Battle of Plataea

Battle of Plataea
Part of the Greco-Persian Wars
Plain of Plataea, from Mount Cithaeron engraving by William Miller after H W Williams.jpg
Engraving showing the view of Plataea from Mount Cithaeron
Date August 479 BC
Location Plataea, Greece
Result Decisive Greek victory.
Territorial
changes		 Persia loses control of Attica and Boeotia.
Belligerents
Greek city-states Achaemenid Empire
Commanders
Pausanias Mardonius †
Strength
110,000 (Herodotus)
100,000 (Pompeius)

~40,000
(Modern consensus)		 300,000 (Herodotus)
120,000 (Ctesias)

70,000 - 120,000
(Modern consensus, including Greek allies)
Casualties and losses
10,000+ (Ephorus and Diodorus)
1,360 (Plutarch)
759 (Herodotus)		 257,000 (Herodotus)
10,000+ (Modern estimates)
Ionian Revolt
1st Naxos – Sardis – Ephesus – Lade

First Persian invasion
2nd Naxos – Eretria – Marathon
Second Persian invasion
Thermopylae – Artemisium – Salamis – Potidea – Olynthus – Plataea – Mycale

The Greek reconquest
Sestos – Byzantium – Eion – Eurymedon – Thassos – Pampremis – Memphis – Prosoptis – Citium – Salamis in Cyprus

The Battle of Plataea was the final land battle during the second Persian invasion of Greece. It took place in 479 BC between an alliance of the Greek city-states, including Sparta, Athens, Corinth, Megara and others, against the Persians Empire of Xerxes I. The Greeks won a decisive victory, ending the invasion and preventing the conquest of Greece.

Contents

Sources

Main article: Herodotus

Nearly all of the sources for the account of the battle come ultimately from the Greek historian Herodotus, writing in his 'Histories'. Historically, Herodotus has often been derided, even by other ancient writers. However, recent archaeological finds have tended to confirm specific claims made by Herodotus, and have done much to restore his reputation.[1] Nevertheless, it remains true that Herodotus often appears to have exaggerated, or simply to have recounted what he was 'told' without much critical appraisal.[2]

Background

Main articles: Greco-Persian Wars, Second Persian invasion of Greece, and Battle of Salamis

The Greek city-states of Athens and Eretria had supported the unsuccessful Ionian Revolt against the Persian Empire of Darius I in 499-494 BC. Darius swore revenge on these two city-states, and also saw the opportunity to expand his empire into the fractious world of Ancient Greece.[3] A preliminary expedition under Mardonius, in 492 BC, to secure the land approaches to Greece ended with the re-conquest of Thrace and forced Macedon to become a client kingdom of Persia.[4]

In 491 BC, Darius sent emissaries to all the Greek city-states, asking for a gift of 'earth and water' in token of their submission to him.[5] Having had a demonstration of his power the previous year, the majority of Greek cities duly obliged. In Athens, however, the ambassadors were put on trial and then executed; in Sparta, they were simply thrown down a well.[5] This meant that Sparta was also now effectively at war with Persia.[5]

Darius thus put together an amphibious task force under Datis and Artaphernes in 490 BC, which attacked Naxos, before receiving the submission of the other Cycladic Islands. The task force then moved on Eretria, which it besieged and destroyed.[6] Finally, it moved to attack Athens, landing at the bay of Marathon, where it was met by a heavily outnumbered Athenian army. At the ensuing Battle of Marathon, the Athenians won a remarkable victory, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Persian army to Asia.[7]

A map showing the Greek world at the time of the battle

Darius therefore began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition.[3] Darius then died whilst preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I. Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt, and very quickly re-started the preparations for the invasion of Greece. Since this was to be a full scale invasion, it required long-term planning, stock-piling and conscription. Xerxes decided that the Hellespont would be bridged to allow his army to cross to Europe, and that a canal should be dug across the isthmus of Mount Athos (rounding which headland, a Persian fleet had been destroyed in 492 BC). These were both feats of exceptional ambition, which would have been beyond any contemporary state.[8] By early 480 BC, the preparations were complete, and the army which Xerxes had mustered at Sardis marched towards Europe, crossing the Hellespont on two pontoon bridges.[9]

