Greek military junta of 1967–1974

Regime of the Colonels redirects here. For the Polish regime of colonels, see Colonels' group.

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The Greek military junta of 1967–1974, alternatively "The Regime of the Colonels" (Greek: Το καθεστώς των Συνταγματαρχών, To kathestos ton Syntagmatarhon), or in Greece "The Junta", (Greek: Η Χούντα I Hunta) and "The Seven Years" (Greek: Η Επταετία, I Eptaetia) are terms used to refer to a series of right-wing military governments that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. Rule by the military started in the morning of 21 April, 1967 with a coup d'état led by a group of colonels of the Greek military, and ended in July 1974.

Background

See also: Greek Civil War

The 1967 coup and the following seven years of military rule were the culmination of 30 years of national division between the forces of the Left and the Right that can be traced to the time of the resistance against Axis occupation of Greece during World War II. After the liberation in 1944 Greece descended into civil war, fought between the forces of the Communist-led Greek resistance and the now returned government-in-exile.

American influence in Greece

Main article: Operation Gladio#Greece

In 1947, the United States formulated the Truman Doctrine, and began to actively support a series of authoritarian governments in Greece, Turkey and Iran, in order to ensure that these states did not fall under Soviet influence. With American and British aid, the civil war ended with the military defeat of the Left in 1949. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) was outlawed and many Communists had to either flee the country or face persecution. The CIA and the Greek military began to work closely, especially after Greece joined NATO in 1952. Greece was a vital link in the NATO defense arc which extended from the eastern border of Iran to the northmost point in Norway. Greece in particular was seen as being in risk, having experienced a Communist insurgency. In particular, the newly-founded Hellenic National Intelligence Service (KYP) and the LOK Special Forces (later actively involved in the 1967 coup) maintained a very close liaison with their American counterparts. In addition to preparing for a Soviet invasion, they agreed to guard against a leftwing coup. The LOK in particular were integrated into the Gladio European stay-behind network. Although there have been persistent rumors about an active support of the perpetrators of the coup d'état by the US government there is no evidence to support such claims. It is however likely that the US military was informed of the coup a few days in advance by Greek liaison officers.

The Apostasia and political instability

Main article: Apostasia of 1965

After many years of conservative rule, the election of centrist George Papandreou, Sr. as Prime Minister was a sign of change. In a bid to gain more control over the country's government than what his limited constitutional powers allowed, the young and inexperienced King Constantine II clashed with liberal reformers, dismissing Papandreou in 1965, causing a constitutional crisis known as the Apostasia of 1965.

After making several attempts to form governments, relying on dissident Center Union and conservative MPs, Constantine II appointed an interim government under Ioannis Paraskevopoulos, and new elections were called for 28 May 1967. There were many indications that Papandreou's Center Union would emerge as the largest party, but would not be able to form a single-party government and would be forced into an alliance with the United Democratic Left, which was suspected by conservatives of being a proxy for the banned Communist Party of Greece. This possibility was used as a pretext for the coup.

A "Generals' Coup"

Greek historiography and the press have also hypothesized about a "Generals' Coup"^[1], a coup that would have been deployed at the behest of the palace,^[2] under the pretext of combatting communist subversion.^[3] In the confusion of the first few hours it was actually thought by many outside observers that the King was behind the coup and many European newspapers carried headlines accusing Constantine of being the mastermind behind the events in Greece.

Before the elections that were scheduled for 28 May 1967, with expectations of a wide Centrist victory, a number of National Radical Union politicians feared that the policies of leftist members of the Center Union, such as Andreas Papandreou and Spyros Katsotas, would lead to a constitutional crisis. One such politician, George Rallis, has recounted he had proposed that, in case of such an "anomaly", the King should declare martial law, as the monarchist constitution permitted him. According to Rallis, Constantine was receptive to the idea.^[4].

According to US diplomat John Day, the Americans also worried that due to the old age of Georgios Papandreou, Andreas Papandreou would have a very powerful role in the next government. According to Robert Keely and John Owens, American diplomats attached to the US Embassy in Greece at the time, Constantine asked US Ambassador Philip Talbot what would be the attitude of the US government to an extra-parliamentary solution to this problem. To this the embassy responded negatively in principle, adding however that "US reaction to such move cannot be determined in advance but would depend on circumstances at time". To this day, Constantine denies this. ^[5]

According to then US Ambassador Philip Talbot, after this communication, Constantine met with the army generals, who promised him that they would not take any action before the coming elections. However they were nervous by the proclamations of Andreas Papandreou and reserved to re-examine taking actions according to the results of the elections.^[5]

In 1966 Constantine II of Greece sent his envoy Demetrios Bitsios to Paris on mission to convince Constantine Karamanlis to return to Greece and resume a role in Greek politics. According to uncorroborated claims made by the former monarch, in 2006 and after the deaths of the two men involved, Karamanlis replied to Bitsios that he would only return if the King imposed martial law, as was his constitutional prerogative.^[6]

US journalist Cyrus L. Sulzberger has separately claimed that Karamanlis flew to New York to lobby US support from Lauris Norstad for a coup d'état in Greece that would establish a strong conservative regime under himself; Sulzberger alleges that Norstad declined to involve himself in such affairs.^[3] Sulzberger's account, which unlike that of the former King was delivered during the lifetime of those implicated (Karamanlis and Norstad), rested solely on the authority of his and Norstad's word. When, in 1997, the former King reiterated Sulzberger's allegations, Karamanlis stated that he "will not deal with the former king's statements because both their content and attitude are unworthy of comment". ^[7] The deposed King's adoption of Sulzberger's claims against Karamanlis was castigated by the left-leaning media, typically critical of Karamanlis, as "shameless" and "brazen".^[7] It bears noting that, at the time, the former King referred exclusively to Sulzberger's account, to support the theory of a planned coup by Karamanlis, and made no mention of the alleged 1966 meeting with Bitsios, which he would refer to only after both participants had died and could not respond.

