Battle of Thermopylae

Battle of Thermopylae
Part of the Greco-Persian Wars
The site of the battle today.
Date August 480 BC[1] Location Thermopylae, Greece Result Persian victory. Territorial changes Persians gain control of Boeotia and march for Athens.
Belligerents
Greek city-states	Achaemenid Empire
Commanders
Leonidas I †	Xerxes I of Persia, Mardonius, Artapanus†?, Hydarnes
Strength
Totala 5,200+ (Herodotus) 7,400 (Diodorus Siculus) 11,200 (Pausanias) Individual groups 300 Spartans 400 Thebans 700 Thespians 900 helots? 1,000 Phocians 2,800+ other Greek alliesb	Total ~2,080,000 (Herodotus)[2] 120,000 (Ctesias)[3] ~200,000 (Modern estimates - see below)
Casualties and losses
1,000+c to 4,000[4] ~400 capturedd	~20,000 (Herodotus)[5]
aNumbers from the ancient sources. Modern estimates are discussed below; bDismissed on the last day of battle, leaving the above troops to guard the rear;[6] cAt least 300 Spartans and 700 Thespians, plus all other casualties; d 400 Thebans (less casualties)

Greco-Persian Wars Ionian Revolt 1st Naxos – Sardis – Ephesus – Lade First Persian invasion 2nd Naxos – Eretria – Marathon Second Persian invasion Thermopylae – Artemisium – Salamis – Potidea – Olynthus – Plataea – Mycale The Greek reconquest Sestos – Byzantium – Eion – Eurymedon – Thassos – Pampremis – Memphis – Prosoptis – Citium – Salamis in Cyprus

The Battle of Thermopylae [thər móppəlee] (Greek: Θερμοπύλαι), detailed primarily by Herodotus, was fought in August 480 BC,^[1] between an alliance of Greek city-states and the invading Persian Empire of Xerxes I, at the pass of Thermopylae in central Greece. Vastly outnumbered, the Greeks held up the Persians advance for seven days in total (including three of battle), before the rear-guard was annihilated in one of history's most famous last stands. During two full days of battle, the small force led by King Leonidas I of Sparta blocked the only road through which the massive Persian army could pass. After the second day of battle, a local resident named Ephialtes betrayed the Greeks by revealing a mountain path that led behind the Greek lines. Aware that they were being outflanked, Leonidas dismissed the bulk of the Greek army, remaining to guard the rear with 300 Spartans, 700 Thespian, 400 Thebans and perhaps a few hundred others.

The Persians succeeded in taking the pass but sustained losses disproportionate to those of the Greeks. Nevertheless, in doing so, they conquered Boeotia and Attica, burning Athens in the process. However, the fierce resistance of the Spartan-led army had given the Allies valuable time to prepare the defense of the Peloponnesus, at the isthmus of Cornith, and later that year the Athenian-led navy was able to win a decisive naval battle that would do much to determine the outcome of the war.^[7] The Greek victory at the Battle of Salamis prevented a naval invasion of the Peloponnesus, and therefore prevented the completion of the Persian conquest. Demoralised, Xerxes retreated to Asia, leaving a force in Greece under Mardonius to complete the subjugation of the Greeks. The following year, however, a full-strength Allied army defeated the Persian force at the Battle of Plataea, ending the expansion of the Persian Empire into Europe.^[8]

Both ancient and modern writers have used the Battle of Thermopylae as an example of the superior power of a patriotic army of freemen defending native soil.^[9] The performance of the defenders at the battle of Thermopylae is also used as an example of the advantages of training, equipment, and good use of terrain as force multipliers,^[10] and has become a symbol of courage against overwhelming odds.^[10]

Contents 1 Sources 2 Background 3 Prelude 4 The opposing forces 4.1 Size and composition of the Persian army 4.1.1 Primary sources 4.1.2 Modern estimates 4.2 Size and composition of the Greek army 5 Strategic and tactical considerations 5.1 Topography of the battlefield 6 The Battle 6.1 First day 6.2 Second day 6.3 Third Day 7 Aftermath 8 Significance 9 Legacy 9.1 Monuments to the battle 9.1.1 Epitaph of Simonides 9.1.2 Leonidas monument 9.1.3 Thespian monument 9.2 Legends associated with the battle 9.3 Thermopylae in popular culture 10 References 11 Further reading 12 External links 13 See also

Sources

Main article: Herodotus

Nearly all of the sources for the account of the battle come ultimately from the Greek historian Herodotus, writing in his 'Histories'. Historically, Herodotus has often been derided, even by other ancient writers. However, recent archaeological finds have tended to confirm specific claims made by Herodotus, and have done much to restore his reputation.^[11] Nevertheless, it remains true that Herodotus often appears to have exaggerated, or simply to have recounted what he was 'told' without much critical appraisal. In the specific case of the Persian invasion of Europe in 480 BC, the huge troop numbers he mentions are usually summarily dismissed due to their improbable levels. Herodotus claimed that the land and naval forces of Xerxes at the passage of Hellespont totalled 2,317,000 in addition to 2,000,000 slaves and support personnel; this figure is not generally accepted.^[12] Elsewhere, Herodotus estimated that the total size of the Persian army in their empire was 5,283,220; this was dismissed as an "absurd exaggeration" by renowned archaeologist and ancient Greek historian John Boardman.^[13]

Background

Main articles: Greco-Persian Wars and Second Persian invasion of Greece

The Greek city-states of Athens and Eretria had supported the unsuccessful Ionian Revolt against the Persian Empire of Darius I in 499-494 BC. Darius swore revenge on these two city-states, and also saw the opportunity to expand his empire into the fractious world of Ancient Greece.^[14] A preliminary expedition under Mardonius, in 492 BC, to secure the land approaches to Greece ended with the re-conquest of Thrace and forced Macedon to become a client kingdom of Persia.^[15]

