War in Abkhazia (1992–1993)

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For the war in 1998, see War in Abkhazia (1998).

War in Abkhazia (Georgian-Abkhazian conflict)
Part of the Georgian Civil War
The Government House of Abkhazia, destroyed in the Abkhaz offensive on September 27, 1993, still stands in ruins.
Date 1992–1993 Location Abkhazia, Western Georgia Result Military victory by Separatist forces, ethnic cleansing of Georgian civilians Territorial changes Abkhazia becomes an unrecognized de facto republic, but internationally recognized as part of Georgia.
Belligerents
Abkhaz military Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus Russian Cossacks Russian Forces1	Georgian Interior and Defense Ministry forces Paramilitary groups and volunteer battalions
Commanders
Iysuph Soslanbekov, Musa Shanibov, Shamil Basayev, Beslan Barghandjia, Anri Djergenia	Geno Adamia, Guram Gubelashvili, Gia Kharkharashvili, Davit Tevzadze, Soso Akhalaia
Casualties and losses
~2,500-4,000 dead, unknown wounded	~10,000-30,000 dead, unknown wounded
1Involvement Disputed

v • d • e War in Abkhazia Tkvarcheli - Gagra - Kamani - Sukhumi

v • d • e Conflicts in the Former Soviet Union Nagorno-Karabakh – South Ossetia – 1st Abkhazia – Georgia – North Ossetia – Transnistria – Tajikistan – 1st Chechnya – 2nd Abkhazia – Dagestan – 2nd Chechnya

The War in Abkhazia between 1992 and 1994 was waged chiefly between Georgian government forces on one side and Abkhaz separatist forces supporting independence of Abkhazia from Georgia on the other side. Ethnic Georgians who lived in Abkhazia fought largely on the side of Georgian government forces. Abkhazias population of ethnic Armenians and Russians^[1] largely supported Abkhazians^[2][3][4], and many fought on their side. The separatists were supported by thousands of the North Caucasus and Cossack militants, and by the Russian Federation forces stationed in and near Abkhazia^{[citation needed]}.

Handling of this conflict was aggravated by the civil strife in Georgia proper between the supporters of the ousted Georgian president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and the post-coup government headed by Eduard Shevardnadze, as well as the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.

Significant human rights violations and atrocities were reported on all sides, and peaked in the aftermath of the Abkhaz capture of Sukhumi on September 27, 1993, which was followed by a large-scale campaign of ethnic cleansing against ethnic Georgian population (officiasly recognized by the OSCE and also mentioned in UN resolution GA/10708). ^[5] From 13,000 to 20,000 ethnic Georgians have been reported to be killed and approximately 3,000 Abkhaz, more than 250,000 Georgians became internally displaced and refugees, and 2,000 are considered missing.

Post-Soviet Georgia was heavily affected by the war and suffered considerable financial, human and psychological damage. Abkhazia has been devastated by the war and subsequent continued sporadic conflict. The region, de facto independent from Georgia, suffers huge economic and social problems.^{[citation needed]} Its status remains undetermined, and the region remains heavily dependent on Russia.^[6]

Contents 1 War 1.1 The first months of the conflict 1.2 Fall of Gagra 1.3 Abkhaz offensive on Eshera, Kamani, Shroma and Gulripshi 1.4 Bombing and siege of Sukhumi 1.5 Fall of Sukhumi 1.6 Refugee exodus 1.7 Ethnic cleansing campaign 1.8 Russian role in the conflict 1.8.1 Humanitarian actions 1.9 Results 2 Conflict mediation 2.1 UN involvement 3 Notes 4 Bibliography 5 See also 6 External links

[edit] War

The situation in the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia had been tense since the end of the 1980s when Georgian anti-Soviet opposition started demanding the separation from the USSR. In March 1989, Abkhaz nationalists demanded, in the Lykhny Declaration, as they had done on several occasions before, the status of separate Soviet Socialist Republic (based on the precedent of the existence of the separate Abkhazian SSR during 1925-1931, which was associated with the Georgian SSR by a confederative "Union Treaty"). The Declaration was signed amongst others by the rector of the Sukhumi University.^{[citation needed]} Ethnic Georgian students of the university announced a protests, but these were forbidden by the Georgian government. Nevertheless the students rallied and were attacked by some Abkhazians.^[7] The Georgian anti-Soviet movement was outraged by the event and included the students' clause against Abkhazian secession into the list of slogans of the demonstrations of several thousands of Georgians in Tbilisi, which concluded with a bloody crackdown by the Soviet troops on April 9, 1989.

