Talk:Western Front (World War II)

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[edit] Page one

I was under the impression that the Western Front generally only referred to events in Europe from Overlord onwards. Oberiko

I've never heard anyone make such a claim, and I have in fact seen it used many times to refer to the early events in the war. →Raul654 18:10, Sep 3, 2004 (UTC)
Alright, then is it the North-West European Campaign that would refer to events Overlord and beyond?
I sincerely doubt there's a specific term for the post D-day Western front. I consider myself well versed in this area, and I can't think of one. →Raul654 18:40, Sep 3, 2004 (UTC)
I think there has to be a way to differentiate it. A few sites that do refer to that matter in question with the name NWEC Canadian department of defense website, British army website, Royal Canadian Armoured Core website, Book from the Imperial War Museum. This was, admittedly, a quick and dirty Google search, but I think it does show that there is a specific name for the events by reputable sources.
Also, if all these events (essentially everything west of Germany) encompass the Western Front, would that make Poland part of the Eastern Front? Oberiko 12:38, 4 Sep 2004 (UTC)

The British (and Canadians) Army fought the 1944-1945 North-West European Campaign culminating in the German surrender on Lüneburg Heath in 1945. The campaign battle honour was "North-West Europe 1944-1945". After the breakout from Normandy most of the rest of the Western Front 1944-1945 was manned by the US Army and commanded by US Generals under Eisenhower's "broad-front" strategy. Most of the troops who landed in Operation Dragoon in the South of France on the Mediterranean coast (17 km from St Tropez) never saw cold wet NW Europe.

BTW During the battle of France in 1940 the campaign battle honour awarded to the British regiments was "North-West Europe 1940"

To answer your question is Poland (1939) part of the Eastern Front. As you know from other pages where we have been debating this over the last couple of days, I would say yes. But I can also appreciate the argument that as there were no combatants on the Eastern front between the fall of Poland and the start of operation Barbarossa that to lump them together could be confusing. However on the Western Front as the UK was still in the fight and the Germans had to keep divisions on the western coast, to defend against raids like Dieppe and later the D-Day invasion, so the Western Front was in existence from 1939-1945. Philip Baird Shearer 09:17, 22 Sep 2004 (UTC)

Running out of names here then. I'll probably call it Western Front (campaign) and move this page to Western Front (theatre). Oberiko 15:03, 22 Sep 2004 (UTC)

I don't think that is a good idea. The name of this article is fine as it is unless it is moved to "Western Front of World War II" . The name "Western Front (theatre)" could be used for the Western Front (WWI) as well, so it is ambiguous.

If you want a specific page for the British campaign then call it "North-West European Campaign (1940)" and "North-West European Campaign (1944-1945)". Not that I think that this is necessary at the moment as the "Military history of Britain during World War II" covers it in as much detail as most would need. Fleshing out the very sketchy "Battle of France" would seem to me to be a better way to spend time.

As a general rule I would argue that one can not have theatres in the theatres. Because it is confusing to read. Look at the example in WWII when the mischievous US General Vinegar Joe Stilwell made what was an administrative grouping the "CBI theater" in to an line organisation with a command staff. It caused confusion at the time in the "South-East Asian Theatre" chain of command and still causes confusion for anyone trying to understand what was happening in the China/India/Burma triangle during WWII! The immediate assumption that the reader makes is that the Americans were running their own theatre independent of the "South-East Asian Theatre" and therefore separate campaigns which were not related. This of course was not true.

I do not understand why you do not feel comfortable with there being more than one campaign on a Front. After all this is quite normal just look at the Napoleonic wars where there was a new campaign every year often over the same ground. On the Eastern front winter tended to stop major initiative until the next year and it is quite possible to call the next summers attack a campaign Eg the the Caucus campaign. Also one can argue that when new allies join an existing front and take up most of the fighting like the Germans did in Africa or the Americans in Britain, that a new campaign starts on an existing Front.Philip Baird Shearer 18:02, 22 Sep 2004 (UTC)


