Zohair Abdul Mohammed Al-Shorabi

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Zohair Abdul Mohammed Al-Shorabi is a citizen of Yemen held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 569. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts estimate that he was born in 1977, in Taiz, Yemen.

Contents

[edit] Identity

Captive 569's name is spelled inconsistently on official documents released by the United States Department of Defense:

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Nawaf Fahad Al Otaibi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 11 February 2005.[11] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a The detainee is al Al Qaida fighter.
  1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan in 1999 in order to train at a “Libyan” camp near Kabul, Afghanistan.
  2. At this camp, the detainee trained with pistols and Kalishnikov [sic] rifles.
  3. With the above weapons, the detainee fired approximately five rounds per weapon each day over a period of 10 days.
  4. The detainee claims that he personally observed Usama Bin Laden.
b The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.
  1. The detainee admits that he was sent to the front lines to fight.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that Al-Shorabi chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

The Associated Press acquired a copy of the unclassified dossier prepared for Al-Shorabi's Tribunal, and made it available for download.[2]

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[12]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Zuhail Abdo Anam Said Al Sharabi's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 25 October 2005.[4] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee immigrated to Afghanistan in 1999 to train under Omar Al Libi at the Libyan camp near Kabul, Afghanistan.
  2. In approximately mid-February of 2000, the detainee stayed at a large, well known Taliban guesthouse in Quetta, Pakistan.
  3. In approximately February of 2000, the detainee stayed at the Arab guesthouse run by Abu Khaloud in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  4. The detainee lived in the Al Ansar guesthouse located in the Karti Barwan neighborhood of Kabul, Afghanistan for fifteen months. He lived in another nearby guesthouse for eight months.
  5. In approximately February or March of 2000, the detainee stayed at the guesthouse located in the Karti Barwan section of Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee went back and forth from the frontline to the guesthouse.
  6. After the detainee was sent to the front lines to fight, he saw an associate who was in charge at the battlefront near Kandahar.
  7. The detainee was on the front lines on 11 September 2001. He remained on the frontline until Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance and they retreated. The detainee and three Saudis drove from Kabul to Abu Khaloud's guesthouse in Kandahar.
  8. After the fall of Kabul, the detainee stayed at Abu Khaloud's guesthouse for about a week before going with an Afghan guide to Quetta, Pakistan. From Quetta, the detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan and was arrested at a safehouse.
b. Training
  1. The detainee trained at a camp located near the Al Ansar guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan. The leader of the camp was Abu Omar Al-Libby.
  2. The detainee completed 40 days of training that included physical fitness, self-defense, small weapons training on pistols and Kalashnikovs and geographic and topographic training.
  3. A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee as a participant in an elite training course a the Mes Aynak camp in Lowgar, Afghanistan, in 1999.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee traveled to Malaysia with a senior al Qaida operative. The detainee met him at the Arab guesthouse in the Karti Barwan section of Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee knew this individual for a year prior to traveling with him to Malaysia.
  2. The senior al Qaida operative who traveled with the detainee to Malaysia is a close associate of Usama Bin Laden. He was known to be one of the closest persons in charge of Usama Bin Laden's security.
  3. The detainee's trip to Malaysia with the senior al Qaida operative was directed by Usama Bin Laden for the purpose of collecting information on airport and aircraft security. The objective of fitting him (the senior al Qaida operative) with a prosthetic device was a cover for the trip.
  4. While the detainee was in Malaysia, he stayed in a condominium with two individuals.
  5. These two individuals have been identified as 11 September hijackers.
  6. The detainee worked as a guard at the airport prior to 11 September 2001. The detainee was seen in the company of Usama Bin Laden and another senior al Qaida operative. The detainee is believed to be al Qaida because of his access ot Usama Bin Laden.
  7. In February 2001, the detainee attended a speech by Usama Bin Laden at a center for Arabs near Kabul, Afghanistan.
  8. The detainee may have sworn bayat to Usama Bin Laden.
  9. The detainee was identified as one of Usama Bin Laden's guards.
  10. The detainee was identified as one of Usama Bin Laden's drivers.
  11. The detainee's passport photo, identification card and flight coupon from Sana to Karachi were recovered during the arrest of a known Usama Bin Laden bodyguard. The detainee's documents were found with photos and documents of other Usama Bin Laden bodyguards.
  12. The detainee was identified as being at the Ashara guesthouse and closely associated with the individual in charge of the Ashara guesthouse and who also commanded on the front lines. This individual was known to be al Qaida and the detainee was suspected of being al Qaida.
  13. The senior al Qaida operative gave the detainee money to purchase an airline ticket to Yemen from Malaysia.
  14. The senior al Qaida operative gave the detainee money while they were in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Malaysia.
d. Intent
The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to die as a martyr for God.
e. Detainee Actions and Statements
  1. The detainee acquired a false Yemeni passport in the name of Imad Muhamed Ali Said.
  2. The detainee wore Afghan clothing while traveling form Karachi to Afghanistan so as not to raise suspicion.
  3. The detainee stated he was willing to sign a statement saying he is a member of al Qaida and put his fingerprints and toe-prints on the document.
  4. The detainee stated he is in trouble for being a member of and associated with al Qaida.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee stated he has never sworn bayat to Usama bin Laden.
b.

