Battle of the Little Bighorn

Battle of the Little Bighorn
Part of the Great Sioux War of 1876-77
Custer Massacre At Big Horn, Montana June 25 1876.jpg
Custer Massacre at Big Horn, Montana —
June 25, 1876, artist unknown
Date June 25 – June 26, 1876
Location Near the Little Bighorn River, Big Horn County, Montana
Result Decisive Native American Victory
Belligerents
Lakota
Northern Cheyenne
Arapaho		 Flag of the United States United States
7th Cavalry Regiment (United States)
Commanders
Sitting Bull
Crazy Horse
Chief Gall		 George A. Custer †,
Marcus Reno,
Frederick Benteen,
James Calhoun †
Strength
Believed to be 949 lodges (probably 900 - 1,800 warriors) 31 officers,
566 troopers,
15 armed civilians,
~35-40 scouts
Casualties and losses
Believed to be at least 36 killed, ~168 wounded
(according to Sitting Bull); or 136 killed, 160 wounded (according to Red Horse)		 ~268 killed (16 officers, 242 troopers, 10 civilians/scouts),
~55 wounded
Great Sioux War of 1876-77
Powder River – Rosebud – Little Bighorn – Warbonnet Creek – Slim Buttes – Cedar Creek – Dull Knife Fight – Wolf Mountain

The Battle of the Little Bighorn—also known as Custer's Last Stand, and, in the parlance of the relevant Native Americans, the Battle of Greasy Grass Creek—was an armed engagement between a Lakota-Northern Cheyenne combined force and the 7th Cavalry of the United States Army. It occurred on June 25 and June 26, 1876, near the Little Bighorn River in the eastern Montana Territory, near what is now Crow Agency, MT.

The battle was the most famous action of the Great Sioux War of 1876-77, and was a remarkable victory for the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne, led by Sitting Bull. The U.S. Seventh Cavalry, including a column of 700 men led by George Armstrong Custer, was defeated. Five of the Seventh's companies were annihilated and Custer himself was killed as were two of his brothers and a brother-in-law. This battle did not inflict the highest number of casualties by Native Americans against U.S. forces. That record was set in 1791 at the Battle of the Wabash with nearly 1000 casualties.

Contents

Prelude to the Battle of Little Bighorn

After the 1875 Sun Dance alliance, made by Sitting Bull between the Lakota and Cheyenne, thousands of Indians had slipped away from their reservations in early 1876. Chief Sitting Bull during this Sun Dance had a vision of soldiers falling from the sky meaning a victory was ahead. Military officials planned a summer campaign to force them back to the reservations, using both infantry and cavalry in three prongs:

Col. John Gibbon's column of six companies (A, B, E, H, I, and K) of the 7th Infantry and four (F, G, H, and L) of the 2nd Cavalry marched east from Fort Ellis in western Montana on March 30, patrolling the Yellowstone River.

Brig. Gen. George Crook's column of ten companies (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I, L, and M) of the 3rd Cavalry, five (A, B, D, E, and I) of the 2nd Cavalry, two companies (D and F) of the 4th Infantry, and three (C, G, and H) of the 9th Infantry, moved north from Fort Fetterman in the Wyoming Territory on May 29, marching toward the Powder River area.

Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry's command (the entire 7th Cavalry; Companies C and G, 17th U.S. Infantry; and the Gatling gun detachment of the 20th Infantry) departed westward from Fort Abraham Lincoln in the Dakota Territory on May 17. They were accompanied by teamsters and packers with 150 wagons and a large contingent of pack mules. Companies C, D, and I, 6th U.S. Infantry, moved up the Yellowstone from Fort Buford on the Missouri River to set up a supply depot, and joined Terry on May 29 at the mouth of the Powder River.

The coordination and planning went awry on June 17 when Crook's column was delayed after the Battle of the Rosebud. Surprised and, according to some accounts, astonished by the unusually large numbers of Indians faced in the battle, Crook was essentially defeated in battle and forced to stop and regroup. Unaware of Crook's battle, Gibbon and Terry proceeded, joining forces in late June near the mouth of the Rosebud River. They formulated a plan, based on the discovery of a large Indian trail on June 15, that called for Custer's regiment to proceed up the Rosebud River, while Terry and Gibbon's united columns would move towards the Bighorn and Little Bighorn rivers. The officers hoped to trap the Indian village between these two forces. The 7th Cavalry split from the remainder of the Terry column on June 22 and began a rapid pursuit along the trail. Custer was offered the use of the Gatling guns but declined, saying they would slow his command.[1] He also declined the offer of two further companies of cavalry on the basis that his regiment could handle anything they found without additional assistance.

Custermovements.jpg

While the Terry/Gibbon column was marching toward the mouth of the Little Bighorn, on the evening of June 24 Custer's scouts arrived at an overlook known as the Crow's Nest, 14 miles (23 km) east of the Little Bighorn River. At sunrise on June 25, Custer's scouts reported to him they could see signs of the Indian village roughly 15 miles (24 km) in the distance. Custer's initial plan was a surprise attack on the village the following morning on June 26, but a report came to him that several hostile Indians had discovered the trail left by his troops. Assuming their presence had been exposed, Custer decided to attack the village without further delay. Unbeknownst to Custer, this group of Indians were actually leaving the encampment on the Big Horn and did not alert the village. Custer's scouts repeatedly warned him about the size of the village, with scout Mitch Bouyer saying, "General, I have been with these Indians for 30 years, and this is the largest village I have ever heard of." Custer's overriding concern was that the Indians would break up and scatter in different directions. The command began its approach to the Indian village at 12 noon and prepared to attack in full daylight.[2]

Custer's assumptions

As the Army moved into the field on its expedition, it was operating with incorrect assumptions as to the number of Indians it would encounter. The Army's assumptions were based on inaccurate information provided by the Indian Agents that no more than 800 hostiles were in the area. The Indian Agents based the 800 number in their assessment on the numbers of Indians led by Sitting Bull and other leaders off the Reservation, in protest of US Government policies. This was was a correct estimate until several weeks before the battle, when the reservation Indians joined Sitting Bull's ranks for the summer buffalo hunt. As one South African historian wrote, "The (US) Army's strength estimate didn't change, because the civilian Indian agents on the reservations didn't tell the Army that large numbers of Indians had left." [3] Nor did the agents take into account that many thousands of "reservation Indians" that had "unofficially" left the reservation to join their uncooperative non-reservation cousins led by Sitting Bull. Sitting Bull and his uncooperative non-reservation Indians were those groups who had indicated that they were not going to cooperate with the US Government and live on reservation lands. They had essentially voted with their feet to defy US Government policy. Custer unknowingly faced thousands of Indians in addition to the 800 non-reservation "hostiles." All Army plans were based on these incorrect numbers. While Custer was severely criticized for subsequently not accepting reinforcements and for dividing his forces, it must be understood that he had no reason not to accept the same official Government estimates of hostiles in the area that Terry and Gibbon also accepted.