The Athenians had also been preparing for war with the Persians since the mid-480s BC, and in 482 BC the decision was taken, under the guidance of the Athenian politician Themistocles, to build a massive fleet of triremes that would be necessary for the Greeks to fight the Persians[3]. However, the Athenians did not have the manpower to fight on land and sea; and therefore combatting the Persians would require an alliance of Greek city states. In 481 BC, Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking for earth and water, but making the very deliberate omission of Athens and Sparta.[10] Support thus began to coalesce around these two leading states. A congress of city states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC,[11] and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. It had the power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. This was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world, especially since many of the city-states in attendance were still technically at war with each other.[3]

Movements to Salamis

The 'Allies' initially adopted a strategy of blocking the land and sea approaches to southern Greece.[12] Thus, in August 480 BC, after hearing of Xerxes's approach, a small Allied army led by the Spartan king Leonidas I blocked the Pass of Thermopylae, whilst an Athenian-dominated navy sailed to the Straits of Artemisium. Famously, the massively outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae against the Persians army for six days in total, before being outflanked by a mountain path. Although much of the Greek army retreated, the rearguard of Spartans and Thespians were surrounded and killed.[3] The simultaneous Battle of Artemisium was up to that point a stalemate;[13] however, when news of Thermopylae reached them, they also retreated, since holding the straits of Artemisium was now a moot point.[14]

The Allied fleet had then sailed from Artemisium to Salamis to assist with the final evacuation of Athens, whilst the mostly Peloponnesian Allied army prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth.[15] Following Thermopylae, the Persian army had proceeded to burn and sack the Boeotian cities which had not surrendered, Plataea and Thespiae; before taking possession of the now-evacuated city of Athens. Xerxes wished for a final crushing defeat of the Allies to finish the conquest of Greece in that campaigning season; conversely the Allies sought a decisive victory over the Persian navy that would guarantee the security of the Peloponnessus.[16] The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis ended in a decisive victory for the Greeks, marking (in retrospect) a turning point in the conflict.[17]

Following the defeat of his navy at the Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Asia with the bulk of the army. He left Mardonius, with handpicked troops, to complete the conquest of Greece the following year.[18] Mardonius evacuated Attica, and over-wintered in Thessaly;[19] with the Athenians then reoccupying their destroyed city.[17] Over the winter, there seems to have been some tension between the Allies. In particular, the Athenians, who were not protected by the Isthmus, but whose fleet were the key to the security of the Peloponnesus, felt hard done by, and demanded an Allied army march north the following year.[17] When the Allies failed to commit to this, the Athenian fleet refused to join the Allied navy in Spring. The navy, now under the command of the Spartan king Leotychides, thus skulked off Delos, whilst the remnants of the Persian fleet skulked off Samos, both sides unwilling to risk battle.[20] Similarly, Mardonius remained in Thessaly, knowing an attack on the Isthmus was pointless, whilst the Allies refused to send an army outside the Peloponessus.[17]

Mardonius moved to break the stalemate, by offering peace, self-government and territorial expansion to the Athenians (with the aim of removing their fleet from the Allied forces), using Alexander I of Macedon) as intermediate.[20] The Athenians made sure that a Spartan delegation was on hand to hear the offer, but rejected it:

The degree to which we are put in the shadow by the Medes' strength is hardly something you need to bring to our attention. We are already well aware of it. But even so, such is our love of liberty, that we will never surrender.[20]

Athens was thus evacuated again, and the Persians marched south and re-took possession of it. Mardonius now repeated his offer of peace to the Athenian refugees on Salamis. Athens, along with Megara and Plataea sent emissaries to Sparta demanding assistance, and threatening to accept the Persian terms if not.[21] According to Herodotus, the Spartans, who were at that time celebrating the festival of Hyacinthus, delayed making a decision until they were persuaded by a guest, Chileos of Tegea, who pointed out the danger to all of Greece if the Athenians surrendered.[22] When, the next day the Athenian emissaries delivered an ultimatum to the Spartans, they were amazed to hear that a task force was in fact already en route; the Spartan army was marching to meet the Persians.[23]

Prelude

When Mardonius learned of the Spartan force, he completed the destruction of Athens, tearing down whatever was standing.[24] He then retreated towards Thebes, hoping to lure the Greek army into territory which would be suitable for the Persian cavalry.[24] Mardonius created a fortified encampment on the north bank of the Asopus river in Boeotia, and waited for the Greeks.[25]