I have no problem with multiple campaigns within a theatre or a front, but I would consider the Anglo-American campaign as one joint venture (just as the American and British assaults into Tunisia during the finishing days of the North African Campaign is generally catagorized as one Allied campaign).
I also have no problem with campaigns within campaigns, as that's quite common.
As I've said earlier, I prefer to catagorize by campaign more so then theatre or the ever ambigious front. The Italian Campaign was seperate from the Balkans, even though one might consider them both the Southern Front. Poland was a seperate campaign from the Soviet-German war, even though they could, (as our debates have shown) potentially, both be considered the Eastern Front by some.
What I'm looking for is a way to distinguish the joint Anglo-American attack (which is, I believe, one large joint campaign made up of multiple smaller campaigns) from 1944-1945 in Western Europe as seperate from, say, the Battle of France. I'd rather not resort to something unwieldly Western Allied Campaign to liberate Europe when I'm sure there's a more common, and therefore better, name for the venture. Oberiko 20:02, 22 Sep 2004 (UTC)

I think that the year titles in the article Western Front (WWII) are sufficient: 1939 – 1941, 1942 – 1943, 1944 – 1945. I think you are flogging a dead horse and should lighten up on the campaign bit in this case, because the Americans tend not to use the term they have wars, theater commands, operations and battles rather than campaigns, (it very positive thinking because it does not allow for defeats), while armies modelled on the British system have wars, campaigns, operations and battles (probably because the first campaign in a major war is often a defeat for the British). You can see this in the "campaign" medals awarded to Americans at the end of WWII, which are so broad as to be theatre medals,American Campaign Medal, Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal, European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal [1], [2]. If the names of articles in Wikipedia are to be close to those used in other references, the best that can be done is to try to muddle the two together. A Western Front article is a good name for an overview which allows those two different views to be encompassed in one document with links into more detailed articles. But I would not exclude 1939-1943 from the Western Front because they are just as much part of the front as 1944-1945.Philip Baird Shearer 23:56, 22 Sep 2004 (UTC)

Alright, I found it. European Theater of Operations was an American term used to refer to the European Campaign (for all Western Allies) from (essentially) Overlord onwards. While there is some ambiguity to the Mediterrean, it is common [3] to see it as strictly Western Europe. I'll do the writing there. Oberiko 14:48, 6 Oct 2004 (UTC)

If you do make sure that you do not mix up American adminstrative commands like ETOUSA and allied joint operational commands like SHAEF. Philip Baird Shearer 19:22, 7 Oct 2004 (UTC)

[edit] Roer or Rur?

I have changed the river's name to the German Rur from the Flemish/Dutch Roer mainly because this is the accepted spelling on that topic's main page (Roer gets a redirect). Also, though, the vast majority of the river flows through Germany, not the Netherlands, and in this context the crossing took place entirely on German soil. As far as I know, the convention adopted in the field and subsequently in the literature of using the Dutch was solely to avoid ambiguities with the 'Ruhr' of 'Ruhrgebiet' fame. But on Wiki the disambiguity is made explicit on both rivers' pages (I mean Rur and Ruhr). On the Rur page I've added a little bit more detail about its history as a front from Dec. to Feb. 44-45 Ribbit 13:33, 3 March 2006 (UTC)Ribbit

[edit] Casualties

Quick Question Did more US troops die on the Western Front against Germans or did more died fighting against the Japanese?--Secret Agent Man 20:37, 5 Mar 2005 (UTC)

There were about 407,000 US deaths in World War II of which about 292,000 were killed in action or missing and about 115,000 died due to other causes (accidents, disease, mistreatment as POWs etc). According to [4] the figures for killed in action break down very roughly into 4,000 in Africa, 30,000 in Italy, 109,000–135,000 on the Western Front, 92,000 in the Pacific, 4,000 in Southeast Asia, and 27,000–53,000 elsewhere. So more died on the Western Front. Gdr 19:20, 2005 Mar 19 (UTC)

[edit] Discussion on the 44-45 campaign

This text was added to the article (Revision as of 04:44, 22 January 2007) by W. B. Wilson:

>==1944 – 1945: The Campaign in Hindsight==

While the unconditional surrender of Germany represented a resounding Allied success, the path to this outcome was influenced by the strategic decisions of both sides. In retrospect, it is clear that particular factors and choices strongly affected the pace and course of the campaign.