Additionally, Custer was more concerned with preventing the escape of the Indians than with fighting them. The Indians had been sleeping in the morning of the battle as virtually every native account attests, giving Custer a false estimate of what he was up against. When he and his scouts first looked down on the Indian Village from the heights across the Little Bighorn River most of the warriors were still asleep or just waking up and the scene would have been of women preparing for the day, young boys taking thousands of horses out to graze south of the Indian village. While the village was enormous in size, it would look to Custer and his scouts as if there were far fewer warriors to defend the village because most of the estimated two thousand warriors were still asleep in their teepees,

Finally, Custer would seem to have assumed that in the event of his encountering Indians, his subordinates Benteen and the pack train following them would quickly come to his aid. Rifle volleys were a standard way of telling supporting units to come to another unit's aid. Benteen and Reno's men heard distinct rifle volleys as late as 4:30pm during the battle.

The Battle

Movement of the 7th CavalryA: Custer B: Reno C: Benteen D: Yates E: Weir

Reno's attack

Movement of Major Reno's three Companies

The first group the second detachment to attack was Major Reno's, conducted after receiving orders from Custer issued by Lt. William W. Cooke, as Custer's Crow scouts reported Sioux tribe members were alarming the village. Reno was ordered to charge and began that phase of the battle. The orders, made without accurate knowledge of the village's size, location, or propensity to stand and fight, had been to pursue the Indians and "bring them to battle." Reno's force crossed the Little Bighorn at the mouth of what is today Reno Creek around 3:00 p.m. [4] and immediately realized that the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne were present "in force and not running away."

Reno advanced rapidly across the open field towards the northwest, his movements masked by the thick bramble of trees that ran along the southern banks of the Little Big Hom river. The same trees on his front right that shielded his movements across the wide field across over which his men rapidly road first with two approximately forty man companies abreast and eventually with all three charged abreast (M, A and G) also obscured his view of the Indian village until he road past that bend on his right front and was suddenly within arrow shot of the tents occupied by the Hunkpapa Sioux that constituted its south eastern edge. It is important to note that Reno had little idea of the length, depth and size of the village until he and his men rode past the treeline to their right front and came out into the open field past the bend on their front right formed by the creek. Today, this bend is immediately behind the present day privately owned Garryowen Museum. [5] It was here, now past this bend, that the Indian village came into full view. With trees and the river to his right and his left flank was the most exposed, Reno sent his Arikara/Ree and Crow Indian scouts forward on his left flank. This disposition of Reno's forces is confirmed by one of his surviving Arikara scouts, Little Sioux. [6] That decision, to put his least reliable men on his most vulnerable flank, is still criticized by students of the battle. Now seeing the full extent of the village's width, Reno, who had been nearly killed during the Civil War by a cleverly laid Confederate ambush in the Shenandoah Vally, quickly suspected what he would later call "a trap" and stopped a few hundred yards short of the encampment, dismounting and deploying in a skirmish line, as standard army doctrine called for. In a skirmish line, every fourth trooper handled the horses for the troopers taking firing positions, thus immediately reducing a fighting force by 25 percent. The troopers on the skirmish line were positioned five to ten yards apart, with officers to their rear and troopers with horses behind the officers. As Reno's men fired into the village and killed, by some accounts, several wives and children of the Sioux leader, Gall or Pizi, mounted Indians warriors began streaming out of the village to meet his forces. From the Indian's perspective, with Reno's men to their front anchored to the left by that same impassible tree line and bend in the river, it was natural for the Indians to ride rapidly to the south west, to the right of the line of troopers. After an estimated 20 minutes of long distance firing, Reno's battalion had taken only one casualty, but the odds against him had become more obvious (Reno estimated five to one) and Custer had not reinforced him. Trooper Billy Jackson reported that by then, the Indians had begun massing in that open area shielded by a small hill to the left of the Reno's line and to the right of the Indian village. [7] Now obviously massing for a mounted attack of more than 500 warriors, to the left and rear of Reno's line, [8] the Indians soon turned Reno's exposed left flank and forcing him into a hasty withdrawal to Reno's right - into the timber on that same loop in the river that had shielded his movement across the field only 30 minutes earlier.[9] Here the Indians pinned Reno and his men down and even set fire to the brush in an attempt to drive the soldiers out of their position. After giving orders to mount, dismount and mount again, Reno told his men, "All those who wish to make their escape follow me," and Reno led an initially ordered column of fours move for the river that quickly degenerated into a disorderly run for the river to reach the high ground of the bluffs on the other side. The retreat was confused and immediately disrupted by Cheyenne attacks at close quarters. Reno later reported that three officers and 29 troopers were killed during the retreat and subsequent fording of the river, with another officer and 13-18 men missing. Most of these men were left behind in the timber, although many eventually rejoined the detachment.

Reno-Benteen Defensive Position
Bloody Knife

The hasty retreat was believed to have been inspired by the death of Bloody Knife, a prominent Crow scout. While talking to Reno in the timber, he was shot in the head, with witnesses claiming some of his brain matter having actually splattered Reno. This shocking development is believed to have sufficiently unnerved Reno and to have inspired his disorganized retreat across the river. Several witnesses claimed Reno was in a panicked state for a considerable time following Bloody Knife's death.

Reno and Benteen on Reno Hill

Atop the bluffs, known today as Reno Hill, Reno's shaken troops soon linked up with the detachment of Captain Benteen, arriving from the south. This force had been on a lateral scouting mission when it had been summoned by Custer's messenger, Italian bugler John Martin (Giovanni Martini) with the hand-written message "Come on...big village, be quick...bring pacs" ("pacs" referring to ammunition, meaning that by this time Custer was most likely aware of the large numbers of Indians they were having to face). Benteen's coincidental arrival on the bluffs was just in time to save Reno's men from possible annihilation. Their detachments were then reinforced by McDougall and the pack train. The 14 officers and 340 troopers on the bluffs organized an all-around defense and dug rifle pits using whatever implements they had among them, including knives.

