Talk:War Plan Orange

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I rewrote this:

"The Imperial Japanese Navy developed a counter-plan to allow the US Fleet to sail across the Pacific while using submarines to weaken it. The Japanese fleet would then attempt to force a battle against the US fleet on territory that was favorable to it after the US fleet had been weakened."

To this:

"The Imperial Japanese Navy developed a counter-plan to allow the Pacific Fleet to sail across the Pacific while using submarines to weaken it. The Japanese fleet would then attempt to force a battle against the U.S. in a "decisive battle area", near Japan, after inflicting such attrition. This is in keeping with the theory of Alfred T. Mahan, a doctrine to which every major navy subscribed before World War Two, in which wars would be decided by engagements between opposing surface fleets^[1] (as they had been for over 300 years). It was the basis for Japan's demand for a 70% ratio (10:10:7) at the Washington Naval Conference, which would give Japan superiority in the "decisive battle area", and the U.S.'s insistence on a 60% ratio, which meant parity.^[2]

"Both IJN planning, and ORANGE, failed to notice technological developments in submarines and aircraft had made Mahan obsolete. ORANGE

"Later, the U.S. achived total dominance with her carrier task forces, a mobile strike force^[3] Japan could not have dreamed of.

"Moreover, by their obsession with "decisive battle", IJN would ignore the vital role of antisubmarine warfare.^[4] Germany and the U.S. would demonstrate this with their submarine campaigns against merchant shipping, ultimately choking Japan's industrial production."

and added these:

^ Mahan, Alfred T. Influence of Seapower on History, 1660-1783. Boston: Little, Brown.
^ Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1991.
^ Willmott, H.P. Barrier and the Javelin. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1983.
^ Parillo, Mark. Japanese Merchant Marine in World War 2. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1993.