Water privatization in Brazil

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Flag of Brazil
Flag of Brazil

Water privatization in Brazil has been relatively limited compared to other infrastructure sectors in Brazil (power, transport, telecommunications) and to the water sector in some other Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Chile. Private companies provide water services to less than 4% of the population through a few dozen private concessions issued by state and (more frequently) municipal governments. As under all concession contracts, the private sector does not own the infrastructure. Likewise, water resources themselves remain publicly owned.[1] Approximately 80% of the population is serviced via public concessions from municipal authorities to state water companies, while the remainder of public water systems are provided directly by municipalities or municipal utilities.[2] Most concession contracts have been awarded by municipalities. A lack of legal clarity as to the right of state governments to also award concession contracts has thwarted some efforts at water privatization, notably in the state of Rio de Janeiro.

Privatization in Brazil has taken place without having previously developed a sound regulatory regime, as it was the case, for example, in Chile.[3] The impact of water privatization on access, investment, service quality, water use, tariffs and efficiency remains controversial and has not been analyzed systematically. A study to assess its impact is currently underway with support from various Brazilian stakeholders as part of a global multistakeholder dialogue on water and the private sector.[4]

Contents

[edit] History

[edit] Origins

Pedro II, the last Emperor of Brazil, and ruler during the first privatization efforts
Pedro II, the last Emperor of Brazil, and ruler during the first privatization efforts

The privatization of water in Brazil is linked to political-historical developments in the nation from the post-colonial Empire under Pedro II of Brazil. The first water privatization efforts took place (with English capital) in Rio de Janeiro (1857) and São Paulo (1877).[5] In São Paulo, Campanhia Cantareira’s sanitation services were deemed unsatisfactory by the 1890s and its contract was not renewed; Rio de Janeiro’s services were similarly re-municipalized a few years later following "popular uprising."[5] Colonization can be seen as laying the ground for privatization in these locales, as can be seen with the relative triumph of water privatization in French colonies compared to their British counterparts.[6] Health crises in the mid-19th century lead to an increased role for municipal governments in the water and sanitation sector,[7] and water came to be "seen as a public service."[8]

[edit] Water Code

Main article: Water resources management in Brazil
Getúlio Vargas established Brazil's Water Code in 1934.
Getúlio Vargas established Brazil's Water Code in 1934.

The federal government’s role in water and sanitation development was first formalized by the Water Code of 1934. The Code (one of the key documents of the Brazilian state-building period of the 1930s) was essentially an attempt to balance between competing water interests, tilted heavily towards the then-dominant agricultural sector.[9] The role of the state concretized by the Code continued "uninterrupted" from the 1930s through the 1960s, despite the varied ideologies of Getúlio Vargas’ Estado Novo, Juscelino Kubitscheck’s "developmentalism," and the military dictatorship post-1964.[10] However, the Water Code itself was largely disregarded by the 1950s when it came into conflict with the push for rapid hydropower expansion to fuel industrialization.[11] Yet, whereas the dam-building project stalled, the ideological legacy of Vargas lives on in construction of natural resources as the “exclusive right of the federal government.”[12]

[edit] PLANASA

Basic sanitation (saneamento básico) has only been conceptualized as a state responsibility since the mid-1950s and only widely implemented since the 1970s, after the rise of a military junta in 1964.[13] However, the provision of water supply has consistently eclipsed water sanitation as a form of state-building. Prior to the 1970s, the provision of water services was a distinctly municipal policy consideration, with federal supervision limited to the National Health Foundation (Funasa), which lacked any real regulatory or enforcement capacity.[14]

In 1971, federal water policy took a bold leap forward with the creation of the National Water Supply and Sanitation Plan (PLANASA),[15] which delegated authority to 27 nascent state-owned companies (Caompanhias Estaduais de Saneamento Básico or CESBs), which received the exclusive right to obtain financing from the newly-created Banco Nacional de Habitação (BNH).[16]

About 3,200 municipalities took advantage of PLANASA (although often without formal contracts), granting concessions to these state companies for 20-30 years, while 1,800 municipalities chose to continue providing services on their own.[17] In exchange for lucrative investment capital, PLANASA required municipalities to abide by national norms in such areas as tariff and credit policy.[18] As anticipated, due to their larger territorial scope, CESBs were better able to cross-subsidize between different classes of consumers, especially between grossly disparate neighboring municipalities[19] PLANASA reduced the role of many municipal governments—deputized with responsibility for water and sanitation services by the 1967 Federal Constitution—to signing concession contracts with CESBs[20]