Despite hearing heavy gunfire from the north, including distinct volleys at 4:20 p.m., Benteen concentrated on reinforcing Reno's badly wounded and hard-pressed battalion, rather than continuing on toward Custer. Benteen's apparent reluctance to reach Custer prompted later criticism that he had failed to follow orders. Around 5:00 p.m., Capt. Thomas Weir and Company D moved out against orders to make contact with Custer. They advanced a mile, to what is today Weir Ridge, and could see in the distance Indian warriors on horseback shooting at objects on the ground. By this time, roughly 5:25 p.m., Custer's battle may have concluded, and the conventional historical understanding is that what Weir witnessed was most likely warriors finishing off the wounded and shooting at dead bodies on the "Last Stand Hill" at the northern end of the Custer battlefield. (Some contemporary historians have suggested that what Weir witnessed, however, was actually a fight on what is now called Calhoun Hill where the destruction of Keogh's battalion may have begun with the collapse of L, I and C Company following the combined assaults led by Crazy Horse, White Bull, Hump, Gall and others. [10] Other Indian accounts seem to contradict this understanding, however, and the time element remains a subject of debate.) The other entrenched companies eventually followed Weir by assigned battalions, first Benteen, then Reno, and finally the pack train. Growing Indian attacks around Weir Ridge forced all seven companies to return to the bluff before the pack train, with the ammunition, had moved even a quarter mile. There, they remained pinned down for another day, but the Indians were unable to breach this tightly held position.

Benteen displayed calmness and courage by exposing himself to Indian fire and even being hit in the heel of his boot by an Indian bullet. At one point, he personally led a counterattack to push back Indians who had continued to crawl through the grass ever closer to the soldier's positions. [11]

Custer's fight

Interpretations of Custer's fight are conjecture, since none of his men survived the battle, while the accounts of surviving Indians are conflicting and unclear. The gunfire heard on the bluffs by Reno and Benteen's men was from Custer's fight. His force of roughly 210 men was engaged by the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne about 3.5 miles (6 km) to the north. Having isolated Reno's force and driven them away from the encampment, the bulk of the warriors were free to pursue Custer. The route taken by Custer to his "Last Stand" remains a subject of debate. One possibility is that after ordering Reno to charge, Custer continued down Reno Creek to within about a half mile (800 m) of the Little Bighorn, but then turned north, and climbed up the bluffs, reaching the same spot to which Reno would soon retreat. From this point on the other side of the river, he could see Reno charging the village.

Custer at Minneconjou Ford

Custer then rode north along the bluffs, and descended into a drainage called Medicine Tail Coulee, which led to the river. Some historians believe that part of Custer's force descended the coulee, going west to the river and attempting unsuccessfully to cross into the village. According to some accounts, a small contingent of Indian sharpshooters opposed this crossing.

White Cow Bull claimed to have shot a leader wearing a buckskin jacket off his horse in the river. While no other Indian account supports this claim, if White Bull did actually shoot a buckskin-clad leader off his horse, some historians have argued that Custer himself may have been seriously wounded by one of these marksmen. Some Indian accounts claim that besides wounding one of the leaders of this advance, a soldier carrying a company guidon was also hit. [12] Troopers had to dismount to help the wounded men back onto their horses.[13] The fact, however, that both of the non-mutilation wounds to Custer's body (a bullet wound below the heart and a shot to the left temple) would have been instantly fatal casts doubt on the proposition that either remounted wounded soldier was Custer.[14]

Lieutenant Colonel Custer and his U. S. Army troops are defeated in battle with Native American Lakota Sioux and Northern Cheyenne, on the Little Bighorn Battlefield, June 25, 1876 at Little Bighorn River, Montana. Inaccurately shows Custer in a blue uniform and long hair

The attempted fording of the river at Medicine Tail Coulee might explain Custer's purpose for Reno's attack, that is, a coordinated "hammer-and-anvil" maneuver, with Reno holding the Indians at bay at the southern end of the camp, while Custer drove them against Reno's line from the north. Other historians have noted that if Custer did attempt to cross the river near Medicine Tail Coulee, he may have been inspired by the belief that it was the north end of the Indian camp, when in fact it was only the middle. Some Indian accounts, however, place the Northern Cheyenne encampment and the north end of the overal village to the left (and south) of the opposite side of the crossing. [15] The exact location of the north end of the village remains in dispute, however. Custer had tried a variation of this same sort of tactic at the 1868 Battle of Washita River -- a simultaneously converging attack.

Other views of Custer's actions at Minneconjou Ford

Other historians claim that Custer never approached the river, but rather continued north across the coulee and up the other side, where he gradually came under attack. According to this theory, by the time Custer realized he was badly outnumbered, it was too late to break back to the south where Reno and Benteen could have provided assistance. Two men from the 7th Cavalry later claimed to have seen Custer engage the Indians, including the young Crow scout Ashishishe, known by his translated name Curley, and the trooper Peter Thompson, who allegedly fell behind Custer's column. The accuracy of their recollections remains controversial, with battle participants and historians almost universally discrediting Thompson's claim.

A new interpretation is based on recent archaeological evidence and Indian testimony. In the 1920s, battlefield investigators discovered hundreds of .45-70 shell cases along the ridge line, known today as Nye-Cartwright Ridge, between South Medicine Tail Coulee and the next drainage at North Medicine Tail (also known as Deep Coulee). Historians believe Custer divided his battalion into two (and possibly three) companies, retaining personal command of one while presumably delegating Captain George W. Yates to command the second.

"Custer's Last Stand." Lieutenant Colonel Custer standing center, wearing buckskin, with few of his soldiers of the Seventh Cavalry still standing. Inaccurately shows Custer with a Cavalry saber and long hair.

This 1920s' evidence supports the theory that at least one of the companies made a feint attack southeast from Nye-Cartwright Ridge straight down center of the "V formed by the intersection at the crossing of Medicine Tail Coulee on the right and Calhoun Couley on the left which both meet at the crossing rather than riding down the rocky bottom of the coulee, itself, on the way to Minneconjou Ford with the intent of relieving the pressure on Reno's detachment, (according to Crow scout, Curley possibly viewed by both Mitch Bouyer and Custer) withdrawing the skirmish line into the timber on the edge of the Little Bighorn River. Had they come straight down Medicine Tail Coulee, their approach to the Minneconjou Crossing and the northern area of the village would have been masked by the high ridges running on the northwest side of the Little Bighorn River. That they might have come southeast from the center of the area known as Nye-Cartwright Ridge seems to be supported by Indian accounts which talked of the Northern Cheyenne seeing the approach of the distinctly white colored horses of the Company E, known as the Grey Horse Company and that its approach was seen by Indians at that end of the village. Behind them, a second company, further up on the heights, would have provided long range cover fire. Warriors could have been drawn to the feint attack, forcing the battalion back towards the heights, up the north fork drainage, away from the troops providing cover fire above. The covering company would have moved towards a reunion, delivering heavy volley fire and leaving the trail of expended cartridges discovered 50 years later.

