Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

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Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is the most influential and widely discussed interpretation of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.[1] First published in 1982, the book contends that the central argument of the Philosophical Investigations centers on a devastating rule-following paradox that undermines the possibility of us ever following rules in our use of language. Kripke writes that this paradox is "the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date" (p. 60). Kripke argues that Wittgenstein does not reject the argument that leads to the rule-following paradox, but accepts it and offers a 'skeptical solution' to ameliorate the paradox's destructive effects. Whilst most commentators accept that the Philosophical Investigations contains the rule-following paradox as Kripke presents it, few have concurred in attributing Kripke's skeptical solution to Wittgenstein. It should be noted that Kripke himself expresses doubts in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language as to whether Wittgenstein would endorse his interpretation of the Philosophical Investigations. He says that the work should not be read as an attempt to give an accurate statement of Wittgenstein's views, but rather as an account of Wittgenstein's argument "as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him" (p. 5). The portmanteau "Kripkenstein" has been coined as a jesting nickname for Kripke's reading of the Philosophical Investigations.

Contents

[edit] The Rule-Following Paradox

In PI 201a Wittgenstein explicitly states the rule-following paradox: "This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course of action can be made out to accord with the rule". Kripke gives a mathematical example to illustrate the reasoning that leads to this conclusion. Suppose that you have never added numbers greater than 50 before. Further, suppose that you are asked to perform the computation '68 + 57'. Our natural inclination is that you will apply the addition function as you have before, and calculate that the correct answer is '125'. But now imagine that a bizarre skeptic comes along and argues:

(i) That there is no fact about your past usage of the addition function that determines '125' as the right answer.

(ii) That nothing justifies you in giving this answer rather than another.

After all, the skeptic reasons, by hypothesis you have never added numbers greater than 50 before. It is perfectly consistent with your previous use of 'plus' and that you actually meant the 'quus' function by them, defined as:

'x quus y' = x + y, if x, y < 50. = 5 otherwise.

The skeptic argues that there is no fact about you that determines that you ought to answer '125' rather than '5'. Your past usage of the addition function is susceptible to an infinite number of different quus-like interpretations. It appears that every new application of 'plus', rather than being governed by a strict, unambiguous rule, is actually a leap in the dark.

The obvious objection to this procedure is that the addition function is not defined by a number of examples, but by a general rule or algorithm. But then the algorithm itself will contain terms that are susceptible to different and incompatible interpretations, and the skeptical problem simply resurfaces at a higher level. In short, rules for interpreting rules provide no help, because they themselves can be interpreted in different ways. Or, as Wittgenstein himself puts it, "any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning" (PI 198a).

Similar skeptical reasoning can be applied to any word of any human language. The power of Kripke's example is that in mathematics the rules for the use of expressions appear to be defined clearly for an infinite number of cases. Kripke doesn't question the validity the mathematics of the '+' function, but rather the meta-linguistic usage of 'plus': what fact can we point to that shows that 'plus' refers to the mathematical function '+'.

[edit] The Skeptical Solution

Kripke, following David Hume, distinguishes between two types of solution to skeptical paradoxes. Straight solutions dissolve paradoxes by rejecting one (or more) of the premises that lead to them. Skeptical solutions accept the truth of the paradox, but argue that it does not undermine our ordinary beliefs and practices in the way it seems to. Because Kripke thinks that Wittgenstein endorses the skeptical paradox, he is committed to the view that Wittgenstein offers a skeptical, and not a straight, solution.

The rule-following paradox threatens our ordinary beliefs and practices concerning meaning because it implies that there is no such thing as meaning something by an expression or sentence. John McDowell explains this well. We are inclined to think of meaning in contractual terms: that is, that meanings commit or oblige us to use words in a certain way. When you grasp the meaning of the word "dog", for example, you know that you ought to use that word to refer to dogs, and not cats. Now, if there cannot be rules governing the uses of words, as the rule-following paradox apparently shows, this intuitive notion of meaning is utterly undermined.

Kripke’s view of the Philosophical Investigations disagrees with other commentators who suggest the Private language argument is presented in sections after §256. Instead, Kripke insists the conclusion is explicitly stated by §202, which reads “Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same as obeying it.” Further, Kripke identifies Wittgenstein’s interests in the philosophy of mind as being related to his interests in the foundations of mathematics, in that both subjects require considerations concerning rules and rule following. (WRPL 4)

[edit] Controversies Over Kripke's Interpretation

Kripke could be said to diverge from the text and spirit of Philosophical Investigations in a number of ways. Kripke quotes section §201 as follows: “this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule.” Kripke holds this passage presents the reader with a novel form of philosophical skepticism, one, he claims, that is central to Philosophical Investigations. (WRPL 7) §201 continues

"The answer was: if everything could be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here."

Which seems to support Kripke’s view, but §201 continues further

"It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another one standing behind it. What this shews (sic) is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases." (PI §201 italics in original)

Thus any paradox is immediately dissolved. We can understand the difference between “obeying” and “going against” the rule in actual cases, that is, without the aid of philosophy. How do we, then, distinguish the use or misuse of a rule in actual cases? §202 provides a straightforward answer: Obeying a rule is a public practice.

There is another reason to hold Kripke has overstated the central nature of what he calls “The Wittgentsteinian Paradox” to Philosophical Investigations. In many ways this violates the spirit of Wittgenstein’s book. Throughout Philosophical Investigations are disavowals of philosophical theses. He implores to his reader: “don’t think, but look!” (PI §66) Philosophy, to Wittgenstein, “simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. –since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. (PI §126) And then: “If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.” (PI §128)

Kripke, however, attributes a new form of philosophical skepticism to Wittgenstein, and further attributes to him a skeptical solution. Skepticism, much less any solution to skepticism, is a thesis in itself. One does not come to skeptical arguments by ‘looking’ or by use of common sense, but from ‘thinking’ or from a philosophical perspective. Accordingly, many philosophers recognize that the view presented in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is philosophically important, though something of a hybrid position — as if it were a fictional thinker of Kripke's own creation — and so it is useful to have a name by which to call it. The thinker meant to hold the view is also sometimes called 'Kripke's Wittgenstein', or 'Kripkenstein' for short, or simply 'KW'.

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ Stern, David. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: an introduction, p. 2

[edit] Further Reading