In national political discourse, PLANASA was justified by appeal to CESBs perceived catering to “fast-growing metropolitan areas,” which in turn were perceived as critical to national development[21] Indeed, PLANASA produced rapid but uneven water and sanitation development, to the benefit of Brazil’s urban areas and Southern/Southeastern regions.[22] Between 1970 and 1990, PLANASA expanded coverage from 45% to 95% for water and 24% to 42% for sanitation among urban residents[23] Over two decades, PLANASA produced uniformity and centralization to a degree which can only be described as the “hallmark of the authoritarian regime."[24] According to Lemos and Oiveira, these "pre-democratic institutions" posited themselves as “islands of competence,” constitutive of an “infallible technocracy” which systemically warded off public or even local involvement in policy-making.[25]

[edit] Transition to democracy and demise of PLANASA

PLANASA — and federal water policy in general — fell into decline during Brazil’s transition to democracy in the mid-1980s. The National Housing Bank's ability to meet financing needs was compromised in 1986 due to anti-inflationary policies including a freeze on water tariffs imposed by the federal government.[26] According to McNallen the dissolution of the National Housing Bank in 1988 — and its replacement by the Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF)— reduced the funding available to the sector, leading to the demise of water development as a national policy.[27] However, the Caixa remained a major source of funding for the sector.

PLANASA was formally abolished in 1992, making it more difficult for state state governments to finance state water companies. This encouraged some states to devolve services to the local level or to seek private concessions. Water and sanitation policy thus entered a new era. Unfortunately, this era was characterized by an environment of legal and political uncertainty.

Although the 1988 Federal Constitution had confirmed public ownership of water supply and sanitation infrastructure, the issue of which level of government owned the infrastructure remained unresolved.[28] A complicated web of un-enforced or weakly-enforced statutory requirements (e.g. permit requirements) persisted. [29] According to Tupper and Resende, the primary effect of the new constitution was to render the responsibility for water provision “less clearly defined”.[30]

State water companies continue to be regulated almost exclusively at the state level. The national water regulatory agency, the Agência Nacional de Águas (ANA), was created in 2000 to improve water resources management and had no authority to regulate water supply and sanitation services.

Article 30 of the 1988 constitution allows municipal government to legislate in matters of “local interest” and to “organize and provide, directly or by concession or permit, the public services of local interest,” but does not resolve a variety of “unclear property rights” questions relating to the concession authority of municipalities.

In February 1995 The Public Concession Act was passed. It cast additional legal uncertainty on swathes of public concession contracts signed during the 1970s and before, and eviscerated relevant states on contract law.

[edit] Water privatization in the 1990s

Privatization in Brazil was initiated under President Collor, through the Programa Nacional de Desestatização created in April 1990. In infrastructure, a major privatization program was initiated only in 1994, covering energy, transport, water supply and sanitation and telecommunications.

Between 1994 and 2000 a total of 38 private sector contracts (concessions, BOTs and service contracts) were signed, with investment commitments of more than US$ 2.5 billion.[31] The nine first private concession agreements were in 1994-96 were all in the state of Sào Paulo (Limeira, Mairinque, Marília, Mineiros do Tietê, Ourinhos, Pereiras, São Carlos, Salto and Tuiuti).

To support the privatization effort, in 1997 the Workers Compensation Fund FGTS approved the use of 10% of the funds allocated for the Pró-Saneamento program to be directed towards privatization. In the same year, the Caixa Economica Federal, which was a main source of funding for water and sanitation, established a Special Water Works Concession Bureau (Eesan) to support private concessions. [32] International financial institutions such as the World Bank supported private sector participation. For example, according to Miranda, following an unsuccessful 1999 attempt to privatize Compesa, the state water company of Pernambuco, it became extremely difficult to craft an acceptable loan proposal sans privatization.[33]

In 1999, Brazil was viewed as "one of the world's largest concentrations of water and wastewater privatisation opportunities"; Thames Water opened an office in Rio de Janeiro and Azurix purchased AMX Acqua Management Inc. in order to get a "foot in the door."[34]

