Yunis Abdurrahman Shokuri

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Yunis Abdurrahman Shokuri is a citizen of Morocco, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.[1] His detainee ID number is 197. Shokuri reports his date of birth as April 5, 1968. The Department of Defense reports that he was born in Asafi, Morocco.

Contents

[edit] Identity

Shokuri was named inconsistently in official Department of Defense documents.

  • He was named Yunis Abdurrahman Shokuri in the official list of all captives, released on May 15, 2006.[2]
  • He was named Yuunis Shokuri in one of the allegations in the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for Laacin Ikrassin, another Moroccan, which justified his continued detention because he associated with Radwan Shokuri and Yuunis Shokuri.[3]:

[edit] Press reports

On July 12, 2006 the magazine Mother Jones provided excerpts from the transcripts of a selection of the Guantanamo detainees.[4] Shokuri was one of the detainees profiled. According to the article his transcript contained the following comment:

[T]he only way I know the United States is through movies from Hollywood or through cartoons. I’m a big fan of a lot of their singers…. [T]he first time I saw an American soldier was at Kandahar Air Base…. When I first saw myself in Kandahar, it was like I was in a cinema or a movie. I saw a 1996 movie called The Siege. The movie was about terrorists carrying out terrorist attacks in the United States…. [In the movie] the CIA and FBI were not successful in finding that terrorist group and the United States Army interfered and gathered all the people of Arabic descent and put them in a land cage or camp just like it happened in Kandahar. I was shocked, thinking, “Am I in that movie or on a stage in Hollywood?”… Sometimes I laugh at myself and say, “When does that movie end?”

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Shokuri Yunis Abdurrahman's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 16 November 2004.[5][6] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee was associated with the Taliban and al Qaida:
  1. The detainee traveled in June 2001 from Damascus, Syria, through Turkey and Iran, to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  2. Prior to helping form the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group (GICM), the detainee was involved with Jama'at Al-Tablighi [sic] .
  3. Jama'at Al-Tablighi [sic] is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization that is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
  4. The detainee was the head of the Military Commission[7] of the GICM.
  5. The GICM is associated with and supported by other known terrorist groups, including the: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Hizb-E Islami Gulbuddin [sic] (HIG), al Qaida, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Egyptian National Tarouat Salah, the Taliban and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA).
  6. The GICM allies itself with al Qaida and has supplied personnel for al Qaida for operations abroad.
  7. The GICM, with assistance from al Qaida, planned to carry out attacks against U.S. citizens in foreign countries.
  8. The detainee associated with known al Qaida members.
  9. The detainee is associated with a former Afghan-Arab linked to an al Qaida sleeper cell in Morocco.
  10. The detainee obtained AK-47 rifles and a mortar from the Taliban.
  11. Members of the GICM trained in an area between Kabul and the front lines against the Northern Alliance, where they fired AK-47 Rifles [sic] .
  12. The detainee left Jalalabad on foot in November 2001, when the city fell, and was arrested by the Pakistani Police on 19 December 2001 as he tried to cross the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

[edit] Transcript

Shokuri chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[8]

The allegations were read aloud, and recorded in Shokuri's transcript.[9] The version read aloud did not have his position within the GICM -- he was the head of the GICM's Military Commission. The version read aloud listed fewer terrorist groups associated with the GICM.

[edit] Opening statement

Shokuri said that all the detainees he had talked with, who had been allowed to meet with the lawyers handling their habeas corpus cases had been told they should not participate in their Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[9] But Shokuri said he chose to participate anyhow, because he had faith in his total innocence.

Shokuri said he had lived for six years in Pakistan, where he studied and did humanitarian work. Following his stay in Pakistan he traveled to Yemen and Syria. During the summer of 2001 he traveled to Afghanistan -- for humanitarian work.