As it turned out, the constitutional crisis did not originate either from the political parties, or from the Palace, but from middle-rank army putschists.

The coup d'état of 21 April

On 21 April, 1967, (just weeks before the scheduled elections), a group of right-wing army officers led by Brigadier Stylianos Pattakos and Colonels George Papadopoulos and Nikolaos Makarezos seized power in a coup d'etat. The colonels were able to quickly seize power by using surprise and confusion. Pattakos was commander of the Armour Training Centre (Greek: Κέντρο Εκπαίδευσης Τεθωρακισμένων, ΚΕΤΘ), based in Athens. The coup leaders placed tanks in strategic positions in Athens, effectively gaining complete control of the city. At the same time, a large number of small mobile units were dispatched to arrest leading politicians and authority figures, as well as many ordinary citizens suspected of left-wing sympathies, according to lists prepared in advance. One of the first to be arrested was Lieutenant General Gregorios Spandidakis, Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army.

The conspirators were known to Spantidakis. Indeed, he was instrumental in bringing some of them to Athens, to use in a coup he and other leading Army generals had been planning, in an attempt to prevent George Papandreou's victory in the upcoming election and the Communist takeover that would, supposedly, follow it. The colonels succeeded in persuading Spandidakis to join them and he issued orders activating an action plan (the "Prometheus" plan) that had been previously drafted as a response for a hypothetical Communist uprising (see Operation Gladio). Under the command of paratrooper Lieutenant Colonel Kostas Aslanides, the LOK (see above) took control of the Greek Defence Ministry while Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos gained control over communication centers, the parliament, the royal palace, and according to detailed lists, arrested over 10,000 people. Since orders came from a legal source, commanders and units not involved in the conspiracy automatically obeyed them. Many of the arrested were held during the first days at the Phaliron race track and some of them were executed in cold blood by young army officers.

By the early morning hours the whole of Greece was in the hands of the colonels. All leading politicians, including acting Prime Minister Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, had been arrested and were held incommunicado by the conspirators. Phillips Talbot, the US ambassador in Athens, disapproved of the military coup, complaining that it represented "A rape of democracy", to which Jack Maury, the CIA chief of station in Athens, answered, "How can you rape a whore?" The Papadopoulos' junta attempted to re-engineer the Greek political landscape by coup.

The role of the King

Main article: Constantine II of Greece

When the tanks rolled on to Athens streets on 21 April, the legitimate National Radical Union government, of which Rallis was a member, asked King Constantine to immediately mobilise the state against the coup; he declined to do so, and swore in the dictators as the legitimate government of Greece, while asserting that he was "certain they had acted in order to save the country".

The three plot leaders visited Constantine in his residence in Tatoi, which they circled with tanks, effectively preventing any form of resistance. The King wrangled with the colonels and initially dismissed them, ordering them to return with Spantidakis. Later in the day he took it upon himself to go the Ministry of National Defence, located north of Athens city centre, where all the coup leaders were gathered. The King had a discussion with Kanellopoulos, who was detained there, and with leading generals. This was a pointless exercise, since Kanellopoulos was a prisoner whilst the generals had no real power, as was evident from the shouting of lower and middle-ranking officers, refusing to obey orders and clamouring for a new government under Spantidakis.

The King finally relented and decided to co-operate, claiming to this day that he was isolated and did not know what else to do. He has since claimed that he was trying to gain time to organise a counter-coup and oust the Junta. He did organise such a counter-coup; however, the fact that the new government had a legal sanction, in that it had been appointed by the legitimate head of state, played an important role in the coup's success. The King was later to regret bitterly his decision. For many Greeks, it served to identify him indelibly with the coup and certainly played an important role in the final decision to abolish the monarchy, sanctioned by the 1974 referendum.

The only concession the King could achieve was to appoint a civilian as prime minister, rather than Spantidakis. Konstantinos Kollias, a former Attorney General of the Areios Pagos, was chosen. He was a well-known royalist and had even been disciplined under the Papandreou government for meddling in the investigation on the murder of MP Gregoris Lambrakis. Kollias was little more than a figurehead and real power rested with the army, and especially Papadopoulos, who emerged as the coup's strong man and became Minister of Defence and Minister of the Government's Presidency. Other coup members occupied key posts.

Up until then constitutional legitimacy had been preserved, since under the then-Greek Constitution the King could appoint whomever he wanted as prime minister, as long as Parliament endorsed the appointment with a vote of confidence or a general election was called. It was this government, sworn-in in the early evening hours of 21 April, that formalised the coup. It adopted a "Constituent Act", an amendment tantamount to a revolution, canceling the elections and effectively abolishing the constitution, which would be replaced later. In the meantime, the government was to rule by decree. Since traditionally such Constituent Acts did not need to be signed by the Crown, the King never signed it, permitting him to claim, years later, that he had never signed any document instituting the junta. Critics claim that Constantine II did nothing to prevent the government (and especially his chosen prime minster Kollias) from legally instituting the authoritarian government to come. This same government formally published and enforced a decree, already proclaimed on radio as the coup was in progress, instituting military law. Constantine claimed he never signed that decree either.

