Ziad Said Farg Jahdari

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Ziad Said Farg Jahdari is a citizen of Saudi Arabia, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo detainee ID number is 286. Intelligence analysts estimate he was born in 1979, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared, on 30 August 2004, for the Combatant Status Review Tribunal of a captive called both Ziad Said Farg Jahdari and Ziyad Sa'id Faraj Al-Jahdali.[2] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. Detainee is a member of the Taliban.
  1. Detainee was recruited to fight the Northern Alliance and was financed for his trip to Afghanistan from Jessah [sic] Saudi Arabia by a Taliban member.
  2. Detainee traveled to Afghanistan and stayed in a place called the "Afghan center,"" 20 kilometers from Kabul. Detainee served as a guard and his responsibility was to watch for the enemy. The Afghan center was run by the Taliban.
  3. Detainee received informal training in the use of the Kalashnikov [sic] rifle.
b. Detainee engaged in hostilities against the United States and/or its coalition partners.
  1. Detainee fired his weapon in the direction of what he believed was the enemy.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that Jahdari participated in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[3]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings.[4] The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Ziad Said Farq Jahdari's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 24 January 2005.[5] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. Detainee traveled to [[Afghanistan and stayed in a place called the Afghan Center, 20 kilometers from Kabul. Detainee served as a guard and his responsibility was to watch for the enemy. The Afghan Center was run by the Taliban.
  2. The detainee has been designated as a high priority target and placed on a government watch list.
  3. Detainee departed Saudi Arabia in the Spring 2001, spent two nights in Karachi, Pakistan, then flew on to Quetta, PK. The detainee spent 6 hours in Quetta, PK, then left for Afghanistan. The detainee traveled by car to Kandahar, AF, where he stayed in a house with both Afghanis and Arabs. The detainee stayed there for approximately three weeks before traveling to Kabul, AF. The detainee stayed in Kabul for approximately three weeks before leaving for a village where he trained on the Kalashnikov. The detainee spent two and a half months in the village.
b. Training
  1. The detainee received one day of training with the Kalashnikov rifle before standing guard duty.
  2. The detainee was unable to provide the name of the group which he trained under; the name of the individual who trained him in the operation of the Kalishnikob rifle; the names of the individuals who sent him to the front lines; or the name of the commander he was under.
c. Intent
  1. The detainee was advised to fight with the Taliban if it is needed.
  2. The detainee was recruited to fight the Northern Alliance and was financed for his trip to Afghanistan from Jessah, Saudi Arabia by a Taliban member.
  3. The detainee fired his weapon in the direction of what he believed was the enemy.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainne advised if given the opportunity to return to his home of Jetta, Saudi Arabia, he would get married, obtain a job, and live with his mother and father.
  2. The detainee advised he does not hold any hostility or hatred toward the United States.
  3. The detainee was provided misinformation in the local mosque which he was attending in Saudi Arabia. It was there he was told the aggressors in Afghanistan were not Muslims.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Ziad Said Farq Jahdari's Administrative Review Board, on 3 February 2006.[6] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee was designated a high priority target and placed on a foreign government's watch list for his trip to Chechnya.
  2. The detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan. From Karachni he went to Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee then departed Quetta for Kandahar, Afghanistan. After a short stay in Kandahar, the detainee arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan.
  3. The detainee stood guard duty at an Afghan and Arab guesthouse.
b. Training
The detainee trained with a Kalishnikov [sic] for one day. He fired his weapon approximately twelve times.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee's name was found on a list of al Qaida Mujahidin recovered from various computer media in al Qaida safehouses.
  2. Another detainee claims the detainee was at al Farouq, Kabul and Tora Bora.
d. Intent
The detainee admitted he went to Afghanistan to fight the Northern Alliance.
e. Other Relevant Data
The detainee was on the second line of defense for approximately three months. At one point, the detainee and four or five other fighters moved from the second line to the front line for one day. While on the front line the detainee fired the Kalishnikov once in the direction of what he believed was the location of the enemy. He did not actually see any of the enemy troops.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee stated that if he knew the Americans would become involved in Afghanistan, he would have left immediately. The detainee repeated that he went to Afghanistan to teach the Koran and assist the Taliban in its fight against the Northern Allliance. He claims to have had no desire to fight Americans.
b.

The detainee claims that if given the opportunity to return to his home he would get married, obtain a job, and live with his mother and father. As far as employment, he does not have a specific trade, but would be willing to do any type of work to assist him in living a normal life.
c.

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

[edit] Transcript

The Department of Defense did not publish a summarized transcript of the unclassified session of the hearing. The Department of Defense did not explain why it did not publish a summarized transcript of the unclassified session of the hearing.

The Board's decision report memo records that the Assisting Military Officer summarized the captive's response to the factors.[7]

The Board's decision report memo records that the Assisting Military Officer reported that the captive felt attending the hearing would be pointless.[7]

"The AMO informed the board that during the ARB interview the EC appeared frustrated when asked if he wished ot personally appear at the ARB and he fidgeted in his chair and said, "what's the use, I've already given all my statements and I still have to be here."

[edit] Board recommendations

In early September 2007 the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official.[8][7] The Board's recommendation was unanimous The Board's recommendation was redacted. England authorized his transfer on August 14, 2006.

His Board convened twice, on 10 February 2006 and 17 April 2006.[8] His Board recommended that he "continues to be a threat".

His Board considered assessments from the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, the CIA, the FBI, the Criminal Investigation Task Force, Joint Task Force Guantanamo, the United States Southern Command and the Office of Military Commissions.[7]

[edit] Repatriation

According to The Saudi Repatriates Report Jahdari was one of sixteen men repatriated on December 14, 2006.[9]

[edit] References

  1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ OARDEC (30 August 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Jahdari, Ziad Said Farq (Al-Jahdali, Ziyad Sa'id Faraj) page 30. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-25.
  3. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  4. ^ Army Sgt. Sarah Stannard. "OARDEC provides recommendations to Deputy Secretary of Defense", JTF Guantanamo Public Affairs, October 29, 2007. Retrieved on 2008-03-26. 
  5. ^ OARDEC (24 January 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Jahdari, Ziad Said Farq pages 58-59. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-25.
  6. ^ OARDEC (3 February 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Jahdari, Ziad Said Farq pages 54-56. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-25.
  7. ^ a b c d OARDEC (17 April 2006). Classified Record of Proceedings and basis of Administrative Review Board recommendation for ISN 286 pages 2-11. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-25.
  8. ^ a b OARDEC (15 May 2006). Administrative Review Board assessment and recommendation ICO ISN 286 page 1. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-25.
  9. ^ Anant Raut, Jill M. Friedman (March 19, 2007). The Saudi Repatriates Report. Retrieved on April 21, 2007.