[edit] Testimony

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[10]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Yunis Abdurrahman Shokuri's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 26 October 2005.[11] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
The detainee was involved with the "Saudi Charity Committee" and was in charge of the belongings and valuables for the Commission for Orphans of Former Mujahidin.
b. Training
The detainee stated there was a Moroccand fighting group training with weapons in Afghanistan.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee bribed a Taliban official to obtain AK-47 rifles and a mortar for the Moroccan group.
  2. The detainee was a part of a small group of leaders who formed the Groupe Islamiste Combatant Du Maroc organization in 1995.
  3. The detainee managed a guesthouse and was a recruiter for the Groupe Islamiste Combatant Du Maroc.
  4. The detainee is a Military Commander.
  5. The goals of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group reportedly included establishing an Islamic state in Morocco and supported al Qaida's jihad against the West.
  6. The detainee went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan and convinced the leaders of the Hizbi E Islami Gulbuddin [sic] to give them an apartment to erect a Moroccan guesthouse.
  7. The detainee rented a house in Hayatabad, which served as a welcome center for Groupe Islamiste Combatant Du Maroc volunteers traveling to Afghanistan.
  8. The detainee and several of his personnel met with Usama Bin Laden, who aided their group financially.
  9. The detainee had participated in the Afghan war and witnessed the United States invasion of Afghanistan.
d. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee left Jalalabad, Afghanistan when the city fell in 2001. The detainee was arrested at the Pakistan border by the Pakistan police.
  2. The detainee was first involved in Jamaat al Tablighi when he decided to travel to Afghanistan in 1990 to participate in jihad.
  3. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group provided recruiting, logistics support and paramilitary training to the Groupe Islamiste Combatant Du Maroc.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee traveled to the border of Afghanistan to do relief work.
b. The detainee was a relief worker for several organizations in Pakistan.
c. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo detention facility with negative results.
d. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
e. THe detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to the [sic] execution on 11 September 2001.
f. The detainee denies any involvement with al Qaida and states he would never swear bayat to Usama Bin Laden.
g. The detainee claims no connection to the Moroccan Islamic group.

[edit] Statement

The Department of Defense released a brief statement Yunis Abdulrahman wrote[12]:

I am the signed below, Yunis Abdulrahman: I've lived a happy life in my country, and I've learned from my father to love, do good, do charity work, and to give to the people. I grew up on this thought, and I traveled to Pakistan and participated in charity work in a real, true way through several charity organizations. I have felt the emotions and compassion for the needy and the poor. I was happy to do so, and I still truly feel that way, so every victim, whereever he is, he is in need of aid, help and care. My job in this life is to love people and help them, and offer everything and put all my effort I can to it. This is my joy. I thank God in spite of these years I spent in this great distressed and oppressed, unjust place that I have lived. This matter has only made me love good and feel what the oppressed, the poor, and the needy feel in the whole world, especially victims of the terrorists, who do not have any fault. The woman who lost her husband, the son who became an orphan with no fault, and the mother who lost her husband. People of love, caring, and kindness. This is my duty in life.

