Zambian general election, 2006
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On 28 September 2006 Zambia will hold popular elections to determine the legislative and executive branches of government. The incumbent party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy led by President Levy Mwanawasa, will face a stiff election challenge from the opposition front-runner Michael Sata, of the Patriotic Front.
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[edit] Previous Multiparty Elections
In 1991, following the 1990 constitutional amendment that legalized multiparty politics, competitive elections were held and judged to be relatively “free and fair” by a number of observer teams. The results of this watershed election were clear testaments to an overwhelming rejection of the long-time incumbent, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), in favor of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Kenneth Kaunda, Independence leader and sole president since independence in 1964, was voted out in favor of the tenured labor leader Frederick Chiluba. Indeed, the election was a landside, where 76 percent voted in favor of Chiluba in the presidential contest, versus 24 percent cast for the incumbent. Similarly, the MMD walked away from the election holding 125 out of the 150 seats in the National Assembly.
The second multiparty elections to be administered after the 1990 constitutional changes took place in 1996. Despite being presided over by a new regime, the 1996 elections were troubled by a number of short-comings and violent episodes. These included questions over the accuracy of voter lists, problems with voter identification, a constitutional amendment which effectively blocked Kaunda from contesting the presidential race, and a UNIP boycott of the elections. Furthermore, state authorities harassed, and in some cases arrested, UNIP members and supporters for being allegedly associated with the “Black Mamba” bombings.
The second multiparty election also illustrates the coalition fragmentations that ensued within the opposition camp during the years following the 1991 election. As the African Election Database [1] shows, the 1996 elections were marked by tremendous growth in the number of opposition parties contesting the presidential and parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, the increase in the number of opposition organizations was not associated with any corresponding change in the level of support for the MMD or Frederick Chiluba.
However, due to continued economic stagnation and internal disagreements over the implementation of economic reform measures, the unity of the MMD was in a rapid retreat. As opposition to the Chiluba administration increased, the government increasingly resorted to heavy-handed tactics against dissent. To be sure, by most accounts, the human rights record of the MMD regime during and since the 1996 elections has increasingly soured, most obviously so during election periods and in the aftermath of the coup attempt on October 28th, 1997. The scathing report penned by Human Rights Watch in May of 1998, entitled “No Model for Democracy: Continuing Human Rights Violations”, which served as the basis for the NGO’s call for the continued suspension of donor aid to Zambia, documented serious human rights abuses against Chiluba’s political opponents, including the injuries of Kenneth Kaunda and Rodger Chongwe in August of 1997, and the crackdown against the Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC) and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) during the post-coup state of emergency. In the led-up to the 2001 campaign period, Human Rights Watch reported that, while MMD meetings and rallies were often carried out with ease, government authorities tended to obstruct events organized opposition parties and NGOs. Flexing the Public Order Act (POA), where breaches of the Act yield a maximum of seven years imprisonment, opposition meetings were prohibited or canceled on “public security grounds”.
The political climate at the time was also dominated by the “Third Term Debate”, where President Chiluba, with the backing of a supportive MMD national convention vote, pushed for a constitutional amendment allowing him to stand for another five-years in the executive office. This attempt at legal engineering was widely opposed throughout Zambian society, primarily by a group of civic organizations called the Oasis Forum. Due to the presence of organized opposition in civil society, Chiluba conceded defeat by May 2001, subsequently agreeing to back Levy Mwanawasa as the next MMD presidential candidate.
The credibility and ultimately the legitimacy of the December 27th, 2001 elections, which produced a narrow MMD victory in the presidential and parliamentary contests, were questionable if not an outright disaster. Some major and minor pre-election and election-day problems were pointed out by long-term and short-term observer teams. These included a “lack of ECZ (Electoral Commission of Zambia) independence and transparency”, bias media access and focus, the “misuse of state resources” compounded by a general “lack of a level playing field” in favor of the incumbent, inadequate voter education , and a mere fifty-five percent voter registration . Observations made by the Carter Center on election-day reported “minor problems”, including “an intimidating presence of officials from the Office of the President…, insufficient access for observers to verify results…, general chaos at some locations…, and long queues”.