  • The Allied deception as to where the D-Day landings would take place was very successful, with the majority of the German command convinced the landings would take place at Calais. For their part, the Germans underestimated Allied willingness to risk an amphibious assault over a route longer than the shortest path across the English Channel. While the Allies meticulously planned the landings, they failed to assess the countryside immediately beyond the beaches, which resulted in the Germans very successfully using the hedgerow country (Bocage) as a system of natural defensive works that took the Allies two months to clear at a staggering cost in infantry casualties. Historians have also asserted the U.S. Army should have landed on the eastern end of the Normandy beaches and formed the northern wing of Allied forces in Northwest Europe. The primary argument in support of this is that the mobility of American forces could have been better used in the more open terrain and most direct route to Berlin that the northern approach offered. As it was, the pre-invasion basing of troops in England determined the arrangement of the landing forces.
  • While the Germans had reason to occasionally doubt Allied military proficiency, it is clear the Germans consistently underestimated Allied competency. In its most damaging expression, this habit of underestimation led to the rejection of any notion that the Allies might have broken German military ciphers, most famously the Enigma code. The ability to monitor German military communications was an Allied strategic asset of the highest order. Less dramatically, the Germans also too often underestimated Allied troop proficiency, a habit that resulted in occasional sharp defeats for overconfident German units.
  • Manpower strongly affected the course of the campaign. The German ability to form a cohesive defensive line (the so-called "Miracle in the West") after the disaster their forces endured in Normandy was due almost entirely to the ability of the German Ersatzheer (Replacement Army) to quickly deploy large numbers of new troops. These inexperienced troops were paired with seasoned cadres who swiftly transformed the replacements into competent combat units. Thus, while the Allies took large numbers of German prisoners during their advance from Normandy to the German border, they underestimated the ability of the Germans to reconstitute their forces under very disadvantageous circumstances. The Allies also gravely underestimated the infantry casualties their forces would suffer in Northwestern Europe and the number of divisions that would be required to win the campaign. British manpower shortages became so grave that two infantry divisions had to be disbanded, while the Americans were forced to shake excess personnel out of their logistical and Army Air Force units in order to bring rifle units up to strength. Shortages of American manpower were strongly aggravated by a tendency to attack head-on regardless of circumstances, a habit that was particularly in evidence during the months of fighting in the Hurtgen Forest. The Allied logistical crisis that dominated their operations from September through December had the further pernicious effect of limiting the number of divisions in England that could be moved onto the continent to reinforce the front, since the Allies were only able to supply a limited number of divisions east of the Seine River. After the Allies mastered the logistical crisis, the Americans diverted divisions bound for the Pacific Theater to Europe in a belated realization that more divisions were needed for operations in Europe.
  • While the Germans achieved strategic surprise with their offensive in the Ardennes, the Panzer divisions that had been so painstakingly rebuilt could have been more profitably used to defend the Westwall and the Rhineland, or perhaps, in the defense of Berlin against the Red Army. The German thrust failed to shatter their enemies' alliance and cost Germany high casualities and equipment losses it could ill-afford. This folly was repeated in Alsace in January, but with the added disadvantage this time that the Allies were expecting the attack.
  • The Allies made serious errors and questionable uses of their forces several times during the course of operations in 1944-45.
    • Upon breaking out of Normandy in August, the Americans committed two armored divisions to operations in Brittany when armored units were direly needed for the pursuit of the German army across France. While the port of Brest, France was ultimately captured by the Americans, it consumed the operations of an American corps for an entire month and ultimately did little for the Allied effort because the Germans so thoroughly destroyed the port before it was captured.
    • Out of fear that two wings of their forces might collide, the Allies failed to definitively close the Falaise Gap in August, allowing trapped German forces an escape route to the east. Although the operations around Falaise trapped a considerable number of German prisoners, experienced German leadership cadres evaded Allied forces and were available to reconstitute a cohesive front line along the Westwall.
    • Although British forces conducted a brilliant pursuit across northern France that resulted in the liberation of the critically important port of Antwerp in early September, they failed to realize the port would remain unuseable while the Scheldt Estuary remained uncleared of Germans. The Germans immediately grasped the signficance of the Scheldt Estuary and moved in troops to conduct a lengthy defense. The Allied failure to swiftly clear the Scheldt Estuary meant the port of Antwerp could not be used until November 28, and strongly contributed to the lengthy logistical crisis that hamstrung Allied operations for four months. Operation Market-Garden was a double failure in the sense that the resources used for it would have been more profitably committed to clearing the Scheldt Estuary instead of carving out an extended salient that did nothing but extend an already over-extended Allied front line.
    • Despite grave shortages of riflemen, American operations in front of the Westwall, particulary in U.S. First Army's area, were characterized by bloody frontal assaults. Stubbornness and misplaced notions that the U.S. Army could not allow itself to abandon unprofitable operations saw five infantry divisions shredded in the Hurtgen Forest fighting, with the attack being abandoned only in December after the Germans attacked into the Ardennes. The concentration of divisions in the Hurtgen Forest-Aachen area also forced a corresponding lack of concentration along the Ardennes front, with the result that only four U.S. divisions were initially available in the Ardennes to parry a German offensive that was 26 divisions strong.
    • When, in November, the Allies enjoyed significant success in 6th Army Group's area, General Eisenhower refused to reinforce the success and even forbade his commanders in the south to attempt to assault across the Rhine in the area of Strasbourg while the German defenses were in shambles. This lack of bold enterprise was a by-product of General Eisenhower's decision to conduct limited-objective attacks on a broad front even though the Allies lacked a sufficient number of divisions to both man a broad front and concentrate enough combat power in chosen areas to achieve breakthroughs.
    • After crossing the Rhine, Allied force deployments were tainted by misplaced priorities, lack of firm direction from supreme political echelons, and to some extent, by exaggerated fears of German capabilities. When American troops reached the Elbe River in mid-April, General Eisenhower unilaterally decided that Berlin was no longer a significant military or political objective and ordered U.S. forces to halt along the Elbe and Mulde Rivers. Thus, these spearheads were practically immobilized while the war raged on for three more weeks. Simultaneously, General Bradley considered the Germans trapped in the Ruhr Pocket to be the most significant threat and committed suprisingly large numbers of U.S. troops to contain the pocket instead of reinforcing his troops at the Elbe River. As a consequence of Eisenhower's decision, British 21st Army Group was ordered to drive northeast in the direction of Hamburg instead of proceeding due east in the direction of Berlin. Finally, the Allies proved curiously gullible about German propaganda claiming the existence of a "National Redoubt" in the Alpine hinterlands of Bavaria and Austria. Fearing a large-scale last stand by the Nazis in this so-called redoubt, General Eisenhower directed no less than three field armies to clear southern Germany at a time when the largest groups of German forces stood to the east, not the south, of General Eisenhower's troops. Fortunately for the Allies, the German Army of April,1945, was in no position to exploit such misguided troop movements.