In the aftermath, the first armed clashes between the representatives of the Abkhazian and Georgian populations took place on July 16–July 17, 1989 in Sukhumi. The conflict was sparked by alleged violations during the entrance exams to the Sukhumi University. The resulting civil unrest quickly turned into militarized clashes resulting in 16 deaths and about 140 wounded, mostly Georgians. To quench the unrest, the Army was invoked.

The government of the Soviet Union did nothing to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts, itself being on the verge of collapse.

[edit] The first months of the conflict

The tensions in the autonomy approached the dangerous edge in June 1992, when Abkhaz militants attacked the government buildings in Sukhumi. On July 23, 1992, the Abkhazian government proclaimed the independence of the region, though this was not internationally recognized. On August 14, 1992, Georgian police and National Guards units were dispatched to restore government control over Abkhazia. The ranks of Georgian troops were filled partially by "emptying the jails" as some of the inmates were released on condition they fight in Abkhazia.^[8] Fighting broke out the same day. On August 18, 1992, the separatist government fled from Sukhumi to Gudauta. Georgian government forces managed to take control of large parts of Abkhazia, but military actions continued.

On August 25 Giorgi Karkarashvili, Georgian military commander, in a TV broadcast announced that the Georgian forces would not take POWs. He promised that no harm would be done to peaceful residents of Abkhazia and that peace talks would be conducted. He warned separatists that if the peace talks wouldn't succeed and if 100,000 Georgians get killed then all the 97,000 people (all the ethnic Abkhaz) who supported Ardzinba would perish.^[9] Karkarashvili also urged the Abkhaz politician Vladislav Ardzinba 'not to make so that the Abkhaz nation will be left without descendants' and placed all the responsibility for future deaths on Ardzinba personally.^[9] Later, his speech has been widely misquoted and misinterpreted by separatists' propaganda to portray Georgians as "fascist marauders" and justify their own actions, breaches of agreements, and refusal of peaceful settlement. ^[10]

Significant ethnic cleansing accompanied by atrocities occurred on both sides,^[11] with Abkhazians displaced from Georgian-held territory and vice-versa; some 6,000 people were reported to have been killed in this first phase of the war.

...(Abkhazian) refugee family described how drunken men broke into their apartment firing automatic weapons and telling them to leave Sukhumi "forever, because Sukhumi is Georgian." The family claimed that the soldiers stole jewelry, assaulted the husband, and then threw them all out into the street. The same witnesses reported seeing dead civilians, including women and elderly people, in the street, although fighting had been over for days.^[8]

On August 26 armed Chechens captured Valery Maliuk from Eshera, just because he expressed his sympathy to Georgians. On the same day they raped Georgian teenagers and along with the Abkhaz militants committed atrocities in the village of Orjonikidze.^[12]

Many human rights abuses -- principally looting, pillage, and other outlaw acts, along with hostage-taking and other violations of humanitarian law, were committed by all sides throughout Abkhazia. Both sides engaged in high level of criminality.^[8] After taking Sukhumi the Georgian forces (including Mkhedrioni) engaged in "vicious, ethnically based pillage, looting, assault, and murder".^[8] In addition to the looting, Abkhaz cultural monuments were destroyed in a manner that, according to some reports, suggests deliberate targeting. University buildings were sacked, and museum and other cultural collections broken up. The irreplaceable Abkhaz national archives were set upon and burned by Georgian forces; reportedly, local firefighters did not attempt to douse the blaze.^[8]

At the end of this stage of the conflict Georgian troops controlled most of Abkhazia. The pockets of Abkhaz forces were besieged in parts of Ochamchira district and Tkvarcheli, while in Gudauta they were pinched between the Georgian troops in Sukhumi and Gagra.

[edit] Fall of Gagra

Main article: Battle of Gagra

On September 3, 1992, a ceasefire was negotiated in Moscow. According to the agreement, Georgian forces were obliged to withdraw from Gagra district. The Georgian side carried out the implementation of the agreement and left its positions. As the result local population of Gagra remained defenceless. The ceasefire was soon violated by the Abkhaz side. Thousands of volunteer paramilitaries, mainly Chechens and Cossacks from the militarized Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC) joined the Abkhaz military to fight the Georgian government. Abkhaz and CMPC forces attacked the town of Gagra on October 2. Abkhaz, Russian and CMPC joint troops attacked Gagra by overwhelming numbers of tanks and aviation. Russian navy started to block the seawater area near Gagra. The military vessels: SKP "Bezukoriznenniy", "KIL-25", "BTH-38", "BM-66", "Golovin", Landing 345, aviation 529 (SU-25, SU-27), MI- and anti-aircraft 643 regiments commanded by the first deputy Minister of Defense of Russian Federation G. Kolesnikov took part in the occupation of Gagra. Russian tanker "Don" delivered 420 tons of fuel to Separatist-held Gudauta.