However, the jurisdictional conflicts characterizing the regulatory environment in the water and sanitation sector complicated privatization efforts.[35] For example, attempts to encourage private sector participation at the state level (in Bahia and Rio de Janeiro) have been challenged in the Supreme Federal Court by municipal governments.[36] According to McNallen Brazil’s system of civil law, with its limited adherence to precedent, is another obstacle to further privatization.[37] It also affected concessions, planned for Espirito Santo and Petrolina.[38] According to a report by Business News America, between 2002 and January 2007, no private sanitation contracts were signed.[39] In part due to this legal uncertainty, a mayoral initiative to cancel a 40% tariff increase in Limeira requested by the concessionaire Suez was upheld by a federal court.[40] The specific Brazilian context of water governance has produced "unprecedented wrangling” between national, state, and municipal officials.[41]

As of 2000 only 1% municipalities had issued concession agreements to private companies. 71% of Brazil’s municipalities delegated water and sewage services to state companies and 28% retained municipal provision. [42]

[edit] 21st century

A bill (Bill 4147/2001) which would have granted states the conceding authority for metropolitan areas failed to be passed due to opposition from trade groups.[43] The primary controversy over the bill was about the interpretation of the Federal Constitution. But the discourse was also infused with rhetoric of the private sector as “inherently abusive in setting rates and unable or unwilling to invest to serve poorer areas adequately.”[44] Finally another bill (Bill 5296/2005) was passed that clarified the role of the federal government in the sector, but failed to clarify the respective roles of states and municipalities.[45] The law became effective in January 2007 as the sanitation law (law 11.445). Subsequently seven new contracts for public-private partnerships (PPPs) were signed in 2007 alone, with Abcon expecting 15-20 more in 2008.[39]

The sanitation law allows service contracts without launching a bidding process. It is being challenged by Brazil's Attorney General Antonio Fernando Souza, who is seeking an injunction from the Supreme Federal Court.[46]

[edit] Results

Main article: Water supply and sanitation in Brazil

So far no comprehensive study has assessed the results of private sector participation in water supply and sanitation in Brazil. Such a study is, however, currently underway [47] with support from various Brazilian stakeholders as part of a global multistakeholder dialogue on water and the private sector. The study attempts to assess private sector participation using the following criteria:

  • improvements in operational performance
  • improvements in financial performance
  • increase in sector investments

In the absence of a completed comprehensive study this article draws on partial data and case studies quoted in the literature. The criteria used are increase in investment, increase in access, changes in efficiency, impact on water demand and health impacts.

[edit] Investment

Water and sanitation investment by public and private utilities has dropped by an average of 30% since 1998. Projections of future capital requirements vary. One source estimates a minimum need of US$60 billion over the next 20 years.[48]

One justification for privatization has been that it would increase investments. For example, the Brazilian Association of Private Water and Sewage Operations (ABCON) promotes privatization primarily by arguing that it is the only way to acquire necessary infrastructure investments.[49] Between 1990 and 2006, the Brazilian water and sewage sector produced 52 private projects, received US$3.069 billion in private capital.[50]

Favelas in Rio de Janeiro.
Favelas in Rio de Janeiro.

In some concessions, actual investments remained below investment commitments, such as in concessions in Limeira, Manaus, Campo Grande.[51] For example, in July 2000, Campo Grande, the capital of the Mato Grosso do Sul state granted a 30-year, US$ 217 million water and sewage concession to Aguas de Barcelona, a subsidiary of Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux; by November 2001, planned investment was reduced 27.1% from the amount pledged.[52]

[edit] Access

One justification for privatization has been that it would accelerate the increase of access to water and sanitation, in particular the poor. However, according to McNallen and Olivier, private cherry picking has had deleterious effects on the cross-subsidization which has made possible even the moderate provision of water and sanitation services to such users.[53] According to the think tank PSIRU - which is financed by Public Services International, an organization that opposes water privatization under any circumstances - in Manaus, Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux backtracked on promises to expand access to 95% of the population immediately after receiving a 30-year concession in June 2000.[54]

[edit] Efficiency

There has apparently be no study analyzing changes in efficiency of privatized utilities in Brazil. However, Motta and Moreira have compared the efficiency of public and private utilities in Brazil at one point in time. Their cross-sectional statistical study examined the relative technical efficiency of public and private water companies in Brazil reveal that utilities with private sector participation are not much more efficient than public utilities. [55] Faria speculates that the relatively low difference in efficiency in comparison to private sector participation in other countries can perhaps be explained by the relative weakness of the Brazilian regulatory regime.[56] Public and private local operators also apparently face similar firm-specific costs. The differences between which are swamped by the stark difference between state and municipal firms.[57] Ayres concludes that privatization is not a sufficient condition to improve efficiency, unless coupled with regulation to curtain anti-competitive practices and additional government stabilization.[58]

[edit] Impact on water use

Water tariff increases have occurred throughout Brazil in both public and private utilities, contributing to a decrease in water use.