Thus, while the Allies enjoyed a great victory, it is equally obvious that their prosecution of the campaign was far from flawless, and that on occasion it afforded their German adversaries opportunities that prolonged the fighting unnecessarily.

I have placed it here because it contains a lot of assertions which are not attributed to any source and as such can be seen as either original research or a none neutral point of view. If such assertions are going to be made then I think the section needs to follow the example in Rhineland_Campaign#Battle_of_the_Scheldt:

Some scholars, including Stephen Ambrose, have suggested that the siege of Aachen was a mistake. ...

But even that example uses weasel words and does not cite its source which it ought to do:

Stephen Ambrose asserts that the siege of Aachen was a mistake (book xyz page 99). ...

would be better --Philip Baird Shearer 08:19, 22 January 2007 (UTC)

References provided -
The text in the "1944 - 1945: The Campaign in Hindsight" section in question is neither original research nor an attempt to assert a non-neutral POV (indeed, the standard histories of the 1944-45 campaign for many years were non-neutral POVs that failed to adequately identify Allied failures - Author Norman Davies in his work Europe has described a superset of this phenomenon as the "Allied Scheme of History".) If the text seems to focus on the Allies much more than the Germans, that is because the Allies held the initiative that drove the campaign's course for the bulk of its duration. Hopefully, the references provided will indicate where the comments in the text issue from. W. B. Wilson 18:00, 4 February 2007 (UTC)

Just in passing: British historians have always commented on this campaign (either to praise Monty or to bury him). They either emphasise that if only Monty's ideas had been followed the Western Allies would have been in Berlin months earlier than the Soviets, or to bash Monty (thank goodness Ike did not listen to Monty, look what a mess Monty made of advancing on a narrow front with Market Garden). --Philip Baird Shearer 19:33, 10 May 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Suggesting split

This article is really about two different campaigns, fought in some of the same locations, but a few years apart and by slightly different countries:

  1. the "Blitzkreigs" of 1939-40
  2. the "Second Front" of 1944-45.