With the Abkhaz conquest of Gagra, many Georgians were killed and a majority was forcefully expelled from the town. ^{[8] [11]}Abkhaz forces, largely supported by Russian military presence in the region, were now in control over Gagra, Gudauta (where a former Soviet/Russian military base remains) and Tkvarcheli and approached Sukhumi.

“

My husband Sergo was dragged and tightened to the tree. Abkhaz woman named Zoya Tsvizba brought a tray with lots of salt on it. She took the knife and started to inflict wounds on my husband. Then she threw salt onto my husbands exposed wounds. They tortured him like that for ten minutes. Then they forced a young Georgian boy (they killed him after that) to dig a hole with a tractor. They placed my husband in this whole and buried him alive. The only thing I remember him saying before he was covered with the gravel and sand was: “Dali, take care of the kids! ”.[11]

”

[edit] Abkhaz offensive on Eshera, Kamani, Shroma and Gulripshi

The villages along the Gumista river (north and east of Sukhumi) such as Kamani, Shroma and Achadare heavily populated by ethnic Georgians became a very important area strategically which enabled motorized units to reach Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhazia. After failed attempt to storm Sukhumi from the west, the Abkhaz formations and their allies diverted their offensive on the northern and eastern sides of Sukhumi. On July 02, 1993 under the Russian military directives and naval support, the Abkhaz and their allies (Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus) attacked the villages on the Gumista river. The Georgian side did not expect any offensive from the northern or eastern side of Sukhumi district. The Georgian side suffered great losses (as many as 500 dead within an hour of the attack) ^[13] and the defensive line around Sukhumi was breached by the Abkhaz offensive. On July 5, 1993 Abkhaz, Russian, Armenian Bagramyan battalion and North Caucasian detachments stormed the villages of Akhalsheni, Guma and Shroma of Sukhumi district. The residents from the villages were rounded up and massacred. The last offensive took place on July 9, on the village of Kamani. Kamani was a Svan (sub-ethnic group of the Georgian people) village which also included a Orthodox Church (named after St George) and convent (populated by priests and nuns). After the fall of the village, most of its inhabitants (including priests and nuns) were killed by Abkhaz formations and their allies (see Kamani massacre). ^[11]

[edit] Bombing and siege of Sukhumi

In December 1992, Abkhaz troops began the shelling of Georgian-held Sukhumi. On March 4, 1993, Eduard Shevardnadze, head of the State Council of Georgia, arrived in the capital of the region to take control over the defensive operations in the city. The Minister of Economy, Beslan Kobakhia, arrived in Sukhumi during the negotiations with Goga Khaindrava. According to Kobakhia, separatist leader Ardzinba would resign if Shevardnadze would do the same. He did not approve of the facts of vandalism in Gagra and noted that Abkhazia officially never declared the aim to secede from Georgia. As Commander–in chief of Georgian Military Forces Eduard Shevardnadze issued the order "Measures on the defense of Sukhumi and Ochamchira Regions" that stated: "Military formations of different countries are concentrating in Gudauta and Gumista area. We have an information that those forces have serious aim to seize Sukhumi and bring the chaos and turmoil in entire Georgia." On February 10 Shevardnadze appointed Guram Gabiskiria as Mayor of Sukhumi. Meanwhile, Georgian Parliament made an official declaration blaming Russia for aggression against Georgia and demanding the withdrawal of all Russian military forces from the territory of Abkhazia.

On March 14, 1993, At 6 and 9 o'clock in the morning Abkhaz and the Confederation forces launched a full-scale attack on Sukhumi resulting in large destruction and casualties among the civilians.^[14] At 2 o'clock in the morning Abkhaz side started artillery bombardments of Georgian positions at the Gumista River and Sukhumi. Later in the day several Russian SU-25 had been shelling Sukhumi till the morning of the next day. Russian special detachment led the operation followed by Abkhaz fighters and CMPC volunteers. They crossed the river Gumista and took part of Achadara. However, the government forces repelled the attack.

On May 14, a short-lived ceasefire was signed. On July 2, a strong force of Abkhaz and North Caucasian volunteers landed again with the strong support of Russian navy near the village Tamishi. The battle was one of the bloodiest in the war. Several hundreds were killed and wounded from all sides, but Georgian forces managed to regain the positions. In July Russian detachments, Abkhaz military and CMPC volunteers captured the villages of Akhalsheni, Guma and Shroma of Sukhumi region. The fiercest struggle near the village Kamani cost the life of many Georgians, both military and civilian. Separatists occupied almost all strategic heights and practically besieged Sukhumi. Soon after the Chairman of the Georgian Council of Defense of Abkhazia Tamaz Nadareishvili resigned due to ill-health and was succeeded by Member of Georgian Parliament Zhiuli Shartava. Abkhaz forces brought down 3 airplanes including one flying from Sochi and another one flying from Tbilisi.