In 491 BC, Darius sent emissaries to all the Greek city-states, asking for a gift of 'earth and water' in token of their submission to him.^[16] Having had a demonstration of his power the previous year, the majority of Greek cities duly obliged. In Athens, however, the ambassadors were put on trial and then executed; in Sparta, they were simply thrown down a well.^[16] This meant that Sparta was also now effectively at war with Persia.^[16]

Darius thus put together an amphibious task force under Datis and Artaphernes in 490 BC, which attacked Naxos, before receiving the submission of the other Cycladic Islands. The task force then moved on Eretria, which it besieged and destroyed.^[17] Finally, it moved to attack Athens, landing at the bay of Marathon, where it was met by a heavily outnumbered Athenian army. At the ensuing Battle of Marathon, the Athenians won a remarkable victory, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Persian army to Asia.^[18]

Darius therefore began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition.^[14] Darius then died whilst preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I. Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt, and very quickly re-started the preparations for the invasion of Greece. Since this was to be a full scale invasion, it required long-term planning, stock-piling and conscription. Xerxes decided that the Hellespont would be bridged to allow his army to cross to Europe, and that a canal should be dug across the isthmus of Mount Athos (rounding which headland, a Persian fleet had been destroyed in 492 BC). These were both feats of exceptional ambition, which would have been beyond any contemporary state.^[19] By early 480 BC, the preparations were complete, and the army which Xerxes had mustered at Sardis marched towards Europe, crossing the Hellespont on two pontoon bridges.^[20] The Athenians had also been preparing for war with the Persians since the mid-480s BC, and in 482 BC the decision was taken, under the guidance of the Athenian politician Themistocles, to build a massive fleet of triremes that would be necessary for the Greeks to fight the Persians.^[14] However, the Athenians did not have the manpower to fight on land and sea; and therefore combatting the Persians would require an alliance of Greek city states. In 481 BC, Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking for earth and water, but making the very deliberate omission of Athens and Sparta.^[21] Support thus began to coalesce around these two leading states. A congress of city states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC,^[22] and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. It had the power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. This was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world, especially since many of the city-states in attendance were still technically at war with each other.^[14]

Initially the 'congress' agreed to defend the narrow Vale of Tempe, on the borders of Thessaly, and thereby block Xerxes's advance.^[23] However, once there, they were warned by Alexander I of Macedon that the vale could be bypassed through the Sarantoporo Pass, and that the army of Xerxes was overwhelming, the Greeks retreated.^[24] Shortly afterwards, they received the news that Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont.

A second strategy was therefore suggested by Themistocles to the allies. The route to southern Greece (Boeotia, Attica and the Peloponnesus) would require the army of Xerxes to travel through the very narrow pass of Thermopylae. This could easily be blocked by the Greek hoplites, despite the overwhelming numbers of Persians. Furthermore, to prevent the Persians bypassing Thermopylae by sea, the Athenian and allied navies could block the straits of Artemisium. This dual strategy was adopted by the congress.^[25] However, the Peloponnesian cities made fall-back plans to defend the Isthmus of Corinth should it come to it, whilst the women and children of Athens had been evacuated en masse to the Peloponnesian city of Troezen.^[26]

Prelude

Xerxes seems to have made rather leisurely progress through Thrace and Macedon, and June and July passed without the Persians approaching Greece. Finally, in August, news of the imminent arrival of the Persians reached Greece. Unfortunately for the Greeks, at this time of year the Spartans, generally considered to be the best warriors in Greece, were celebrating the festival of Carneia. During the Carneia, military activity was forbidden by Spartan law; the Spartans had arrived too late at the Battle of Marathon because of this requirement^[27] It was also the time of the Olympic Games, and therefore the Olympic truce, and would have been doubly sacrilegious for the whole Spartan army to march to war^[28] On this occasion, the ephors decided the urgency was sufficiently great to justify an advance expedition to block the pass, under one of its kings, Leonidas I. Leonidas took with him the 300 men of the royal bodyguard, the Hippeis, and probably a larger number of support troops drawn from other parts of Lacedaemon (including helots).^[28] These were to try and gather other allied troops along the way, and to await the arrival of the main Spartan army.

The legend of Thermopylae (as told by Herodotus) has it that Sparta consulted the Oracle at Delphi before setting out to meet the Persian army. The Oracle is said to have made the following prophecy in hexameter verse:^[29]

O ye men who dwell in the streets of broad Lacedaemon!
Either your glorious town shall be sacked by the children of Perseus,
Or, in exchange, must all through the whole Laconian country
Mourn for the loss of a king, descendant of great Heracles.

Herodotus tells us that Leonidas, in line with the prophecy, was convinced he was going to certain death since his forces were not adequate for a victory, and so he selected only Spartans with living sons.^[30] En route to Thermopylae, the Spartan force was reinforced by contigents from various cities (see below), and numbered more than 5,000 by the time it arrived at the pass. Leonidas chose to camp at, and defend the 'middle gate', the narrowest part of the pass of Thermopylae, where the Phocians had built a defensive wall some time before. News also reached Leonidas, from the nearby city of Trachis, that there was a mountain track which could be used to outflank the pass of Thermopylae; in response, Leonidas stationed 1,000 Phocians on the heights to prevent such a maneuver^[31]

Finally, in mid-August, the Persian army was sighted across the Gulf of Malia, approaching Thermopylae. With the Persian army's arrival at Thermopylae, the Greeks held a council of war. Some Peloponnesians suggested withdrawal to the Isthmus and blocking the passage to Peloponnesus. The Phocians and Locrians, whose states were located nearby, became indignant and advised defending Thermopylae and sending for more help. Leonidas calmed the panic, and agreed to defend Thermopylae.^[32] Since the whole strategy of the Greeks depended on holding both Thermopylae and Artemisium, it could scarcely have been otherwise.