The detainee stated that he never used his weapon or killed anyone.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that captive 569 chose to participate in his first annual Administrative Review Board hearing.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Zohair Mohammed Said's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 12 October 2006.[10] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee immigrated to Afghanistan in 1999 to train at the Libyan camp near Kabul, Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee stated he lived in the al Ansar guest house located in Kabul, Afghanistan for fifteen months until he moved across the street to a new guest house when the guest house closed. The detainee lived at the new guest house for eight months.
  3. The detainee was sent to the front lines to fight, he saw an associate who was in charge at the battlefront near Qandahar, Afghanistan.
  4. In approximately mid-February 2000, the detainee stayed at a large, well known Taliban guest house in Quetta, Pakistan.
  5. In approximately February 2000, the detainee stayed at the Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  6. In approximately February or March 2000, the detainee stayed at the guest house located in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee went back and forth from the frontline to this guesthouse.
  7. The detainee was on the frontlines on 11 September 2001. He remained on the frontline until Kabul, Afghanistan fell to the Northern Alliance, then retreated. The detainee and three Saudis drove from Kabul to the Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  8. After the fall of Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee stayed at the Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan for about a week before going with an Afghan guide to Quetta, Pakistan. From Quetta, the detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan.
  9. The detainee was arrested at a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan.
b. Training
  1. The detainee trained at a camp located near the Al Ansar guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee completed 40 days of training that included physical fitness, self-defense, small weapons training on pistols and Kalashnikovs and geographic and topographic training.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee traveled to Malaysia with a senior al Qaida operative. The detainee met him at the Arab guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee knew this individual for a year prior to traveling with him to Malaysia.
  2. While the detainee was in Malaysia, he stayed in a condominium with a senior al Qaida operative, Khalid al-Midhdar and Mawaf al-Hazmi.
  3. The senior al Qaida operative gave the detainee money while they were in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Malaysia.
  4. The senior al Qaida operative gave the detainee money to purchase an airline ticket to Yemen from Malaysia.
  5. The detainee worked as a guard at the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport prior to 11 September 2001. The detainee was seen in the company of Usama bin Laden and another senior al Qaida operative. The detainee is believe to be al Qaida because of his access to Usama bin Laden.
  6. The detainee's passport photo, false identification card and flight coupon from Sana, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan were recovered during the arrest of a known Usama bin Laden bodyguard. The detainee's documents were found with photos and documents of other Usama bin Laden bodyguards.
  7. A source identified the detainee as being at the Ashara guest house and closely associated with the indivicual in charge of the guest house that also commanded on the front lines. This individual was known to be al Qaida and the source believed the detainee was also al Qaida.
  8. The detainee was identified as one of Usama bin Laden's drivers.
d. Intent
The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to die as a martyr for God.
e. Detainee Actions and Statements
  1. The detainee acquired a false Yemeni passporot in the name of Imad Muhamed Ali Said.
  2. The detainee wore Afghan clothing while traveling from Karachi, Pakistan to Afghanistan so as not to raise suspicion.
  3. The detainee stated he was willing to sign a statement saying he is a member of al Qaida and put his fingerprints and toe prints on the document.
  4. The detainee stated he is in trouble for being a member of and being associated with al Qaida.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee stated he has never sworn bayat to Usama bin Laden.
b.

The detainee stated that he never used his weapon or killed anyone.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that captive 569 chose to participate in his second annual Administrative Review Board hearing.

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ a b unclassified dossier (.pdf) from Zohair Abdul Mohammed Al-Shorabi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, September 30, 2004, page 12
  3. ^ OARDEC. "Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal - Al-Shorabi, Zohair Abdul Mohammed", United Statest Department of Defense, September 8, 2004, pp. page 91. Retrieved on 2007-11-10. 
  4. ^ a b OARDEC (25 October 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Sharabi, Zuhail Abdo Anam Said pages 21-23. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-09.
  5. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
  6. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index for Combatant Status Review Board unclassified summaries of evidence. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  7. ^ OARDEC (August 8, 2007). Index for CSRT Records Publicly Files in Guantanamo Detainee Cases. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  8. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index to Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  9. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index of Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round Two. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  10. ^ a b OARDEC (12 October 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Said, Zohair Mohammed pages 63-65. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-09.
  11. ^ OARDEC (11 February 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Otaibi, Nawaf Fahad pages 86-87. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-20.
  12. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10.