The Athenians sent 8,000 hoplites, led by Aristides, along with 600 Plataean exiles, to join the Allied army.[26] The army then marched in Boeotia across the passes of Mount Cithaeron, arriving near Plataea, and above the Persian position on the Asopus.[27] Under the guidance of the commanding general, Pausanias, the Greeks took up position opposite the Persian lines, but remained on high ground.[27] Knowing that he had little hope of successfully attacking the Greek positions, Mardonius sought to either sow dissension amongst the Allies, or lure them down into the plain.[27] Plutarch reports that a conspiracy was discovered amongst some prominent Athenians, who were planning to betray the Allied cause; although this account is not universally accepted, it may indicate Mardonius's use of intelligence and intrigue.[27]

Mardonius also sent hit-and-run cavalry attacks against the Greek lines, possibly to lure the Greeks down to the plain in pursuit.[27][28] Although initially having some success,[29] this strategy backfired when the cavalry commander Masistius was killed, whereupon the cavalry retreated.[29][30]

Their morale boosted by this small victory, the Greeks moved forward, still remaining on higher ground, to a new position nearer Mardonius's camp.[31]. The Spartans and Tegeans were on a ridge to the right of the line, the Athenians on a hillock on the left, and the other contingents on the slightly lower ground between.[27] In response Mardonius brought his men up to the Asopus, and arrayed them for battle. However, both sides refused to attack; Herodotus claims this is because both sides received bad omens during sacrificial rituals.[32] The armies thus stayed camped in their present locations for 8 days, and all the while new Greek troops arrived.[33] Mardonius then sought to break the stalemate by sending his cavalry to attack the passes of Mount Cithaeron; this raid resulted in the capture a convoy of provisions intended for the Greeks.[33] Two further days passed, during which time the supply lines of the Greeks continued to be menaced.[27] Mardonius then launched a further cavalry raid on the Greek lines, which succeeded in blocking the Gargaphian Spring, which had been the only source of water for the Greek army (they could not use the Asopus due to the Persian archers).[34] Coupled with the lack of food, the restriction of the water supply made the Greek position untenable, so they decided to retreat to a position in front of Plataea, from where they could guard the passes and have access to fresh water.[35] To prevent the Persian cavalry attacking the retreat, it was to be performed that night.[35]

However, the retreat went badly awry. The Allied contingents in the centre missed their appointed position, and ended up scattered in front of Plataea itself.[27] The Athenians, Tegeans and Spartans, who had been guarding the rear of the retreat, had not even begun to retreat by daybreak.[27] A single Spartan division was thus left on the ridge to guard the rear, whilst the Spartans and Tegeans retreated uphill; Pausanias also instructed the Athenians to begin the retreat and if possible to join up with the Spartans.[27][36]. However, the Athenians at first retreated directly towards Plataea,[36] and thus the Allied battle line remained fragmented as the Persian camp began to stir.[27]

The opposing forces

The Greeks

According to Herodotus, the Spartans sent 45,000 men under the command of Pausanias; 5,000 Spartiates (full citizen soldiers), 5,000 perioeci (other Lacedaemonians) and 35,000 helots (seven per Spartiate).[26] This was probably the largest Spartan force ever assembled.[27] The Greek army had been reinforced by contingents of hoplites from the other Allied city-states, as shown in the table.

City Number
of men		 City Number
of men		 City Number
of men
Sparta[26] 10000 Athens[26] 8000 Corinth[26] 5000
Megara[26] 3000 Sicyon[26] 3000 Tegea[26] 1500
Phleious[26] 1000 Troezen[26] 1000 Anactorium &
Leukas[26]		 800
Epidaurus[26] 800 Orchomenian
Arcadians[26]		 600 Eretria &
Styra[26]		 600
Plataea[26] 600 Aegina[26] 500 Ambracia[26] 500
Chalcidice[26] 400 Mycenae &
Tiryns[26]		 400 Hermione[26] 300
Potidaea[26] 300 Cephalonia[26] 200 Lepreum[26] 200
Total 38,700 [37]

According to Herodotus, there were a total of 69,500 lightly armed troops; 35,000 helots,[37] and 34,500 troops from the rest of Greece; roughly one per hoplite.[37] Herodotus also tells us that there were also 1,800 Thespians (but not how they were equipped), giving a total strength of 110,000 men.[38]

The number of hoplites is accepted as reasonable (and possible); the Athenians alone had fielded 10,000 hoplites at the Battle of Marathon.[27] However, the number of light troops is often rejected as exaggerated.[27] Conversely, some historians have accepted these numbers and used them as a population census of Greece at the time.