The "Interlude" section is somewhat relevant to both — as an afterword to the first part and a preamble to the second.

I suggest splitting it into:

  • Western front (1939-40)
  • Western front (1944-45)

Apart from anything else, it seem odd to me that we don't have overview articles about either of the above subjects. What do others think? Regards, Grant | Talk 07:17, 27 August 2007 (UTC)

Agreed. Also I believe it should link to an article on the greater European-Mediterianian-African theatre. I imagine many people (myself included) may search for a Western Front in the terms of the war including the Western allies against Germany, including the Italian, Mediteranian, and African, as well as the Atlantic. Homersmyid 07:02, 30 August 2007 (UTC)
Perhaps we should go the other direction, and merge it into the air war and the war at sea, and the Mediteranian conflict. Something should cover the entire span of the UK-Nazi 39-45 conflict in which the two phases of the western front are only shorter chapters. Perhaps the western front should span everything from Norway to Syria (and west), and then split out detailed sections on the fall of france, the second front, etc. Gomm 18:36, 31 August 2007 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Gomm (talk • contribs)

I'm not so sure about splitting them. I can see how they're substantially different but I think they're closely related enough that it's not really a problem as such. Certainly, if the article gets too big and two articles are called for, that would definitely be the way to do it. As for now, I think it's small enough that it's all very much accessible so it's good having it together.Gregory j 22:56, 18 September 2007 (UTC)

I agree with Gregory j. Also what about 1940 to 44? --Philip Baird Shearer 19:50, 20 September 2007 (UTC)

We can definitely create a Western European Campaign (1944-1945) article (a title that's used in several sources) to contain the events including and beyond Overlord. For the 1939-1940 Western Europe actions (Phony War, Norwegian Campaign, Battle of France and Battle of Britain), I'm in agreement with Grant that Western Front (1939-1940) would be acceptable. If we did that we could also then have Western Front (1941-1944) (if needed) to cover events such as the Dieppe Raid, the actions by British Commandos and the bombing attacks over Germany. We could then keep Western Front as the parent article to the three.
To address Homersmyid's point, there's no common name (so far as I'm aware) which refers to the entirety of European Axis' war with the Western Allies as opposed to their war against the Soviets. My personal suggestion would to use The Western Allies war against the European Axis; a bit long, but quite clear. Oberiko 23:42, 28 September 2007 (UTC)

Redirects now work to sections. So I have altered Western European Campaign (1944-1945) to redirect to the specific section. So unless this article becomes so large that it needs a main article under the section "1944-45: the Second Front" I do not see the advantage of splitting the article. --Philip Baird Shearer 09:17, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] List of commanders

The list of commanders in the infobox is a mess. Many are missing and the command levels shown are including at least one division commander. It would be more tidy if it listed only theater and perhaps army group (and air / naval equivalent) commanders for 1939-1940 and 1944-45. Comments? W. B. Wilson 03:39, 10 October 2007 (UTC)

Agreed. I've made some revisions but still fear it is too unruly. It would seem the only way to truncate would to only include the head of state and most important field commander for each Allied army (for example only Roosevelt and Eisenhower to represent the US).
As for the changes I made 1) Clark fought in the Mediterianian, he doesn't belong on this list 2) Milburn was a corps commander, not as notable as Army commanders like Patton that aren't even on this list. 3) Removed Béthouart and Goislard also beacuse they were Corps commanders 4) Added Gamelin since he commanded the entire French Army during the fall of France 5)Added George Marshall as the chief of staff of the US Army (this might be contreversail since he wasn't a field commander, I'll leave it to the people's discretion).
Also I'd like to sugest possibly one representative of the Norwegian, Dutch, and/or Belgian armies be added to recognise their involvement in the campaign. Homersmyid 22:21, 12 October 2007 (UTC)