The King's counter-coup

From the outset, the relationship between King Constantine II and the Colonels was an uneasy one. The colonels were not willing to share power with anyone, whereas the young King, like his father before him, was used to playing an active role in politics and would never consent to being a mere figurehead, especially in a military administration. Although the colonels' strong anti-communist, pro-NATO and pro-Western views appealed to the United States, fearful of domestic and international public opinion, President of the United States Lyndon B. Johnson told Constantine, in a visit to Washington, D.C. in early autumn of 1967, that it would be best to replace that government with another one. Constantine took that as an encouragement to organise a counter-coup and it was probably meant as one, although no direct help or involvement of the US was forthcoming.

The King finally decided to launch his counter-coup on 13 December 1967. Since Athens was effectively in the hands of the junta militarily, Constantine decided to fly to the small northern city of Kavala. There he hoped to be among troops loyal only to him. The vague plan he and his advisors had conceived was to form a unit that would advance on and take Thessaloniki. Constantine planned to install an alternative administration there. International recognition, which he believed to be forthcoming, as well as internal pressure from the fact that Greece would have been split in two governments would, the King hoped, force the junta to resign, leaving the field clear for him to return triumphant to Athens.

In the early morning hours of 13 December, the King boarded the royal plane, together with Queen Anne-Marie of Greece, their two baby children Princess Alexia of Greece and Denmark and Pavlos, Crown Prince of Greece, his mother Frederika of Hanover and his sister, Princess Irene of Greece and Denmark. Constantine also took with him Prime Minister Kollias. At first, things seemed to be going according to plan. Constantine was well received in Kavala which, militarily, was under the command of a general loyal to him. The Air Force and Navy, both strongly royalist and not involved in the 1967 coup, immediately declared for him and mobilised. Another of Constantine's generals effectively cut all communication between Athens and northern Greece.

However, the King's plans were overly bureaucratic, naïvely supposing that orders from a commanding general would automatically be obeyed. Further, the King was obsessive about avoiding "bloodshed", even where the junta would be the attacker. Instead of attempting to drum up the widest popular support, hoping for spontaneous pro-democracy risings in most towns, the King preferred to let his generals put together the necessary force for advancing on Thessaloniki in strict compliance with military bureaucracy. The King made no attempt to contact politicians, even local ones, and even took care to include in his proclamation a paragraph condemning communism, lest anyone should get the wrong idea.

In the circumstances, rather than the King managing to put together a force and advancing on Thessaloniki, middle-ranking pro-junta officers neutralised and arrested his royalist generals and took command of their units, which subsequently put together a force to advance on Kavala to arrest the King. The junta, not at all shaken by the loss of their figurehead premier, ridiculed the King by announcing that he was hiding "from village to village". Realising that the counter coup had failed, Constantine fled Greece on board the royal plane, taking his family and helpless Prime Minister with him. They landed in Rome early in the morning of 14 December. Constantine remained in exile all through the rest of military rule (although nominally he continued as King until 1 June 1973) and was never to return to Greece as King.

The Regency

The flight of the King and Prime Minister to Italy left Greece with no legal government or head of state. This did not concern the military junta. Instead the Revolutionary Council, composed of Pattakos, Papadopoulos and Makarezos, issued a notice in the Government Gazette appointing another member to the military administration, Major General Georgios Zoitakis, as Regent. Zoitakis then appointed Papadopoulos Prime Minister. This became the only government of Greece after the failure of the King's attempted coup, as the King was unwilling to set up an alternative administration in exile. The Regent's position was later confirmed under the 1968 Constitution, although the exiled King never officially recognised, or acknowledged, the Regency.

In a legally controversial move, even under the junta's own Constitution, the Cabinet voted on 21 March 1972 to oust Zoitakis and replace him with Papadopoulos, thus combining the offices of Regent and Prime Minister. It was thought Zoitakis was problematic and interfered too much with the military. The King's portrait remained on coins, in public buildings, etc., but slowly, the military was chipping away at the institution of the monarchy: the royal family's tax immunity was abolished, the complex network of royally managed charities was brought under direct state control, the royal arms were removed from coins, the Navy and Air Force were no longer "Royal" and the newspapers were usually banned from publishing the King's photo or any interviews.

During this period, resistance against the colonels' rule became better organized among exiles in Europe and the United States. In addition to the expected opposition from the left, the colonels found themselves under attack by constituencies that had traditionally supported past right-wing regimes: pro-monarchists supporting Constantine; businessmen concerned over international isolation; the middle class facing an economic downturn after 1971. There was also considerable political infighting within the junta. Still, up until 1973 the junta appeared in firm control of Greece, and not likely to be ousted by violent means.

Characteristics of the Junta

Ideology

The colonels preferred to call the coup d'état of 21 April a "revolution to save the nation" ("Ethnosotirios Epanastasis"). Their official justification for the coup was that a "communist conspiracy" had infiltrated the bureaucracy, academia, the press, and even the military, to such an extent that drastic action was needed to protect the country from communist takeover. Thus, the defining characteristic of the Junta was its staunch anti-Communism. They used the term anarcho-communist (Greek: αναρχοκομμουνιστές, anarchokommounistes) to describe all leftists. In a similar vein the junta attempted to steer Greek public opinion not only by propaganda but also by inventing new words and slogans, such as old-partyism (palaiokommatismos) to discredit parliamentary democracy, or Greece for Christian Greeks (Ellas Ellinon Christianon) to underscore its ideology.

The junta's main ideological spokesmen included Georgios Georgalas and journalist Savvas Konstantopoulos, both former Marxists. Its propaganda often relied on fabricated evidence and fictional enemies of the state. Atheism and pop culture, such as rock music and the hippies, were also seen as parts of this conspiracy. Nationalism and Christianity were widely promoted but never really enforced.