The Persians

According to Herodotus, the Persians numbered 300,000 and were accompanied by troops from Greek city states which supported the Persian cause (including Thebes).[39] Herodotus admits that no-one counted the latter, so he guesses that there were 50,000 of them.[39]

Ctesias, who wrote a history of Persia based on Persian archives, claimed there were 120,000 Persian and 7,000 Greek soldiers, but his account is generally garbled (for instance, placing this battle battle before Salamis).[40] Nevertheless, his figure is remarkably close to that generated by modern consensus.[40]

The figure of 300,000 has been doubted, along with many of Herodotus's numbers, by many modern historians. Since modern consensus places the total number of troops for the Persian invasion at around 250,000[41], a number of 300,000 does not find favour with modern historians. One approach to estimating the size of the Persian army has been to estimate how many men might feasibly have been accommodated within the Persian camp; this approach gives figures of between 70,000 and 120,000 men. [42][43] Most estimates for the total Persian force are generally in this range.[44][45][46]

Munro and Macan note that Herodotus mentions by name six superior military commanders and 29 μυριαρχοι (muriarchoi), commanders of a baivarabam.[47] The baivarabam was the tactical unit of the ancient Persian infantry that numbered 10,000 men; thus, if these units were all at full strength, a force approximating 300,000 might have been possible.[48]

Strategic and tactical considerations

In some ways, the run-up to Plataea resembled that at the Battle of Marathon; there was a prolonged stalemate in which neither side risked attacking the other.[27] The reasons for this stalemate were primarily tactical, and similar to the situation at Marathon; the Greek hoplites did not want to risk being outflanked by the Persian cavalry, and the lightly armed Persian infantry could not hope to assault well defended positions.[27]

From a strategic point of view, both sides wished for a decisive battle which would tip the war in their favour.[49][27] Equally, however, the strategic situation allowed both sides to procrastinate, since food supplies were in ample supply for both armies[49][27]. Under these conditions, the tactical considerations outweighed the strategic need for action.

However, when Mardonius's raids disrupted the Greek supply chain, it forced a strategic rethink on the part of the Greeks. Rather than now moving to attack, however, they instead looked to retreat slightly and secure their lines of communication.[35] Despite this defensive move from the Greeks, it was in fact the chaos resulting from this retreat which finally ended the stalemate. Mardonius percieved this as a full-on retreat, in effect thinking that the battle was already over, and sought to pursue the Greeks.[50] Since he did not expect the Greeks to fight, the tactical problems were no longer an issue, and he tried to take advantage of the altered strategic situation.[27]

The Battle

Once the Persians discovered that the Greeks had abandoned their positions, and appeared to be in retreat, Mardonius decided to set off in immediate pursuit with the elite Persian infantry.[51] As he did so, the rest of the Persian army, unbidden, also began to move forward.[51] The Spartans and Tegeans had by now reached the Temple of Hera.[52] The rearguard under Amompharetus began to withdraw from the ridge, under pressure from Persian cavalry, to join them.[52] Pausanias sent a messenger to the Athenians, asking them to join up with the Spartans.[53] However, the Athenians were engaged by the Theban phalanx, and unable to assist Pausanias.[52] The Spartans and Tegeans were first assaulted by the Persian cavalry,[53] whilst the Persian infantry made their way forward. The Persian infantry then planted their shields and began firing arrows at the Greeks, whilst the cavalry withdrew.[53][52]

According the Herodotus, Pausanias refused to advance, because good omens were not divined in the goat-sacrifices that were performed.[54] At this point, as men began to fall under the barrage of arrows, the Tegeans started to run at the Persian lines.[54] Offering one last sacrifice and a prayer to the heavens, Pausanias finally received favourable omens, and gave the command for the Spartans to advance, whereupon they too charged the Persian lines.[55]

