Battle of Tsushima | |||||||
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Part of the Russo-Japanese War | |||||||
![]() Admiral Togo on the bridge of Mikasa, at the beginning of the Battle of Tsushima in 1905. The signal flag being hoisted is the letter "Z", which was a special instruction to the Fleet. |
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Belligerents | |||||||
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![]() Imperial Russian Navy
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Commanders | |||||||
Heihachiro Togo | Zinovy Rozhestvensky # Nikolai Nebogatov # |
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Strength | |||||||
4 battleships 27 cruisers several destroyers and auxiliary vessels |
8 battleships 3 coastal battleships 8 cruisers 9 destroyers |
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Casualties and losses | |||||||
117 dead 583 injured 3 torpedo boats sunk |
4,380 dead 5,917 captured 21 ships sunk (7 battleships) 7 captured 6 disarmed |
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The Battle of Tsushima (Japanese: 対馬海戦, tsushima-kaisen, Russian: Цусимское сражение, Tsusimskoye srazheniye), commonly known as the “Sea of Japan Naval Battle” (Japanese: 日本海海戦, nihonkai-kaisen) in Japan and the “Battle of Tsushima Strait” elsewhere, was the last and most decisive sea battle of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. It was fought on May 27–28, 1905 (May 14–15 in the Julian calendar then in use in Russia) in the Tsushima Strait. In this battle the Japanese fleet under Admiral Heihachiro Togo destroyed two-thirds of the Russian fleet under Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky. Historian Edmund Morris calls it the greatest naval battle since Trafalgar.[1] It was the largest naval engagement of the pre-dreadnought battleship era.
The Battle of Tsushima was the only sea battle in history in which steel battleships fought a decisive fleet action. In addition, much to the Russian Navy's credit, Admiral Rozhestvensky's battleship fleet conducted a voyage of over 18,000 nautical miles (33,000 km) to reach the Far East.
Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, countries constructed their battleships with mixed batteries of mainly 150 mm (6-inch), 203 mm (8-inch), 254 mm (10-inch) and 305 mm (12-inch) guns, with the intent that these battleships fight on the battle line in a close-quarter, decisive fleet action. The battle demonstrated that big guns with longer ranges were more advantageous during naval battles than mixed batteries of different sizes.
Contents |
On February 8, 1904 destroyers of the Imperial Japanese Navy launched a surprise attack on the Russian Far East Fleet anchored in Port Arthur; 3 ships—2 battleships and a cruiser—were damaged in the attack. The Russo-Japanese war had begun. Japan's first objective was to secure its sea lines of communication and supply to the Asian mainland thereby enabling it to conduct a ground war in Manchuria. To achieve this, it needed to neutralise Russian naval power in the East. At first, the Russian naval forces lay dormant and did not engage the Japanese, resulting in unopposed Japanese troop landings in Korea, but the Russians were revitalised by the arrival of Admiral Stepan Makarov and they were able to achieve some degree of success against the Japanese. However, Admiral Makarov's flagship battleship Petropavlovsk struck a mine, which resulted in the death of the admiral, and Makarov's successors failed to challenge the Japanese Navy; as a consequence, the Russians were effectively bottled up in Port Arthur. By May, the Japanese had landed forces on the Liaodong Peninsula and in August began the siege of the naval station. In August, the Russian leadership finally decided to sortie the First Pacific Squadron and link up with the Vladivostok Squadron and then challenge the Japanese. However, both squadrons of the Russian Pacific Fleet were dispersed at the battles of the Yellow Sea and Ulsan on 10 August and 14 August 1904 respectively. What remained of Russian naval power would eventually be sunk in Port Arthur.
With the inactivity of the First Pacific Squadron after the death of Makarov and the Japanese tightening the noose around Port Arthur, the Russians were considering sending part of their Baltic Fleet to the Far East. The Russian plan was to relieve Port Arthur by sea, link up with the First Pacific Squadron, overwhelm the Imperial Japanese Navy and then delay the Japanese advance into Manchuria until Russian reinforcements arrived via the Trans-Siberian railroad, thereby overwhelming Japanese land forces in Manchuria. With the situation in the Far East deteriorating, the Tsar (encouraged by his cousin Kaiser Wilhelm II), finally agreed to the formation of the Second Pacific Squadron which would consist of five divisions of the Baltic Fleet, including 11 of its 13 battleships. The squadron departed on 15 October, 1904 under the command of Zinovy Rozhestvensky.