Sources of support and sociocultural policies

To gain support for his rule, Papadopoulos projected an image that appealed to some key segments of Greek society. The son of a poor but educated rural family, he was educated at the prestigious Hellenic Military Academy. Papadopoulos allowed substantial social and cultural freedoms to all social classes, but political oppression and censorship were at times heavy handed, especially in areas deemed sensitive by the junta, such as political activities, and politically related art, literature, film and music. Kostas Gavras's film Z and Mikis Theodorakis's music, among others, were never officially allowed even during the most relaxed times of the dictatorship, and an index of prohibited songs, literature and art was kept.

Western music and film

Remarkably, after some initial hesitation and as long as they were not deemed to be politically damaging to the junta, junta censors allowed wide access to Western music and films. Even the then racy, West German film Helga (German: Helga. Vom Werden des menschlichen Lebens, Greek: Helga, η ιστορία μίας γυναίκας), a 1967 sex education documentary featuring a live birth scene, had no trouble making its debut in Greece just like in any other Western country.^[8] Moreover, the film was only restricted for those under 13 years of age. In 1971 Robert Hartford-Davis was allowed by the junta to film the classic horror film Incense for the Damned, starring Peter Cushing and Patrick Macnee and suitably featuring Chryseis (Χρυσηίς), a beguiling Greek siren with vampire tendencies, on the Greek island of Hydra.^[9][10][11] In 1970 the film Woodstock was shown all over Greece, with reports of arrests and disturbances especially in Athens as many youths flocked to see the film and filled theatres to capacity, while many others were left outside.^[12][13]

Meanwhile at Matala, Crete, a hippie colony which had been living in the caves since the 1960s, was never disturbed. Singer songwriter Joni Mitchell was inspired to write the song "Carey" after staying in the Matala caves with the hippie community in 1971. Hippie colonies also existed in other popular tourist spots such as "Paradise Beach" in Mykonos.^[14]

Greek rock

Western music broadcasts were, for a period, limited from the airwaves in favour of martial music, an indispensable part of any developing coup, but this was subsequently relaxed. In addition, pop/rock music programmes such as the one hosted by famous Greek music/radio/television personality and promoter Nico Mastorakis were very popular throughout the dictatorship years both on radio and television.^[15] Most Western record sales were similarly not restricted. In fact, even rock concerts and tours were allowed such as by the then popular rock groups Socrates Drank the Conium and Nostradamos.^[16][17] Another pop group "Poll" was a pioneer of Greek pop music in the late 1960s. Its lead singer and composer was Robert Williams, who was later joined, in 1971, by Kostas Tournas.^[18][19] Poll enjoyed a number of nationwide hits, such as "Anthrope Agapa (Humankind Love One Another)", an anti-war song, composed by Tournas and "Ela Ilie Mou (Come, My Sun)", composed by Tournas, Williams),^[20] Tournas later pursued a solo career and in 1972 produced the progressive psychedelic hit solo album Aperanta Chorafia (Greek: Απέραντα Χωράφια, Infinite Fields).^[21] He wrote and arranged the album using an orchestra and a rock group ("Ruth") combination.^[21][22]

While the lyrics of "Poll" were composed exclusively in Greek, the band's name was an English word rendered in Greek characters, Πολλ. The dictionary definition of poll, a sampling or collection of opinions on a subject or the voting at an election, apparently did not register with the Greek military junta censors.

Songwriter and troubadour Dionysis Savvopoulos, who was initially imprisoned by the regime, nevertheless rose to great popularity and produced a number of influential and highly politically allegorical, especially against the junta, albums during the period, including To Perivoli tou Trellou (Greek: Το Περιβόλι του Τρελλού, The Madman's Orchard, Ballos (Greek: Μπάλλος, Name of Greek folk dance) and Vromiko Psomi (Greek: Βρώμικο Ψωμί, Dirty Bread).^[13]

Tourism

Concurrently, tourism was actively encouraged by Papadopoulos' government and, funding scandals notwithstanding, the tourist sector saw great development. With tourism came the nightlife. Although discos and nightclubs were, initially, subjected to a curfew, partially due to an energy crisis, this was eventually extended from 1.00 a.m. to 3:00 a.m. as the energy crisis eased.^[14] These freedoms were later reversed by Dimitrios Ioannides after his coup. However, even under Papadopoulos, in the absence of any civil rights these sociocultural freedoms existed in a legal vacuum that meant they were not guaranteed, but rather dispensed at the whim of the junta. In addition any transgressing into political matters during social or cultural activities usually meant arrest and punishment.

Agriculture

The farmers were Papadopoulos' natural constituency and were more likely to support him, seeing him, because of his rural roots, as one of their own. He cultivated this relationship by appealing to them, calling them the backbone of the people (Greek: η ραχοκοκαλιά του λαού) and cancelling all agricultural loans.^[23] By further insisting on promoting, but not really enforcing for fear of middle-class backlash, religion and patriotism, he further appealed to the simpler ideals of rural Greece and strengthened his image as people's champion among farmers, who tended to ridicule the middle class. Furthermore, the regime promoted a policy of economic development in rural areas, which were mostly neglected by the previous governments, that had focused largely on urban industrial development.

Urban classes

Papadopoulos was less likely to appeal to the largely civilian and city-oriented middle class, since he was a military man from a rural background. Yet, the political crisis of 1965–1967 led some citizens to entertain the notion that any stable government, even a military one, was better than the preceding chaos. In addition, he had promised from the beginning that the dictatorship would not be permanent, and that when political order was established democratic rule would return,^[24] a pledge, as events would later show, was not shared by the hardliners, especially Ioannides.^[24] On top of that, his promotion of tourism and other beneficial economic measures and the fact that, with the notable exceptions of political freedoms and press censorship, he did not otherwise substantially restrict the middle class, had the effect of assisting the junta in establishing its control over the country by gaining, at least initially, the reluctant acquiescence of some key segments of the population.