[edit] Fall of Sukhumi

Another Russian-mediated ceasefire was agreed in Sochi on July 27, and lasted until September 16, when separatists violated the agreement and launched a large-scale offensive against Sukhumi, which after a fierce fighting fell on September 27. Shevardnadze appealed to the population of Sukhumi by radio:

"Dear friends, Citizens of Sukhumi and Georgia! Georgia is facing the most difficult days, especially Sukhumi. Separatists and foreign invaders entered into the city. I am proud of your courage… Separatists and opportunists will be judged by history... They do not want Georgians to live in this Georgian city. Many of them dream to repeat the Gagra tragedy here... I know that you understand the challenge we are facing. I know how difficult the situation is. Many people left the city but you remain here for Sukhumi and for Georgia… I call on you, citizens of Sukhumi, fighters, officers and generals: I understand the difficulties of being in your position now, but we have no right to step back, we all have to hold our ground. We have to fortify the city and save Sukhumi. I would like to tell you that all of us – Government of Abkhazia, Cabinet of Ministers, Mr. Zhiuli Shartava, his colleagues, city and regional government of Sukhumi, are prepared for action. The enemy is aware of our readiness, that's why he is fighting in the most brutal way to destroy our beloved Sukhumi. I call on you to keep peace, tenacity and self-control. We have to meet the enemy in our streets as they deserve."

After the Abkhaz capture of the city one of the most horrific massacres of the war was committed against the remaining and trapped Georgian civilians in the city.^[8] Almost all members of the Georgia-backed Abkhaz government who refused to leave the city, including Zhiuli Shartava, Guram Gabiskiria and Raul Eshba, were murdered (see Sukhumi Massacre).^[11]

The 1994 U.S. State Department Country Reports also describes scenes of massive human rights abuse:

The [Abkhaz] separatist forces committed widespread atrocities against the Georgian civilian population, killing many women, children, and elderly, capturing some as hostages and torturing others ... they also killed large numbers of Georgian civilians who remained behind in Abkhaz-seized territory... ^[15]

The separatists launched a reign of terror against the majority Georgian population, although other nationalities also suffered. Chechens and other north Caucasians from the Russian Federation reportedly joined local Abkhaz troops in the commission of atrocities... Those fleeing Abkhazia made highly credible claims of atrocities, including the killing of civilians without regard for age or sex. Corpses recovered from Abkhaz-held territory showed signs of extensive torture. (The evidence available to Human Rights Watch supports the U.S. State Department’s findings.) ^[15]

Eduard Shevardnadze left the city narrowly escaping death. Soon Abkhaz forces and the Confederates overran the whole territory of Abkhazia, except the small region of the upper Kodori Gorge (which more or less remains under the control of the Tbilisi government). The total defeat of Georgian forces was accompanied by the ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population with all horrors of humanitarian catastrophe.^[15] As a result of the war, more than 250.000 people (mainly Georgians, also Greeks and others) fled from or were forced out of Abkhazia. In September 1994, several reports indicated ethnic clashes between Abkhaz and Armenians, a significant part of whom supported the former during the war. Chechen militants of the CMPC soon left Abkhazia to take part in the First Chechen War with Russia.

“

When Abkhaz entered my house, they took me and my seven year old son outside. After forcing us to knee, they took my son and shot him right in front of me. After they grabbed me by hair and took me to the nearby well. Abkhaz soldier forced me to look down that well; there I saw three younger man and couple of elderly woman who were standing soaking in water naked. They were screaming and crying while Abkhaz were dumping dead corpses on them. After, they threw a grenade there and placed more people inside. I was forced again to knee in front of the dead corpses. One of the soldiers took his knife and took the eye out from one of the dead near me. Then he started to rub my lips and face with that decapitated eye. I could not take it any longer and fainted. They left me there in pile of corpses.”.[16]

”

In the concluding phase of the battle of Sukhumi, the Abkhaz forces destroyed three Georgian civilian airliners that resulted in the death of over 150 people.