The Second Pacific Squadron sailed through the North Sea. With rumours of Japanese torpedo boats in the North Sea, several Russian ships fired upon British fishing trawlers off Dogger Bank, this caused a diplomatic incident leading to the Royal Navy shadowing the Russian fleet until an agreement was reached. Barred from using the Suez Canal by the British, the Russians proceeded around Africa and by April/May 1905 had anchored in Indochina. The voyage was long and arduous, and the morale of the crew began to plummet. The Russians had been ordered to break the blockade of Port Arthur, but the town had already fallen on 2 January, 1905 so the Russian port of Vladivostok would have to be the objective.
The Russians could have sailed through one of three possible straits to reach Vladivostok: La Perouse, Tsugaru, and Tsushima. Admiral Rozhestvensky chose Tsushima in an effort to simplify his route. Admiral Togo, based at Pusan, Korea also believed Tsushima would be the preferred Russian course. The Tsushima Strait is the body of water eastwards of the Tsushima Island group located midway between the Japanese island of Kyushu and the Korean Peninsula, the shortest and most direct route from Indochina. The other two routes would have required the fleet to sail to the east of Japan. The Japanese Combined Fleet and the Russian Second and Third Pacific Squadrons, sent over from Europe, fought in the straits between Korea and Japan near the Tsushima Islands.
The Japanese fleets had practised gunnery continually since the beginning of the war, using sub-calibre adapters for their cannon. The Japanese had superior gunners, and hit their targets more often. Furthermore, the Japanese used mostly high explosive shells with shimose (melinite), which was designed to explode on contact and wreck the upper works of ships. The Russians used armour-piercing rounds with small guncotton bursting charge and unreliable fuses. Japanese hits caused more damage to Russian ships in proportion to Russian hits on Japanese ships, setting the superstructures, the paintwork and the large quantities of coal stored on the decks on fire. (The Russian fleet had had to obtain coal from merchant vessels on most of their long voyage due to the lack of friendly fuelling ports on the journey). Japanese fire was also more accurate because they had more, and more modern, rangefinders on their ships than those on most of the Russian vessels.
The Russian fleet was in poor shape for a naval battle. Apart from the four newest Borodino class battleships, the ships were older designs and poorly-maintained. The long voyage and the lack of opportunity for maintenance meant their bottoms were heavily fouled, significantly reducing their speed. The Japanese ships could reach 16 knots (30 km/h), but the Russian fleet could reach only 9 knots (17 km/h). Togo was able to use the superior manoeuvrability of his fleet to advantage, "crossing the T" twice. Finally, there were significant deficiencies in the Russian naval fleet's equipment and training. Russian naval tests with their torpedoes exposed major technological failings.[2]
Lord Nelson had used this plan earlier in history and his strategies were re-used. The crossing the T method was used where ships in a single file line would battle ships in at 90 degrees to them.
Battleships, cruisers, and other vessels were arranged into divisions, each division being commanded by a Flag officer (i.e. Admiral). At the battle of Tsushima, Admiral Togo was the officer commanding in Mikasa (the other divisions being commanded by Vice Admirals, Rear Admirals, Commodores and Captains and Commanders for the destroyer divisions). Next in line after Mikasa came the battleships Shikishima, Fuji and Asahi. Following them were two armoured cruisers.
When Admiral Togo decided to execute a turn to port "in sequence, he did so in order to preserve the sequence of his battleline, i.e. with the flagship Mikasa still in the lead (obviously Togo wanted his more powerful units to enter action first). Turning in sequence meant that each ship would turn one after the other whilst still following the ship in front, effectively each ship would turn over the same piece of sea (this being the danger in the manoeuvre as it gives the enemy fleet the opportunity to target that area). Togo could have ordered his ships to turn "together" i.e. each ship would have made the turn at the same time and reversed course, this manoeuvre, the same which was effected by the French-Spanish fleet in Trafalgar, would be quicker but would have disrupted the sequence of the battleline and caused confusion by altering the battle plans, placing the cruisers in the lead, and this was something Togo wanted to avoid.
Because the Russians desired to slip undetected into Vladivostok, as they approached Japanese waters they steered outside regular shipping channels to reduce the chance of detection. On the night of 26/27 May, the Russian fleet approached Tsushima Strait.
It was a dark, misty night, a thick fog blanketed the straits, giving the Russians an advantage. At 2:45am, however, the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru observed three lights on what appeared to be a vessel in the distant horizon and closed in to investigate. These were navigation lights onboard the hospital ship Orel. At 4:30am, Shinano Maru approached the vessel, noting that the vessel contained no guns and appeared to be an auxiliary. The Orel mistook the Shinano Maru for another Russian vessel and did not attempt to notify the fleet — instead, she signaled to inform the Japanese ship that there were other Russian vessels nearby. The Shinano Maru then sighted the shapes of ten other vessels in the mist. The Russian fleet had been discovered, and any chance of reaching Vladivostok undetected had disappeared.