External relations

The military government was given at least tacit support by the United States as a Cold War ally, due to its proximity to the Eastern European Soviet bloc, and the fact that the previous Truman administration had given the country millions of dollars in economic aid to discourage Communism. US support for the junta is claimed to be the cause of rising anti-Americanism in Greece during and following the junta's undemocratic rule.^[25] Greece's allies in Western Europe were split in their attitudes toward the Junta. The Scandinavian countries as well as the Netherlands took a very hostile stance towards the Junta and filed a complaint before the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe in September 1967. Greece however opted for leaving the Council of Europe voluntarily in December 1969 before a verdict was handed down. Countries such as the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany on the other hand were voicing criticism about Greece's human rights record but supported the countries continued membership in the Council of Europe and NATO because of the country's strategic value for the western alliance.

Economic policies

The 1967–1973 period was marked by high rates of economic growth coupled with low inflation and low unemployment. GDP growth was driven by investment in the tourism industry, public spending, and pro-business incentives that fostered both domestic and foreign capital spending. Several international companies invested in Greece at the time, including the Coca-Cola Corporation. Economic growth started losing steam by 1972.^[24] In addition, large scale construction of hydroelectric dam projects, such as in Aliakmon, Kastrakion, Polyphytos, the expansion of Thermoelectric generation units and other significant infrastructure development, took place. The junta used to proudly announce these projects with the slogan: "Greece is a construction zone" (Η Ελλάς είναι ένα εργοτάξιον). The always smiling Stylianos Pattakos, also known as the first trowel of Greece, (Το πρώτο μυστρί της Ελλάδας), since he frequently appeared at project inaugurations with a trowel in hand, starred in many of the Epikaira propaganda documentaries that were screened before feature film presentation in Greek cinemas.^[26]

Financial scandals

Cases of non-transparent public deals and corruption allegedly occurred at the time, given the lack of democratic checks and balances and the absence of a free press. One such event is associated with the regime's tourism minister, Ioannis Ladas (Greek: Ιωάννης Λαδάς). During his administration, several low-interest loans, amortized over a twenty-year period, were issued for tourist development. This fostered the erection of a multitude of hotels, sometimes in non-tourist areas, and with no underlying business rationale. Several such hotels were abandoned unfinished as soon as the loans were secured, and their remains still dot the Greek countryside. These questionable loans are referred to as Thalassodaneia (Greek: θαλασσοδάνεια), or "loans of the sea", to indicate the loose terms under which they were granted.^[27]

Another contested policy of the regime was the writing-off of agricultural loans, up to a value of 100,000 drachmas, to farmers. This has been attributed to an attempt by Papadopoulos to gain public support for his regime.

Civil rights

As soon as the coup d'état was announced over the radio on 21 April 1967, martial music was continuously broadcast over the airwaves.^[28] This was interrupted from time to time with announcements of the junta issuing orders that always started with the introduction "We decide and we order" (Greek: Αποφασίζομεν και διατάσσομεν). Long standing political freedoms and civil liberties, that had been taken for granted and enjoyed by the Greek people for decades, were instantly suppressed. Article 14 of the Greek Constitution which protected freedom of thought and freedom of the press was immediately suspended.^[29][30] Military courts were established, and political parties were dissolved. Legislation that took decades to fine tune and multiple parliaments to enact was thus erased in a matter of days. The rapid devolution of Greek democracy had begun.

In fact the junta crackdown was so fast that by September 1967, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands went before the European Commission of Human Rights to accuse Greece of violating most of the Human Rights conventions of the Commission.^[31] Following the 21 April coup, 6,188 suspected communists and political opponents were imprisoned or exiled to remote Greek islands.^[32] Under the junta torture was a deliberate practice carried out both by the Security Police and the Greek Military Police, with an estimated 3,500 people detained in torture centres run by ESA.^[31][32] According to a human rights report by Amnesty International, in the first month of the 21 April coup an estimated 8,000 people were arrested.^[31][32] James Becket,^[33] an American attorney and author of Barbarism in Greece,^[34][35] was sent to Greece by Amnesty International and wrote in December 1969 that "a conservative estimate would place at not less than two thousand" the number of people tortured.^[31]

The citizens' right of assembly was revoked and no political demonstrations were allowed. Surveillance on citizens was a fact of life, even during permitted social activities. That had a continuously chilling effect on the population who realised that, even though they were allowed certain social activities, they could not overstep the boundaries and delve into or discuss forbidden subjects. This realisation including the absence of any civil rights as well as maltreatment during police arrest, ranging from threats to beatings or worse, made life under the junta a difficult proposition for many ordinary citizens.

Following the junta's logic, one was allowed to participate in a rock concert, as an example, but if any misbehaviour occurred during that activity that was not up to junta's standards, the resulting arrest, coupled with the complete absence of any civil rights, could easily lead to beatings and labelling of the individual as an anarchist, communist, a combination of these terms, or worse. The absence of a valid code of jurisprudence led to the unequal application of the law among the citizens and to rampant favouritism and nepotism. Absence of elected representation meant that the citizens' stark and only choice was to submit to these arbitrary measures exactly as dictated by the junta. The country had become a true police state.^[36]

Complete lack of press freedom coupled with non existing civil rights meant that continuous cases of civil rights abuses could neither be reported nor investigated by an independent press or any other reputable authority. This led to a psychology of fear among the citizens during the Papadopoulos dictatorship, which became worse under Ioannides.