A Persian embassy was sent by Xerxes to negotiate with Leonidas; the allies were offered their freedom and the title "Friends of the Persian People", moreover they would be re-settled on better land than they currently possessed.^[33] When these terms were refused by Leonidas, the ambassador asked him more forcefully to lay down his weapons; Leonidas's famous response was for the Persians to "Come and get them" (Μολὼν λἀβε).^[34] With the Persian embassy returning empty-handed, battle now became inevitable. However, Xerxes delayed attacking for four days, waiting for the Greeks to disperse, before sending troops to attack the Greeks.^[35]

The opposing forces

Size and composition of the Persian army

Primary sources

In 480 BC, the Persian army and navy arrived at the Persian garrison of Doriskos in Thrace. At Doriskos, Xerxes conducted a review and a count of his army and navy, which was recorded by the Persian scribes. Herodotus lists and describes the units and gives the size of Xerxes' combined forces as follows:

Units	Numbers
1,207 triremes with 200-man crews from 12 ethnic groups: Phoenicians of Palestine, Egyptians,[36] Cyprians,[37] Cilicians, Pamphylians, Lycians, Dorians of Asia, Carians, Ionians, Aegean islanders, Aeolians, Greeks from Pontus	241,400[38]
30 marines per triremea from the Persians, Medes or Sacae	36,210[38]
3,000 Galleys, including 50-oar penteconters (80-man crew), 30-oared ships, light galleys and heavy horse-transports[39]b	240,000[38]b
Total of ships' complements	517,610[38]
Infantry from 47 ethnic groupsc, including; Medes, Cissians, Hyrcanians,[40] Assyrians, Chaldeans,[41] Bactrians, Sacae,[42] Indians,[43] Arians, Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadicae,[44] Caspians, Sarangae, Pactyes,[45] Utians, Mycians, Paricanians,[46] Arabians, Ethiopians of Africa,[47] Ethiopians of Baluchistan,[48] Libyans,[49] Paphlagonians, Ligyes, Matieni, Mariandyni, Cappadocians,[50] Phrygians, Armenians,[51] Lydians, Mysians,[52] Asian Thracians,[53] Lasonii, Milyae,[54] Moschi, Tibareni, Macrones, Mossynoeci,[55] Mares, Colchians, Alarodians, Saspirians[56] and Red Sea islanders.[57]	1,700,000[58]
Horse cavalry from the Persians,[59] Sagartians,[60] Medes, Cissians, Indians, Caspians and Paricanians.[61]	80,000[62]
Arab camel troops and Libyan charioteers	20,000[38]
Total Asian land and sea forcesd	2,317,610[63]
120 triremes with 200-man crews from the Greeks of Thrace and the islands near it.	24,000[64]
Balkan infantry from 13 ethnic groups: European Thracians, Paeonians, Eordi, Bottiaei, Chalcidians, Brygians, Pierians, Macedonians, Perrhaebi, Enienes, Dolopes, Magnesians, Achaeans	300,000[64]
Grand Total, Asian, African, and European	2,641,610
Notes: a - the 30 marines may already be included in the figure of 200 given for the ships' crews; b - There is some contradiction in Herodotus's accounts. The figure of 240,000 is derived from 3,000 penteconters; c - The 47th ethnic group is missing from Herodotus's text; d - The term "Asian" is Herodotus' but under that term he also includes Arabians and north Africans.

This number is doubled in order to account for support personnel and thus Herodotus reports that the total Persian force numbered 5,283,220 men.^[2] The poet Simonides, who was a contemporary, talks of three million combatants.^[65] One century later, Ctesias of Cnidus gives 800,000 as the total number of the army that met in Doriskos, and 80,000 for Thermopylae; specifically, 10,000 Persian Immortals, 20,000 Median and Cissian cavalry, and ~50,000 other infantry.^[3]

Modern estimates

Modern scholars have given different estimates based on knowledge of the Persian military systems, their logistical capabilities, the Greek countryside, and supplies available along the army's route. An early and very influential modern, George Grote, set the tone by expressing incredulity at the numbers given by Herodotus:^[66] "To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is obviously impossible." Grote's main objection is the supply problem, but he nowhere states any measure of supply capability nor did he have available any scientific data on the topic. He does not reject Herodotus altogether, citing the latter's reporting of the Persians' careful methods of accounting and their stockpiling of supply caches for three years. He points to the contradictions in the ancient estimates and refrains from making one of his own or implying that such an estimate is possible.

A pivotal study of the early 20th century by Major-General Sir John Frederick Maurice focuses on the water supply.^[67] A former British transport officer, he had access to the British Admiralty handbook containing data on the rivers of Greece. Noting that Herodotus reports that water resources were strained ("Was there a river ... which sufficed for his troops to drink?"),^[68] he calculated the force which could be supported by the locally available water at approximately 200,000 men and 70,000 animals. He then further suggested that Herodotus may have confused the Persian terms for chiliarchy (1,000) and myriarchy (10,000), leading to an exaggeration by a factor of ten. He therefore modifies Herodotus' figure for land combatants only to about 210,000 men, 75,000 animals.^[69] This does not include support personnel.

Since Maurice the number of Persian troops has become a specialized topic. There are no standard estimates or ranges of estimates.^[70] A more detailed analysis by Hammond,^[71] working entirely from ancient sources, estimates the Persian fleet, based on its size at the Battle of Salamis, to have been 1,407 warships, 281,400 naval personnel, with another 3,000 vessels, 120,000 men, in support, for a total of about 400,000 men, to which must be added another 8,000 men operating 400 supply ships. The grand total of naval personnel is 408,000 men in about 4,800 ships. For the land force under Xerxes, based on what was said about the land force under Mardonius at the Battle of Plataea, Hammond estimates 220,000 men plus 22,000 in the supply services for a total of 242,000 men. Note that Hammond's postulate of supply ships minimizes the resources of the Greek countryside as a limiting factor.