Crazy Horse, White Bull and other warriors attack the center of Custer's line

Custer's fight, from this point, is difficult to follow. Even before some of Custer's force descended down Medicine Tail Coulee to attempt a forced crossing into the north end of the village, the threat from Custer's companies had been earlier detected by renowned Sioux warrior, Gall. He had crossed the Little Bighorn and had ridden up to the ridgeline south east of what is today called Sharpshooters Ridge. From there, he had ridden stealthily to see Custer's forces concealed at that point down in Medicine Tail Coulee. Gall claimed to have ridden southwest, crossing back across the Little Bighorn River to warn the hundreds of warriors who had just returned from their repulse of Reno of this new threat from the Northeast.

A handful of Indian sharpshooters had prevented Custer from crossing the Minnecounjou Ford and now these same warriors were joined by hundreds of Sioux, among whom were Gall and Crazy Horse. These crossed the river and headed up Calhoun Coulee even as Custer's Company E and possibly L were ahead of them crossing Calhoun Coulee from east to west and riding up onto the ridge line known today as Findley Ridge (running from Calhoun Hill in the southeast to Last Stand Hill to the northwest). Traditional white accounts attribute to Gall the attack that drove Custer up onto the ridge, but Indian witnesses have disputed Gall's account as self-serving.[16] According to Michno's research among the Indian accounts, the warning of Custer's imminent approach was given by the four surviving boys who had been sent out to round up the horses earlier that day. A surprise encounter with soldiers of Custer's column left one of the boys dead, and the others fled back to the camp. The sister of the slain boy, Pretty Bird, was remembered by the Indian witnesses as displaying extreme bravery in her precipitous personal action of defiance of the cavalry troopers' firing line, thus provoking the Indians' charge that broke through the center of the cavalry's defense.[17] along either side of the ridge above the Little Bighorn that stretched northward toward Custer Hill.

At any rate, the warriors who had infiltrated up Calhoun Coulee in a northerly direction and had taken positions northeast of Finley Ridge, began to pour arrows down on Companies C, I and L. Then Crazy Horse and White Bull, provoked by the display of Pretty Bird (above), suddenly charged with their braves through an opening between Lt Calhoun's Company L and Company I, cutting the troopers' defensive position in half. The breach in the perimeter probably forced Company L to pull back off the ridge in an attempt to link back up with Company I, forcing Companies C and L to cease their fire to redeploy. The warriors who had broken through, seeing that the two cavalry companies no longer possessed their previous fire superiority, now attacked from the east as the other Indians attacked the isolated elements of Company C from both the east and the south. These actions soon finished off Companies C and L and forced the remaining survivors and some of Company I to flee towards Custer and his men north of the so-called "Last Stand Hill." An attempt at an orderly retreat soon descended into a what Benteen later described as a "panic rout." The Indian participants described this retreat as a "buffalo run" where the warriors loped alongside the fleeing soldiers on their painted ponies, striking the troopers with their coup sticks and lances and "counting coup".[18]

According to the location of the bodies found on the battlefield, Companies I and L, under Captain Keogh's command, were possibly detached and dismounted to provide a rear guard, and may have been the last organized defense. A bullet wound was found on Keogh's left leg that broke his ankle, making any attempt for him to run nearly impossible. A matching bullet wound was found on his horse, Comanche that confirmed Keogh's wound. The fact that Keogh himself was unable to flee may account for the fact that his body was surrounded by senior officers and enlisted men of his command. A 7th Cavalry survivor, Henry Benien, described "thirty eight bodies in a heap" at Keogh's position.[19] Others in Keogh's three companies fled northwest toward the top of what is known today as Custer Hill. Indian accounts speak of Custer's command racing to the top of the hill to provide covering fire for Keogh's retreating troopers. This action forced their pursuers on the defensive for a few minutes and slowed the pursuit. Even before the end of Custer's immediate command, many Indian accounts speak of small breakout attempts from C, L and I Company positions in Keogh's sector toward the river as well as toward Custer Hill. These accounts would explain the troopers' bodies scattered across the fields southeast of the ridge line toward the Little Bighorn River. None of the soldiers made it to the river from the southern end of the battlefield as charts of battlefield markers demonstrate. [20]

Last stand on Custer Hill

In the end, the hilltop itself was probably too small to accommodate the survivors and wounded. Fire from the south east made it impossible for Custer's men to put in a defensive position all around Last Stand Hill. On Last Stand Hill, however, the soldiers put up their most dogged defense. According to native accounts, far more Indian causalities occurred in the attack on Last Stand Hill than anywhere else. The extent of their resistance would seem to indicate that the soldiers had little doubts about their prospects for survival. Nevertheless, according to Indian testimony, the command structure rapidly broke down, although smaller "last stands" were apparently made by several groups. Soon Custer's remaining companies C, E, and K were wiped out with the the last approximately 28 survivors making a running dash right through Indian lines south for the river. They were trapped in the box canyon that is called "Deep Ravine" and their deaths signaled the end of the Battle and the complete annihilation of Custer's 5 companies.

By almost all accounts, within less than an hour Custer's force was completely annihilated.[21][22][23] David Humphries Miller, who between 1935 and 1955 interviewed the last Indian survivors of the battle, wrote that the Custer fight lasted less than one-half hour.[24] The Lakota asserted that Crazy Horse personally led one of the large groups of warriors that eventually overwhelmed the cavalrymen in a surprise charge from the northeast, causing a breakdown in the command structure and panic among the troops. Many of these men threw down their weapons while Cheyenne and Sioux warriors rode them down, "counting coup" with lances, coup sticks and quirts. Some Indian accounts recalled this segment of the fight as a "buffalo run."[25] Eyewitness accounts from Indians, long ignored by traditional historians, were collected for many years after the battle and continue to be analyzed most recently by Gregory Michno in his book, "Lakota Noon: The Indian Narrative of Custer's Defeat," and which describes the Indian participant person-by-person, location-by-location account of the Battle tracing the movements of virtually all Indian participants who left a record of their movements before, during and after the Battle.[26]

Numbers of Indian combatants

The exact number of Indian warriors participating in the battle has never been determined and remains controversial. It has been estimated that in the overall battle the warriors outnumbered the 7th Cavalry by approximately three to one, or roughly 1800 against 600.[27] In Custer's fight, this ratio could have increased to as high as nine to one (1800 against 200) after his isolated command became the main focus of the fighting. Some historians, however, claim the ratio of the Custer fight to be as low as three to one. By almost all accounts, Custer's detachment was certainly outnumbered and was caught in the open on unfamiliar terrain.