Anti-Junta movement

The democratic elements of the Greek society were opposed to the junta from the start. In 1968 many militant groups promoting democratic rule were formed, both in exile and in Greece. These included, among others, Panhellenic Liberation Movement, Democratic Defense, the Socialist Democratic Union, as well as groups from the entire left wing of the Greek political spectrum, including the Communist Party of Greece which had been outlawed even before the junta. The first armed strike against the junta was the failed assassination attempt against George Papadopoulos by Alexandros Panagoulis, on 13 August 1968.

Assassination attempt by Panagoulis

The assassination attempt took place in the morning of 13 August, when Papadopoulos went from his summer residence in Lagonisi to Athens, escorted by his personal security motorcycles and cars. Alexandros Panagoulis ignited a bomb at a point of the coastal road where the limousine carrying Papadopoulos would have to slow down, but the bomb failed to harm Papadopoulos. Panagoulis was captured a few hours later in a nearby sea cave, as the boat that would let him escape the scene of the attack had not shown up.

Panagoulis was transferred to the Greek Military Police (EAT-ESA) offices were he was questioned, beaten and tortured (see the proceedings of Theofiloyiannakos's trial). On 17 November 1968 he was sentenced to death, and remained in prison for five years. After the restoration of democracy, Panagoulis was elected a Member of Parliament. Panagoulis is regarded as an emblematic figure for the struggle to restore democracy.

Broadening of the movement

The funeral of George Papandreou, Sr. on 3 November 1968 spontaneously turned into a massive demonstration against the junta. Thousands of Athenians disobeyed the military's orders and followed the casket to the cemetery. The government reacted by arresting 41 people.

On 28 March 1969, after two years of widespread censorship, political detentions and torture, Giorgos Seferis, recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1963, took a stand against the junta. He made a statement on the BBC World Service,^[37] with copies simultaneously distributed to every newspaper in Athens. Attacking the colonels, he passionately demanded that "This anomaly must end". Seferis did not live to see the end of the junta. His funeral, though, on September 20, 1972, turned into a massive demonstration against the military government.

Also in 1969, Costa-Gavras released the film Z, based on a book by celebrated left-wing writer Vassilis Vassilikos. The film, banned in Greece, presented a lightly fictionalized account of the events surrounding the assassination of United Democratic Left MP Gregoris Lambrakis in 1963. The film captured the sense of outrage about the junta. The soundtrack of the film was written by Mikis Theodorakis, who was imprisoned by the junta and later went into exile, and was smuggled into the country to be added to the other inspirational, underground Theodorakis tracks.

International protest

The junta exiled thousands on the grounds that they were communists and/or "enemies of the country". Most of them were subjected to internal exile on Greek deserted islands, such as Makronisos, Gyaros, Gioura, or inhabited islands such as Leros, Agios Eustratios or Trikeri. The most famous were in external exile, most of whom were substantially involved in the resistance, organising protests in European capital cities, or helping and hiding refugees from Greece. These included: Melina Merkouri, actor, singer (and, after 1981 Minister for Culture); Mikis Theodorakis, composer of resistance songs; Costas Simitis, (prime minister from 1996 to 2004); and Andreas Papandreou, (prime minister from 1981 to 1989 and again from 1993 to 1996). Some chose exile, unable to stand life under the junta. For example Melina Merkouri was allowed to enter Greece, but stayed away on her own accord. Also in the early hours of 19 September 1970 in Matteotti square in Genoa, Geology student Kostas Georgakis set himself ablaze in protest against the dictatorship of George Papadopoulos. The junta delayed the arrival of his remains to Corfu for four months, fearing public reaction and protests. At the time his death caused a sensation in Greece and abroad as it was the first tangible manifestation of the depth of resistance against the junta. He is the only known anti-junta resistance activist to have sacrificed himself and he is considered the precursor of later student protest, such as the Athens Polytechnic uprising. The Municipality of Corfu has dedicated a memorial in his honour near his home in Corfu city.

The German writer, investigative reporter and journalist Günter Wallraff traveled to Greece in May 1974. While in Syntagma Square, he protested against human right violations. He was arrested and tortured by the police, as he did not carry, on purpose, any papers on him that could identify him as a foreigner. After his identity was revealed, Wallraff was convicted and sentenced to 14 months in jail. He was released in August, after the end of the dictatorship.^[38]

The Velos mutiny

VELOS D16 (Greek: ΒΕΛΟΣ, "ARROW"), now a museum in the Gulf of Faliron in Athens

In an anti-junta protest, on 23 May 1973, HNS Velos, under the command of Commander Nicholaos Pappas, refused to return to Greece after participating in a NATO exercise and remained anchored at Fiumicino, Italy. During a patrol with other NATO vessels between Italy and Sardinia, the captain and the officers heard over the radio that a number of fellow naval officers had been arrested in Greece. Cdr Pappas was involved in a group of democratic officers, who remained loyal to their oath to obey the Constitution, which was planning to act against the junta. Evangelos Averoff also participated in the Velos mutiny, for which he was later arrested as an "instigator".

Pappas believed that since his fellow anti-junta officers had been arrested, there was no more hope for a movement inside Greece. He therefore decided to act alone in order to motivate global public opinion. He mustered all the crew to the stern and announced his decision, which was received with enthusiasm by the crew. Pappas signalled his intentions to the squadron commander and NATO headquarters, quoting the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty, which declares that "all governments ... are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law", and, leaving formation, sailed for Rome. There, anchored about 3.5 nautical miles (6 km) away from the coast of Fiumicino, three ensigns sailed ashore with a whaleboat, went to Fiumicino Airport and telephoned the international press agencies, notifying them of the situation in Greece, the presence of the destroyer, and that the captain would hold a press conference the next day.