[edit] Refugee exodus

After the fall of Sukhumi thousands of refugees started to flee Sukhumi, Gali and Ochamchira regions. The plight of refugees became deadly due to snow and cold on the pathway in Kodori valley. Georgian authorities were unable to evacuate all remaining civilians (previously many people were evacuated from Sukhumi via airplanes and cargo ships from Ukraine). The refugees started to move in through the Kodori gorge on foot, bypassing Gali region which was blocked by advancing Abkhaz separatist forces. The crossing of the Kodori gorge on foot became another death trap for the fleeing IDPs.^[11] Most of the people who did not survive the crossing, died from freezing cold and starvation. The survivors who reached the Svan mountains were attacked and robbed by local criminal groups. One of the survivors recalls the crossing:^[15]

“

They were killing everyone who was Georgian. Every road was blocked. There was only one way out, through the mountains. It was terrible and horrific; nobody knew where it ended or what would happen on the way. There were children, woman, and elderly people. Everyone was marching not knowing where they are headed. We were cold, hungry, there was no water… We marched the whole day. By the end of the day we were tired and could not go on. To rest, it meant to die, so we marched and marched. Some woman near me did not make it; she has fallen. As we marched, we saw people frozen and dead; they apparently stopped for a break and it was their end. The path never ended, it seemed that we would die at any time. One young girl who marched beside me all the way from Sukhumi was pregnant. She delivered her baby in the mountains. The child died on the third day of our deadly march. She separated from us and we never seen her after. Finally we made in to Svan villages. Only woman and children were allowed in their huts. Buses came later on that day. We were taken to Zugdidi.”[16]

”

According to the United States State Department Commission on Foreign Relations and International Relations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994, at 815 (Joint Comm. Print 1995), the victorious Abkhaz "separatists moved through captured towns with prepared lists and addresses of ethnic Georgians, plundered and burned homes, and executed designated civilians." Georgians were specifically targeted, but all non-Abkhaz suffered.^[17]

[edit] Ethnic cleansing campaign

Main article: Ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia

The ethnic cleansing and massacres of Georgians has been officially recognized by the OSCE conventions in 1994, 1996 and again in 1997 during the Budapest, Lisbon and Istambul summits and condemned the “perpetrators of war crimes committed during the conflict.” ^[18] On May 15 2008, UN General Assembly adopted a resolution (GA/10708) which acknowledges the ethnic cleansing campaign which have been described by OSCE conventions, and strongly emphasizes the return of all Georgian IDPs back to Abkhazia, protection of their property rights and full restoration of the pre-war population. ^[19] The International Criminal Court is currently investigating allegations of genocide and crimes against humanity in Abkhazia. ^[20] The ICC was provided with the documents selected from the 300 volumes of evidence about the genocide of Georgians in Abkhazia. These materials were collected by the Georgian Prosecutors' Office beginning in 1993 and allegedly contain horrific accounts of atrocities committed by the Abkhaz fighters and mercenaries from Russia.^[21] The reports included a detailed description of how the separatists played soccer with the heads of dead Georgians on the field after the executions in Gagra.^[22]

[edit] Russian role in the conflict

Although Russia officially claimed neutrality during the war in Abkhazia, Russian military officials and politicians were involved in the conflict in several ways. Russia was the main source of weapons for both conflicting sides, it unofficially supported the Abkhaz side and finally Russia also carried out some humanitarian operations.^[23]

Russian arms used by Georgia were transferred to it under the bilateral agreements with Russia and included main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery and heavy mortars. The whole Akhaltsikhe motorised rifle division was turned over to Georgia on September 22, 1992.^[24] Some weapons were gained by local raids on Russian Army bases in Batumi, Akhalkalaki, Vaziani (near Tbilisi) and Poti by irregular Georgian paramilitary forces.^[25] After several attacks Russia declared it would defend its bases with force.

Prior to the outbreak of the war, the Abkhaz leadership arranged for the redeployment of a Russian airborne battalion from the Baltic States to Sukhumi.^[26] According to the Russian historian Svetlana Chervonnaya, a number of Russian security servicemen also arrived in Abkhazia as "tourists" during that summer:

“

The main load in the preparation of Abkhazian events was given to staff of the former KGB. Almost all of them got appointments in Abkhazia under cover of neutral establishments which had nothing to do with their real activities. To distract attention, various ruses were resorted to, such as the private exchange of apartments, or the necessity of moving one’s place of work to Abkhazia due to a sudden deterioration of health.

”

^[27]

According to another Russian expert, Evgeni Kozhokin, director of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Abkhaz guardsmen had been supplied with weaponry by Russia’s 643rd anti-aircraft missile regiment and a military unit stationed in Gudauta. Ardzinba had major supporters in Moscow as well, including Vice President Alexander Rutskoy and the Chechen speaker of the Russian parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov.^[28][27]

After the eruption of armed conflict, the Abkhaz separatist paramilitary units, along with their political supporters fled to Gudauta from where they obtained significant amount of military and financial aid.^[11][29] In Gudauta, Russian Army base housed and trained Abkhaz paramilitary units and provided protection for the leader of Abkhaz separatists, Vladislav Ardzinba. ^[11] The high level of corruption in the Russian military also contributed in the leakage of Russian arms to both sides.

