damashii equipped each soldier with a strict code: never be captured, never break down, and never surrender. To be a coward or to be captured was a disgrace to one's family, community, and country. Each soldier was trained to fight to the death and was expected to die before suffering dishonor. Often, imperial soldiers would shout "Banzai" before charging into battle, believing that the exuberant cheer would indicate their willingness to die with honor. Every soldier accepted that they were expected to serve stoically as part of their bushido, represented in the idea of "death before dishonor". Sadao Araki, an Army theorist, devised the contemporary adaptation to bushido code as a Seishin Kyoiku (spiritual training) doctrine for the army. As such, each soldier would leave everything behind when going into the service, needing nothing but honor. Indeed, honor as represented by name and face meant everything to these soldiers. Yamato Damashi is an old Nippon spirit of self-pride and persistence in the face of grave danger, a sort of kokoro.
Tied in with this concept of Bushido was immense, religious respect for the Emperor. Although during Meiji and Taishō eras, the Emperor was practically a figurehead, with the real power being held by the bureaucrats underneath him, he was still considered a divine figure. In theory the commander in chief, the Emperor usually went along with whatever the government "asked" him to do. The Emperor wore the commander-in-chief's uniform, and was saluted by the Imperial Forces, at all ceremonial functions involving the IJA forces.
At the time, the Imperial government could only mobilize the military if the cabinet ministers came to a unanimous consensus on the order. The role of the Emperor lay in giving his blessing to execute and bind such orders. Since the Emperor was required to be present at all Imperial government meetings for their decision to be binding, The Emperor silently observed all the official arguments made by the ministers. Presuming his blessing was given, after an agreement of the ministers, these requests became the orders of the Emperor, enforceable upon the people of Japan.
Total military in August 1945 was 6,095,000.
The Imperial Japanese Army managed various Arsenals:
In the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), the term Gun, literally meaning "army", was used in a different way to the military forces of other countries. A So-Gun, meaning "General Army", was the term used in the IJA for an army group. Of a similar but slightly lower status was a Haken Gun, or "Expeditionary Army". A Homen Gun ("Area Army" or "Theatre Army") was equivalent to the field armies of other nations and a Gun ("Army") was equivalent to a corps in other armies.
As the IJA was an infantry force the most common type of division was the infantry division. Later four tank and one parachute division were formed. The first 18 infantry divisions were originally formed as square divisions, and after 1938, most of the remainder were formed as triangular divisions with the security divisions being binary divisions. During the course of its existence the IJA organized three Guards Divisions and over 220 infantry divisions of various types(A/Reinforced,B/Standard,C/Counter-insurgency). On 7 December the IJA had two divisions serving in Japan/Korea and 50 serving abroad, most in China. During the war another 117 were raised for foreign service and 56 were raised for national defense. These totaled 223 including the Imperial Guard. Of this total no more than 35, that is one fifth of the IJA infantry division total, fought in the Pacific theatre.
The Japanese Imperial Army had two types of Mixed Brigades.
The IJA maintained two types of Independent Regiments, both were used to provide garrisons in occupied areas.
Detachments were particular military formations of the Imperial Japanese Army. Similar to German Kampfgruppen, these detachments were usually a force of infantry, artillery, armor, and other support units which were temporarily assigned for independent action and had a special mission. They were usually named after their commanders or the area in which they were to operate, and could be any size below division.
Cavalry were formed in Regiments most were either operating attached to Infantry divisions or directly under a Brigade attached to an army prior to the formation of the Cavalry Group in 21 April 1933.
Over the course of the Imperial Japanese Army's existence, millions of its soldiers were either killed, wounded or went missing in action.
543 (12 killed in battle and 531 by disease).
The IJA suffered 13,823 dead and 3,973 wounded.
The number of total Japanese dead in combat is put at around 47,000 with around 80,000 if disease is included.
1,455 Japanese were killed, mostly at the Battle of Tsingtao
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