This action increased international interest in the situation in Greece. The captain, six officers, and twenty five petty officers requested and remained abroad as political refugees. Indeed, the whole crew wished to follow their captain but were advised by its officers to remain onboard and return to Greece to inform families and friends about what happened. Velos returned to Greece after a month with a replacement crew. After the fall of junta all officers and petty officers returned to the Navy.

Collapse

The collapse of the junta both ideologically and politically was triggered by a series of events which unfolded soon after Papadopoulos' attempt at liberalisation, with ideological collapse preceding its eventual political collapse. During and following this ill-fated process the internal political strains of the junta came to the fore and pitted the junta factions against each other, thus destroying the seemingly monolithic cohesion of the dictatorship. This had the effect of seriously weakening the coherence of the political message and, consequently, the credibility of the regime, a fatal blow from which, as later events would show, it never recovered. At the same time, during Papadopoulos' attempt at liberalisation, some of the junta constraints were removed from the body politic of Greece and that led to demands for more freedoms, and political unrest, in a society well used to democratic action prior to the dictatorship.

Normalization and attempts at liberalization

Papadopoulos had indicated as early as 1968 that he was eager for a reform process and even tried to contact Markezinis at the time. He had declared at the time that he did not want the "Revolution", (junta speak for the "dictatorship"), to become a "regime". He then repeatedly attempted to initiate reforms in 1969 and 1970, only to be thwarted by the hardliners including Ioannides. In fact subsequent to his 1970 failed attempt at reform, he threatened to resign and was dissuaded only after the hardliners renewed their personal allegiance to him.^[24]

As internal dissatisfaction grew in the early 1970s, and especially after an abortive coup by the Navy in early 1973,^[24] Papadopoulos attempted to legitimize the regime by beginning a gradual "democratization" (See also the article on Metapolitefsi). On 1 June 1973, he abolished the monarchy and declared himself President of the Republic after a controversial referendum, the results of which were not recognised by the political parties. He furthermore sought the support of the old political establishment, but secured only the cooperation of Spiros Markezinis, who became Prime Minister. Concurrently, many restrictions were lifted, and the army's role significantly reduced. Papadopoulos intended to establish a presidential republic, with extensive powers vested in the office of President, which he held. The decision to return to political rule and the restriction of their role was resented by many of the regime's supporters in the Army, whose dissatisfaction with Papadopoulos would become evident a few months later.

The uprising at the Polytechnic

Main article: Athens Polytechnic uprising

Papadopoulos' heavy handed attempt at liberalisation did not find favour among many in Greece. The stilted democratisation process he proposed was constrained by multiple factors. His inexperience at carrying out an unprecedented political experiment of democratisation was burdened by his tendency to concentrate as much power in his hands as possible, a weakness he exhibited during the dictatorship years when he would sometimes hold multiple high echelon government portfolios. This antagonised many but especially the intelligentsia whose primary exponents were the students. The students at the Law School in Athens, for example, demonstrated multiple times against the dictatorship prior to the events at the Polytechneion.

The tradition of student protest was always strong in Greece, even before the dictatorship. Papadopoulos tried hard to suppress and discredit the student movement during his tenure at the helm of the junta. But the liberalisation process he undertook allowed the students to organise more freely and this gave the opportunity to the students at the Athens Polytechnic to organise a demonstration that grew increasingly larger and more effective. The political momentum was on the side of the students. Sensing this the Papadopoulos junta panicked and reacted violently.

On the early hours of 17 November 1973 Papadopoulos sent the army to suppress the student strike and sit-in of the "Free Besieged" (Ελεύθεροι Πολιορκημένοι), as the students called themselves, at the National Technical University of Athens which had commenced on November 14. Shortly after 03:00 am and under almost complete cover of darkness, a AMX 30 tank crashed through the rail gate of the Athens Polytechnic with subsequent loss of life.

Ioannides' involvement in inciting unit commanders of the security forces to commit criminal acts during the Athens Polytechnic uprising, so that he could facilitate his upcoming coup, was noted in the indictment presented to the court by the prosecutor during the junta trials and in his subsequent conviction in the Polytechneion trial where he was found to have been morally responsible for the events.^[39][40]

The Ioannides regime

The uprising triggered a series of events that put an abrupt end to Papadopoulos' attempts at "liberalisation".

Taxiarkhos Dimitrios Ioannides, a disgruntled junta hardliner, used the uprising as a pretext to reestablish public order, and staged a counter-coup that overthrew Georgios Papadopoulos and Spiros Markezinis on 25 November. Military law was reinstated, and the new Junta appointed General Phaedon Gkizikis as President and economist Adamantios Androutsopoulos as Prime Minister, although Ioannides remained the behind-the-scenes strongman.

Ioannides' heavy handed and opportunistic intervention had the effect of destroying the myth that the junta was an idealistic group of army officers with exactly the same ideals who came to save Greece by using their collective wisdom. The main tenet of the junta ideology (and mythology) was gone and so was the collective. By default, he remained the only man at the top after toppling the other three principals of the junta. Characteristically, he cited ideological reasons for ousting the Papadopoulos faction, accusing them with straying from the principles of the Revolution, especially of being corrupt and misusing their privileges as army officers for financial gains.