At 4:55am, Captain Narukawa of the Shinano Maru radioed to Admiral Togo in Masampo that "Enemy is in square 203". By 5am, intercepted radio signals informed the Russians that they had been discovered and that Japanese scouting cruisers were shadowing them. Admiral Togo received the message at 5:05am, and immediately he began to prepare his battle fleet for a sortie.
At 6.34am, before departing with the Combined Fleet, Admiral Togo wired a confident message to the navy minister in Tokyo:
“ | I have just received news that that the enemy fleet has been sighted. Our fleet will proceed forthwith to sea to attack the enemy and destroy him.[3] | ” |
At the same time the entire Japanese fleet was put to sea, with Admiral Togo from his flagship Mikasa leading over forty vessels to meet the Russians. Meanwhile, the shadowing Japanese scouting vessels sent in reports every few minutes as to the formation and course of the Russian fleet. There was still mist which reduced visibility and the weather was poor. At around 1:40pm, both fleets sighted each other and prepared to engage each other. Also at 1:55pm, Admiral Togo ordered the hoisting of the Z flag:
“ | The Empire's fate depends on the result of this battle, let every man do his utmost duty.[4] | ” |
At 2:45 p.m., Togo crossed the Russian 'T' enabling him to fire broadsides, while the Russians could only reply with their forward turrets."[5] [6]
The Russians sailed from south-southwest to north-northeast; the Japanese fleet from west to northeast. Admiral Togo ordered the fleet to turn in sequence, which enabled his ships to take the same course as the Russians, though risking each battleship in turn. This U-turn was successful. At 14:08, the Japanese flagship Mikasa was hit at about 7,000 metres, with the Japanese replying at 6,400 metres. Superior Japanese gunnery then took its toll[7] with most of the Russian battleships being crippled. As naval engagements traditionally began at a considerably closer range, Togo immediately gained the advantage of surprise.
A Russian officer, Commander Vladimir Semenoff, aboard Rozhestvensky 's flagship the Suvorov describes what it was like to be under Japanese fire:
“ | It seemed impossible even to count the number of projectiles striking us. Shells seemed to be pouring upon us incessantly one after another. The steel plates and superstructure on the upper decks were torn to pieces, and the splinters caused many casualties. Iron ladders were crumpled up into rings, and guns were literally hurled from their mountings. In addition to this, there was the unusually high temperature and liquid flame of the explosion, which seemed to spread over everything. I actually watched a steel plate catch fire from a burst[6] | ” |
A direct hit on the Borodino's magazines by the Japanese battleship Fuji caused her to explode which sent smoke thousands of feet into the air and trapped all of her crew onboard as the Borodino slid into the sea.[6] The Japanese ships suffered only light damage. Admiral Rozhestvensky was knocked out of action by a shell fragment in his skull. In the evening, Rear Admiral Nebogatov took over command of the Russian fleet. The Russians lost the battleships Knyaz Suvorov, Oslyabya, Imperator Aleksander III and Borodino on May 27.
At night, around 8pm, 37 Japanese torpedo boats and 21 destroyers were thrown against the Russians. The destroyers attacked from the vanguard while the torpedo boats from the east and south of the Russian fleet. The Japanese were aggressive, continuing their attacks for three hours without intermission, and as a result during the night there were a number of collisions between the small craft and Russian warships. The Russians were now dispersed in small groups trying to break northwards. By 11pm, it appeared that the Russians had vanished, but they revealed their positions to their pursuers by turning on their searchlights — ironically, the searchlights had been turned on to spot the attackers. The old battleship Navarin struck a mine and was compelled to stop, and consequently it was torpedoed four times and sunk. Of a crew of 622, only three survived to be rescued by the Japanese.
The battleship Sisoy Veliki was heavily damaged by a torpedo in the stern, and it was scuttled the next day. Two old armoured cruisers — Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh — were heavily damaged: the former by a torpedo hit to the bow, and the latter by colliding with a Japanese destroyer. They were both scuttled by their crews the next morning, the Admiral Nakhimoff off Tsushima Island where she headed while taking on water. The night attacks had put great strain on the Russians, as they had lost two battleships and two armoured cruisers, while the Japanese only lost three torpedo boats.
