Zahar Omar Hamis Bin Hamdoun

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Zahar Omar Hamis Bin Hamdoun is a citizen of Yemen, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] His detainee ID number is 576. The Department of Defense reports that Bin Hamdoun was born on November 13, 1979, in Ash Shihr, Yemen.

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunal. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Allegations

To comply with a Freedom of Information Act request, during the winter and spring of 2005, the Department of Defense released 507 memoranda. Those 507 memoranda each contained the allegations against a single detainee, prepared for their Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The detainee's name and ID numbers were redacted from all but one of the memoranda. However 169 of the memoranda had the detainee's ID hand-written on the top right hand of the first page corner. When the Department of Defense complied with a court order, and released official lists of the detainee's names and ID numbers it was possible to identify who those 169 were written about. Zahar Omar Hamis Bin Hamdoun was one of those 169 detainees.[2]

a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida:
  1. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in the fall of 1999 from Yemen via Pakistan.
  2. The detainee trained at the al Farouq camp.
  3. The detainee completed training on the AK-47 fifle, M-16 rifle, rocket-propelled grenade launcher, PK, and hand grenades.
  4. The detainee attended a lecture by Usama Bin Laden.
  5. The detainee stayed at multiple safehouses.
  6. The detainee was arrested in a safehouse.
  7. During detainee's arrest, two flotation devices, with explosive residue on them, were discover [sic] .

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that Bin Hamdoun participated in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[3]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Zahar Omar Hamis Bin Hamdoun's first annual Administrative Review Board, on July 12, 2005.[4] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan eight months after graduating high school. Abdu Salam [sic] , a parishioner at the Takwa Mosque, convinced him to go to Afghanistan for "dawa" (religious calling to teach Islam).
  2. Abdul Salem [sic] , a possible al Qaida or Taliban recruiter and travel facilitator, provided the detainee airline tickets and 50 U.S. dollars for his travel to Afghanistan.
b. Training
  1. The detainee attended Farouk camp for two to three months where he trained on the Kalishnikov (AK-47), M-16, pistols, PK, RPG, and hand grenades.
  2. The detainee was identified as a trainer at al Farouq who taught everything from basic weapons to explosives.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. While training at the camp, Usama Bin Ladin visited the camp to give a lecture.
  2. After training, the detainee claimed he stayed at an unidentified Arab house with Sheik abu Hassen [sic] .
  3. The detainee described Abu Hassan [sic] as Egyptian, six feet tall, 200 lbs and 40 years of age, with short black hair and a long beard.
  4. Sheik Hassen [sic] , a high level al Qaida official at the al Qaida basic training course, is an Egyptian national, approximately six feet tall with medium build, white skin, black hair and a long black beard. Sheik Hassen came to ensure that the jihad was being taught properly.
  5. In Karachi, the detainee stayed at an Arab guesthouse while waiting for Abu Aziz to arrange travel for the detainee.
  6. Al Qaida operative Riyadh the Facilitator was well known in Karachi as Aziz [sic] . He assisted mujahaddin [sic] departing Pakistan.
  7. Sixteen individuals resided in the Karachi house waiting for Aziz to get stamps or visas for their passports in order to get out of Pakistan. Pakistani security raided the Karachi safehouse on 7 February 2002. They captured Riyadh (Aziz) and 15 other individuals.
  8. The detainee was part of the group arrested with Aziz.
d. Other Relevant Data
  1. During a 14 July 2002 interview, the detainee, contrary to previous statements, claimed that he had never trained at any training camp, including al Farouq, and had never seen Usama Bin Laden in person.
  2. The detainee stated that although there was a stamp for Jordan in his passport, he had never been to Jordan.
  3. When captured, the detainee had his passport, a Koran, and $1000 U.S. currency in his possession.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

When asked how he felt about Americans, the detainee stated just because someone is not a Muslim doesn't mean he won't treat them well.
b.

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Za Her Omer Khamis second annual Administrative Review Board, on 20 August 2006.[5] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. A parishioner at Takwa Mosque convinced the detainee to go to Afghanistan for Dawa. The detainee went to Afghanistan eight months after graduating high school.
  2. The detainee was at guest [sic] house called Muddafah al Ansar in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
b. Training
  1. The detainee trained at Camp al Farouq for two to three months on various weapons including the Kalishnikov, M-16, pistols, PK, RPG, and hand grenades.
  2. The al Farouq Camp was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan.
  3. When the detainee arrived at Camp Farouk, he was asked to take weapons training for jihad and the detainee agreed willingly.
  4. The detainee identified the commander of Camp Farouk.
  5. An individual identified the detainee as the primary weapons instructor at Camp al Farouq. Reportedly, the detainee also taught explosives.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee states he stopped at a house called Madafa, known as the House of the Saudi Ambassador, located in Wazr Akbahr Khan, Shahree Nao, Afghanistan.
  2. The Ambassador of Saudi Arabi Guest House is known as Azzam Guest House.
  3. The Azzam Guest House is run by one of Usama bin Laden's most trusted people.
  4. The detainee stayed at a house in Karachi, Pakistan. During this stay, all travel arrangements, food and clothing was taken care of by an individual at the house.
d. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee, contrary to previous statements, claimed that he had never trained at any training camp, including al Farouq.
  2. The detainee said Usama bin Laden visited Camp Farouk during his training to give a lecture on the battle of Jagi in Northern Afghanistan.
  3. The detainee, contrary to previous statements, stated that he had never seen Usama bin Laden in person but that he only saw him on the television.
  4. The detainee, contrary to previous statements, stated that the Commander of Camp al Farouk was not the Commander previously acknowledged and that the detainee didn't know what his job was.
  5. At the time of the detainee's arrest, life jackets from an airline were found at the house in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee acknowledged seeing one vest lying on a second floor balcony
  6. Initial testing on the two life vests and a backpack found at the safe house in Karachi, Pakistan, tested positive for explosives.
  7. The detainee's passport indicates he was in Jordan 14 April to 18 August 2000. The detainee states he had never been to Jordan and htat an acquaintance forged his passport.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee states he had no prior knowledge of the events leading up to the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

[edit] References

  1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ Summary of Evidence memo (.pdf) prepared for Zahar Omar Hamis Bin Hamdoun's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - October 14, 2004 - page 260
  3. ^ (Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  4. ^ OARDEC (July 12, 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of pages 30-32. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-11.
  5. ^ OARDEC (20 August 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of pages 74-76. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-11.