However, the most pressing complaints stemmed from two particular aspects of the 2001 election, each related to the decline of MMD strength. First, the election results were close enough, particularly in the presidential contest, to easily lead to the perception that consistent irregularities during the elections may have erroneously determined an MMD victory (see table below). Secondly, the ECZ and the High Court was entirely unwilling to investigate these irregularities prior to announcing Mwanawasa and the MMD as the victors of the election.
The net result was a post-election fiasco and weakened election legitimacy. Immediately following the elections, letters of protest were delivered to Chief Justice Mathew Ngulube, who is also the chief returning officer under Zambian law, asking him not to declare a winner until the appropriate investigations were made. Numerous petitions landed on the doorstep of the High Court in efforts to delay the inauguration. Heating confrontations ensued only a few days after the election, when thousands of protesters were tear-gassed by police when attempting to storm the High Court compound.
Levy Mwanawasa was sworn by Ngulube on January 2, 2002, despite the popular protests and concerns expressed by Carter Center, European Union, and the SADC Parliamentary Forum over the election process. The major complaint lodged by the European Union mission was that “the ECZ’s preparations for the conduct of polling day, of the count and of the tabulation proved wholly inadequate for the logistical requirements in the field.” Furthermore, according to the EU delegation, the ECZ failed to investigate the differences in voter turnout for the presidential elections versus the parliamentary elections, where twenty-two constituencies showed a difference on nine-hundred or more. Similar ‘invalid’ vote discrepancies appeared in some fifty-five constituencies . In the final report issued by the Carter Center in early March, 2002, the delegation found that the “ECZ and government failed to administer a fair and transparent election and address electoral irregularities that clearly could have affected the outcome of a close race” .
[edit] The led-up to the 2006 Elections
In the years since the 2001 general election, government authorities and the ruling party have continued to show contempt and, at times, hostility toward political dissent. In the number of by-elections held since 2001, members of an assortment of opposition parties, including the Zambian Republican Party (ZRP) and the United Party for National Development (UPND) were arrested for disrupting elections or threatening peace and public order. In most cases, the charges were dropped by the police or the defendants acquitted by a judge. While the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), a Zambia-based election monitoring organization, stated that the voting in the Kantanshi by-elections “went on smoothly” , the organization was also expressed concern over the MMD's use of “government resources in electioneering, vote buying, and intimidation” .
More generally, the authorities have repeatedly used the POA as a legal venue for denying the right to political assembly, and forcibly dispersing demonstrations and obstructing rallies of the opposition, labor unions, and civic groups. Additionally, the police continue to challenge the autonomy of the media vis-à-vis the regime. In 2004, Reporters Sans Frontières reported that nearly all the actions “taken against journalists in 2003 were prompted by articles criticizing the president”.
Nevertheless, some positive developments have occurred more recently, most of which are attempts at strengthening the credibility and legitimacy of the up-coming elections. In late August, delegates from Zambia’s political parties, civil society, and the ECZ have traveled to South Africa to witness the printing of the ballot papers for the late September election. Additionally, the ECZ, now led by Justice Ireen Mambilima, recommitted itself to section 111 of the Electoral Act by establishing the national and district conflict management committees, which were dissolved after the 2001 election due to ineffectiveness and the lack of funds. With the goal of preventing and managing pre- and post-election conflict, committee representatives from all registered political parties, governmental and non-governmental organizations are supposed to ensure a balanced and informed approach to conflict management. Finally, in an attempt to reduce election-day intimidation, the Inspector General of Police Ephraim Mateyo, has ordered all police firearms to be “securely” stored in the armory rather than carried by each of the two police officers guarding polling stations on election day .