The numerically superior Persian infantry were of the heavy (by Persian standards) sparabara formation, but this was still much lighter than the Greek phalanx.[56] The Persian defensive weapon was a large wicker shield, and they used short spears; by contrast the hoplites were armoured in bronze, with a bronze shield and a long spear.[52] As at Marathon, it was a severe mismatch.[55][57] The fight was fierce and long, but the Greeks continued to push into the Persian lines.[52] The Persians tried to break the Greeks' spears by grabbing hold of them, but the Greeks were able to use their swords instead.[55] Mardonius was present at the scene, riding a white horse, and surrounded by a bodyguard of 1,000 men, and whilst he remained, the Persians stood their ground.[56] However, the Spartans closed in on Mardonius, and stone thrown by the Spartan Aeimnestus hit him in the head, killing him.[58] With Mardonius dead, the Persians began to flee, although his bodyguard remained and were annihilated.[52] Quickly the rout became general, with many Persians fleeing in disorder to their camp. [57] However, Artabazus (who had earlier commanded the Sieges of Olynthus and Potidea), had disagreed with Mardonius about attacking the Greeks,[50] and he had not fully engaged the forces under his command.[59] As the rout commenced, he led these men (40,000 according to Herodotus) away from the battle field, on the road to Thessaly, hoping to escape eventually to the Hellespont.[59]

On the opposite side of the battle field, the Athenians had triumphed in a tough battle against the Thebans.[60] The other Greeks fighting for the Persians had deliberately fought badly, according to Herodotus.[60] The Thebans retreated from the battle, but in a different direction from the Persians, allowing them to escape without further losses.[61] The Allied Greeks, reinforced by the contingents who had not taken part in the main battle, then stormed the Persian camp.[62][52] Although the Persians initially defended the wall vigorously, it was eventually breached; and the Persians, packed tightly together in the camp, were slaughtered by the Greeks.[63] Of the Persians who had retreated to the camp, scarcely 3,000 were left alive.[63]

According to Herodotus, only 43,000 Persians survived the battle.[63] The number who died of course depends on how many there were in the first place; there would be 257,000 dead by Herodotus's reckoning. Herodotus claims that the Greeks as a whole lost only 159 men.[63] Furthermore, he claims that only Spartans, Tegeans and Athenians died, since they were the only ones who fought.[63] Plutarch, who had access to other sources, gives 1,360 Greek casualties,[64] while both Ephorus and Diodorus tally the Greek casualties to over 10,000.[65]

Aftermath

Main article: Second Persian invasion of Greece
The Serpent Column dedicated by the victorious Greeks

According to tradition, the Battle of Mycale occurred on the same day, with the Greek fleet destroying the Persian fleet in the Aegean Sea off the coast of Ionia. The Persian army, under the command of Artabazus tried to retreat all the way back to Asia Minor. Most of the 43,000 survivors were attacked and killed by the forces of Alexander I of Macedon at the estuary of the Strymon river. This ended the defensive phase of the Persian War, although the Persians continued to interfere in Greek politics until they were conquered in the 4th century BC by Alexander the Great. However, this was the last time the Persians tried to invade the Greek mainland with the goal of total conquest.

A bronze column in the shape of intertwined snakes (Serpent column) was created from the melted-down Persian weapons acquired in the battle plunder of the Persian camp and was offered at the oracle of Delphi, which commemorated all the Greek city-states who participated in the battle. Part of it still survives in the Hippodrome of Constantinople in present-day Istanbul, where it was carried by Constantine the Great during the founding of his city on the Greek colony of Byzantium. It lists all city-states that took part in the battle, confirming Herodotus' account (but not his numbers). The Greeks also took Mardonius' payroll money and other treasure. The Greeks are recorded to have marvelled at the splendour of the Persian camp, asking why being so wealthy, the Persians wanted to conquer their relatively poor peninsula.

Another important and longer-lasting aftermath was that after the Persian wars the Persian empire started recruiting and relying on Greek mercenaries. Eventually, especially after the March of the 10,000, their superior fighting ability (due to their armor and battle tactics) was demonstrated, leading the way for Alexander the Great's conquests.

