Auction

"Auctioneer" redirects here. For the DC Comics supervillain, see Auctioneer (comics).
An auctioneer and her assistants scan the crowd for bidders

An auction is a process of buying and selling goods or services by offering them up for bid, taking bids, and then selling the item to the winning bidder. In economic theory, an auction may refer to any mechanism or set of trading rules for exchange.

There are several variations on the basic auction form, including time limits, minimum or maximum limits on bid prices, and special rules for determining the winning bidder(s) and sale price(s). Participants in an auction may or may not know the identities or actions of other participants. Depending on the auction, bidders may participate in person or remotely through a variety of means, including telephone and the internet. The seller usually pays a commission to the auctioneer or auction company based on a percentage of the final sale price.

Contents

History of the auction

Artemis, Ancient Greek marble sculpture. In 2007, a Roman-era bronze sculpture of "Artemis and the Stag" was sold at Sotheby's in New York for US$28.6 million, by far exceeding its estimates and setting the new record as the most expensive sculpture as well as work from antiquity ever sold at auction.[1][2]
An 18th century Chinese meiping porcelain vase. Porcelain has long been a staple at art sales. In 2005, a 14th century Chinese porcelain piece was sold by the Christie's for £15.68 million, or $30.6 million. It set a world auction record for any ceramic work of art.[3]

The word "auction" is derived from the Latin augēre, which means "to increase" or "augment".[4]

For most of history, auctions have been a relatively uncommon way to negotiate the exchange of goods and commodities. In practice, both haggling and sale by set-price have been significantly more common.[5] Indeed, prior to the seventeenth century the few auctions that were held were sporadic and infrequent.[6]

Nonetheless, auctions have a long history, having been recorded as early as 500 B.C.[7] According to Herodotus, in Babylon auctions of women for marriage were held annually. The auctions began with the woman the auctioneer considered to be the most beautiful and progressed to the least. It was considered illegal to allow a daughter to be sold outside of the auction method.[8]

During the Roman Empire, following military victory, Roman soldiers would often drive a spear into the ground around which the spoils of war were left, to be auctioned off. Later slaves, often captured as the "spoils of war", were auctioned in the forum under the sign of the spear, with the proceeds of sale going towards the war effort.[9].

The Romans also used auctions to liquidate the assets of debtors whose property had been confiscated.[10] For example, Marcus Aurelius sold household furniture to pay off debts, the sales lasting for months.[11] One of the most significant historical auctions occurred in the year 193 A.D. when the entire Roman Empire was put on the auction block by the Praetorian Guard. On March 23 The Praetorian Guard first killed emperor Pertinax, then offered the empire to the highest bidder. Didius Julianus outbid everyone else for the price of 6,250 drachmas per Guard, an act that initiated a brief civil war. Didius was then beheaded two months later when Septimius Severus conquered Rome.[12]

From the end of the Roman Empire to the eighteenth century auctions lost favor in Europe,[13] while they had never been widespread in Asia.[14]

In some parts of England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries auction by candle was used for the sale of goods and leaseholds. This auction began by lighting a candle after which bids were offered in ascending order until the candle spluttered out. The high bid at the time the candle extinguished itself won the auction.[15]

Arguably the world's oldest auction house, the Stockholm Auction House (Stockholms Auktionsverk), was established in 1674 in Sweden.[16][17]

During the end of the 18th century, soon after the French Revolution, auctions came to be held in taverns and coffeehouses to sell art. Such auctions were held daily, and catalogs were printed to announce available items. Such Auction catalogs are frequently printed and distributed before auctions of rare or collectible items. In some cases these catalogs were elaborate works of art themselves, containing considerable detail about the items being auctioned.
Sotheby's, now the world's second-largest auction house,[16] held its first auction in 1744. Christie's, now the world's largest auction house,[16] was established around 1766. Other early auction houses that are still in operation include Dorotheum (1707), Bonhams (1793), Phillips de Pury & Company (1796), Freeman's (1805) and Lyon & Turnbull (1826).[18]

During the American civil war goods seized by armies were sold at auction by the Colonel of the division. Thus, some of today's auctioneers in the U.S. carry the unofficial title of "colonel". [11]

The development of the internet, however, has lead to a significant rise in the use of auctions as auctioneers can solicit bids via the internet from a wide range of buyers in a much wider range of commodities than was previously practical.[5]

Types of auction

Primary types of auction

Tuna auction at the Tsukiji fish market in Tokyo
Fish auction in Honolulu, Hawaii

Secondary types of auction

Time requirements

Each type of auction has its specific qualities such as pricing accuracy and time required for preparing and conducting the auction. The number of simultaneous bidders is of critical importance. Open bidding during an extended period of time with many bidders will result in a final bid that is very close to the true market value. Where there are few bidders and each bidder is allowed only one bid, time is saved, but the winning bid may not reflect the true market value with any degree of accuracy. Of special interest and importance during the actual auction is the time elapsed from the moment that the first bid is revealed to the moment that the final (winning) bid has become a binding agreement.