From the outset of the hostilities Russia called upon both sides to negotiate and it brokered several cease-fires which mostly proved ineffective (i.e. the Sukhumi offensive was undertaken by the Abkhaz side in violation of the previous cease-fire agreement). On the other hand, the Russian military offered protection to the retreating Abkhaz detachments during the summer 1992 Georgian offensive. In November 1992, Russian Air Force conducted heavy air strikes against the villages and towns in Abkhazia predominantly populated by Georgians. In response, the Georgian Defense Ministrya accused Russia for the first time in public of preparing a war against Georgia in Abkhazia. This led to the Georgian attacks on targets under Russian and Abkhaz control, and the retaliation from the Russian forces.^[30]

The Russian attitude began to tilt further to the Abkhaz side after a Russian Mi-8 helicopter (reportedly carrying humanitarian aid) was brought down by Georgian forces on October 27 which triggered retaliation from Russian forces. On December 14, 1992, the Russian military suffered the loss of another military helicopter, carrying evacuees from Tkvarcheli, resulting in 52 to 64 deaths (including 25 children). Although Georgian authorities denied any responsibility, many believed the helicopter was shot down by the Georgian forces. On 16 December, the government of Georgia requested the Russians to evacuate their nationals from Abkhazia via other routes, foremost the Black Sea, but also to limit the number of missions flown from Gudauta, the main Russian air base in the area.^[30] However, this incident "raised the level of general malevolence in the war and catalyzed more concerted Russian military intervention on the Abkhaz side".^[31][8][32] The town of Tkvarcheli had been besieged by Georgian forces and its population (mostly Abkhaz, Georgians and Russians) suffered a severe humanitarian crisis. Russian military helicopters supplied the city with food and medicine and mobilized Russian-trained and Russian-paid fighters to defend the city.^[8]

The Human Rights Watch states: Although the Russian government continued to declare itself officially neutral in the war, parts of Russian public opinion and a significant group in the parliament, primarily Russian nationalists who had never been favourably disposed toward the Georgians, began to tilt toward the Abkhaz at least by December.<^[8] During this period the Abkhaz side obtained a large number of armor, tanks (T-72 and T-80) and heavy artillery. The question remains whether there were specific orders concerning the transfer of weapons to Abkhaz side and if so, whom they were issued by. Russian border guards allowed the Chechen fighters led by Shamil Basayev to cross into Abkhazia or at least did nothing to prevent them from arriving in the conflict zone.^[33] The defense minister in the secessionist government and one of the main organizers of Abkhaz armed units was the professional Russian military officer Sultan Sosnaliev from the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic.

The most obvious example of Russian support to the Abkhaz side in 1993 was the bombing of Georgian-held Sukhumi by Russian fighter-bombers. The Russian Defence minister Pavel Grachev consistently denied it but after Georgians succeeded in bringing down one SU-27 fighter-bomber and UN experts identified the dead pilot as Russian it became irrefutable. Nevertheless some equipment was turned over to Georgia according to the previous agreements in 1993. Russian general Grachev claimed that Georgian side has painted the aircraft to resemble Russian Air Force aircraft and bombed their own positions, killing hundreds of their own people in Sukhumi and Eshera. This statement raised anger and utter contempt among Georgians toward the Russian side.

The Russian journalist Dmitry Kholodov who has witnessed the Russian bombardment of Sukhumi, wrote a couple of compiling reports with detailed description of humanitarian catastrophe:

"The shelling of Sokhumi (by Russians) is the most disgusting thing in this war. All the residents of Sokhumi remember the first shelling. It took place on 2 December 1992. The first rocket fell on Peace Street. They struck at crowded places. The next strategic 'target' was the town market which was hit with great precision. Eighteen people were killed that day. There were always lots of people in the market".^[34]

Kholodov also reported on the Russian volunteers fighting on the separatist side:

"..Russians, too, are fighting there. We often heard from Georgian guards how Russian mercenaries were attacking: 'It's a blood-curdling sight - they have helmets and firm, bullet-proof jackets on, and their legs are armored as well. They advance with their heads bent down, like robots ready to kill. There is no use shooting at them. No tanks are needed, they are followed by the Abkhaz behind."^[34]

On February 25, the Georgian Parliament appealed to the UN, European Council and Supreme Council of the Russian Federation demanding the withdrawal of Russian forces from Abkhazia and stating that Russia waged “an undeclared war” against Georgia.^[35]

Georgian Parliament adopted another resolution on April 28, 1993 which openly blamed Russia in political facilitation of ethnic cleansing and genocide against Georgians.^[36]