During his second annual Administrative Review Board he referred to attending his earlier Board.[13] The Department of Defense has not explained why this transcript was withheld.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Ahmad Abdullah Al Wazan's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 19 September 2006.[14] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee said that during 1990 he became active in Jamaat al Tabligh when he decided to travel to Afghanistan to participated in Jihad.
  2. The detainee said he was a founding member of a group identifed as Jamat Mujahedeen Maroc. The group was founded during 1999 in Peshawar, Pakistan.
  3. The detainee said he was called the Military Commander of al Mujahedin de Maroc only due to him being bestowed the title by virtue of being one of the oldest of the group.
b. Training
  1. The detainee said member of his group partipated in small arms training with Kalashnikov rifles. The training was conducted at a large complex outside of Kabul, Afghanistan and included live fire training by shooting targets. The training was for fighting against the Northern Alliance when called upon by the Taliban. In exchange, the group was provided a house in Kabul, Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee said that during the summer of 2001, approximately eight members of his group wanted to train with weapons. In an effort to keep these members from going to one of the area training camps, the detainee obtained nine Kalashnikov rifles from the Taliban in Kabul, Afghanistan had a local official write a letter of reference and then gave a bribe to a Taliban guard at a weapons warehouse.
  3. A source stated said [sic] that he attended training with the detainee at the Tarik Camp located near Bagram, Afghanistan. The source stated the detainee also fought alongside the source's group near the front combat lines in the vicinity of Bagram, Afghanistan.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. According to a source, the detainee was part of a small group of Moroccan Islamic leaders who formed the Group Islamique Combatant du Maroc, GICM, during 1995 in Sudan. The purpose of this organization is the overthrow of the Moroccan monarchy and to establish a religious state. The GICM was active inside Morocco, the United Kingdom, Italy, Syria, Turkey and France.
  2. According to a source, during the bombings in Afghanistan, the detainee met with Usama bin Laden who supposedly gave Group Islamique Combatant due Maroc financial aid to undertake actions in Morocco.
  3. The detainee and another person went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan [sic] early 1999 and convinced the leaders of Hizb I Islami Gulbuddin [sic] to give them a two-bedroom apartment for a Moroccan guest house.
  4. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb I Islami GUlbuddin, HIG, as a faction of the Hizb I Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Usama bin Laden after the latter fled Sudan in 1996.
  5. According to a source, Hizb E Islamic Gulbuddin [sic] provided Group Islamique Combatant du Maroc paramilitary training and infrastructure support.
  6. According to a source, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group provided Group Islamique Combatant du Maroc recruiting, indoctrination, logistic support, and paramilitary training.
  7. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Declared [sic] the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organiza against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama bin Ladin's al Qaida organization or are active in the international Mujahidin network. The group was designated for asset freeze in September 2001.
  8. A source said he saw the detainee at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan and heard he was a leader at the al Farouq Training Camp.
  9. Another source said that he was told the detainee was very close to Usama Bin Laden, was in charge to the Kandahar camp and was head of the North African group of al Qaida fighters. The source was also told that the detainee had his own weapon, vehicle and guards.
  10. An additional source said that the detainee was a military leader on the front lines near Bagram, Afghanistan and also in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
  11. Another source identified the detainee from a photograph and said the detainee was an individual that was experienced with explosives and improvised explosive devices.
d. Other Relevant Data
The detainee said when the bombing started in northern Afghanistan in November 2001 he planned to flee Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee's wife obtained transportation to Peshawar, Pakistan while the detainee and his brother Radwan fled east into the Tora Bora Mountains. After crossing the border the detainee and his brother were turned over to Pakistan authorities.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee said he didn't have any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also didn't have knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
b.

The detainee claims no connection to Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group.
c.

The detainee said he had no involvement with al Qaida and would never swear bayaat to Usama bin Laden.

[edit] Transcript

The Department of Defense released a 15 page summarized transcript.[13]

[edit] Release and disappearance

Various press reports assert that Shokure was transferred back to Morocco on October 12, 2006.[15]

[edit] References

  1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
  2. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  3. ^ OARDEC (2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Ikrassin Laacin. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-10-03.
  4. ^ "Why Am I in Cuba?", Mother Jones (magazine), July 12, 2006
  5. ^ OARDEC (16 November 2004). [Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- name redacted (released March 2005) pages 69-70. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-07.
  6. ^ OARDEC (16 November 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Shokuri, Yunis Abdurrahman pages 9-10. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-07.
  7. ^ The phrase "head of the Military Commission" was redacted when this memo was first released in March 2005.
  8. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Yunis Abdurrahman Shokuri's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 70-85
  9. ^ a b Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Yunis Abdurrahman Shokuri's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 70-85
  10. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  11. ^ OARDEC (26 October 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Shokuri, Yunis Abdurrahman pages 38-40. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-07.
  12. ^ OARDEC. Yunis Abdulrahman's statement to his first annual Administrative Review Board page 196. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-07.
  13. ^ a b OARDEC (date redacted). Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings for ISN 197 pages 21-35. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-07.
  14. ^ OARDEC (19 September 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Wazan, Ahmad Abdullah pages 4-6. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-07.
  15. ^ 10th Moroccan detainee transferred home from Guantanamo, International Herald Tribune, October 23, 2005