Xa Loi Pagoda raids

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The Xá Lợi Pagoda raids were a series of synchronised attacks on the Buddhist pagodas in South Vietnam shortly after midnight on August 21, 1963. The raids were executed by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces under Colonel Lê Quang Tùng, who took his orders directly from Ngô Đình Nhu, the younger brother of the Catholic President Ngô Đình Diệm. The most prominent of the pagodas raided was the Xá Lợi Pagoda, the largest in the capital Sài Gòn. Over 1400 Buddhists were arrested. The number killed or "disappeared" is estimated in the hundreds.

Contents

[edit] Planning

On the evening of August 18, ten senior generals of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam met to discuss the situation of the Buddhist crisis and decided that the imposition of martial law was needed. The generals wanted to disperse the monks from Sài Gòn and return them to their original pagodas in the provinces. The Buddhists had been protesting against religious favoritism towards Catholics in South Vietnam.[1][2]

Seven of the generals were summoned to Gia Long Palace on August 20 by Nhu for consultations. They presented their request to impose martial law and discussed how to disperse the monks form organizing protests in Sài Gòn. Nhu sent the generals to see Diệm. The president listened to the group of seven, led by General Tran Van Don. The group also included Army Chief of Staff General Tran Thien Khiem and General Nguyen Khanh, commander of the II Corps in the Central Highlands. Khiem and Khanh were the two who were responsible for helping to put down the attempted coup in 1960. Also present was General Le Van Kim, head of the military academy and Don's brother-in-law, General Do Cao Tri, commander of I Corps which ruled the northernmost region around Hue. The final two men present were the favorites of the Diem regime. General Ton That Dinh, the brash paratrooper who at 37 was South Vietnam’s youngest ever general, was the commander of the III Corps surrounding Saigon. General Huynh Van Cao was the commander of the IV Corps in the Mekong Delta and the only one of the septet that was not involved in plotting against Diem.[1]

Don claimed that Communists had infiltrated the monks at Xa Loi Pagoda and warned that ARVN morale was deteriorating because of the civil unrest. He claimed that it was possible that the Buddhists could assemble a crowd to march on Gia Long Palace. Hearing this, Diem agreed to declare martial law effective on the next day, without consulting his cabinet. Troops were ordered into Saigon to occupy strategic points. Don was appointed at the acting Chief of the Armed Forces in the place of General Le Van Ty, who was abroad having medical treatment. Don noted that Diem was apparently concerned with the welfare of the monks, telling the generals that he did not want any of them hurt. The martial law orders were authorized with the signature of Don, who had no idea that military action was to occur in the early hours of August 21 without his knowledge.[1][2]

[edit] Nhu's subversion

With the approval of Diem, Nhu used the declaration of martial law to order armed men into the Buddhist pagodas. Nhu purposely chose a time when the American Embassy was without a leader. Frederick Nolting had returned to he United States and his successor Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. was yet to arrive. Since the high command of the ARVN worked closely with the American military advisers deployed in the country, Nhu used the combat police and ARVN Special Forces of Colonel Le Quang Tung. Tung took his orders directly from Nhu. The men were dressed in regular army uniforms, so as to pass off the raids as regular military actions. Nhu’s motive was to shift the responsibility for a violent operation that would anger many Vietnamese and the Americans to the army. In doing so, he intended to dent the public and American confidence in the senior army command that were plotting against him. Nhu hoped that the majority Buddhist populace and the Americans would be less inclined to support the generals in staging a coup. In the past, Nhu’s Machiavellian tactics in playing the generals against one another had kept conspirators off-balance and thwarted coup attempts.[3]