Russian policy during the final battle for Sukhumi in September 1993, immediately after the breach of the cease-fire by the Abkhaz forces, appeared to follow several lines. Russian officials condemned the attack, issued calls to Abkhaz forces to cease the offensive and its accompanying human rights violations, and reportedly cut off electricity and telephone service to parts of Abkhazia from September to December 1993. Russia also supported resolutions in the Security Council condemning Abkhaz forces for breaching the ceasefire. At the same time, the Russian government criticized the Georgian government for refusing, once the attack was underway, to negotiate. As the Human Rights Watch report notes "it is doubtful, however, that Russian forces in or near Abkhazia were as surprised as the Russian government seemed to be. Initiating an offensive as large as the one undertaken, in three different directions at once, must have required extensive movement of forces and resupply during the days leading up to it." Russian forces on the Georgian-Abkhaz border who were supposed to police the cease-fire made no attempt to forestall the attack. The Abkhaz weapons were stored near the front and were returned to the Abkhaz by Russian military mission when hostilities restarted.^[37] Ataman Nikolay Pusko, a notable commander of some 1,500 Cossack volunteers fighting against Georgians in Abkhazia, later claimed that his sotnia was the first to enter Sukhumi.^[38]

In a Time Magazine article published in October 4th 1993, Georgians said Russian Army officers provided Abkhazian separatists — at the beginning using mere hunting rifles and shotguns — with sophisticated weapons like BM-21 multiple rocket launchers and Sukhoi Su-25 jet aircraft, plus battlefield intelligence.^[39]

[edit] Humanitarian actions

In the beginning of the conflict (August, 1992) Russia evacuated many people from Abkhazian resorts by means of Black Sea fleet and Russian Airforce. As the war progressed Russia began to supply humanitarian aid to both sides; it also brokered numerous agreements concerning the exchange of prisoners-of-war. In the course of the war, Russian humanitarian efforts were chiefly focused on the town of Tkvarcheli which had large ethnic Russian population and was besieged by the Georgian forces. The landmines installed along the mountain highway to this town made Russian helicopters the only safe means of transportation into it. However, Russian navy also evacuated tens of thousands of Georgian civilians after the fall of Gagra (October 1992) and Sukhumi (September 1993) to the separatist forces.^[8]

[edit] Results

Georgia effectively lost control over Abkhazia and the latter established as a de facto independent territory. The relations between Russia and Abkhazia improved in the late 1990s and the economic blockade of Abkhazia was lifted. The laws were also passed allowing other countries to become part of Russian Federation which was interpreted by some as an offer to Abkhazia and other unrecognised countries of the former Soviet Union.^[40]

Georgia claimed that Russian army and intelligence contributed decisively to the Georgian defeat in the Abkhazian war and considered this conflict (along with the Georgian Civil War and Georgian-Ossetian War) as one of Russia's attempt of restoring its influence in the post-Soviet area.^[41]

At the end of the war, the Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said at the UN General Assembly: “Russia realizes that no international organization or group of states can replace our peacekeeping efforts in this specific post-Soviet space.”^[42]

A wide array of opinions on Russian policy with respect to Georgia and Abkhazia is expressed in the media and parliament^[43]. Leonid Radzikhovsky, a political analyst and independent journalist, wrote that gaining new territories is the last thing Russia needs and compared the support of foreign separatists to throwing stones at one's neighbours while living in the glass house.^[44]

Oxford Professor S.N. MacFarlane, notes on the issue of Russian mediation in Abkhazia:^[43]

Notably, it is clear that Russian policy makers are uncomfortable with the idea of a prominent role being granted to external actors in dealing with conflict in the former Soviet space. More recently, this has been extended specifically to he activities of international organisations in the management of conflict. As one group of influential Russian foreign policy commentators and policy makers put it in May 1996, 'it is definitely not in Russia’ s interest to see outside mediation and peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union'. (511)

[...] Russia has clear hegemonic aspirations in the former Soviet space. Although a wide array of opinions is expressed on Russian policy in the newly independent states in the media and in parliament, a dominant consensus appears to have emerged among foreign policy influentials on the need for active presence and influence in the area. Such views have been widely expressed in official statements, influential statements by independent policy groups, and by advisers to the president, influential political figures, and the president himself. The hegemonic component of Russian policy in the ` near abroad’ is evident in its efforts to restore Russian control over the external borders of the former Soviet Union, to reassume control over the Soviet air defence network, to obtain agreements on basing Russian forces in the non-Russian republics, and by its obvious sensitivity to external military presences (including multilateral ones) on the soil of the former Soviet Union. To judge from Russian policy on Caspian Sea and Central Asian energy development, it extends beyond the political/security realm and into the economic one. Its sources are diverse, and include the Russian imperial hangover, but more practically the fate of the Russian diaspora, the lack of developed defences along the borders of the Russian Federation proper, concern over Islam, and discomfort with the spill-over effects of instability in the other republics. (521)