Auctions: characterization

Auctions can differ in the number of participants:

Prices are bid (or offered) by buyers and asked by sellers. Auctions may also differ by the procedure for bidding (or asking, as the case may be):

Auctions may differ as to the price at which the item is sold, whether the first (best) price, the second price, the first unique price or some other. Auctions may set a reservation price which is the least/maximum acceptable price for which a good may be sold/bought.

Without modification, auction generally refers to an open, demand auction, with or without a reservation price (or reserve), with the item sold to the highest bidder.

Supply auction
Demand auction
Double auction

Common uses for auctions

Auctions are publicly and privately seen in several contexts and almost anything can be sold at auction. Some typical auction arenas include the following:

Farm clearing sale, Woolbrook, NSW.
Grass-fed cattle at auction, Walcha, NSW
Wool buyers' room at a wool auction, Newcastle, NSW.

Although less publicly visible, the most economically important auctions are the commodities auctions in which the bidders are businesses even up to corporation level. Examples of this type of auction include:

Bidding Strategy

Bid shading

Bid shading is placing a bid which is below the bidder's actual value for the item. Such a strategy risks losing the auction, but has the possibility of winning at a low price. Bid shading can also be a strategy to avoid the Winner's curse.

Collusion

Whenever bidders at an auction are aware of the identity of the other bidders there is a risk that they will form a “Ring” and thus manipulate the auction result. By agreeing to bid only against outsiders, never against members of the “Ring”, competition becomes weaker, which may dramatically affect the final price level. After the end of the official auction, an unofficial auction will take place among the “Ring” members. The difference in price between the two auctions will then be split among the “Ring” members.

On the opposite side, the owner of the object being auctioned may increase competition by taking part in the bidding himself (but drop out of the bidding just before the final bid). In Britain and many other countries Rings and the bidding on one's own object are illegal. See collusion.

In an English auction a dummy bid is a bid made by a dummy bidder acting in collusion with the auctioneer or vendor, designed to deceive genuine bidders into paying more. In a First price auction a dummy bid is an unfavourable bid designed so as not to become the winning bid. (The bidder does not want to win this auction, but he wants to make sure that he will be invited to the next auction).

In South Australia a dummy bid (shill, schill) is a criminal offense but a vendor bid or a co-owner bid below the reservation price is permitted, if clearly declared as such by the auctioneer. These are all official legal terms in Australia, but may have other meanings elsewhere. A co-owner is one of two or several owners (who disagree among themselves).

In Sweden and many other countries there are no legal restrictions, but it will severely hurt the reputation of an auction house that knowingly permits any other bids except genuine bids. If the reserve is not reached this should be clearly declared.

Suggested opening bid (SOB)

There will usually be some kind of (rough) estimate as to what the object will fetch. In an ascending open auction it is considered important that there should be at least a 50 percent increase in the bids from start to finish. To accomplish this the auctioneer must start the auction by announcing a Suggested Opening Bid, SOB, that is low enough to be immediately accepted by one of the bidders. Once there is an Opening Bid there will quickly be several other higher bids submitted. Experienced auctioneers will often select an SOB that is about 45 percent of the (lowest) estimate. Thus there is a certain margin of safety to ensure that there will indeed be a lively auction with many bids submitted. Several observations indicate, that the lower the SOB, the higher the final winning bid will be. This is due to the increase in number of bidders attracted by the low SOB. When 50 bidders compete with each other the winning bid will be about twice as high as when only two bidders compete. Sometimes with English auction there will be more than 50 bidders.

A Chi-square distribution shows many low bids but few high bids. Bids "show up together"; without several low bids there will not be any high bids.

Another approach to choosing a SOB: The auctioneer may achieve good success by asking the expected final sales price for the item, as this method suggests to the buyer the amount of the item's particular value. For instance, say an auctioneer is about to sell a $1,000 car at a sale. Instead of asking $100, hoping to entice wide interest (for who wouldn't want a $1,000 car for $100?), the auctioneer may still suggest the opening bid of $1,000; although the first bidder may finally begin bidding at a mere $100, the final bid may more likely approach $1,000.