Debate over effectiveness of cavalry weapons

It has been claimed in defense of Custer that some of the Indians were armed with repeating Spencer, Winchester rifles and Henry rifles, while the 7th Cavalry carried single-shot Springfield Model 1873 carbines, caliber .45-70.[28] These rifles had a slower rate of fire than the aforementioned repeating rifles and tended to jam when overheated. The carbines had been issued with a copper cartridge, and troopers soon discovered that the copper expanded in the breech when heated upon firing, thus jamming the rifle. Troopers were forced to extract the cartridges manually with a knife blade, rendering the carbines useless in combat except as a club. During Reno's fight Captain French was reported to have sat in the open, completely exposed to Indian gunfire, extracting jammed shells from guns, reloading, and then passing them back to troopers in exchange for other jammed weapons to clear.[29]

Yet the Springfield Model 1873 was selected by the Army Ordnance Board after extensive testing in competition with other rifles. It was considered to be the most reliable rifle after multiple weathering tests. The choice of a single-shot rifle over repeat-firing rifles was a deliberate attempt to prevent overuse of ammunition, following the Army's emphasis at that time on marksmanship and taking into account the expenses associated with the fact that every cartridge arrived at the end of a 1,000-mile (1,600 km) supply line. While Indian accounts of the Custer fight note men throwing down their rifles, in panic or possibly anger, allegations of jammed Springfield carbines do not appear in other confrontations during the Indian Wars.

Indian accounts, documented in paintings on buffalo hides, indicate a fight between bows and arrows and cavalry pistols.[30] While this representation may support the claims of the Army's carbines malfunctioning, the single-shot Springfield rifles used by the 7th had a much greater range than the Winchester and Henry rifles of the Indians, and by use of skirmishers covering fixed arcs of fire, the soldiers were able to keep the Indians at bay for some time. Indian leaders spoke of several charges against the soldiers' positions that were repulsed, forcing the Indians to return to cover below the ridge.

As more Indians joined the fight, fire on Company L and Company C's two positions increased steadily in intensity. Indian accounts describe warriors deliberately rushing army positions with bright robes to induce panic in the cavalry mounts.[31] Another account related that soldiers (probably I Company, held initially in reserve over the crest of Finley Ridge) were rushed by warriors waving blankets and by lone warrior "bravery runs," which forced some troopers to choose between holding horse reins or letting go of them and returning fire. Soldiers aiming at oncoming Indians often had their hands involuntarily pulled upwards by the frightened mounts, resulting in weapons discharged upwards as horses reared. When horses carrying ammunition packs were driven off, the Indians quickly gained control of them.

While some warriors came armed with rifles (including antiquated muzzle-loaders and Army Sharps carbines which they had acquired years earlier in trades with the settlers along the South Platte), the Indians also carried a large variety of primitive weapons including bows and arrows and several styles of heavy, stone-headed war clubs. According to the Indian accounts, at least half of the Indian warriors were armed only with bows and "many arrows," making it the primary weapon.[32] Many of the participants, including the thirteen year-old Black Elk, claimed to have acquired their first gun from dead troopers at the battle.[33] The Sioux warrior White Bull described the Indians as systematically stripping slain troopers of their guns and cartridge belts so that as the losses mounted among Custer's men, the soldiers' fire steadily decreased, while the gunfire from the Indians steadily increased.[34] The Cheyenne participants gave similar testimony: the Indians' firepower was increased by the new carbines they took off the soldiers, and the large amounts of ammunition they were constantly recovering from the saddlebags of the troopers' horses.

The exposed terrain of the battlefield gave Lakota and Cheyenne bows and arrows a deadly advantage over the troopers on the ridge. The heights above the Little Bighorn River, unlike the valley itself, are considered completely unsuited for mounted troops. Custer's men were essentially trapped on higher ground from which direct fire at the Indians through the high, dense brush would have been difficult. On the other hand, the Lakota and Cheyenne would have been able to launch their arrows from heavy sagebrush below the ridge where Custer's men were making their stand by arcing their arrows upward over obstacles at the puffs of smoke from the troopers' weapons. A large volume of arrows would have ensured severe casualties and, in fact, many of the slain troopers discovered were found to have multiple arrows protruding from their bodies. Many of the dead cavalrymen also appeared to have their skulls crushed, possibly by the stone-headed war clubs.[35] It is unknown if these injuries occurred during the battle or post-mortem. Some accounts of the Indian wars describe Indian women coming onto the field after a battle and systematically bashing in the heads of the enemy dead and wounded alike.

More on Custer's final resistance

Recent archaeological had work at the battlefield site indicates that organized resistance in the form of skirmish lines probably took place. The remainder of the battle possibly took on the nature of a running fight. Modern archeology and historical Indian accounts indicate that Custer's force may have been divided into three groups, with the Indians attempting to prevent them from effectively reuniting. Indian accounts describe warriors (including women) running up from the village to wave blankets in order to scare off the soldiers' horses. Fighting dismounted, the soldiers' skirmish lines were most likely overwhelmed. Studies show that it would have taken an hour to cover the long stretch over which the troopers died and by most accounts, the battle was over within this time. Army doctrine would have called for one man in four to be a horseholder on the skirmish lines and, in extreme cases, one man in eight. As the Custer field is unique, in that markers were placed where men were believed to have fallen a couple of years after the battle, the placements of troops have been roughly construed. The troops evidently died in several groups, including on Custer Hill, around Captain Myles Keogh and strung out towards the Little Big Horn River. As individual troopers were wounded or killed, initial defensive positions would have become untenable.

Last break out attempt by twenty eight troopers

Mitch Boyer marker on Deep Ravine trail, Deep Ravine is to the right of this picture (s/sw), and about 65 yrds. distant.

Modern documentaries suggest that there may not have been a "Last Stand," as traditionally portrayed in popular culture. Instead, archaeologists suggest that, in the end, Custer's troops were not surrounded but rather overwhelmed by a single charge. This scenario corresponds to several Indian accounts stating Crazy Horse's charge swarmed the resistance, with the surviving soldiers fleeing in panic. At this point, the fight became a rout with warriors riding down the fleeing troopers and hitting them with lances and coup sticks.[36] Many of these troopers may have ended up in a deep ravine 300-400 yards away from what is known today as Custer Hill. At least 28 (most common number associated with burial witness testimony is 28) bodies, including that of scout Mitch Bouyer, were discovered in or near that gulch, their deaths possibly the battle's final actions. Although the marker for Mitch Bouyer has been accounted for as being accurate through archaeological and forensic testing[37] , it is some 65 yards away from Deep Ravine. Other archaeological explorations done in Deep Ravine[38] have found no human remains associated with the battle. According to other Indian accounts, about 40 men made a desperate stand around Custer on Custer Hill, delivering volley fire.[39] The great majority of the Indian casualties were probably suffered during this closing segment of the battle as the soldiers and Indians on Calhoun Hill were more widely separated and traded fire at greater distances for most of their portion of the Battle than were the soldiers and Indians on Custer Hill. [40] It is important to note that some 47 marble markers, originally intended for Reno-Benteen Hill were mistakenly taken to the Custer side of the battlefield. Soldiers told of placing 2 markers over a body, one at the head and one at the foot of the soldier's remains. This may explain the paring of double markers at several places especially on Calhoun Hill and at other places at that end of the battlefield.