It has been suggested that Herodotus or his sources had access to official Persian Empire records of the forces involved in the expedition.^[72] Whatever the real numbers were, it is clear that Xerxes was anxious to ensure a successful expedition by mustering an overwhelming numerical superiority by land and by sea.^[72]

Size and composition of the Greek army

According to Herodotus,^[73] and Diodorus Siculus,^[74] the Greek army included the following forces:

Group	Numbers - Herodotus	Numbers - Diodorus Siculus
Spartans	300	300
Lacedaemonians/ Perioeci[75]	[75]	700
Spartan helots[76][75]	"helots were also there for them to see" (for reconciliation of most accounts) 900?[75]	3,000 (other Peloponnesians sent with Leonidas)
Mantineans	500
Tegeans	500
Arcadian Orchomenos	120
Other Arcadians	1,000
Corinthians	400
Phlians	200
Mycenaeans	80
Total Peloponnesians	[3,100][77] or 4,000[78]	4,000
Thespians	700	-
Melians	-	1,000
Thebans	400	400
Phocians	1,000	1,000
Opuntian Locrians	"all the men they had" or (according to Pausanias) 6,000	1,000
Grand Total	[5,200], or 6,100 plus the Opuntian Locrians, and (by Pausanias number) 11,200	7,400

Herodotus and Diodorus describe the levied troops differently, but the only actual direct contradiction between their accounts is the inclusion of 700 Thespians by Herodotus, and 1,000 Melians (and no Thespians) by Diodorus. Diodorus suggests that there were 1,000 Lacedemonians and 3,000 other Pelopennesians, for a total of 4,000. Herodotus agrees with this figure in one passage, quoting an inscription by Simonides saying there were 4,000 Peloponnesians.^[78] However, elsewhere, in the passage summarized by the above table, Herodotus tallies 3,100 Peloponnesians at Thermopylae before the battle^[77] He also reports that at Xerxes' public showing of the dead, "helots were also there for them to see",^[76] but he does not say how many or in what capacity they served. Thus, the difference between his two figures can be squared by supposing (without proof) that there were 900 helots (three per Spartan) present at the battle.^[75] If helots were present at the battle, there is no reason to doubt that they served in their traditional role as armed retainers to individual Spartans. Alternatively, Herodotus's 'missing' 900 troops might have been Perioeci, and could therefore correspond to Diodorus's 1,000 Lacedemonians.^[75]

The fact that both authors agree (at least in some passages) that 4,000 Pelopennesians fought at Thermopylae suggests it is a likely number. However, the failure to specify exactly the number of Spartans, other Lacedemonians/Perioeci and helots leaves these numbers open to interpretation. For instance, do Diodorus's 1,000 Lacedemonians include the 300 Spartans? As the Spartans themselves generally meant "other Lacedaemonians" by the term, it is possible that they do not. Are Herodotus's missing 900 troops the same as Diodorus's 1,000 Lacedemonians, or are they helots? It is not possible to be clearer on these issues.

Pausanias' account agrees with that of Herodotus (whom he probably read) except that he gives the number of Locrians, which Herodotus declined to estimate. Residing in the direct path of the Persian advance, they gave all the fighting men they had; according to Pausanias 6,000 men, which added to Herodotus' 5,200 would have given a force of 11,200.^[79]

Many modern historians, who usually consider Herodotus more reliable,^[6] add the 1,000 Lacedaemonians and the 900 Helots to Herodotus' 5,200 to obtain 7,100 or about 7,000 men as a standard number,^[80][7] neglecting Diodorus' Melians and Pausanias' Locrians. Though unlikely, if all the hoplites who supposedly came had fought, the whole Greek army would have numbered about 15,000. However, this is only one approach, and many other combinations are plausible.

It is obviously not possible given the sources and known history of the battle to arrive at anything like precise numbers. It is unlikely even the Greeks knew the number of men that fought or were killed. Furthermore, the numbers changed later on in the battle when most of the army retreated and only approximately 3000 men remained (300 Spartans, 700 Thespians, 400 Thebans, probably 900 helots and 1,000 Phocians stationed above the pass; less the casualties sustained in the previous days).^[6]

Strategic and tactical considerations

From a strategic point of view, by defending Thermopylae, the Greeks were making the best possible use of their forces. As long as they could prevent the Persian advance into their lands, they had no requirement to seek a decisive battle, and could thus remain on the defensive. Moreover, by defending two constricted passages (Thermopylae and Artemisium), the Greeks inferior numbers became much less problematic. Conversely, for the Persians the problem of supplying such a large army meant that the Persians could not remain in the same place for too long.^[81] The Persians must therefore retreat or advance; and advancing required the pass of Thermopylae to be forced.

Tactically, the pass at Thermopylae was ideally suited to the Greek style of warfare. A hoplite phalanx would be able to block the narrow pass with ease, with no risk of being outflanked by cavalry. In the pass, the phalanx would have been very difficult to assault for the more lightly armed Persian infantry. The major weak point for the Greeks was the mountain track which led across the highland parallel to Thermopylae, and which would allow their position to be outflanked. Although probably unsuitable for cavalry, this path could easily be traversed by the Persian infantry (many of whom were versed in mountain warfare).^[82] Leonidas was made aware of this path by local people from Trachis, and positioned a detachment of Phocian troops there in order to block this route.

Topography of the battlefield

At the time, the pass of Thermopylae consisted of a track along the shore of the Gulf of Malis so narrow that only one chariot could pass through at a time.^[83] On the southern side of the track stood the cliffs, while on the north side was the gulf. Along the path was a series of three constrictions, or "gates" (pylai), and at the center gate a short wall that had been erected by the Phocians in the previous century to aid in their defense against Thessalian invasions.^[83] The name "Hot Gates" comes from the hot springs that were located there.