According to Olivier, a 2004 tariff increase in the Manaus municipal water network by Aguas do Amazonas—a private operator and subsidiary of Suez Environment, which acquired a 30-year concession in June 2000—resulted in a substantial reduction in consumption, even steeper among low income users.[59] According to PSIRU in another case poor water users in Paraná reverted to drinking rain water and other contaminated sources as a result of tariff increases by Vivendi’s subsidiary, Sanepar.[60]

[edit] Health impact

There are no specific data on the health impact of water privatization in Brazil. According to Peres et al., privatization is likely to negatively affect the health of poorer populations if service gaps between rich and poor increase.[61] This would contrast the experience of at least another country that has been studied in detail. According to a detailed study in Argentina, water privatization has had a positive impact on health indicators.


[edit] List of concession agreements

Brazilian municipality or state MNC Concession Year Notes
Araçatuba (city) Aracatuba Saneamento 1998 R$11.6 million investment to build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer a potable water and sewerage treatment plant
Campo Grande, Mato Grosso Suez (Aguas de Barcelona subsidiary)/Agbar Aguas Guariroba (originally Interagua, spun off from state company, Sanesul) 2000 30-year, US$ 217 million water and sewage concession; Posted an immediate R$ 1.46 million loss and began operating a 20% monthly deficit after winning a 30-year concession.[62]
Cachoeiro de Itapemirim (municipality) Aguas de Cachoeiro 1998 R$41.4 million investment to build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer water utility with sewerage
Guariroba Suez Aguas Guariroba
Juturnaiba Aguas de Juturnaiba 1998 R$65.2 million investment to build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer water utility with sewerage
Limeira Suez Aguas de Limeira 1995 R$100 million investment to rehabilitate, operate, and transfer water utility with sewerage; 30-year water/wastewater concession ($50-70MM investment)[63]
Manaus, Amazonas Suez Aguas do Amazonas 2000 30-year concession; 90% of shares in state company, Manasa, for R$193 million; Loans from BNDES in 2001 (R$72 million load for both purchase and further investment)
Mairinique Mairinque Water Company 1997 R$28.5 million investment to build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfe water utility with sewerage
Mineiros do Tietê (municipality) Mineiros do Tiete Water Company 1995 R$2 million investment to build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer water utility with sewerage
Marília (city) Marilia Water Company 1997 R$3 million investment to build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer water utility with sewerage
Ourinhos (municipality) Ourinhos Water Service 1996 R$1.2 million investment to build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer water utility without sewerage
Paraná (state) Vivendi (with Brazilian Andrade Gutierrez Group) Companhia de Saneamento do Paraná (SANEPAR) 1998 R$216.7 million investment; 2001 loans from World Bank-International Finance Corporation ($30 million investment in AGC)
Problems have included: increased faecal colibacteria and algae contamination, unlicensed groundwater exploitation, and raw wastewater discharging.[64] As a result, managing director Jean-Mari d’Aspe returned to France in December 2001 under threat of imprisonment for criminal charges from litigation brought by a local NGO, Instituto Timoneira.[65]
The Vivendi-led consortium’s 30% share in Senepar bought them 59.3% of total voting power on the Board of Directors, and the right to appoint directors who oversaw a combined 87% of Sanepar’s employees.[66]
Paranaguá (state) Paranagua Water and Wastewater System 1997 R$66 million investment to build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer water utility with sewerage
Pereiras (municipality) Pereiras Water Company 1994 R$1.2 million investment to build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer water utility and sewerage infrastructure
Petrópolis (city) Petropolis Water Company 1998 R$89 million investment to build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer water utility and sewerage
Ribeirão Preto Inima, subsidiary of OHL Ambient 80% stake[67]
Municipalities in Rio de Janeiro State (including the five municipalities of Buzios, Cabo Frio, Sao Pedro da Aldeia, Iguaba and Arraial do Cabo out of the 91 municipalities in the state of Rio de Janeiro) Águas de Portugal Prolagos 2000 93.5% share (sought $38.8 million from European Investment Bank in 2001 for investment)
Salto (municipality) 1996 R$364,000 investment to rehabilitate, operate, and transfer sewerage collection and treatment
São Carlos (city) Sao Carlos Water System 1994 R$1 million investment to rehabilitate, operate, and transfer water utility without sewerage; concluded
Tangará da Serra 2001 30-year concession
One city counselor was murdered on the steps of city hall on the day of a water privatization vote in which other counselor’s confessed to having been bribed.[68]
Tuiuti (municipality) Tuiuti Water Company 1996 R$1.4 million investment to build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer water utility with sewerage