Additionally, new laws and electoral acts have been passed in order to reduce pre and post-election tensions that plagued earlier elections as well as stop the tide of international and domestic accusations of voting fraud. Despite the fact that the MMD will spend some 3-billion Kwacha in the parliamentary election , a new law forbids the ruling party from using public money for campaigning. An additional provision prohibits “unbalanced coverage” by the state media . Measures have also focused on strengthening transparency and accuracy in the election process. New voter cards have been issued and transparent ballot boxes purchased by the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ). The 2006 elections will be the first to use biometric data and equipment purchased from the South African Waymark Info Tech, to match the identity of voters to a database on eligible voters . Whether or not these measures will actually strengthen the credibility and legitimacy of the September elections, or reduce the prospects for post-election conflict, remains to be seen.
[edit] Zambian Political Parties
With the risk of oversimplification, political parties in sub-Saharan Africa are typically grounded on geographically-based identities and personal loyalties. Political parties in Zambia are no exception. Neo Simutanyi, of the University of Zambia, and the IRIN report that the “Zambian parties are largely regional organizations.” The largest opposition organization is the United Party for National Development (UPND), its main support base in the southern region. The Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD), and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) on the other hand, draw their support from the east. In the north and Copperbelt, the Patriotic Front (PF) is dominant, while the ruling MMD is among the Bemba speakers in the Copperbelt, Luapula, and north . The United Democratic Alliance (UDA) presidential candidate and former Grant Thontorn managing director Hakainde Hichilema draws support from his Tonga and Lozi base in Lusaka the Southern and Western Provinces.
Informed by the aforementioned party groundings, striking durable political alliances can be thwarted by strong differences based on language, culture, religion, as well as personal power ambitions. To be sure, there are multitudes of reports showing the persistence of race or tribal based verbal attacks between parliamentary and presidential contenders. The most notable ethnic discourse emerging during the 2006 election defines the presidential race as a contest between Bembas, centered on the PF presidential aspirant Michael Sata, versus the Bantu Botatwe, centered on Mwanawasa and Hichilema .
Despite the divergent bases of Zambian political parties, and the personal power struggles that often drive wedges between possible alliance formations, there has been some stellar displays of party unity in the lead-up to the September election. Over the past few years, the MMD experienced an enormous amount of factional struggles, as Mwanawasa’s anti-corruption drive conditioned widespread defections or expulsions from the party. The MMD presidential nomination in July of 2005, a process with the potential to shred some of the most long-standing incumbents, was equally heated. Enoch Kavindele, who was sacked as vice-president in 2003, challenged Mwanawasa’s bid for the MMD nomination . Despite these intra-party fissures, the incumbent regime has remained quite cohesive since the closing of the nomination process last summer.
Likewise, there have been some successful and unprecedented attempts at constructing pre-election coalition among the opposition parties. Early in 2006, the three largest opposition parties (FDD, UNIP and UPND) managed to stitch together the United Democratic Alliance (UDA), agreeing to support one presidential candidate, H. Hichilema, and one parliamentary candidate in each constituency. The United Liberal Party (ULP) agreed to back the FP presidential candidate Michael Sata. Mwanawasa has backing from the NDF (National Democratic Focus) and UNP leader Ackim Ngosa, while the Heritage Party (HP) president Godfrey Miyanda, appears to have support from the Agenda for Change.
Clearly, some of this alliance-making is a product of the high costs of running an election campaign, paired with the 20-million Kwacha nomination fee. Most of the parties that did decide not to field a presidential candidate, did so shortly after failing to meet the deadline for filing nominations. This included the New Generation Party (NGP), the New Congress Party (NCP), the NDF, the Reform Party (RP), and the Common Cause Democracy (CCD). All-in-all, where eleven presidential candidates were featured in the 2001 election, the 2006 election features a total of five.
