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Stone Age | 70,000–3300 BCE | ||||
• Mehrgarh Culture | • 7000–3300 BCE | ||||
Indus Valley Civilization | 3300–1700 BCE | ||||
Late Harappan Culture | 1700–1300 BCE | ||||
Iron Age | 1200–0 BCE | ||||
• Maha Janapadas | • 700–300 BCE | ||||
• Magadha Empire | • 545 BCE - 550 | ||||
• Maurya Empire | • 321–184 BCE | ||||
• Chera Empire | • 300 BCE–1200 CE | ||||
• Chola Empire | • 300 BCE–1070 CE | ||||
• Pandyan Empire | • 250 BCE–1345 CE | ||||
• Satavahana | • 230 BCE–220 CE | ||||
Middle Kingdoms | 0 BCE–1279 CE | ||||
• Kushan Empire | • 60–240 CE | ||||
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• Chalukya Dynasty | • 543–753 | ||||
• Rashtrakuta | • 753–982 | ||||
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• Delhi Sultanate | • 1206–1526 | ||||
• Deccan Sultanates | • 1490–1596 | ||||
Ahom Kingdom | 1228–1826 | ||||
Vijayanagara Empire | 1336–1646 | ||||
Mughal Empire | 1526–1858 | ||||
Maratha Empire | 1674–1818 | ||||
Sikh Confederacy | 1716–1799 | ||||
Sikh Empire | 1799–1849 | ||||
Company rule in India | 1757–1858 | ||||
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The Government of India Act 1935 (26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8 c. 2) was the last pre-independence constitution of the British Raj. The significant aspects of the act were:
The federal part of the Act was never introduced due to strong opposition from the princely state rulers. In 1937 the first set of elections under this act were held.
The Government of India Act 1935 was the outcome of a long process constitutional development, of which the main stages were:
The Government of India Act 1919 had a Preamble explaining the overarching aim and philosophy of the Act. The Preamble quoted, and centered on, the statement of the Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu (July 17, 1917 – March 19, 1922) to the House of Commons on 20 August 1917 which pledged
…the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral Part of the British Empire.
Had there been a Preamble to the new Act, it would have had to have included the Viceroy Lord Irwin’s statement of 31 October 1929[1]:
The goal of British policy was stated in the declaration of August 1917 to be that of providing for the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire…. I am authorized on behalf of His Majesty's Government to state clearly that in their judgement it is implicit in the declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is the attainment of Dominion Status.
Once the new Act had been passed Irwin’s statement would have become Parliament’s commitment. However, many Conservative backbenchers, not only the diehards, opposed granting India dominion status. To avoid a confrontation, that is, to fudge the issue, Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for India made the following statement to Parliament on 6 February 1935[2]:
The House will observe that the Bill, like most modern Bills, contains no Preamble. There have, it is true, been important Acts in the past, among them the Government of India Act, 1919, to which a statement of policy and intentions was prefixed. There is, however, no need for a Preamble in this case, as no new pronouncement of policy or intentions is required. The Preamble to the Act of 1919 was described by the Joint Committee in their Report as ‘having set out finally and definitely the ultimate aims of British rule in India'. The Committee, after full consideration, further asserted that 'subsequent statements of policy have added nothing to the substance of this declaration', which they then proceed to quote in full in their Report as, in their own words, ‘settling once and for all the attitude of the British Parliament and people towards the political aspirations' of India…. Moreover, in government, and above all in the government of the Indian Empire, continuity of policy is of the first importance. No Government and no Parliament can treat lightly any statement issued under the authority of their predecessors…. The position of the Government therefore, is this: They stand firmly by the pledge contained in the 1919 Preamble, which it is not part of their plan to repeal, and by the interpretation put by the Viceroy in 1929, on the authority of the Government of the day, on that Preamble that 'the natural issue of India's progress as there contemplated, is the attainment of Dominion Status'. The declaration of 1929 was made to remove doubts which had been felt as to the meaning of the Preamble of 1919. There is, therefore, no need to enshrine in an Act words and phrases which would add nothing new to the declaration of the Preamble.
Hoare’s statement asserted his Government’s support for the Irwin declaration but did not submit it to Parliament to receive parliamentary approval for its contents.