Indian Casualties

Indian casualties have never been determined and estimates vary widely, from as few as 36 dead (from Indian listings of the dead by name) to as many as 300. The Sioux Chief Red Horse told Col. W. H. Wood that the Indians suffered 136 dead and 160 wounded during the battle.[41] Many historians do not agree with these categorical numbers, since Indians did not keep such statistics..

The aftermath

After the Custer force was annihilated, the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne regrouped to attack Reno and Benteen. The fight continued until dark (approximately 9:00 p.m.) and for much of the next day, with the outcome in doubt. Reno credited Benteen's leadership with repulsing a severe attack on the portion of the perimeter held by Companies H and M.[42] On June 26, the column under General Terry approached from the north, and the Indians drew off in the opposite direction. The Crow scout White Man Runs Him was the first to tell General Terry's officers that Custer's force had "been wiped out." Reno and Benteen's wounded troops were given what treatment was available at that time; five later died of their wounds. One of the regiment's three surgeons had been with Custer's column, while another, Dr DeWolf, had been killed during Reno's retreat;[43] the remaining doctor, Assistant Surgeon Henry R. Porter,[44] was assisted by interpreter Fred Gerard.

The soldiers on Reno Hill were unaware of what had happened to Custer until Terry's arrival and were reportedly stunned by the news. An examination was immediately made of the Custer battle site, but soldiers could not determine what exactly had transpired. There was evidence of organized resistance including what appeared to be breastworks made of dead horses on Custer Hill.[45] The Indian dead had mostly been removed from the field. The 7th's dead were identified as best as possible and hastily buried where they fell. Custer was found to have been shot in the left chest and left temple. Either wound would have been fatal, though he appeared to have bled from only the chest wound, meaning his head wound may have been delivered post-mortem. He also suffered a wound to the arm. Some Lakota oral histories assert that Custer committed suicide to avoid capture and subsequent torture. Several Indian accounts do note multiple soldiers committing suicide near the end of the battle, but the claim of Custer's suicide is usually discounted since he was right-handed. His body was found near the top of Custer Hill, also known as "Last Stand Hill," where a large obelisk inscribed with the names of the 7th's casualties now stands. Most of the dead had been stripped of their clothing, mutilated, and were in an advanced state of decomposition making identification of many of the bodies impossible.[46]

Several days after the battle, Curley, Custer's Crow scout who had taken his leave of Custer near Medicine Tail Coulee, gave an account of the battle which indicated that Custer had attacked the village after attempting to cross the river, but had been driven back, retreating towards the hill where his body was found.[47] The scenario seemed compatible with Custer's aggressive style of warfare and with evidence found on the ground, forming the basis of many popular accounts of the battle. The story of Custer's purported heroic attack across the river, however, was undermined by the account of participant Chief Gall, who told Lt. Edward Godfrey that Custer never came close to the river.[48] Gall's account, however, was criticized by Cheyenne and Sioux participants.[49]

7th Cavalry casualties

The 7th Cavalry suffered 52 percent casualties: 16 officers and 242 troopers killed or died of wounds, 1 officer and 51 troopers wounded. Every soldier in the five companies with Custer was killed, although for years rumors persisted of survivors.[50] The sole surviving animal reportedly discovered on the battlefield by General Terry's troops was Captain Keogh's horse Comanche.[51]

Comanche in 1887
Scene of Custer's last stand, looking in the direction the Indian village and the deep ravine. Photo by Stanley J. Morrow, spring 1879.

In 1878, the army awarded 24 Medals of Honor to participants in the fight on the bluffs for bravery, most for risking their lives to carry water from the river up the hill to the wounded.[52] Few on the non-Indian side questioned the conduct of the enlisted men, but many questioned the tactics, strategy and conduct of the officers. Indian accounts spoke of panic-driven flight and suicide by soldiers unwilling to be captured by the Indians after seeing the terrible fate of those who fell into Indian hands while still alive. [53]

7th Cavalry reconstituted in July 1876

Beginning in July, the 7th Cavalry was assigned new officers[54] and recruiting efforts begun to fill the depleted ranks. The regiment, reorganized into eight companies, remained in the field as part of the Terry Expedition, now based on the Yellowstone River at the mouth of the Big Horn and reinforced by Gibbon's column. On August 8, 1876, after Terry was further reinforced with the 5th Infantry, the expedition moved up Rosebud Creek in pursuit of the Lakota. It met with Crook's command, similarly reinforced, and the combined force, almost 4,000 strong, followed the Lakota trail northeast toward the Little Missouri River. Persistent rain and lack of supplies forced the column to dissolve and return to its varying starting points. The 7th Cavalry returned to Fort Lincoln to reconstitute.

The Army expanded to end remaining Indians resistance

The Army as a whole was expanded by 2,500 men to meet the emergency resulting from the disaster befalling the 7th Cavalry. The Democratic Party-controlled House of Representatives actually abandoned for a session its campaign to drastically curtail the size of the Army. Word of Custer's fate reached the 44th United States Congress as a conference committee was attempting to reconcile opposing appropriations bills approved by the House and the Republican Senate. A measure originally sponsored by the Texas delegation to increase the size of cavalry companies to 100 enlisted men was approved on July 24, and the ceiling on the size of the Army temporarily lifted by 2,500 on August 15.[55]

Battle controversies

The Battle Of The Little Bighorn was the subject of an 1879 U.S. Army Court of Inquiry, made at Reno's request, in Chicago, during which his conduct was scrutinized.[56] Some testimony was presented suggesting that he was drunk and a coward, but since none of this came from army officers, Reno's conduct was found to be without fault. The charge of cowardice has been leveled at Reno throughout the years due to his hastily ordered retreat. Reno defenders point out that while the retreat was disorganized, Reno did not withdraw from his position until it was clear that he was outnumbered and outflanked.

Benteen has been criticized for "dawdling" on the first day of the fight, and supposedly disobeying Custer's written orders to bring "pacs" (ammunition). However, Benteen has also been acknowledged by many historians for supporting and defending Reno's men on Reno Hill.