[edit] Opposition

President Collor led a massive wave of privatization—across sectors—in the 1990s.
President Collor led a massive wave of privatization—across sectors—in the 1990s.

Opposition to PSPs has too often been characterized by "controversial and emotional debates,"[69] laced with “doubts, fears and prejudices” originating from generalized objections to globalization and neoliberalism.[70] Similarly, according to Lemos and Oliveira many potentially beneficial public private partnerships (PPPs) have suffered from widespread mistrust—bred by “decades of broken promises”—and numerous “accounts of policy failure.”[71]

Many politically influential groups in Brazil harbor an “outright aversion to private capital participation” in water and other essential services.[72] Politically, water privatization has often been conflated with conflicts over decentralization vis-à-vis the return of control from State water companies established under the military regime to re-municipalized companies.[73] Thus, Brazilian water reform has remained “paralyzed by the controversy” because the municipal-state contest has too often been reduced to a question of which level of government should have the authority to grant concessions to grant concessions to private actors, rather than the authority to develop a coherent policy including both public and private elements.[74]

Political parties that oppose privatization include the Workers' Party (PT) and the Socialism and Freedom Party (PSOL).[75]

[edit] Alternatives

Emerging Brazilian alternatives have increasingly transcended the public-private debate by focusing on stakeholder participation and institutional cooperation.

[edit] Participatory models

Public water companies in Porto Alegre and Recife have developed “people-centered, participatory models” for improving water access. This has allowed them to position themselves as more than just being anti-privatization, but to develop a constructive alternative.[76] Porto Alegre’s DMAE in particular has become known for its participatory budgeting process. According to PSIRU, the think tank financed by Public Services International which opposes water privatization under any circumstance, this has enabled Porto Alegre to "continually fight off privatization attempts" that were allegedly supported by the Brazilian Congress as well as international donors such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) to the World Bank.[77] The participatory budgeting process — which allows any public demand to be included in the following year’s budget subject only to a popular vote and evaluation for technical feasibility — has become a model for direct democracy elsewhere in Brazil, and the world.[78]

[edit] Sale of shares in the stock market

São Paulo’s state water and sewer company Sabesp, the largest water company in Latin America, has chosen a different path. Instead of awarding a private concession it has sold shares in the Brazilian stock market and even on the New York Stock Exchange. In addition, it obatined loans from the Inter-American Development Bank and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation.[79] Rio de Janeiro's state government also plans to sell shares in its water and sewerage company, Nova Cedae, while still retaining majority control of the company, citing the example of SABESP (four attempts to privatize the company in 1998 failed due to lack of agreement between the city and state governments).[80]

According to PSIRU such "civically active utilities" are alternatives to "desperation-induced privatization attempts" in Parana[81] and Rio de Janeiro.[82]

[edit] Reduction of private sector influence in existing agreements

In Paraná a 1998 concession agreement had given Dominó Holdings (formed by Vivendi, Brazilian bank Opportunity, and the Andrade Gutierrez group) control of the state water and sewer company SANEPAR. Recently, the Supreme Federal Court authorized the state government to increase its stake in SANEPAR, overturning an injunction granted by a lower court which had prevented the state from calling a general shareholders meeting. [83]