Today, the pass is not near the sea but is several miles inland due to infilling of the Gulf of Malis. The old track appears at the foot of hills around the plain, flanked by a modern road. Recent core samples indicate that the pass was only 100 meters wide and the waters came up to the gates; "Little do the visitors realize that the battle took place across the road from the monument."^[84] The pass still is a natural defensive position to modern armies, and British Commonwealth forces in World War II made another defense against the Nazi invasion meters from the original battle field.

• Maps of the region:[11][12]
• Image of the battlefield, from the east:[13]

The Battle

First day

Xerxes waited four days for the Greek force to disperse. On the fifth day he sent Medes and Cissians, along with relatives of those who had died ten years earlier in the Battle of Marathon, to take the Greeks prisoner and bring them before him.^[85][86] They soon found themselves launching a frontal assault on the Greek position.^[85] The Greeks had camped on either side of the rebuilt Phocian wall. The wall was guarded by the Greeks who fought in front of it.^[87] Details of the tactics are scant; Diodorus says "the men stood shoulder to shoulder" and the Greeks were "superior in valor and in the great size of their shields."^[88] This is probably describing the standard Greek phalanx, in which the men formed a wall of overlapping shields and layered spear points. This would have been highly effective as long as it spanned the width of the pass. The small shields and shorter spears of the Persians were not a match for the superior armament of the Greek hoplites.^[88][89] Herodotus says that the units for each city were kept together;^[90] units were rotated in and out of the battle to prevent tiredness, which implies the Greeks had more men than necessary to block the pass.^[14] The Greeks killed so many Medes that Xerxes is said to have started up off the seat from which he was watching the battle three times.^[91] According to Ctesias, the first wave was "cut to pieces" with only two or three Spartans dead.^[92]

According to Herodotus and Diodorus, the king, having taken the measure of the enemy, threw his best troops into a second assault the same day: the Immortals, an elite corps of 10,000 men.^[88][89] Ctesias tells a totally different story, that Xerxes sent another 20,000 troops against the Greeks, after the first 10,000 under Artapanus were defeated. They also failed to open the pass even though they were flogged by their leaders to press on.^[92] Although there may well have been 10,000 Medes in the first wave, the Immortals only numbered 10,000 and as elite troops it would not have been necessary to flog them.

Second day

On the second day Xerxes sent, according to Ctesias, another 50,000 men to assault the pass, but again they failed. Xerxes at last stopped the assault and withdrew to his camp, totally perplexed.^[92]

Late on the second day of battle, as the Persian king was pondering what to do next, he received a windfall: a Malian Greek traitor named Ephialtes informed him of the mountain path around Thermopylae and offered to guide the Persian army. Ephialtes was motivated by the desire of a reward.^[93] For this act, the name of Ephialtes received a lasting stigma, his name coming to mean "nightmare" and becoming the archetypal term for a "traitor" in Greek.^[94]

Herodotus reports that Xerxes sent his commander Hydarnes that evening, with the men under his command, to encircle the Greeks via the pass. However, he does not say who those men are.^[95] Hydarnes commanded the Immortals, but they had been bloodied the day before. Ctesias tells a different story, asserting that 40,000 troops were sent around the pass, conducted by the leaders of the Trachinians.^[92] The stories can be reconciled by presuming that Hydarnes was given overall command of an enhanced force including what was left of the Immortals, but it is only an assumption. The Immortals were given such a name because when a member fell in battle he was immediately replaced by another to maintain the 10,000, therefore it is also possible they had been replenished from the previous day's fighting. According to Diodorus, Hydarnes had a force of 20,000 for the mission, and not Herodotus' ±10,000 (modern scholars argue that when Herodotus asserts Hydarnes was sent with "the troops under his command," he ment with whatever was left or added to the Immortals from the previous day's of fighting) or Ctesias' 40,000, it is possible he was using both accounts to come up with an average number.^[96] The path led from east of the Persian camp along the ridge of Mt. Anopaea behind the cliffs that flanked the pass. It branched with one path leading to Phocis and the other down to the Gulf of Malis at Alpenus, first town of Locris. As discussed, having been made aware of the path, Leonidas had stationed 1,000 Phocian volunteers on the heights to guard that path.^[97]

Third Day

At daybreak on the third day, the Phocians became aware of the outflanking Persian column by the rustling of oak leaves. Herodotus says that they jumped up and were greatly amazed.^[98] Hydarnes was perhaps just as amazed to see them hastily arming themselves as they were to see him and the Persian forces. He feared that they were Spartans, but was enlightened by Ephialtes and proceeded by firing "showers of arrows" at them. The Phocians retreated to the crest of the mountain to make their stand and defend their city which was behind the mountain range, but the Persians took the left branch of the pass to Alpenus and hence circled behind the main Greek force.^[98]

Learning from a runner that the Phocians had not held the path, Leonidas called a council of war at dawn. Some Greeks argued for withdrawal, while others pledged to stay. After the council, many of the Greek forces did choose to withdraw.^[99] Herodotus believed that Leonidas blessed their departure with an order, but he also offered the alternative point of view that those retreating forces departed without orders.^[100] The Spartans had pledged themselves to fight to the death. A contingent of about 700 Thespians, led by their general Demophilus, the son of Diadromes, refused to leave with the other Greeks, but cast their lot with the Spartans.^[101] Also present were the 400 Thebans, and any helots that had accompanied the Spartans.