Since the Federation, to be established under the Act, would include autocratic Princely States, no meaningful bill of rights could be formulated. N.b. the draft outline constitution in the Nehru Report did include a bill of rights.
The Government of India Act 1935 was the longest bill ever passed by British Parliament.
In 1947, a relatively few amendments in the Act made it the functioning interim constitutions of India and Pakistan.
The Act was not only extremely detailed, but it was riddled with ‘safeguards’ designed to enable the British Government to intervene whenever it saw the need in order to maintain British responsibilities and interests. To achieve this, in the face of a gradually increasing Indianization of the institutions of the Government of India, the Act concentrated the decision for the use and the actual administration of the safeguards in the hands of the British-appointed Viceroy and provincial governors who were subject to the control of the Secretary of State for India.
‘In view of the enormous powers and responsibilities which the Governor-General must exercise in his discretion or according to his individual judgment, it is obvious that he (the Viceroy) is expected to be a kind of superman. He must have tact, courage, and ability and be endowed with an infinite capacity for hard work. “We have put into this Bill many safeguards,” said Sir Robert Horne… “but all of those safeguards revolve about a single individual, and that is the Viceroy. He is the linch-pin of the whole system…. If the Viceroy fails, nothing can save the system you have set up.” This speech reflected the point of view of the die-hard Tories who were horrified by the prospect that some day there might be a Viceroy appointed by a Labour government.’[3]
A close reading of the Act[4] reveals that the British Government equipped itself with the legal instruments to take back total control at any time they considered this to be desirable. However, doing so without good reason would totally sink their credibility with groups in India whose support the act was aimed at securing. Some contrasting views:
“In the federal government… the semblance of responsible government is presented. But the reality is lacking, for the powers in defence and external affairs necessarily, as matters stand, given to the governor-general limit vitally the scope of ministerial activity, and the measure of representation given to the rulers of the Indian States negatives any possibility of even the beginnings of democratic control. It will be a matter of the utmost interest to watch the development of a form of government so unique; certainly, if it operates successfully, the highest credit will be due to the political capacity of Indian leaders, who have infinitely more serious difficulties to face than had the colonial statesmen who evolved the system of self-government which has now culminated in Dominion status.”[5]
Lord Lothian, in a talk lasting forty-five minutes, came straight out with his view on the Bill:
"I agree with the diehards that it has been a surrender. You who are not used to any constitution cannot realise what great power you are going to wield. If you look at the constitution it looks as if all the powers are vested in the Governor-General and the Governor. But is not every power here vested in the King? Everything is done in the name of the King but does the King ever interfere? Once the power passes into the hands of the legislature, the Governor or the Governor-General is never going to interfere. …The Civil Service will be helpful. You too will realise this. Once a policy is laid down they will carry it out loyally and faithfully… We could not help it. We had to fight the diehards here. You could not realise what great courage has been shown by Mr. Baldwin and Sir Samuel Hoare. We did not want to spare the diehards as we had to talk in a different language… These various meetings — and in due course G.D. (Birla), before his return in September, met virtually everyone of importance in Anglo-Indian affairs — confirmed G.D.'s original opinion that the differences between the two countries were largely psychological, the same proposals open to diametrically opposed interpretations. He had not, probably, taken in before his visit how considerable, in the eyes of British conservatives, the concessions had been… If nothing else, successive conversations made clear to G.D. that the agents of the Bill had at least as heavy odds against them at home as they had in India.[6]
"The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread."[7]
Under the Act, British citizens resident in the UK and British companies registered in the UK must be treated on the same basis as Indian citizens and Indian registered companies unless UK law denies reciprocal treatment. The unfairness of this arrangement is clear when one considers the dominant position of British capital in much of the Indian modern sector and the complete dominance, maintained through unfair commercial practices, of UK shipping interests in both India’s international and coastal shipping traffic and the utter insignificance of Indian capital in Britain and the non-existence of Indian involvement in shipping to or within the UK. There are very detailed provisions requiring the Viceroy to intervene if, in his unappealable view, any India law or regulation is intended to, or will in fact, discriminate against UK resident British subjects, British registered companies and, particularly, British shipping interests.