[edit] Campaigns
Reflecting the trends of earlier elections, campaigns in the led-up to the 2006 election have been marked by personal attacks between political opponents, all of which take place at the expense of credible policy statements. Often, such intense attacks serve to divide the opposition rather than act as a source of opposition unity vis-à-vis the incumbent. The United Democratic Alliance (UDA) presidential hopeful Hakainde Hichilema for example, recently chimed in on the side of Mwanawasa’s comments on statements made by the Patriotic Front (PF) presidential aspirant Michael Sata toward government and presidential corruption. In response, United Liberal Party’s (ULP) Sakwiba Sikota, who was defeated by Hichilema in the contest for UPND presidency, came to the aid of Sata by when questioning the manner in which Hichilema gained chairmanship of the Sun International Hotel.
In mid-September, Sata intensified his attacks against his political opponents. In an attempt to implicate Mwanawasa in a web of corrupt campaign practices, the PF candidate, who actually supported Chiluba’s third-term bid, promised to halt the corruption prosecution against Chiluba and company if the former president would simply come clean and publicly state how the money was spent. At the same time, defended himself against attacks from the UDA’s vice-president Edith Nawakwi, by calling her a “frustrated young girl who has been dribbled by her brothers-in-law in the UDA.” Aside from the impact that personal attacks and accusations has on inter-opposition cohesion, mudslinging and character assassinations fail to address those major ideological or policy issues more directly related to poverty and unemployment reduction, health and educational improvements, and economic growth and development.
On August 21, the President of the International Fellowship of Christian Churches (IFCC), Bishop Simon Chihana, expressed his concern over the amount of mudslinging in the presidential campaigns Chihana explained that "we want people who will tell us how they will improve the health and education sectors. They should talk about issues like fighting disease like the HIV/Aids pandemic, tuberculosis and malaria." In a separate statement, Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC) spokesperson Father Paul Samasumo pointed out that “character assassinations” paired with “flamboyant manifestos” leaves open many questions over how such programs will actually be implemented once in office.
On a positive note, some candidates have recently engaged in efforts at presenting themselves as accountable and concerned. The Citizens' Forum, an organization dedicated to promoting “good governance and issue-based electoral campaigns”, has pressured candidates into making policy-based contracts with constituents rather than simply waging personal attacks against political opponents. While some of the promises made by the election contenders may be unrealistic, the issues expressed by candidates clearly reflect a desire to address the most pressing social and economic problems faced by Zambians: construction of schools, clinics, and roads in rural constituencies, and job creation and sanitation for urban constituencies.
Hichilema is perhaps the candidate most outspoken on farming and agriculture, stating that his administration would give “first priority” to rehabilitating the infrastructure in order to ease the burden of getting produce to the markets. With a UDA victory, he also vowed to give peasant farmers free seeds and fertilizers, and to construct irrigation schemes to enable the growth of crops throughout the entire year. He also promises to building a “agro-processing plants” in the Eastern Province in order to create more “employment opportunities” for the local people.
Sata seems to be among the strongest advocates for addressing deficiencies in education. Like most candidates, Sata stresses the importance of making education all the way up to grade 12 compulsory and free. He also gives additional emphasis to the supply-side of education by advocating that all teachers with three years experience should automatic enter into the university, although the Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT) president Sylvester Tembo criticizes this plan as unrealistic and failing to tie university attendance to merit.
The potential confusion for voters however, stems from the fact that almost all of the contenders for the 2006 election seem to be advocating the same policies. Things like free education, infrastructure development, and agricultural modernization feature centrally in the platforms of all of the opposition parties. Only the MMD is able to distinguish itself from the spectrum of competitors, but largely through the accentuation of past policy successes. A parliamentary candidate at a rally in Kabwe stressed the income benefits accrued by local women and youth due to MMD development project, benefits serving as “proof that the New Deal Government” was committed to women's empowerment”. At the same Kabwe rally, Ben Kapita, president of the Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU) highlighted the success of Mwanawasa’s agricultural policies in creating employment, reducing poverty, and curbing interest and inflation rates. Costain Chilala, board chairman of the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) stressed the positive relationship between the MMD’s fight against corruption and promotion of electoral transparency and stability on one hand, and the provision of a profitable business environment on the other hand.