On August 28, Senator Richard Lugar, then visiting Georgia's capital Tbilisi, joined the Georgian politicians in criticism of the Russian peacekeeping mission, stating that "the U.S. administration supports the Georgian government’s insistence on the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the conflict zones in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali district."^[45]

[edit] Conflict mediation

During the war the peace mediation was done first by Russia and second by the UN. From 1993 onwards, the pressure for a peace settlement mounted from UN, Russia and the then Group of Friends of Georgia (Russia, U.S., France, Germany and UK). In December 1993, an official ceasefire was signed by Georgian and Abkhaz leaders under the aegis of the UN and with Russia as intermediary. The venues shifted from Geneva to New York and finally to Moscow. On April 4, 1994, the "Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict" was signed in Moscow. Instead of the deployment of a traditional UN peacekeeping force, the deployment of a CIS, mainly Russian peacekeeping force was agreed in Moscow on May 1994. In June 1994, CIS peacekeeping forces comprising only the Russian soldiers were deployed along the administrative border between Abkhazia and the remaining Georgia. The UN mission (UNOMIG) also arrived. However, these could not prevent further atrocities against the Georgians in the following years (around 1.500 deaths have been reported by the Georgian government in the post-war period). On September 14, 1994, Abkhaz leaders appeared on local TV to demand that all ethnic Georgians depart from the region by September 27 (the anniversary of the capture of Sukhumi). On November 30, 1994, Abkhazia promulgated a new constitution declaring independence of the breakaway region. However, none of the foreign governments recognized this. On December 15, 1994, the US State Department condemned Abkhazia’s declaration of independence. On March 21, 1995, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees accused Abkhaz militias of torturing and murdering dozens of returning ethnic Georgian refugees in the Gali District. Despite an official economic blockade imposed on Abkhazia by Russia and CIS in 1995 (virtually ended by the Russian government in 1997), the breakaway region has been enjoying both military and economic support by Russia.

[edit] UN involvement

The UN sent non-military observers (UNOMIG) to monitor the ceasefire and Russia deployed peacekeeping forces. The Organization for Security in Europe (OSCE) and other international organizations are also involved in monitoring developments. Negotiations toward a permanent peace settlement have made little progress, but the Georgian and Abkhazi governments have agreed to limit the size of their military forces and extend the authorization for UNOMIG. Meanwhile, Georgian refugees maintain a government in exile.

[edit] Notes

[edit] Bibliography

• Chervonnaia, Svetlana Mikhailovna. Conflict in the Caucasus: Georgia, Abkhazia, and the Russian Shadow. Gothic Image Publications, 1994.
• Andrew Andersen, "Russia Versus Georgia: One Undeclared War in the Caucasus.", Young Experts’ Think Tank (YETT)
• Heathe Blair, Ethnic Conflict as a Tool of Outside Influence: An Examination of Abkhazia and Kosovo., Young Experts’ Think Tank (YETT)
• Amy McCallion, Abkhazian Separatism, Young Experts’ Think Tank (YETT)
• Lynch, Dov, The Conflict in Abkhazia: Dilemmas in Russian 'Peacekeeping' Policy. Royal Institute of International Affairs, February 1998.
• MacFarlane, S., N., “On the front lines in the near abroad: the CIS and the OSCE in Georgia’ s civil wars”, Third World Quarterly, Vol 18, No 3, pp 509- 525, 1997.
• Marshania L., Tragedy of Abkhazia Moscow, 1996
• White Book of Abkhazia. 1992-1993 Documents, Materials, Evidences. Moscow, 1993.

[edit] See also

• Transair Georgian Airline Shootdowns (September 1993)
• Ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia
• Sukhumi Massacre
• Politics of Abkhazia
• Russian-Circassian War

[edit] External links

• Accord issue on the Georgia Abkhazia peace process also includes chronology and key texts & agreements. (English)&(Russian)
• Documented accounts of ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia (Russian)
• Documented accounts of ethnic cleansing of Abkhazians by Georgians (Russian)
• Video file, capture of Zhuili Shartava, Guram Gabiskiria, Raul Eshba, etc and their execution
• Interview with Shamil Basayev on Abkhazia
• Historische Hintergründe und politische Motive des abchasischen Separatismus in Georgien, 2005 (de) (PDF-Datei)
• "Abkhazia: An Open Wound in Georgia" by Dr. Andrew Andersen
• Government of Abkhazia (-in-exile)
• Exile Images - Thomas Morley: The forgotten refugees of Abkhazia
• http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_282.shtml#top
• http://www.geocities.com/tato_nikoladze/separatism.html
• http://www.abkhazia-georgia.parliament.ge
• http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data/gabkhazchro.htm
• The risk of history repeating, The Messenger, August 16, 2006
• Video Interview with Shamil Basaev during the battle for Gagra