[edit] See also

Water supply and sanitation in Brazil

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ Sabbioni 2008: 13.
  2. ^ da Motta and Moreira 2006: 185.
  3. ^ "The privatization of water and sewage services in Brazil is still at the pre-regulatory stage, and is thus lagging behind other “pioneering” countries in Latin America, namely Argentina and Chile" (Parlatore 1999: 15-20).
  4. ^ Multistakeholder Dialogue on water and the private sector in Brazil
  5. ^ a b Barraqué et al. 2007: 3446; Prasad 2007: 224.
  6. ^ Prasad 2007: 223.
  7. ^ Barraqué et al. 2007: 3446.
  8. ^ Casey et al. 2006: 367.
  9. ^ do Amaral 1996.
  10. ^ Goldstein 1999: 675-676.
  11. ^ do Amaral 1996.
  12. ^ do Amaral 1996.
  13. ^ Barraqué et al. 2007: 3451-3454.
  14. ^ da Motta and Moreira 2006: 186.
  15. ^ Technically, PLANASA was only the implementation of the National Water Supply and Sanitation System created in 1968 (See Arretche 2001).
  16. ^ The BHN was in turn funded by an 8% excise from workers’ wages collected in the Workers’ Time of Service Guarantee Fund (FGTS), representing a historic degree of political centralization (See Parlatore 1999: 2).
  17. ^ Sabbioni 2008: 12-13.
  18. ^ da Motta and Moreira 2006: 186.
  19. ^ Tupper and Resende 2004: 30.
  20. ^ Barraqué et al. 2007: 3454.
  21. ^ da Motta and Moreira 2006: 187.
  22. ^ Arretche 2001.
  23. ^ McNallen 2006: 173-174.
  24. ^ Parlatore 1999: 2-4.
  25. ^ Lemos and Oliveira 2005: 137.
  26. ^ Sabbioni 2008: 13.
  27. ^ McNallen 2006: 173-174; Parlatore 1999: 6. Until 1997, the National Department of Public Works and Drought Relief (DNOCS) retained the prerogative to make water allocation decisions without input from state, municipal, or local actors (See Lemos and Oliveira 2005: 141).
  28. ^ McNallen 2006: 175-176.
  29. ^ McNallen 2006: 176-177.
  30. ^ Tupper and Resende 2004: 30-31.
  31. ^ World Bank PPI database
  32. ^ Parlatore 1999: 13.
  33. ^ Miranda 2005
  34. ^ FT Energy Newsletters - Global Water Report. 1999, September 17. "Brazil: Azurix secures Rio foothold." lexis.
  35. ^ da Motta and Moreira 2006: 185; Tupper and Resende 2004.
  36. ^ McNallen 2006: 178-179, 193.
  37. ^ McNallen 2006: 185.
  38. ^ McNallen 2006: 175; Arretche 2001.
  39. ^ a b Business News Americas. 2008, March 6. "Abcon; Only PPPs can solve sanitation problem."
  40. ^ de Motta and Moreira 2006: 187. A landmark court ruling in May 2002 against Sanepar—suspending a 18.6% tariff increase—has led to successful copycat litigation in neighboring municipalities (See Hall and Lobina 2002: 17).
  41. ^ McNallen 2006: 172.
  42. ^ Barraqué et al. 2007: 3462.
  43. ^ The Brazilian Association of Sanitary and Environmental Engineering (Abes) and the National Water Works Association (Assemae) are two prominent and vocal opponents of Brazilian water privatization (See Parlatore 1999: 12). Curiously, though, current private sector involvement has not resulted in employment “adjustments” seen in other sectors in Brazil (See Anuatti-Neto et al. 2003: 26).
  44. ^ da Motta and Moreira 2006: 186.
  45. ^ Sabbioni 2008: 13.
  46. ^ Business News Americas. 2008, April 1. "Attorney general requests injunction against sanitation law." lexis.
  47. ^ Multistakeholder Dialogue on water and the private sector in Brazil
  48. ^ da Motta and Moreira 2006: 185-186. Interestingly, Parlatore (1999) puts the cost for universal water and sewage provision at R$ 42 billion; a massive disparity even taking into account exchange rates and price changes between the two articles.
  49. ^ Sabbioni 2008: 13. For example: “privatization is paving the way for reviving Brazil’s water utility sector which has experienced a long period of stagnation and underinvestment” (See Parlatore 1999: 1).
  50. ^ World Bank 2007. For a detailed list of all concession agreements see PPI database project view
  51. ^ Hall and Lobina 2002: 11.
  52. ^ Lobina and Hall 2003: 38.
  53. ^ McNallen 2006: 189; Olivier 2006: 9.
  54. ^ Hall and Lobina 2002: 18.
  55. ^ "The statistical results show that private companies are only marginally more efficient than public ones" (Faria et al. 2005). Faria et al. measure efficiency in terms of an estimated production function in the context of a stochastic frontier model, such that: ln(yt) = β0 + βt1ln(xt1) + β2ln(xt2) + εt - ut where y = output; t = 1,...,n; xt1 = capital for firm t; xt2 = labor for firm t; εt are iid N(0, σ2ε); ut are independent inefficiency components also independent of εt with distributions with support in (0,+infinite); the constants βt are unknown elasticities. Their data comes from Sistema Nacional de Informações sobre Saneamento (SNIS) from 2002 for 279 firms (148 of which, 135 public and 13 private, had sufficient data for inclusion in the regression).
  56. ^ Faria et al. 2005.
  57. ^ Sabbioni 2008.
  58. ^ Ayres 1996.
  59. ^ Olivier 2006.
  60. ^ Lobina and Hall 2003: 56.
  61. ^ Peres et al. 2004: 1187.
  62. ^ Hall and Lobina 2002: 18.
  63. ^ "Session I – Track 4 Building Sustainability: Partnerships and Finance."
  64. ^ Hall and Lobina 2002: 16-17.
  65. ^ Hall and Lobina 2002: 16-17.
  66. ^ Hall and Lobina 2002: 17; McNallen 2006: 186.
  67. ^ Global Water Intelligence. "Spain’s Inima seeks three more Brazilian concessions."
  68. ^ Hall and Lobina 2002: 17.
  69. ^ Prasad 2007: 219
  70. ^ Parlatore 1999: 1.
  71. ^ Lemos and de Oliveira 2005: 134.
  72. ^ da Motta and Moreira 2006: 186.
  73. ^ Barraqué et al. 2007: 3465.
  74. ^ da Mott and Moreira 2006: 193.
  75. ^ Latin America News Digest. 2008, March 18. "Two Brazilian Parties Appeal Against Cesp Privatisation."
  76. ^ Balanyá et al. 2005.
  77. ^ Hall and Lobina 2002: 8; Maltz 2005.
  78. ^ Maltz 2005: 33.
  79. ^ Hall and Lobina 2002: 9.
  80. ^ Business News Americas. 2008, March 7. "Rio govt to sell Nova Cedae shares."
  81. ^ Hall et al. 2003: 2-3.
  82. ^ Hall and Lobina 2002: 8.
  83. ^ Business News Americas. 2008, March 27. "Supreme court authorizes Paraná to increase stake in Sanepar."