“The Joint Committee considered a suggestion that trade with foreign countries should be made by the Minister of Commerce, but it decided that all negotiations with foreign countries should be conducted by the Foreign Office or Department of External Affairs as they are in the United Kingdom. In concluding agreements of this character, the Foreign Secretary always consults the Board of Trade and it was assumed that the Governor-General would in like manner consult the Minister of Commerce in India. This may be true, but the analogy itself is false. In the United Kingdom, both departments are subject to the same legislative control, whereas in India one is responsible to the federal legislature and the other to the Imperial Parliament.”[3]
From the moment of the Montagu statement of 1917, it was vital that the reform process stay ahead of the curve if the British were to hold the strategic initiative. However, imperialist sentiment, and a lack of realism, in British political circles made this impossible. Thus the grudging conditional concessions of power in the Acts of 1919 and 1935 caused more resentment and signally failed to win the Raj the backing of influential groups in India which it desperately needed. In 1919 the Act of 1935, or even the Simon Commission plan would have been well received. There is evidence that Montagu would have backed something of this sort but his cabinet colleagues would not have considered it. By 1935, a constitution establishing a Dominion of India, comprising the British Indian provinces might have been acceptable in India though it would not have passed the British Parliament.
‘Considering the balance of power in the Conservative party at the time, the passing of a Bill more liberal than that which was enacted in 1935 is inconceivable.’[8]
The provincial part of the Act, which went into effect automatically, basically followed the recommendations of the Simon Commission. Provincial dyarchy was abolished; that is, all provincial portfolios were to be placed in charge of ministers enjoying the support of the provincial legislatures. The British-appointed provincial governors, who were responsible to the British Government via the Viceroy and Secretary of State for India, were to accept the recommendations of the ministers unless, in their view, they negatively affected his areas of statutory “special responsibilities” such as the prevention of any grave menace to the peace or tranquility of a province and the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of minorities. In the event of political breakdown, the governor, under the supervision of the Viceroy, could take over total control of the provincial government. This, in fact, allowed the governors a more untrammeled control than any British official had enjoyed in the history of the Raj. After the resignation of the congress provincial ministries in 1939, the governors did directly rule the ex-Congress provinces throughout the war.
It was generally recognized, that the provincial part of the Act, conferred a great deal of power and patronage on provincial politicians as long as both British officials and Indian politicians played by the rules. However, the paternalistic threat of the intervention by the British governor rankled. that was also a healty sign for muslims
Unlike the provincial portion of the Act, the Federal portion was to go into effect only when half the States by weight agreed to federate. This never happened and the establishment of the Federation was indefinitely postponed after the outbreak of the Second World War.
The Act provided for Dyarchy at the Centre. The British Government, in the person of the Secretary of State for India, through the Governor-General of India – Viceroy of India, would continue to control India’s financial obligations, defence, foreign affairs and the British Indian Army and would make the key appointments to the Reserve Bank of India (exchange rates) and Railway Board and the Act stipulated that no finance bill could be placed in the Central Legislature without the consent of the Governor General. The funding for the British responsibilities and foreign obligations (eg. loan repayments, pensions), at least 80 percent of the federal expenditures, would be non-votable and be taken off the top before any claims could be considered for (for example) social or economic development programs. The Viceroy, under the supervision of the Secretary of State for India, was provided with overriding and certifying powers that could, theoretically, have allowed him to rule autocratically.[9]
The federal part of the Act was designed to meet the aims of the Conservative Party. Over the very long term, the Conservative leadership expected the Act to lead to a nominally dominion status India, conservative in outlook, dominated by an alliance of Hindu princes, Muslims, and right-wing Hindus which would be well disposed to place itself under the guidance and protection of the United Kingdom. In the medium term, the Act was expected to (in rough order of importance):
‘At a banquet in the princely state of Benares Hailey observed that although the new federal constitution would protect their position in the central government, the internal evolution of the states themselves remained uncertain. Most people seemed to expect them to develop representative institutions. Whether those alien grafts from Westminster would succeed in British India, however, itself remained in doubt. Autocracy was "a principle which is firmly seated in the Indian States," he pointed out; "round it burn the sacred fires of an age-long tradition," and it should be given a fair chance first. Autocratic rule, "informed by wisdom, exercised in moderation, and vitalized by a spirit of service to the interests of the subject, may well prove that it can make an appeal in India as strong as that of representative and responsible institutions." This spirited defense brings to mind Nehru's classic paradox of how the representatives of the advanced, dynamic West allied themselves with the most reactionary forces of the backward, stagnant East.’[11]