Critics point out that Custer made strategic errors from the start of the campaign, refusing the use of a battery of Gatling guns and General Terry's offer of an additional battalion of the 2nd Cavalry led by Capt. James S. Brisbin. Custer's reasoning was that the Gatling guns would impede his march up the Rosebud and hamper his mobility. Considering his rapid march en route to the Little Big Horn, averaging almost 30 miles (48 km) a day, this was an accurate assessment. Each gun was hauled by four horses and it often became necessary for soldiers to drag the guns by hand over obstacles. These problems do not change the fact that the Gatling guns would have been a decided equalizer in the face of Indian superiority, and that elsewhere in the Indian wars, the Indians often reacted to new army weapons by breaking off the fight.

Custer can also be accused of arrogance, believing that the 7th Cavalry could handle any Indian force encountered, and that the addition of the four companies of the 2nd would not alter the outcome. When the offer of the men of the 2nd Cavalry was made, he reportedly replied to Brisbin that the 7th "could handle anything."[57] There is evidence that Custer suspected that he would be outnumbered by the Indians, although he did not know by how much. When his Crow scouts, viewing the five-mile-long encampment for the first time, asked permission to withdraw, Custer should have had some idea as to what he was facing. Yet he divided his forces anyway, creating a situation in which the entire column could have been defeated in detail, had it not been for Benteen and Reno linking up to make a desperate yet successful stand on the bluff above the southern end of the camp.

The division of his force into four smaller detachments (including the pack train) can be attributed to inadequate reconnaissance on his part, and the deliberate ignoring of the warnings given by his Crow scouts. It was also a clear tactical error by the military doctrine of his time. In some respects, events overtook Custer, so that by the time the had battle begun, he had already divided his forces into three battalions of differing sizes. In doing so he kept the largest with himself. Consequently, his men were widely scattered and unable to support each other.[58][59]

It has been argued that one of Custer's greatest concern before the battle was that the combined tribes would escape to the south and scatter into different groups. Thus he considered an immediate attack on the south end of the camp to be the best course of action. Criticism of Custer was not universal, however. Lieutenant General Nelson A. Miles wrote in 1877 while investigating the battlefield, "The more I study the moves here [on the Little Big Horn], the more I have admiration for Custer."[60] Yet the regular army's stance has historically been to find ways to exculpate Custer, and to blame the Indians' alleged possession of large numbers of repeating rifles and numerical superiority for the defeat.

For years, a debate raged as to whether Custer had disobeyed Terry's orders by attacking the village before his reinforcements arrived. Almost 100 years after the battle, a document surfaced indicating Terry had actually given Custer considerable freedom to attack the Indians if he deemed the action necessary.

Death of Custer - A dramatic portrayal of Sitting Bull stabbing Custer, with dead Native Americans lying on ground, in scene by Pawnee Bill's Wild West Show performers. c.1905

Custer's widow Elizabeth Bacon Custer actively affected the history of the battle by suppressing criticism of her husband. A number of participants decided to wait for her death before disclosing what they knew; however, she outlived almost all of them. As a result, the event was recreated along tragic Victorian lines in numerous books, films and other media. Custer's legend was soon embedded in the American imagination as a heroic officer fighting valiantly against savage forces, an image popularized in Wild West extravaganzas hosted by showman "Buffalo Bill" Cody, Pawnee Bill, and others.

In November 2006, an ethnologist theory by Thomas Bailey Marquis in his 1933 book The Cheyennes of Montana was revived. Marquis stated that the Indians present at Little Bighorn (and on the Plains in general) considered the Sioux War of 1876 to be a misnomer, that in actuality the Lakota participated not as the main antagonist of the U.S. government but only as allies of the Cheyenne, whom they considered the actual objective of the military campaign. Had the Lakota, who did not have the tribal unity and central authority epitomized by the Cheyenne, not taken this view, the theory concludes that the close alliance between the peoples would not have occurred and the outcomes of the campaign could have been greatly different.[61]

By the end of the 20th century, the general recognition of the mistreatment of the various Indian tribes in the settling of the American West, and the perception of U.S. Cavalry's role in it, have altered the image of the battle (and by extension, of Custer) to that of a confrontation between relentless U.S. westward expansion and Native Americans defending their traditional lands and way of life.

Battlefield preservation

Main article: Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument
The battlefield today.
Indian Memorial
Marker stone on the battlefield.

The site was first preserved as a national cemetery in 1879, to protect graves of the 7th Cavalry troopers buried there. It was redesignated Custer Battlefield National Monument in 1946, and later renamed Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument in 1991. Memorialization on the battlefield began in 1879 with a temporary monument to U.S. dead. This was replaced with the current marble obelisk in 1881. In 1890 the marble blocks that dot the field were added to mark the place where the U.S. cavalry soldiers fell. The bill that changed the name of the national monument also called for an Indian Memorial to be built near Last Stand Hill. On Memorial Day 1999, two red granite markers were added to the battlefield where Native American warriors fell. As of December 2006, there are now a total of ten warrior markers (three at the Reno-Benteen Defense Site, seven on the Custer Battlefield).[62]

7th Cavalry officers at the Little Bighorn

Photo taken in 1894 by H.R. Locke on Battle Ridge looking toward Last Stand Hill top center. Wooden Leg Hill can be seen at the far top right.

Civilians killed

Notable scouts/interpreters in the battle

Indian Leaders in the battle

Battle of the Little Big Horn in popular culture

See also Cultural depictions of George Armstrong Custer.

Eye Witness Accounts

From the Indian Village

Hunkpapa

Siasapa (Blackfoot Lakota)

Oohenonpa (Two Kettle Lakota)

Oglala

Sicangru (Brule Lakota)