[edit] Raids

[edit] Saigon

Squads of Special Forces and combat police flattened the gates and smashed their way into the pagoda at around 12.20 AM, as Xa Loi’s brass gong was clanged to signal the attack. Nhu’s men were armed with pistols, submachine guns, carbines, shotguns, grenades and tear gas. The red bereted Special Forces were joined by truckloads of steel-helmeted combat police in army camouflage uniforms.[4] Monks and nuns who barricaded themselves behind wooden shields were attacked with rifle butts and bayonets. The gong of the pagoda was drowned out by the burst of automatic weapons fire, the sound of exploding grenades, shattering glass and human screaming.[5] One monk was thrown from the balcony down to the courtyard 6 meters below. Nhu’s men vandalized the main altar and managed to confiscate the intact charred heart of Thich Quang Duc, the monk who had self-immolated in protest against the policies of the regime. The Buddhists managed to escape with a receptacle with the remainder of his ashes. Two monks jumped the back wall of the pagoda into the grounds of the adjoining US Aid Mission, where they were given asylum.[6] Thich Tinh Khiet, the 80 year old Buddhist patriarch, was seized and taken to a military hospital on the outskirts of Saigon.[7] The commander of the III Corps of the ARVN, Ton That Dinh soon announced military control over Saigon, canceling all commercial flights into the city and instituting press censorship.[8][6]

[edit] Hue

The violence was worse in Hue, where the approach of government forces were met by the beating of Buddhist drums and cymbals to alert the populace. The townsfolk left their homes in the middle of the night in an attempt to defend the city’s pagodas. At Tu Dam Pagoda, monks attempted to burn the coffin of a monk who had self-immolated. Government soldiers, firing M1 rifles, overran the pagoda and confiscated the coffin. They also demolished a statue of Gautama Buddha and looted and vandalized the pagoda.[6] An explosion was set off by the troops, which leveled much of the pagoda. Many Buddhists were shot or clubbed to death.[9]

The most determined resistance to the Diem regime occurred outside the Dieu De Pagoda in Hue. As troops attempted to stretch a barbed wire barricade across the bridge leading to the pagoda, the crowd tore it down with their bare hands. The crowd then fought the heavily armed military personnel with rocks, sticks and their bare fists, throwing back the tear gas grenades that were aimed at them. After a five hour battle, the military finally won control of the bridge at dawn by driving armored cars through the angry crowd. The defense of the bridge and Dieu De had left an estimated 30 dead and 200 wounded. Ten truckloads of bridge defenders were taken to jail and an estimated 500 people were arrested in the city. Seventeen of the 47 professors at Hue University, who had resigned earlier in the week in protest against the firing of the rector Cao Van Luan,[7] a Catholic priest and opponent of Diem’s brother Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc were also arrested.[6] The total number of dead and disappearances was never confirmed, but estimates range up to several hundred.[9]

[edit] US reaction and sanctuary for monks

The United States became immediately embroiled in the attacks following the escape of the two monks over the back wall into the adjacent US Operations Mission building. Saigon’s police chief, disguised in a Republican Youth uniform, cordoned the building. He ordered all Vietnamese inside to leave the area and threatened to storm the building when the Americans denied him entry. Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau rushed to the scene to stop any physical confrontation, but demanded the Americans turn over the monks. William Trueheart, the deputy of the recently relieved US ambassador Frederick Nolting, arrived at the scene. As the leading American diplomat in Vietnam in the transition between ambassadors, Trueheart refused to take action until he received instructions from Washington. He warned Mau against violation of the diplomatic immunity of the USOM. Trueheart knew that handing over the monks would imply American approval of the regime’s action. The confrontation soon died down, and the US State Department ordered Trueheart not to release the two monks and to regard the USOM building as having the same immunity as that of the embassy. More monks went on to find sanctuary in the US embassy which became known as the “Buddhist Hilton”.[10]

The new American ambassador Lodge was in Honolulu for last minute briefings with Nolting when news filtered through of the pagoda raids. He was given directions to proceed directly to Saigon, and arrived after sunset on August 22. The State Department denounced the raids as a "direct violation by the Vietnamese government of assurances that it was pursuing a policy of reconciliation with the Buddhists".[7]

On August 23, the first day that Lodge spent in Saigon, he immediately visited the two monks who had taken refuge in the USOM building. Lodge ordered that vegetarian food be made available for them. The meeting was a useful public relations exercise in showing where American government policy stood towards Diem and Nhu’s attacks on the Buddhist.[11]