Auction terminology

JEL classification

The Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classification code for auctions is D44.[40]

See also

Further reading

Notes

  1. Sotheby's (2007-06-07), Sotheby's Sets a New World Record for Sculpture at Auction, http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/BID/340155988x0x110223/36c23cb5-958d-4a86-b517-ea6f9d297127/110223.pdf, retrieved on 2008-06-20 
  2. New York Times (2008-01-10), Artemis and Stag at Met Museum, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/10/arts/10arts-ARTEMISANDST_BRF.html, retrieved on 2008-06-20 .
  3. *Melikian, Souren (2005-07-26) (HTML), Chinese Jar Sets Record for Asian Art, the International Herald Tribune, http://www.nytimes.com/iht/2005/07/26/arts/IHT-26web.melik.html?pagewanted=print, retrieved on 2008-06-19 
  4. Krishna, 2002: p2
  5. 5.0 5.1 "The Heyday of the Auction", The Economist 352 (8129): 67–68, 1999-07-24, ISSN 0013-0613 
  6. Shubik, 2004: p214
  7. Krishna, 2002: p1
  8. Shubik, 2004: p214
  9. Shubik, 2004: p214
  10. Shubik, 2004: p215
  11. 11.0 11.1 Doyle, Robert A.; Baska, Steve (November 2002), "History of Auctions: From ancient Rome to todays high-tech auctions", Auctioneer, http://www.auctioneersfoundation.org/news_detail.php?id=5094, retrieved on 2008-06-22 
  12. Shubik, 2004: p215
  13. Shubik, 2004: p215
  14. Shubik, 2004: p214
  15. Patten, R. W. (Summer, 1970), "Tatworth Candle Auction", Folklore (London, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of Folklore Enterprises, Ltd.) 81 (2): 132–135, ISSN 0015-587x, http://www.jstor.org/pss/1258945, retrieved on 2008-06-25 
  16. 16.0 16.1 16.2 Varoli, John (2007-10-02), "Swedish Auction House to Sell 8 Million Euros of Russian Art", Bloomberg.com News (Moscow: Bloomberg Finance L.P.), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601088&sid=aGlwT7.MHwzw&refer=muse, retrieved on 2008-06-21 
  17. About the company, Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholms Auktionsverk, http://www.auktionsverket.se/historike.htm, retrieved on 2008-06-21 
  18. Stoica, Michael (August 2007), The Business of Art, http://www.washburn.edu/mabee/crc/courses/auctionhouses.html, retrieved on 2008-06-21 
  19. Krishna, 2002: p2
  20. 20.00 20.01 20.02 20.03 20.04 20.05 20.06 20.07 20.08 20.09 20.10 20.11 20.12 20.13 McAfee, R. Preston; McMillan, John (1987), "Auctions and Bidding", Journal of Economic Literature (American Economic Association) 25 (2): 699–738, June 1987, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2726107, retrieved on 2008-06-25 
  21. Krishna, 2002: p2
  22. Krishna, 2002: p2
  23. Krishna, 2002: p2
  24. Krishna, 2002: p2
  25. Krishna, 2002: p9
  26. Krishna, 2002: p3
  27. Krishna, 2002: p9
  28. Milgrom, 2004: p119
  29. 29.0 29.1 29.2 29.3 29.4 29.5 Gallien, Jérémie; Gupta, Shobhit (May 2007), "Temporary and Permanent Buyout Prices in Online Auctions", Management Science (INFORMS) 53 (5): 814-833, doi:10.1287/mnsc.1060.0650, ISSN 1526-5501, http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/53/5/814 
  30. 30.0 30.1 Pekec, Aleksandar; Rothkopf, Michael H. (November 2003), "Combinatorial auction design.", Management Science (INFORMS) 49 (11): 1485-1503, doi:10.1287/mnsc.49.11.1485.20585, ISSN 1526-5501, http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/53/5/814 
  31. 31.0 31.1 31.2 Fisher, Steven (2006), The Real Estate Investor's Handbook: The Complete Guide for the Individual Investor, Ocala, Florida, USA: Atlantic Publishing Company, pp. 89–90, ISBN 091062769X 
  32. 32.0 32.1 32.2 32.3 Good, Steven L.; Lynn, Paul A. (January/February 2007), "The eBay Effect", Commercial Investment Real Estate (CCIM Institute), http://www.ciremagazine.com/article.php?article_id=1036 
  33. Leichman, Laurence (1996), 90% off! real estate, Ocala, Florida, USA: Leichman Assoc Pubns, pp. 78–79, ISBN 0963686771 
  34. 34.0 34.1 34.2 Schoenherra, Tobias; Mabertb, Vincent A. (September-October 2007), "Online reverse auctions: Common myths versus evolving reality", Business Horizons (Kelley School of Business, Indiana University) 50 (5): 373-384, doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2007.03.003 
  35. 35.0 35.1 35.2 35.3 35.4 Isaac, R. Mark; Schnier, Kurt (October 2005), "Silent auctions in the field and in the laboratory", Economic Inquiry (Oxford, United Kingdom: Western Economic Association International) 43 (4): 715-733, doi:10.1093/ei/cbi050, ISSN 0095-2583, http://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecinqu/v43y2005i4p715-733.html 
  36. Milgrom, 2004: p268
  37. Milgrom, 2004: p267
  38. Milgrom, 2004: p267-268
  39. Milgrom, 2004: p267
  40. "Journal of Economic Literature Classification System" (HTML). American Economic Association. Retrieved on 2008-06-25. (D: Microeconomics, D4: Market Structure and Pricing, D44: Auctions)

References