Some accounts of individuals

Significance

Legacy

References

  1. ↑ Holland, p377
  2. ↑ John Boardman. The Cambridge Ancient History, p532. 1988 ISBN 0521228042. [1]
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Persian Fire. Holland, T. Abacus, ISBN 978-0-349-11717-1
  4. ↑ Herodotus VI, 44
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 Holland, pp178-179
  6. ↑ Herodotus VI, 101
  7. ↑ Herodotus VI, 113
  8. ↑ Holland, pp213-214
  9. ↑ Herodotus VII, 35
  10. ↑ Herodotus VII, 32 VII, 31
  11. ↑ Herodotus VII, 145
  12. ↑ Holland, pp255-257
  13. ↑ Herodotus VIII, 18
  14. ↑ Herodotus VIII, 21
  15. ↑ Herodotus VIII, 71
  16. ↑ Holland, p303
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 Holland, p333-335
  18. ↑ Holland, pp327-329
  19. ↑ Holland, p330
  20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 20.2 Holland, pp336-338
  21. ↑ Herodotus IX, 7
  22. ↑ Herodotus IX, 6-9
  23. ↑ Herodotus IX, 10
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Herodotus IX, 13
  25. ↑ Herodotus IX, 15
  26. ↑ 26.00 26.01 26.02 26.03 26.04 26.05 26.06 26.07 26.08 26.09 26.10 26.11 26.12 26.13 26.14 26.15 26.16 26.17 26.18 26.19 26.20 26.21 26.22 Herodotus IX, 28
  27. ↑ 27.00 27.01 27.02 27.03 27.04 27.05 27.06 27.07 27.08 27.09 27.10 27.11 27.12 27.13 27.14 27.15 27.16 27.17 27.18 Holland, pp343-349
  28. ↑ Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους (History of the Greek nation) vol. Β', Ekdotiki Athinon, Athens 1972
  29. ↑ 29.0 29.1 Herodotus IX, 22
  30. ↑ Herodotus IX, 23
  31. ↑ Herodotus, IX, 25
  32. ↑ Herodotus, IX, 33
  33. ↑ 33.0 33.1 Herodotus, IX, 39
  34. ↑ Herodotus IX, 49
  35. ↑ 35.0 35.1 35.2 Herodotus IX 51
  36. ↑ 36.0 36.1 Herodotus IX, 55
  37. ↑ 37.0 37.1 37.2 Herodotus IX, 29
  38. ↑ Herodotus 9.30 IX, 30
  39. ↑ 39.0 39.1 Herodotus IX, 32
  40. ↑ 40.0 40.1 Ctesias, Persica (from Photius's Epitome)
  41. ↑ Holland, p237
  42. ↑ Holland, p400
  43. ↑ reviewed by Lazenby (1993), p228
  44. ↑ Military History Online website
  45. ↑ Green (1996), The Greco-Persian Wars
  46. ↑ Peter Connolly (1981), Greece and Rome at War
  47. ↑ Cambridge Ancient History vol IV 1929
  48. ↑ Papademetriou Konstantinos Περσικό Πεζικό: Η δύναμη που κατέκτησε τη νοτιοδυτική Ασία (Persian Infantry: The force that conquered southwest Asia), Panzer magazine, issue 22 September-October 2005 Athens, Periscopio edition
  49. ↑ 49.0 49.1 Herodotus, IX, 41
  50. ↑ 50.0 50.1 Herodotus, IX, 58
  51. ↑ 51.0 51.1 Herodotus IX, 59
  52. ↑ 52.0 52.1 52.2 52.3 52.4 52.5 52.6 52.7 Holland, p350-355
  53. ↑ 53.0 53.1 53.2 Herodotus IX, 60
  54. ↑ 54.0 54.1 Herodotus IX, 61
  55. ↑ 55.0 55.1 55.2 Herodotus IX, 62
  56. ↑ 56.0 56.1 Herodotus IX, 63
  57. ↑ 57.0 57.1 Herodotus IX, 65
  58. ↑ Herodotus IX, 64
  59. ↑ 59.0 59.1 Herodotus IX, 66
  60. ↑ 60.0 60.1 Herodotus IX, 67
  61. ↑ Herodotus IX, 68
  62. ↑ Herodotus IX, 69
  63. ↑ 63.0 63.1 63.2 63.3 63.4 Herodotus IX, 70
  64. ↑ Plutarch, Aristides 19
  65. ↑ Diodorus Siculus, Biblioteca Historica XI, 33
  66. ↑ Herodotus 9,72
  67. ↑ Frank Miller (comics)

Bibliography

See also

External links