Papadopoulos and his junta always claimed that the 21 April 1967 "revolution" saved Greece from the old party system. Now Ioannides was, in effect, claiming that his coup saved the revolution from the Papadopoulos faction. The dysfunction as well as the ideological fragmentation and fractionalisation of the junta was finally out in the open. Ioannides, however, did not make these accusations personally as he always tried to avoid unnecessary publicity. The radio broadcasts, following the now familiar coup in progress scenario featuring martial music interspersed with military orders and curfew announcements, kept repeating that the army was taking back the reins of power in order to save the principles of the revolution and that the overthrow of the Papadopoulos-Markezinis government was supported by the army, navy and air force.^[41]

At the same time they announced that the new coup was a "continuation of the revolution of 1967" and accused Papadopoulos with "straying from the ideals of the 1967 revolution" and "pushing the country towards parliamentary rule too quickly".^[41]

Previous to seizing power, Ioannides preferred to work in the background and he never held any formal office in the junta. Now he was the de facto leader of a puppet regime composed by members some of whom were rounded up by ESA soldiers in roving jeeps to serve and others that were simply chosen by mistake.^[42][43] The Ioannides method of forming a government dealt yet another blow to the rapidly diminishing credibility of the regime both at home and abroad.

The new junta, despite its rather inauspicious origins, pursued an aggressive internal crackdown and an expansionist foreign policy.

Sponsored by Ioannides, on 15 July, 1974 the EOKA-B organisation took power on the island of Cyprus by a military coup, in which Archbishop Makarios III, the Cypriot president, was overthrown. Turkey replied to this intervention by invading Cyprus and occupying, after heavy fighting with the Cypriot and Greek ELDYK Forces (Greek: ΕΛΔΥΚ, Ελληνική Δύναμη Κύπρου, Greek Force for Cyprus), the northern part of the island. There was a well founded fear that an all out war with Turkey was imminent.

The fall of the Junta and the restoration of democracy

Main article: Metapolitefsi

The Cyprus fiasco led to senior Greek military officers withdrawing their support for Junta strongman Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides. Junta-appointed President Phaedon Gizikis called a meeting of old guard politicians, including Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Spiros Markezinis, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Evangelos Averoff, and others.

The agenda was to appoint a national unity government that would lead the country to elections. Although former Prime Minister Panagiotis Kanellopoulos was originally backed, Gizikis finally invited former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis, who had resided in Paris since 1963, to assume the role. Karamanlis returned to Athens on a French Presidency Lear Jet made available to him by President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, a close personal friend, and was sworn-in as Prime Minister under President Phaedon Gizikis. Karamanlis' new party, New Democracy, won the November 1974 general election, and he remained prime minister.

Parliamentary democracy was thus restored, and the Greek legislative elections of 1974 were the first free elections held in a decade.

While the physical collapse of the junta as a government was immediately caused by the Cyprus debacle, its ideological collapse was triggered by the 1973 Athens Polytechnic uprising. The uprising at the Polytechneion was the event that discredited the military government most and acted as a key catalyst for its eventual demise by exposing the internal contradictions and stresses of the regime thus destroying the myth of the political cohesion of the junta and, therefore, irreparably damaging the political credibility of the "Ethnosotirios Epanastasis" and its message.

The trials of the junta

Main article: Greek Junta Trials

In January 1975 the junta members were formally arrested and in early August of the same year the government of Konstantinos Karamanlis brought charges of high treason and insurrection against Georgios Papadopoulos and nineteen other co-conspirators of the military junta.^[44] The mass trial was staged at the Korydallos Prison. The trial was described as "Greece's Nuremberg".^[44] One thousand soldiers armed with submachine guns provided security.^[44] The roads leading to the jail were patrolled by tanks.^[44] Papadopoulos, Pattakos, Makarezos and Ioannides were sentenced to death for high treason.^[45] These sentences were later commuted to life imprisonment by the Karamanlis government. A plan to grant amnesty to the junta principals by the Konstantinos Mitsotakis government in 1990 was cancelled after protests from conservatives, socialists and communists.^[46] Papadopoulos died in hospital in 1999 after being transferred from Korydallos while Ioannides remains incarcerated to this day. This trial was followed by a second trial which centered around the events of the Athens Polytechnic uprising and a third called "The trial of the torturers".

Legacy

The historical repercussions of the junta were profound and are still felt to this day in Greece. Internally the absence of civil rights and the oppression that followed created a sense of fear and persecution among many in the population creating trauma and division that persisted long after the fall of the junta. The Cyprus debacle created a tragedy that is still unfolding.^{[47][48][49][50]} While the Cyprus fiasco was due to the actions of Ioannides,^[51] it was Papadopoulos who started the cycle of coups. Externally the absence of human rights in a country belonging to the western block during the cold war was a continuous source of embarrassment for the free world and this and other reasons made Greece an international pariah abroad and interrupted her process of integration with the European Union with incalculable opportunity costs.^[47]

The 21st of April regime remains highly controversial to this day, with most Greeks holding very strong and polarized views in regards to it. According to a survey by Kapa Research published in the center-left newspaper "To Vima" in 2002, the majority of the electoral body (54.7%) consider the regime to have been bad or harmful for Greece while 20.7% consider it to have been good for Greece and 19.8% believe that it was neither good nor harmful.^[52]

In 1999 President Bill Clinton apologised on the behalf of the US government for supporting the military junta in the name of Cold War tactics.^[53][54]

See also

• Timeline of modern Greek history
• History of Modern Greece

References

• Woodhouse, C.M. (1998). Modern Greece a Short History. London: Faber & Faber. ISBN 978-0-571-19794-1. 
• Woodhouse, C.M. (1985). The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels. London. 

Citations and notes

External links

• Matt Barrett, The Rise of the Junta in Greece
• Matt Barrett, November 17th, Cyprus and the Fall of the Junta