[edit] References

  • Anuatti-Neto, Francisco, Barossi-Filho, Milton, de Carvalho, Antonio Gledson, and Macedo, Roberto. 2003. "Costs and benefits of privatization: evidence from Brazil." Inter-American Development Bank, Research Network Working Paper # R-455.
  • Arrretche, Marta T.S. 2001. "Water Supply and Sanitation." Ministério das Relações Exteriores.
  • Ayres, Ron. 1996. "The Economics of Privatization and Regulation: the Brazilian experience 1990-94." Review of Political Economy, 8(3): 303-323.
  • Barraqué, B., Formiga Johnsson, R.M., and Britto, A.L. 2007. "Sustainable water services and interaction with water resources in Europe and in Brazil." Hydrology and Earh System Sciences Discussions, 4: 3441-3467.
  • Balanyá, Belén, Brennan, Brid, Hoedeman, Olivier, Kishimoto, Satako, and Terhorst, Philipp (Eds.). 2005. Reclaiming Public Water: Achievements, Struggles and Visions from Around the World. Transnational Institute and Corporate Europe Observatory.
  • Casey, James F., Kahn, James R., and Rivas, Alexandre. 2006. "Willingness to pay for improved water service in Manaus, Amazonas, Brazil." Ecological Economics, 58: 365-372.
  • Clarke, George R.G., Kosec, Katrina, and Wallsten, Scott. 2004. "Has Private Participation in Water and Sewage Improved Coverage? Empirical Evidence form Latin America." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3445.
  • da Motta, Ronaldo Seroa, and Moreira, Ajax. 2006. "Efficiency and regulation in the sanitation sector in Brazil." Utilities Policy, 14: 185: 195.
  • do Amaral, Helena Kerr. 1996. "Brazilian Water Resource Policy in the Nineties." Instituto Cultural Minerva, Institute of Brazilian Business and Public Management Issues, George Washington University.
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