Ostensibly, the Spartans were obeying the laws of Sparta by not retreating. It is also possible that recalling the words of the Oracle, Leonidas was committed to sacrifice his life in order to save Sparta. A further possibility is that the Greeks had chosen a calculated strategy to extricate themselves from the situation. If they had all retreated, the open ground beyond the pass would have allowed the Persian cavalry to run the Greeks down. If they had all remained at the pass, they would have been encircled, and would, eventually, have all been killed. By covering the retreat, and continuing to block the pass, Leonidas could save only more than 3,000 men, who would be able to fight at some later point.^[102][103] At dawn Xerxes made libations, pausing to allow the Immortals sufficient time to descend the mountain, and then began his advance.^[104]

The Greeks this time sallied forth from the wall to meet the Persians in the wider part of the pass in an attempt to slaughter as many Persians as they could. They fought with spears until every spear was shattered and then switched to xiphē (short swords). In this struggle, Herodotus states that two brothers of Xerxes fell: Abrocomes and Hyperanthes. Leonidas also died in the assault and the sides fought over his body, the Greeks taking possession.^[105]

Receiving intelligence that Ephialtes and the Immortals were advancing toward their rear, the Greeks withdrew and took a stand on a hill behind the wall. The Thebans "moved away from their companions, and with hands upraised, advanced toward the barbarians..." (Rawlinson translation), but a few were slain before their surrender was accepted. The king later had the Theban prisoners branded with the royal mark.^[106] Of the remaining defenders, Herodotus says:

"Here they defended themselves to the last, those who still had swords using them, and the others resisting with their hands and teeth; ..."^[107]

Tearing down part of the wall, Xerxes ordered the hill surrounded and the Persians rained down arrows until every last Greek was dead.^[107] In 1939, the archaeologist Spyridon Marinatos, excavating at Thermopylae, found large numbers of Persian bronze arrowheads on Kolonos Hill, changing the identification of the hill on which the Greeks died from a smaller one nearer the wall.^[108]

Aftermath

Main article: Second Persian invasion of Greece

When the body of Leonidas was recovered by the Persians, Xerxes, in a rage against Leonidas, ordered that the head be cut off and the body crucified. Herodotus observes that this was very uncommon for the Persians, as they had the habit of treating "valiant warriors" with great honor^[107] (the example of Pytheas captured earlier off Skyros also suggests that).^[109] However, Xerxes was known for his rage, as when he had the Hellespont whipped because it would not obey him.^[110] After the Persians' departure, the Greeks collected their dead and buried them on the hill. A stone lion was erected to commemorate Leonidas.^[111] Forty years after the battle, Leonidas' bones were returned to Sparta where he was buried again with full honors and funeral games were held every year in his memory.^[112] According to Herodotus, the Persian dead numbered about 20,000.

With Thermopylae now opened to the Persian army, the continuation of the blockade at Artemisium by the Allied fleet became irrelevant. The simultaneous naval Battle of Artemisium had been a stalemate, and the Allied navy was able to retreat in good order to the Saronic Gulf where they helped to ferry the remaining Athenian citizens across to the island of Salamis.^[113] The retreat from Thermopylae and Artemisium left the Persians in control of the Aegean Sea and Boeotia, where they burned the Allied towns of Plataea and Thespiae. They then marched into Attica, and entered the evacuated Athens. A small number of Athenians had remained barricaded on the Acropolis, but it was eventually stormed, and the city was then burnt to the ground.^[114]

Now able to muster their full armies (after the Olympic truce), the Peloponnesian Allies planned to defend the Isthmus of Corinth. As at Thermopylae, to make this an effective strategy required the Allied navy to stage a simultaneous blockade, barring the passage of the Persian navy across the Saronic Gulf, so that troops could not be landed directly in the Peloponnesus.^[115] However, Themistocles persuaded the Allies to instead seek a decisive victory against the Persian fleet. Luring the Persian navy into the Straits of Salamis, the Allied fleet was able to achieve this, which essentially ended the threat to the Peloponnesus, and significantly reduced the Persian upper hand.^[116] Xerxes now retreated with much of the army back to Asia, leaving a hand picked force under Mardonius to complete the conquest the following year. Instead, however, they were defeated at the Battle of Plataea by the largest Greek army yet assembled^[117], thereby ending the second Persian invasion of Greece.^[118]

Significance

Thermopylae is arguably the most famous battle in European ancient history, repeatedly referenced in both ancient, recent and contemporary culture (see Battle of Thermopylae in popular culture). It is (in western culture) the Greeks who are lauded for their performance in battle;^[119] yet, from a military stand-point, it was unarguably a defeat for the Greeks. The Greek position at Thermopylae, despite being massively out-numbered, was near-impregnable.^[113] If the position had been held for even slightly longer, the Persians may have had to retreat due to a lack of food and water.^[81] Thus, despite the heavy losses, forcing the pass was a clear Persian victory, both tactically and strategically.^[113] From the Greek point of view, the strategy which led to Thermopylae had been sound; but failing to hold the pass had undermined it. As a result, all of Boeotia and Attica fell to the Persians. Strategically, little was thus achieved by the Greeks at Thermopylae. It is sometimes suggested as a successful delaying action which gave the Allies more time to prepare, but whether this extra time was actually critical to the allied effort is debatable.^[120] The successful retreat of the bulk of the Greek troops, though morale-boosting, was in no sense a victory, though it did take some of the sheen off the Persian victory.^[113]

Why then, is Thermopylae so famous? The doomed heroism of the troops, who against appalling odds, remained at the pass is one reason, and has inspired much praise:

...the fairest sister-victories which the Sun has ever seen, yet they would never dare to compare their combined glory with the glorious defeat of King Leonidas and his men^[121]

A second reason is the example it set, of free men, fighting for their country and their freedom; and how powerful that might make them:

So almost immediately, contemporary Greeks saw Thermopylae as a critical moral and culture lesson. In universal terms, a small, free people had willingly outfought huge numbers of imperial subjects who advanced under the lash. More specifically, the Western idea that soldiers themselves decide where, how, and against whom they will fight was contrasted against the Eastern notion of despotism and monarchy — freedom proving the stronger idea as the more courageous fighting of the Greeks at Thermopylae, and their later victories at Salamis and Plataea attested.^[9]

Militarily, the fame of Thermopylae is also justified, on the basis of the first two days fighting. The performance of the defenders is used as an example of the advantages of training, equipment, and good use of terrain as force multipliers.^[10]

Legacy

Monuments to the battle

Epitaph of Simonides

Simonides composed a well-known epigram, which was engraved as an epitaph on a commemorative stone placed on top of the burial mound of the Spartans at Thermopylae. It is also the hill on which the last of them died.^[65] The original stone has not been preserved. Instead the epitaph was engraved on a new stone erected in 1955. The text from Herodotus is:^[65]

Ὦ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε

κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.

Ō ksein', angellein Lakedaimoniois hoti tēide

keimetha tois keinōn rhēmasi peithomenoi.

An ancient alternative substitutes πειθόμενοι νομίμοις for ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι; i.e., substitutes "laws" for "sayings." The sayings are not personal but refer to official and binding phrases of some sort.^[122]

The form of this ancient Greek poetry is an elegiac couplet. Some English renderings are given in the table below.

Translation	Notes
Go tell the Spartans, thou who passest by, That here, obedient to their laws, we lie.[123]	William Lisle Bowles
Stranger, tell the Spartans that we behaved as they would wish us to, and are buried here.[124]	William Golding
Stranger! To Sparta say, her faithful band Here lie in death, remembering her command.[125]	Rev. Francis Hodgson
Stranger, report this word, we pray, to the Spartans, that lying Here in this spot we remain, faithfully keeping their laws.[126]	George Campbell Macaulay
Stranger, bear this message to the Spartans, that we lie here obedient to their laws.[127]	William Roger Paton
Go tell the Spartans, stranger passing by, that here obedient to their laws we lie.[128]	Steven Pressfield
Go, stranger, and to Lacedaemon tell That here, obeying her behests, we fell.[129]	George Rawlinson
Go, way-farer, bear news to Sparta's town that here, their bidding done, we laid us down.[130]	Cyril E. Robinson
Go tell the Spartans, you who read: We took their orders, and lie here dead.[131]	Aubrey de Sélincourt
Friend, tell Lacedaemon Here we lie Obedient to our orders.[132]	William Shepherd
Go tell the Spartans, passerby: That here, by Spartan law, we lie.[133]	Frank Miller

John Ruskin expressed the importance of this ideal to Western civilization as follows:^[134]

Also obedience in its highest form is not obedience to a constant and compulsory law, but a persuaded or voluntary yielded obedience to an issued command .... His name who leads the armies of Heaven is "Faithful and True"... and all deeds which are done in alliance with these armies ... are essentially deeds of faith, which therefore ... is at once the source and the substance of all known deed, rightly so called ... as set forth in the last word of the noblest group of words ever, so far as I know, uttered by simple man concerning his practice, being the final testimony of the leaders of a great practical nation ...: [the epitaph in Greek].

Leonidas monument

Additionally, there is a modern monument at the site, called the "Leonidas Monument", in honor of the Spartan king. It features a bronze statue of Leonidas. A sign, under the statue, reads simply: "Μολών λαβέ" ("Come and get them!"). The metope below depicts battle scenes. The two marble statues on the left and the right of the monument represent, respectively, the river Eurotas and Mount Taygetos, famous landmarks of Sparta.

Thespian monument

In 1997, a second monument was officially unveiled by the Greek government, dedicated to the 700 Thespians who fought with the Spartans. The monument is made of marble and features a bronze statue depicting the god Eros, who was worshiped in ancient Thespiae. Under the statue, a sign reads "In memory of the seven hundred Thespians".

A plate, below the statue, explains its symbolism:

• The headless male figure symbolizes the anonymous sacrifice of the 700 Thespians to their country.
• The outstretched chest symbolizes the struggle, the gallantry, the strength, the bravery and the courage.
• The open wing symbolizes the victory, the glory, the soul, the spirit and the freedom.
• The broken wing symbolizes the voluntary sacrifice and death.
• The naked body symbolizes Eros, the most important god of the ancient Thespians, the god of creation, beauty and life.

The monument to the Thespians is placed beside the one to the Spartans.

Legends associated with the battle

Herodotus's colourful account of the battle has provided us with many apocryphal incidents and conversations away from the main historical events. These accounts are obviously not verifiable, but they form an integral part of the legend of the Battle. They often demonstrate the Laconic speech (and wit) of the Spartans to good effect.

For instance, Plutarch recounts in his Sayings of Spartan Women that upon his departure, Leonidas's wife Gorgo asked what she should do if he did not return; to which Leonidas replied, "Marry a good man and have good children."^[135]

Herodotus attests several conversations that took place between Xerxes and Demaratus, an exiled Spartan king in his retinue. Early in the campaign, Xerxes asked Demaratus whether he thought that the Greeks would put up a fight, for in his opinion neither the Greeks nor even all peoples of Europe together would be able to stop him because they were disunited.^[136] Demaratus replied:^[137]

First, they will never accept conditions from you that bring slavery upon Hellas; and second, they will meet you in battle even if all the other Greeks are on your side. Do not ask me how many these men are who can do this; they will fight with you whether they have an army of a thousand men, or more than that, or less.

