Delusion

Delusion
Classification and external resources
ICD-10 F22
ICD-9 297

A delusion is commonly defined as a fixed false belief and is used in everyday language to describe a belief that is either false, fanciful or derived from deception. In psychiatry, the definition is necessarily more precise and implies that the belief is pathological (the result of an illness or illness process). As a pathology it is distinct from a belief based on false or incomplete information or certain effects of perception which would more properly be termed an apperception or illusion.

Delusions typically occur in the context of neurological or mental illness, although they are not tied to any particular disease and have been found to occur in the context of many pathological states (both physical and mental). However, they are of particular diagnostic importance in psychotic disorders and particularly in schizophrenia and mania in episodes of bipolar disorder.

Contents

Psychiatric definition

Although non-specific concepts of madness have been around for several thousand years, the psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers was the first to define the three main criteria for a belief to be considered delusional in his book General Psychopathology. These criteria are:

These criteria still continue in modern psychiatric diagnosis. In the most recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, a delusion is defined as:

A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everybody else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture.

There is some controversy over this definition, as 'despite what almost everybody else believes' implies that a person who believes something most others do not is a candidate for delusional thought. Furthermore, it is ironic that, whilst the above three criteria are usually attributed to Jaspers, he himself described them as only 'vague' and merely 'external' (General Psychopathology, Volume 1, p. 95). He also wrote that, since the genuine or 'internal' 'criteria for delusion proper lie in the primary experience of delusion and in the change of the personality [and not in the above three loosely descriptive criteria], we can see that a delusion may be correct in content without ceasing to be a delusion, for instance - that there is a world-war.' (General Psychopathology, Volume 1, p. 106).

Diagnostic issues

James Tilly Matthews drew this picture of a machine that he called an "air loom", which he believed was being used to torture himself and others for political purposes.

The modern definition and Jaspers' original criteria have been criticised, as counter-examples can be shown for every defining feature.

Studies on psychiatric patients have shown that delusions can be seen to vary in intensity and conviction over time which suggests that certainty and incorrigibility are not necessary components of a delusional belief.[1]

Delusions do not necessarily have to be false or 'incorrect inferences about external reality'.[2] Some religious or spiritual beliefs by their nature may not be falsifiable, and hence cannot be described as false or incorrect, no matter whether the person holding these beliefs was diagnosed as delusional or not. [3]

In other situations the delusion may turn out to be true belief.[4] For example, delusional jealousy, where a person believes that their partner is being unfaithful (and may even follow them into the bathroom believing them to be seeing their lover even during the briefest of partings) may result in the faithful partner being driven to infidelity by the constant and unreasonable strain put on them by their delusional spouse. In this case the delusion does not cease to be a delusion because the content later turns out to be true.

In other cases, the delusion may be assumed to be false by a doctor or psychiatrist assessing the belief, because it seems to be unlikely, bizarre or held with excessive conviction. Psychiatrists rarely have the time or resources to check the validity of a person’s claims leading to some true beliefs to be erroneously classified as delusional.[5] This is known as the Martha Mitchell effect, after the wife of the attorney general who alleged that illegal activity was taking place in the White House. At the time her claims were thought to be signs of mental illness, and only after the Watergate scandal broke was she proved right (and hence sane).

Similar factors have led to criticisms of Jaspers' definition of true delusions as being ultimately 'un-understandable'. Critics (such as R. D. Laing) have argued that this leads to the diagnosis of delusions being based on the subjective understanding of a particular psychiatrist, who may not have access to all the information which might make a belief otherwise interpretable. R.D. Laing's hypothesis has been applied to some forms of projective therapy to "fix" a delusional system so that it cannot be altered by the patient. Psychiatric researchers at Yale University, Ohio State University and the Community Mental Health Center of Middle Georgia have used novels and motion picture films as the focus. Texts, plots and cinematography are discussed and the delusions approached tangentially.[6]. This use of fiction to decrease the malleability of a delusion was employed in a joint project by science-fiction author Philip Jose Farmer and Yale psychiatrist A. James Giannini. They wrote the novel Red Orc's Rage which, recursively, deals with delusional adolescents who are treated with a form of projective therapy. In this novel's fictional setting other novels written by Farmer are discussed and the characters are symbolically integrated into the delusions of fictional patients.This particular novel was then applied to real-life clinical settings. [7]

Another difficulty with the diagnosis of delusions is that almost all of these features can be found in "normal" beliefs. Many religious beliefs hold exactly the same features, yet are not universally considered delusional. Similarly, Thomas Kuhn argued in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that scientists can hold strong beliefs in scientific theories despite considerable apparent discrepancies with experimental evidence.[8]

These factors have led the psychiatrist Anthony David to note that "there is no acceptable (rather than accepted) definition of a delusion."[9] In practice psychiatrists tend to diagnose a belief as delusional if it is either patently bizarre, causing significant distress, or excessively pre-occupies the patient, especially if the person is subsequently unswayed in belief by counter-evidence or reasonable arguments.

Known Examples

Seattle Windshield Pitting Epidemic

See also

Further reading

References

  1. ↑ Myin-Germeys, I., Nicolson, N.A. & Delespaul, P.A.E.G. (2001) The context of delusional experiences in the daily life of patients with schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 31, 489-498.
  2. ↑ Spitzer, M. (1990) On defining delusions. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 31 (5), 377-97
  3. ↑ Young, A.W. (2000).Wondrous strange: The neuropsychology of abnormal beliefs. In M. Coltheart & M. Davis (Eds.) Pathologies of belief (pp.47-74). Oxford: Blackwell. ISBN 0-631-22136-0
  4. ↑ Jones, E. (1999) The phenomenology of abnormal belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 6, 1-16.
  5. ↑ Maher, B.A. (1988) Anomalous experience and delusional thinking: The logic of explanations. In T. Oltmanns and B. Maher (eds) Delusional Beliefs. New York: Wiley Interscience. ISBN 0-471-83635-4
  6. ↑ AJ Giannini. Use of fiction in therapy. Psychiaric Times. 18(7):56, 2001
  7. ↑ AJ Giannini. Afterword. (in) PJ Farmer. Red Orc's Rage.NY, Tor Books, 1991, pp.279-282.
  8. ↑ Kuhn, T. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-45808-3
  9. ↑ David, A.S. (1999) On the impossibility of defining delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 6 (1), 17-20