[edit] Diem reaction

At 6 am, Diem came on the airwaves of Radio Saigon, stating “Under Article 44 of the constitution, I declare a state of siege throughout the national territory. I confer upon the Army of the Republic of Vietnam the responsibility to restore security and public order so that the state may be protected, Communism defeated, freedom secured, and democracy achieved.” Under the instatement of martial law, the army was given blanket search-and-arrest powers and empowered to ban all public gatherings, restrict press freedom and stop the circulation of all "printed material and other documents harmful to public order and security".[6] Government sources claimed that in Xa Loi, An Quang and various Theravada pagodas, soldiers had found machine guns, ammunition, plastic explosives, homemade mines, daggers, and Vietcong documents.[12]

[edit] Confusion over culpability and army denials

The driving force behind the government assault on the Buddhists appeared to come from senior military commanders acting without consulting civilians. The Secretary of State Nguyen Dinh Thuan and Interior Minister Bui Van Luong were caught off guard by the attacks. The initial perception was that the military establishment had suddenly cracked down on the Buddhists because they were deemed to be a threat to the war effort. The government propagated a theory which held that the military felt compelled to action after pro-Buddhist student unrest on August 17 and 18. In Hue, student protestors had turned on an ARVN officer after he fired into their path. The attacks were also preceded by a large rally at Xa Loi Pagoda where some monks had called for the overthrow of the Diem regime and denounced the anti-Buddhist statements of the de facto first lady Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu. These arguments were dismissed by observers, along with government claims that the raids were spontaneous. Diem had long distrusted his generals and frequently played them against each other in a divide and conquer paradigm to weaken any coup attempts. The army also contained substantial numbers of majority Buddhists, heightening skepticism that they would have attacked the pagodas and monks in such a violent manner. The synchronized military operations throughout the country, the speed at which banners were erected declaring the ARVN resolve to defeat communism and doctored propaganda photos purporting to show Vietcong infiltration of the Buddhists suggested that the actions were long premeditated.[13] Few South Vietnamese officers had known in advance of the raids. To maintain secrecy, special printing presses had produced propaganda materials only hours before the raids.[14]

The initial government line was that the regular army had taken the actions. South Vietnamese Army radio broadcasts bore the influence of Nhu’s abrasive tone in directing the Republican Youth to cooperate with the government. Nhu accused the Buddhists of turning their pagodas into headquarters for plotting anti-government insurrections. He claimed that the Buddhist Intersect Committee operated under the control of "political speculators who exploited religion and terrorism".[15] The new US ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., believed that Diem remained in control although Nhu’s influence had risen to unprecedented levels. He thought that Nhu’s divide and conquer tactics had split the military into three power groups lead by Generals Don and Dinh and Colonel Tung. Don was believed to not have the allegiance of Dinh and Tung, who took their orders directly from Gia Long Palace. The two loyalists were reputed to have detested one another but had support from various loyalist elements. Lodge predicted that if the army deposed Diem, fighting could break out within the ARVN.[15]

The CIA went on to report that the ARVN officers resolutely denied any involvement in the pagoda raids. They held that Tung’s Special Forces had disguised themselves in ARVN uniform before attacking the pagodas. Further unsubstantiated rumours had spread within the army that the Americans, who trained the Special Forces, had helped to plant the attack. The ARVN leaders were unsure of how to proceed and Don called a staff meeting on the morning of August 23 to discuss impending demonstrations against the raids by university students and the anger of junior ARVN officers about the pagoda attacks. Minh noted that the ongoing present of armed military personnel had alienated society by creating an "aura of suppression".[15] Later in the day, Don privately met with CIA agent Lucien Conein and reiterated that the Americans were mistaken in believing that the ARVN was responsible. Don insisted that Diem remained in control although Nhu had to approve all of the generals' meetings with Diem. Don insisted that Nhu had orchestrated the raids in the fear that the generals had too much power. He asserted that Nhu used the cover of martial law to discredit the generals by dressing the Special Forces in ARVN uniforms. Don insisted that he was unaware of the plans and was at JGS with Khiem when he received a radio message informing him of the assaults. Police Commissioner Tran Van Tu, supported by Tung’s men were in charge, and by the time Don arrived, the mission had been completed.[16] Kim had also had his own meeting with Rufus Phillips at the US embassy. He bitterly confided that Nhu had tricked the army into imposing martial law and becoming his "puppet".[17] Kim asserted that Dinh, Don and the other generals were not aware of the raids in advance. Kim revealed that the arms and explosives that Nhu asserted were found in the pagodas were planted. As a result the Vietnamese people had expressed anger at the army and their US backers, strengthening Nhu’s position.[17]