Xerxes laughed at this answer, claiming that "free men" of any number would never be able to stand against his army which was unified by a single ruler, and that obedience to one single master would make his troops extremely courageous, or they would be led into battle "by the whip" even against an army of any size. He added that "even if the Greeks have larger numbers than our highest estimate, we still would outnumber them 100 to 1". He asserted that his army contained men who would gladly fight with three Greeks at once and that Demaratus was talking nonsense.^[138] To this Demaratus answered:^[139]

I would most gladly fight with one of those men who claim to be each a match for three Greeks. So is it with the Lacedaemonians; fighting singly they are as brave as any man living, and together they are the best warriors on earth. They are free, yet not wholly free: law is their master, whom they fear much more than your men fear you. They do whatever it bids; and its bidding is always the same, that they must never flee from the battle before any multitude of men, but must abide at their post and there conquer or die.

It is reported that, upon arriving at Thermopylae, the Persian sent a mounted scout to reconnoiter. The Greeks allowed him to come up to the camp, observe them, and depart. When the scout reported to Xerxes the size of the Greek force and that the Spartans were indulging in calisthenics and combing their long hair, Xerxes found the reports laughable. Seeking again the counsel of Demaratus, Xerxes was told that the Spartans were preparing for battle and that it was their custom to adorn their hair when they were about to risk their lives. Demaratus called them "the bravest men in Greece" and warned the Great King that they intended to dispute the pass. He emphasized that he had tried to warn Xerxes earlier in the campaign, but the king had refused to believe him. He added that if Xerxes ever managed to subdue the Spartans, "there is no other nation in all the world which will venture to lift a hand in their defence" (Rawlinson translation).^[140]

Herodotus also describes the reception of a Persian embassy by Leonidas. The ambassador told Leonidas that Xerxes would offer him the kingship of all Greece if he joined with Xerxes. Leonidas answered: "If you had any knowledge of the noble things of life, you would refrain from coveting others' possessions; but for me to die for Greece is better than to be the sole ruler over the people of my race."^[141] Then the ambassador asked him more forcefully to surrender their arms. To this Leonidas gave his famous answer: Μολὼν λαβέ (pronounced [moˈlɔːn laˈbe]) "Come and get them".^[142]

Such Laconic bravado doubtlessly helped to maintain morale. Herodotus writes that when Dienekes, a Spartan soldier, was informed that Persian arrows would be so numerous as "to block out the sun", he retorted, unconcerned; "So much the better...then we shall fight our battle in the shade."^[143]

After the battle, Xerxes was curious as to what the Greeks had been trying to do (presumably because they had had so few men) and had some Arcadian deserters interrogated in his presence. The answer was that all the other men were participating in the Olympic Games. When Xerxes asked what was the prize for the winner, the answer was "an olive-wreath". Upon hearing this, Tigranes, a Persian general, said: "Good heavens, Mardonius, what kind of men are these that you have pitted against us? It is not for riches that they contend but for honor!" (Godley translation) or otherwise "Ye Gods, Mardonius, what men have you brought us to fight against? Men that fight not for gold, but for glory."^[144]

Thermopylae in popular culture

Main article: Battle of Thermopylae in popular culture

The Battle of Thermopylae has been an icon of western civilization from its very aftermath. This icon expresses itself in countless instances of adages, poetry and song, literature, films, television and video games. A more serious aspect has been its didactic use. The battle appears in many books and articles on military topics.

Main article: Sparta in popular culture

Prior to the battle, the Hellenes remembered the Dorians, an ethnic distinction to which the Spartans belonged, as the conquerors and displacers of the Ionians in the Peloponnesus. After the battle, Spartan culture became an inspiration and object of emulation, a phenomenon known as Laconophilia.

References

Further reading

• Barkworth, Peter R. (1993). "The Organization of Xerxes' Army". Iranica Antiqua XXVII: pages 149–167. http://www.azargoshnasp.net/300/xerxesorganizationarmy.pdf. Retrieved on 2007-10-18. 
• Pressfield, Steven (1998). Gates of Fire. ISBN 9780553383683. 
• Morris, Ian Macgregor (2000). "To Make a New Thermopylae: Hellenism, Greek Liberation, and the Battle of Thermopylae". Greece & Rome 47 (2): pages 211–230. doi:10.1093/gr/47.2.211. 
• Bradford, Ernle (2004). Thermopylae: The Battle for the West. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0306813602. 
• Cartledge, Paul (2006). Thermopylae: The Battle That Changed the World. Woodstock, New York: The Overlook Press. ISBN 1585675660. 
• Matthews, Rupert (2006). The Battle of Thermopylae: A Campaign in Context. Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Tempus Publishing. ISBN 1862273251. 
• Holland, Tom (2006). Persian Fire: The First World Empire and the Battle for the West. ISBN 0385513119. 

External links

• Ctesias; Freese, J.H. (Translator) (2002), "Persica", in Photius; Pearse, Roger, Bibliotheca (Myriobiblon): Codex LXXII, The Tertullian Project .
• EDSITEment staff. "300 Spartans at the Battle of Thermopylae: Herodotus' Real History". National Endowment for the Humanities. Retrieved on 2007-12-18.
• Lendering, Jona (1996-2007). "Herodotus' twenty-second logos: Thermopylae" (html). Livius articles on ancient history. Retrieved on 2007-10-19.
• Lendering, Jona; Marco Prins (2007). "Thermopylae (480 BCE)" (html). Livius articles on ancient history. Retrieved on 2007-10-19.
• Stecchini, Livio C. (2007). "The Persian Wars: the Size of the Persian Army" (html). Iran Chamber Society. Retrieved on 2007-10-19.
• The Five Great Battles of Antiquity by David L. Smith, Symposion Lectures, 30

June 2006.

• Modern monument at siu.edu
• Spartan burial mound at coloradocollege.edu
• Artemisium

See also

• Aristodemus (Spartan)
• Battle of the Persian Gate
• Battles of macrohistorical importance involving invasions of Europe
• Molon labe
• Persian empire
• Pantites
• Spartan Army
• Battle of Saragarhi