Minneconjou

Sans Arc

Lakota, tribe unknown

Yankton/Yanktonai

Northern Cheyenne

Southern Cheyenne

7th Cavalry

Headquarters

Indian Scouts

Company A

Company B

Quartermaster Employees

Burial Party

References

Notes

  1. ↑ See Panzeri.
  2. ↑ Gray, John (1991). "Custer's Last Campaign". University of Nebraska Press. pp. 243. ISBN 0-8032-7040-2. 
  3. ↑ http://www.xfreerepublic.com/focus/f-vetscor/1643759/posts
  4. ↑ Battle of the Little Bighorn Timeline, http://www.seedwiki.com/wiki/lbha/timeline?wikiPageId=576395 based on time tables developed Gray, John S. Custer's Last Campaign,
  5. ↑ http://www.custermuseum.org/Garryowen2.htm
  6. ↑ http://www.astonisher.com/archives/museum/little_sioux_big_horn.html
  7. ↑ http://www.astonisher.com/archives/museum/little_sioux_big_horn.html
  8. ↑ Goodrich, Thomas. Scalp Dance: Indian Warfare on the High Plains, 1865-1879. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1997. p. 242
  9. ↑ Perrett, Bryan. Last Stand: Famous Battles Against the Odds. London: Arms & Armour, 1993; p.8
  10. ↑ Michno, "Lakota Noon", Mountain Press Publishing, pg 240.
  11. ↑ http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/wfbentee.htm
  12. ↑ White Cow Bull's Story of the Battle of the Little Bighorn #1
  13. ↑ Michno, 1997, pp. 117-119
  14. ↑ Wert, 1996, p355
  15. ↑ Michno, 1997, pgs 10-20
  16. ↑ cf. Michno, 1997, p. 168.
  17. ↑ cf. Michno, 1997,
  18. ↑ cf. Michno, 1997. pp. 205–206: testimony of White Bull; p. 215: testimony of Yellow Nose.
  19. ↑ http://www.kancoll.org/books/roenigk/chpt33.htm
  20. ↑ Scudder, Ralph E., Custer Country. Portland, Oregon, Binfords and Mort. 1963, pg 38.
  21. ↑ Miller, David Humphries, "Custer's Fall", Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1985, pg 158
  22. ↑ Graham, Benteen letter to Capt. R.E. Thompson, pg 211
  23. ↑ Graham, Gall's Narrative, p. 88
  24. ↑ Miller, David Humphreys, Custer's Fall, the Indian Side of the Story. Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1985, (reprint of 1957 edition) pg 158
  25. ↑ Graham, pp. 45-56.
  26. ↑ Michno, Lakota Noon, 1997
  27. ↑ cf Michno's account of the numbers, pp. 10-20. He gives a low estimate of about 1000 warriors. Other scholars have given much higher numbers, upwards of 3000. A moderate number, 1800-2000, has been advocated by Fox and Utley.
  28. ↑ Michno, 1997, pp. 212, 226
  29. ↑ Slaper, William. "William Slaper's Story of the Battle. A 7th Cavalry survivor's account of the Battle of the Little Bighorn". Conversations with Crazy Horse. Retrieved on 2008-08-19.
  30. ↑ Michno, 1997, p. 221: testimony of Iron Hawk; also, Grinnell, 1915, pp. 300-301.
  31. ↑ "Gall's Account of the Battle of the Little Big Horn", [1]
  32. ↑ Testimony of American Horse, in Grinnell, p. 302, fn. 4.
  33. ↑ Michno, 1997, pp. 85, 98.
  34. ↑ Vestal, Stanley. Warpath: The True Story of the Fighting Sioux Told in a Biography of Chief White Bull. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1934; also, Michno, 1997, p. 216-217: testimony of Red Hawk; p. 221: testimony of Iron Hawk.
  35. ↑ cf. Goodrich, p. 246. For illustrations of the war clubs, see Mails, Thomas E. Mystic Warriors of the Plains. New York: Marlowe & Co., 1996. pp. 464-71.
  36. ↑ Michno, 1997, p. 215: testimony of Yellow Nose.
  37. ↑ Archaeological Perspectives on the Battle of the Little Bighorn, Scott/Fox/Connor/Harmon, University of Oklahoma Press, 1989 p.82
  38. ↑ Archaeological Perspectives on the Battle of the Little Bighorn, Scott/Fox/Connor/Harmon, University of Oklahoma Press, 1989 p.39-48
  39. ↑ Michno, 1997, pp. 284-285
  40. ↑ Michno, 1997, pp. 282
  41. ↑ Graham, Col. W. A. The Custer Myth. NY, Bonanza Books, 1953, pg 60.
  42. ↑ Reno Court of Inquiry
  43. ↑ "Where Custer Fell",page 57, University of Oklahoma Press, 2007
  44. ↑ "Reno-Benteen Entrenchment Trail, page 6, Western Parks Association, 2004
  45. ↑ Michno, "Lakota Noon", Mountain Press Publishing.
  46. ↑ Brininstool, 60-62.
  47. ↑ Fox, pp. 10-13.
  48. ↑ Godfrey incorporated this into his important publication in 1892 in The Century Magazine
  49. ↑ see above
  50. ↑ Graham, 146. Lt. Edward Godfrey reported finding a dead 7th Cavalry horse (shot in the head), a grain sack, and a carbine at the mouth of the Rosebud River. He conjectured that a soldier had escaped Custer's fight and rafted across the river, abandoning his played out horse.
  51. ↑ Badly wounded, the horse had been overlooked or left behind by the Native Americans, who had taken the other surviving horses. Comanche was taken back to the steamer Far West and returned to Fort Abraham Lincoln to be nursed back to health.
  52. ↑ U.S. Army Medal of Honor website.
  53. ↑ http://www.astonisher.com/archives/museum/he_dog2_little_big_horn.html
  54. ↑ "Records of Living Officers of the United States Army (1884)". eBay.com. Retrieved on 17 January, 2008. Major Elmer I. Otis of the 1st Cavalry was promoted to replace Custer effective 25 June 1876, but did not report until February 1877. Two 1876 West Point graduates designated for the 7th Cavalry were advanced to 1st lieutenant effective 10 days after their graduation. Four others appointed to other regiments, along with eight experienced 2nd lieutenants, were transferred and designated one to each company of the 7th. However five declined the appointment, replaced by 2nd lieutenants of infantry and unappointed new officers in July and August 1876. Only three replacements were able to report while the 7th was still in the field.
  55. ↑ Utley, Robert M. (1973) Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian 1866-1890, pp. 64 and 69 note 11.
  56. ↑ http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=goto&id=History.Reno&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=1 A Complete scanned transcript of the Reno Court of Inquiry (RCOI)
  57. ↑ Connell, Evan S. (1997). Son of the Morning Star. New York: HarperPerennial, p. 257.
  58. ↑ Goodrich, Thomas (1984). Scalp Dance: Indian Warfare on the High Plains, 1865-1879. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, p. 233.
  59. ↑ Wert, Jeffry D. (1964/1996) Custer: The controversial life of George Armstrong Custer. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 327.
  60. ↑ Sklenar, page 341.
  61. ↑ Liberty, Dr. Margot. "Cheyenne Primacy: The Tribes' Perspective As Opposed To That Of The United States Army; A Possible Alternative To "The Great Sioux War Of 1876". Friends of the Little Bighorn. Retrieved on 13 January, 2008.
  62. ↑ National Park Service website for the Little Bighorn Battlefield
  63. ↑ Sturgis was the son of the 7th Cavalry's Colonel. "Samuel Davis Sturgis". Arlington National cemetery. Retrieved on 14 January, 2008.
  64. ↑ John Jordan Crittenden (1854 - 1876) - Find A Grave Memorial
  65. ↑ Above table based upon Nichols, Men With Custer...

Further reading

External links