[edit] Martial law and riots

Police were ordered to shoot those who defied the 9 pm to 5 am curfew. Troops in full camouflage battle dress guarded every major intersection and bridge with automatic weapons and rifles with fixed bayonets. The empty pagodas were now ringed by troops and armored cars.[10] Censorship was enacted on all outgoing news, and reporters had to give their stories to travelers flying to foreign countries. The telephone service in the homes and offices of all US military and embassy staff was disconnected.[6][18] The 14,000 US military advisers throughout the country were under orders to stay in their homes, and all leaves had been canceled.[2]

The pagoda raids stoked widespread public disquiet in the previously apolitical Saigon public. On midnight of August 22, Generals Don, Dinh and Khiem had informed Nhu that student demonstrations were planned for three consecutive days. They recommended that the schools be closed, but when Nhu took them to see Diem, Diem refused to close the schools. Diem decided that the students would be allowed to protest.[19] As a result, Students at Saigon University boycotted classes and rioted, which was met by arrests, imprisonment and the closure of the university. This was repeated at Hue’s University. When high school students demonstrated, Diem arrested them too. More than 1000 students from Saigon's leading high school, most of them children of Saigon public servants were sent to re-education camps.[20]

His foreign minister Vu Van Mau resigned, shaving his head like a Buddhist monk in protest. When he attempted to leave the country on a religious pilgrimage, Diem had him jailed. Tran Van Chuong, the Ambassador to the United States and father of the de facto first lady Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, resigned in protest. Chuong charged Diem with having "copied the tactics of totalitarian regimes".[21] Madame Chuong, who was South Vietnam’s observer at the United Nations resigned and spoke of mass executions and a reign of terror under Diem and Nhu. She predicted that if Diem and the Nhus did not leave Vietnam then it would be inevitable that they would be killed.[11] The Voice of America announced that Chuong had resigned in protest, but this was denied by Saigon, which asserted that they were sacked. Diem’s officials claimed that Chuong’s last telegram had been so critical of the regime that it was determined to be "inadmissible in form and substance".[19] After years of complaining privately about his ambassador, Diem dismissed him.[19]

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ a b c Hammer, p. 166.
  2. ^ a b c Jones, p. 300.
  3. ^ Hammer, p. 167.
  4. ^ Jones, p. 297.
  5. ^ Jacobs, p. 153.
  6. ^ a b c d e f The Crackdown. TIME (August 30, 1963). Retrieved on 2007-08-18.
  7. ^ a b c Hammer, p. 168.
  8. ^ Jones, p. 298.
  9. ^ a b Jacobs, pp. 152–153.
  10. ^ a b Jones, p. 299.
  11. ^ a b Hammer, p. 171.
  12. ^ Jones, pp. 298–299.
  13. ^ Jacobs, p. 300.
  14. ^ Jones, p. 305.
  15. ^ a b c Jones, p. 306.
  16. ^ Jones, pp. 307–308.
  17. ^ a b Jones, p. 309.
  18. ^ Jacobs, p. 153.
  19. ^ a b c Hammer, p. 173.
  20. ^ Jacobs, pp. 153–154.
  21. ^ Jacobs, p. 154.

[edit] References

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