During the night action, Admiral Togo was able to rest his main fleet of armoured ships. At 9:30am, what remained of the Russian fleet was sighted heading northwards. Admiral Togo's battleships proceeded to surround Nebogatov's remaining squadron south of the island of Takeshima.[6] At 10:34 am, realising that his situation was hopeless, Admiral Nebogatov ordered the six ships remaining under his command to surrender. XGE, an international signal of surrender, was hoisted up; it was only at 10:53 that the Japanese agreed to the surrender. Realizing that the battle had become futile, Nebogatov was unwilling to sacrifice the young lives of his sailors to save his own honour.[6] The old Russian admiral decided instead to accept the shame of surrender even in the knowledge that he might be shot when he returned to Russia.[6] He said to his men
“ | "You are young, and it is you who will one day retrieve the honour and glory of the Russian Navy. The lives of the two thousand four hundred men in these ships are more important than mine."[6] | ” |
As for Rozhestvensky, he was imprisoned in a Japanese hospital. The victorious Admiral Togo would later visit him here where Togo comforted the wounded Rozhestvensky with these sage words.
“ | "Defeat is a common fate of a soldier. There is nothing to be ashamed of in it. The great point is whether we have performed our duty."[8] | ” |
In the event, neither Nebogatov nor Rozhestvensky were shot when they returned to Russia. However, both men were placed on trial and imprisoned for a few short years before they were eventually pardoned by the Tsar. Their reputations, however, lay in tatters.
Until the evening of May 28, single Russian ships were pursued by the Japanese until they were destroyed or captured. Three Russian ships reached Vladivostok; the cruiser Izumrud, which escaped from the Japanese despite Nebogatov's surrender, was scuttled by the Russians themselves after running aground near the Siberian coast. Some ships returned to Russia or were interned.
The Russians suffered 4,380 killed and 5,917 captured, including 2 admirals and 1,862 interned.[8]
Battleships
The Knyaz Suvorov, Imperator Aleksander III, Borodino and the Oslyabya were lost during the daylight battle on 27 May. The Navarin was lost during the night action, on 27-28 May, while the Sissoi Veliky, Admiral Nakhimov and Admiral Ushakov were either scuttled or sunk the next day. Four other battleships under Rear Admiral Nebogatov were forced to surrender and would end up as prizes of war. This group consisted of only one modern battleship, Orel, along with the old battleship Imperator Nikolai I and the two small coastal battleships General-Admiral Graf Apraxin and Admiral Senyavin. The small coastal battleship Admiral Ushakov refused to surrender and was sunk by Japanese armoured cruisers.
Cruisers
The Vladimir Monomakh and Svyetlana were sunk the next day, after the daylight battle. The cruiser Dmitri Donskoy fought against six Japanese cruisers and survived; however due to heavy damage she was scuttled. The Izumrud ran aground near the Siberian coast. Three Russian protected cruisers, Aurora, Zhemchug, and Oleg escaped to the US naval base at Manila and were interned. The armed yacht classified as a cruiser, Almaz was able to reach Vladivostok.
Destroyers and Auxiliaries
Five destroyers the Buiny, Buistry, Bezupreshchny, Gromky and Bleshyashchy were sunk on 28 May, the Byedovy also surrendered that day. Bodry was interned in Shanghai. Two destroyers the Grosny and Bravy reached Vladivostok.
Of the auxiliaries, the Kamchatka, Ural and Rus were sunk on 27 May, Irtuish ran aground on 28 May, Koreya and Svir were interned in Shanghai and the Anadyr escaped to Madagascar. The hospital ships Orel and Kostromo were captured with the Kostromo released afterwards.
The Japanese lost only three torpedo boats (Nos. 34, 35 and 69), 117 killed and 500 wounded.[8]
Russia's prestige in the eyes of the world was badly damaged and it was a severe blow to the Romanov dynasty. Nearly the entire Russian fleet was lost in the battle in the Tsushima Straits; the fast armed yacht Almaz (classified as a cruiser of the 2nd rank) and two destroyers (Grozny and Bravy) were the only Russian ships to make it through to Vladivostok. One could argue that the political humiliation of the loss of this war was a direct contribution to the 1905 Revolution in Russia. In The Guns of August historian Barbara Tuchman argues that Russia's loss destabilized the balance of power in Europe, emboldening the Central Powers and contributing to their decision to go to war in 1914.
The battle had a profound cultural and political impact upon Japan. It was the first defeat of a Western power by an Asian country, utilizing full breadth of industrial technology, in modern times. The victory established Japan as the sixth powerful naval power[9] while the Russian navy declined to one barely stronger that of Austria Hungary.[9]
The victory helped embolden Japan's increasingly aggressive political and military establishment. However, the lopsided Japanese victory at Tsushima also:
As Geoffrey Regan notes, Tsushima was decisive:
May 27, 1905 (JST)
May 28, 1905 (JST)