Under the Act,
‘There are a number of restrictions on the freedom of discussion in the federal legislature. For example the act forbids ... any discussion of, or the asking of questions about, a matter connected with an Indian State, other than a matter with respect to which the federal legislature has power to make laws for that state, unless the Governor-General in his discretion is satisfied that the matter affects federal interests or affects a British subject, and has given his consent to the matter being discussed or the question being asked.’[3]
‘I don't believe that… it is impossible to present the problem in such a form as would make the shop window look respectable from an Indian point of view, which is really what they care about, while keeping your hand pretty firmly on the things that matter.’ (Irwin to Stonehaven, 12 November 1928)
No significant group in India accepted the Federal portion of the Act. A typical response was:
‘After all, there are five aspects of every Government worth the name: (a) The right of external and internal defence and all measures for that purpose; (b) The right to control our external relations; (c) The right to control our currency and exchange; (d) The right to control our fiscal policy; (e) the day-to-day administration of the land…. (Under the Act) You shall have nothing to do with external affairs. You shall have nothing to do with defence. You shall have nothing to do, or, for all practical purposes in future, you shall have nothing to do with your currency and exchange, for indeed the Reserve Bank Bill just passed has a further reservation in the Constitution that no legislation may be undertaken with a view to substantially alter the provisions of that Act except with the consent of the Governor-General…. there is no real power conferred in the Centre.’ (Speech by Mr Bhulabhai DESAI on the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, 4 February 1935[12].
However, the Liberals, and even elements in the Congress were tepidly willing to give it a go:
“Linlithgow asked Sapru whether he thought there was a satisfactory alternative to the scheme of the 1935 Act. Sapru replied that they should stand fast on the Act and the federal plan embodied in it. It was not ideal but at this stage it was the only thing…. A few days after Sapru's visit Birla came to see the Viceroy. He thought that Congress was moving towards acceptance of Federation. Gandhi was not over-worried, said Birla, by the reservation of defence and external affairs to the centre, but was concentrating on the method of choosing the States' representatives. Birla wanted the Viceroy to help Gandhi by persuading a number of Princes to move towards democratic election of representatives. …Birla then said that the only chance for Federation lay in agreement between Government and Congress and the best hope of this lay in discussion between the Viceroy and Gandhi.”[13][14]
The British government sent out Lord Linlithgow as the new viceroy with the remit of bringing the Act into effect. This was an unfortunate choice dictated by British politics rather than by any accessment of Indian needs. On the plus side, Linlithgow was intelligent, extremely hard working, honest, serious and determined to make a success out of the Act. On the negative side, he was unimaginative, stolid, legalistic and found it very difficult to "get on terms" with people outside his immediate circle. This legalistic approach, unfortunately, reinforced the extremely legalsitic Act of which he was one of the main authors.
When under pressure, which was most of the time, Linlithgow retreated into the details of administration while going immobile on the strategic level. This contrasts with Gandhi's tendency to retreat into a unrealistic idealistic, semi-mystical pronouncements and Nehru's tendency under pressure to retreat into dogmatic socialism. If you throw in Jinnah's stubborn, legalistic pursuit of Muslim maximum goals the combination did not make for the finding of practical compromise solutions to massive problems
In 1937, after a great deal of confrontation, Provincial Autonomy was launched. From that point until the declaration of war in 1939, Linlithgow tirelessly tried to get enough of the Princes to accede to launch the Federation. In this he received only the weakest backing from the home government and in the end the Princes rejected the Federation en masse. In September 1939, Linlithgow simply declared that India was at war with Germany. A more imaginative and flexible viceroy, such as Irwin, might have tried to consult with Indian leaders and obtain a resolution of support from the Central Legislative Assembly. Though Linlithgow's behaviour was constitutionally correct it was also offensive to much of Indian opinion. This led directly to the resignation of the Congress provincial ministries which drove another nail into the coffin of Indian unity.
From 1939, Linlithgow concentrated on supporting the war effort.
1 ^ Keay, John. India: A History. Grove Press Books, distributed by Publishers Group West. United States: 2000 ISBN 0-8021-3797-0, pp. 490
2 ^ Keay, John. India: A History. Grove Press Books, distributed by Publishers Group West. United States: 2000 ISBN 0-8021-3797-0, pp. 490
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