Of course, being an incumbent also means being exposed to critiques over past government policy and practices. Again, the opposition appears united in expressing objections to pervasive government corruption and inexperience. Michael Sata is arguably the most outspoken critic of the MMD government, recently accusing the government of mishandling the final report of the Constitution Review Commission (CRC) when the cabinet failed to produce a white paper based on the Commission’s findings. For Sata, this failure reflected the government’s lack of ‘experience’ and inadequate of “knowledge on how the government was supposed to function”.
Over the next few weeks, the intensity of personal attacks and the frequency of allegations of corruption will only increase. Critical for the opposition are stronger efforts at directing strong policy critiques against the incumbent rather than at each other. Aside from pronounced resource deficiencies, one of the principle reasons why opposition parties have difficulties wining elections in other parts of Africa is their inability to show the electorate some semblance of unity and capacity for governance. Failures to spell-out clear policy objective, while simultaneously attacking one-another only undermines opposition credibility along these lines.
As for the MMD and Mwanawasa, continued efforts at highlighting some of the positive economic trends, and portraying the party as the only real capable national political organization is vital for achieving election victories. It is also important that the party maintains some internal discipline, as disgruntled party candidates at the constituency levels are at times known to campaign on behalf of opposition contender. Given the resource advantages of the incumbency, maintaining some level of discipline is far easier for the MMD than it is for the opposition.
[edit] Citations
2001. Human Rights Developments (Zambia): Human Rights Watch
2002. Observing the 2001 Zambia Elections Final Report: The Carter Center Democracy Program
2002. Zambia Elections 2001 Final Statement: The European Union
McCullum, Hugh & Chirambo, Kondwani. EU Urges results Verification before Inauguration. Southern African Research and Documentation Cenre, December 31, 2001
2005. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Zambia): U.S. State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
2005. MMD, PF share parley seats. Times of Zambia
2004. Zambia – 2004 Annual Report. Reporters Sans Frontières
Chakwe, Masuzyo. ZEC Commends ECZ for trying to bring Credibility to Electoral Process. The Post (Lusaka), August 24, 2006
Conflict Management Committees Re-Established. The Times of Zambia, August 24, 2006
No Guns for Cops During Next Month's Elections. The Times of Zambia, August 22, 2006
Mupuchi, Speedwell. MMD to Spend K3bn On Parliamentary Campaigns. The Post (Lusaka), August 24, 2006
Aiming for a free and fair election. IRIN, July 28, 2006
Zulu, Brenda. Biometrics to Be Used in 2006 Elections, Highway Africa News Agency, August 23, 2006
Aiming for a free and fair election. IRIN, July 28, 2006
Silwamba, David et. Al. I've Liked HH Very Much says Mpezeni. The Post (Lusaka), August 22, 2006
Muleya, Mweelwa. Issue-Based Campaigns. The Post (Lusaka), August 22, 2006
Landslide win for Zambia leader. BBC, July 15, 2005
Zambia Parties Unite for election. BBC, August 10, 2006
More parties pull out. The Times of Zambia, August 14, 2006
Chellah, George & Paipi, Kwenda. Zambians Will Rise If Polls Are Rigged Says Sata. The Post (Lusaka), August 22, 2006
Saluseki, Bivan & Chellah, George. Sata Pledges to Stop Chiluba’s Prosecution. The Post (Lusaka), September 12, 2006
Church Calls for End to Name-Calling. The Times of Zambia, August 22, 2006
Politicians sign Contract ahead of Vote. IRIN, August 17, 2006
Kasamu, Choolwe. UDA Promises ready Market for Farm Produce. The Times of Zambia, September 12, 2006.
Wandi, Gilbert. KK Has the Right to Support Any Party. The Post (Lusaka), August 29, 2006.
Chilemba, Patson. Teachers Place Their Plight on Election Agenda. The Post (Lusaka), August 24, 2006
Gladys Nyirongo Assures of Victory. The Times of Zambia, August 24, 2006
